Hans Driesch

Victoria Welby (Duneaves, Harrow 21 January 1909) to Charles Sanders Peirce

I was reminded of one or two of your diagrams . . . this morning (5.30 A.M.) by one in Hans Driesch's Gifford Lectures⁵ of what he calls "Harmonious-equipotential system", though probably there is no real link between them.

    ⁵ Hans Adolf Driesch (1867-1941), German zoologist and philosopher.  Delivered the Gifford Lectures before the University of Aberdeen for the years 1907-1908.  The lectures were entitled "The Science and Philosophy of the Organism."

Semiotic and Significs
The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby
Edited by Charles S. Hardwick with the assistance of James Cook
Bloomington and London : Indiana University Press 1977, p. 92.

From THE CRISIS IN PSYCHOLOGY by Hans Driesch, 1925

"Three men share the honor of having first seen the impossibility of the psychology of their time : E. von Hartmann, Wm. James and H. Bergson. Modern normal psychology starts with them. But these writers were critics rather than builders ; they saw the impossible, but did not yet clearly see the possible et necessarium. It was in the beginning of the present century that modern normal [?] psychology was really created as a complete science of universal validity and not merely as a scientific fragment like association psychology. By different roads the same end has been reached : K�lpe, Marbe and their followers began the analysis of so-called thinking and willing in an exact way, with the result that it was found, firstly, that the variety of the immediate conscious possessions was far greater than had been recognized before, and, secondly, that there exist directing causal agents or factors in psychical life just as in material life, as set forth in the study of biology. Besides this modern psychology of thinking and willing, there came into view several new systems and conceptions of logic, established along different lines by Husserl, Rehmke and myself, etc."

(Hans Driesch, The Crisis in Psychology, Princeton University Press, 1925, pp. 4-5)..

From THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE by Ernst Cassirer, 1940

Driesch began . . . with a comprehensive study of the phenomena of regeneration and regulation¹⁶ but soon drew some conclusions that led him far more deeply into metaphysics than ever had been the case before, within the confines of empirical research, during the nineteenth century. His experiments on the eggs of the sea urchin constituted the point of departure, but he ventured at once upon a very bold explanation. The results of experiment had shown that perfectly normal organisms could develop from embryos which had suffered from very severe injury produced by the experiment : thus when the embryo was bisected an entirely normal larva of half size developed, and when embryos were crushed between glass plates so as to disarrange their cells completely, the wholly abnormal positional relationships did not necessarily exclude the formation of a normal, whole organism. No confusion resulted in the system. The embryo with misplaced cells remained an autonomous whole, and followed the usual course of development undisturbed.¹⁷ The conclusion drawn was that since the formative power at work is not interfered with by division, separation, or displacement, it must be a �something� without spatial character and to which no definite position in space can be assigned, but Driesch hesitated to characterize this �something.� In earlier writings he had not scrupled to call it frankly a �soul,� and to explain that the soul accordingly is an �elemental factor in nature.�¹⁸ Later he modified the expression, in order to avoid introducing the idea of a consciously purposeful activity and spoke not of a soul but of a something-like-a-soul, a �psychoid.� It was, of course, not a psyche but it could be spoken of only in such psychological terms. He found the most suitable expression finally in the Aristotelian concept of "entelechy," which now became for him the innermost key to the whole biological system of things. The entelechy is the formative power of the organism, different from the physicochemical forces and not to be set on the same level with them. All merely physical or chemical factors are but means employed by the organism ; they do not make life, though they are used by life and enlisted in its service. No machine of any kind and no sort of causality which depends upon spatial configurations can explain what is done daily and hourly by the organism. "Is it possible to imagine that a complex machine, unsymmetrical in the three planes of space, could be divided hundreds and hundreds of times and still remain intact?"¹⁹   (pp. 197-98)

16. Driesch. Die organischen Regulationen (Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1901)
17. Driesch, "The Experiments on the Egg of the Sea-Urchin," The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, I, 59 ff.; trans. from the German, Die Philosophy des Organischen (1909).
18. Driesch, Die Seele als elementarer Naturfaktor (Leipzig, W. Engelmann, 1903).
19. Driesch. The Science . . . , II, 78 (German original, II, 78) ; see Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre, S. 221.

 

. . . The "entelechy" is abstracted from the realm of spatial existence ; it is something not sensible but supersensible. As such it is, as Driesch himself often makes plain, first describable only in negative terms, and analysis leads to nothing but negative results. It is no "force, it is not an intensity, it is not a constant, it is just—'entelechy,'"²⁷ There is just as little hope of finding anything analogous to it in the realm of consciousness.
.  .  .  neither "entelechy" nor a "psychoid" can be represented in idea, for whatever is thus capable of representations really is spatial.²⁸

But this mere "system of negations" which Driesch, as a logical analyst, sought to display, changed for him as metaphysician into a positive system, and, even more, it became the ens realissimum, the most real of all being.   .   .   we must see in it the actual well-spring of nature, that in which "the power and seed of all activity" discloses itself.²⁹   (pp. 198-99)

27. Driesch. Philosophie des Organischen, II, S. 206 ff., 252, Eng. trans., pp. 204 ff., 250.
28. Ibid. S. 331, Eng. trans., p. 328 ; cf. Der Vitalismus . . . , S. 243.
29. Driesch, Philosophie des Organischen, II, 263 ff., Eng. trans., pp. 260 ff. ; Der Vitalismus . . . , S. 228 ff.

New Haven : Yale University Press,
London : Oxford University Press, 1950.

A Personal Opinion (tentative, due to the incompletenes of the personal knowledge) :

It seems to me that the relative importance of the work by Hans Driesch could not be presently overemphasised, in spite of certain wants within his, or similar propositions. The story seems to have been, more or less as follows,

Driesch had begun in biology ; also, mark well, in the experimental biology.

He just could not take the absurdities of the 'scientific materialism' so called.

Can a brick know anything ?

Not enough (in my opinion) — apart from some aspects of pantheism, with some perceptions surmised to be ever present — but it could be argued that the perceptions by the brick, if any, are not necessary to a human being.

Anyhow, no such fine distinctions are found in the 'materialist' writers, who instead prove, conclusively (but to what use?) that their own premises "cannot be understood".

So far as I have read, it was more or less due to such issues that H. Driesch had expanded onto philosophy and onto any and every questions eventually leading towards the psychic research.

He had not always "hit the nail on the head", maybe, when probing some unproven grounds. But he could hot have erred where it is impossible to err, that is, on distinguishing the knowing (sentient) beings from the inanimate objects.

(How plainly visible such facts are, the reader — are they not ? Were it only not for some branches of 'philosophy' and pseudo-science).

On the 'materialist',

Seemingly innocuous statement, 'the physical bases of consciousness'. On the face of it there might be nothing wrong in it, the grammar looks right.

The 'non-physical bases of consciousness' looks just as grammatically correct. However, consider the following.

The first statement implies the physical bases of the consciousness of this writer here.

It implies the physical bases of the consciousness of the reader (there),

It also implies the physical bases of the consciousness of the author of the statement ('physical bases of consciousness') itself.

The physical bases of the transmission of this 'knowledge', it being this computer here, and what have you, seem obvious.

However, the 'knowledge' thus transmitted re-writes (it seems, quite correctly) as,

the physical bases of the consciousness by the reader of the physical bases of the consciousness by this writer of the physical bases of the consciousness of the author of the statement 'the physical bases of consciousness' (of, presumably, anyone there be).

How can the 'materialist' account for such a concatenation ? I do not see how, should there be any discernible (physical) structure to some actual import of any such proposition it would probably require a computer ten times the size of the known universe, working on the problem for a number of kalpas, perhaps, to produce.

It being a sort of joke, the preceding statement. By the literature known to me, the 'materialist', understandably, cannot account for any such propositions and the general public is being instead sometimes deceived by assertions, made in the name of "science", that the problem "cannot be understood".

Is that 'knowledge' ? A something which "cannot be understood" is not knowledge, obviously, but a useless statement. Are you any the wiser for somebody's telling you something "cannot be understood", the reader ?

Attempting to follow the 'materialist' : on that premiss, "I" is a term which some physico-chemical processes have placed on themselves.

Scio me scire,¹ or, the consciousness of my own consciousness² : this would then be the opinion which one stage of some physico-chemical processes holds on another stage — of self-same physico-chemical processes.

1.   Augustine, quoted by H. Driesch, The Crisis in Psychology.       2.   T. Paine, The Age of Reason.

The "logic" seems unassailable. What does all this have to do with me (this writer).

It seems that all that (some physico-chemical processes) might have nothing to do with me after all. (At this point one could rest comfortably, hoping that Science will eventually solve all this in some way or other.) There may be a danger to it, however, of sorts.

To wit : the 'materialist' would insist that all that has everything to do with me (and with any one for that matter). Yet all that is rank non-sense (is it not, the reader ?)

Am I being in any way unfair ? If there be any faults found with the "logic" of 'materialism', the way I have here attempted to develop it, then examine the "logic" of the 'materialist' authors themselves, the reader — as found in their treatises.

A note on the immaterialist.

It seems that the 'materialist' might sometimes be genuinely at a loss, as to what is the immaterialist actually speaking about.

Thus somebody's certain Prius could have been sometimes stupidly substituted for the actuality of a human being, who is the one that considers any of these questions at all.

Example : this existence of this computer terminal here is obvious.

To whom ?

I (this writer) could surely place this Prius (label) on this computer here. Would that be somebody's Prius in, say, Denver, or in Chicago, etc. ?

Whence this Prius ? Somebody wrote it. Was the author of that Prius "the same thing" as his Prius, or, did he exist on the same level as his Prius ?

That refers to a much-promoted 'philosophy' by a noted 'materialist'. This Prius of his, wherever got, is a Latin version of the word First.

What is first was clearly considered. The truth of the matter is rather, there is nothing found in the nature as some "absolutely" first thing ; the term 'first' in practice refers to where you begin your reckoning (of something, of anything at all).

If there be any first consideration, this would apply to the perceiving entity, that is, one who at some point or other starts to look on something. It is that precedes anything to be observed ; some one must have decided at some point to observe something or other.

The existence of this computer here is obvious — now, that is. Were I present in some other place, as I expect to be in 1/2 hour, the existence of this computer will be pure hypothesis. (It might be removed in the meanwhile, many other things could also happen).

Thus my, possible, placement of Prius on this computer has no other validity than that it is the first thing right now in the front of my eyes. As soon as I have removed elsewhere this reckoning will not at all apply.

Should I place this Prius on self, this would seem to make more sense. But this is exactly what had been thoroughly confounded by the 'philosopher' considered.

On the plurality of objects a Prius had been placed which has nothing corresponding to it in nature, except the expectation that usually we look at something.

But the variety of this 'something' is indefinitely great, and "it" is not any sort of 'substance', or 'substratum'. It is not any "thing" that does in fact exist, but rather such an observation as, if you look around, some objects usually can be found.

The immaterialist position might be awkward to apprehend, due to verbal issues in the main ; the 'materialist' is positively false.

What do you do, the reader ? Pleae note that these are the most fundamental issues ; the littlest error at the premises can ruin an entire structure, while the language itself can get a cumbersome instrument when applied on the very fundamentals.

To pan out something that does make sense is quite another sort of ambition than to prove some sort of bias or other.

One fact, possibly convenient sometimes, possibly inconvenient sometimes, can be found : some parts of some answers on such fundamentals can be sometimes found in some parts of some religions.

The 'science' and 'religion' dilemma has been a false one in most of the instances seen. This has rather become an article of political propaganda (usually to some devious purposes).

Example : the persecutions by a certain Church of various heretics was due to some disagreements found with the officially approved doctrines. The haeresy would be found in something whether that might have anything to do or not with what is now considered as parts of some science.

That did not imply any battle against a generalised 'science' ; the "conflict" has been for the most part manufactured by some more recent propagandists and various kinds of crooked authors.

Fooled into such a row could be anyone, whether on one 'side' or on the other 'side', of a non-existent (purely verbal) problem.

(Personally, it seems to me that either 'side' could get obnoxious, especially when there is no real substance to such a row, of which there is usually none, the arguments usually being over differing sorts of fallacies or prejudices, these found on either 'side' if you really examine the facts, not so much considered as overlooked by either 'side').

Example : The Veda from India had influenced the theories of evolution, which theories had appeared in Europe at just about the time the Indian literature had been translated.

Presently, somebody would propose a theory of evolution as 'science' and would oppose its sources to Europe (Veda) as 'religion'.

Example : the early astronomers or geometers in Egypt were usually members of the priesthood. Was it 'science' or was it 'religion' ?

It rather looks like any "conflict" of the description would be a rare exception within the human history than a rule.

A row, once started, of the sort could go indefinitely long, especially if assisted by some "specialists" on such things (and this seems to be the essence of the problem of 'science' against 'religion') — but one could just as well expect that some people would eventually see through it and abandon any such "problem" in favor of some better things.

On Vitalism

There seems to have been something that neither H. Driesch nor his followers (eg. G. Stromberg) had quite noticed. Another false dilemma, of 'vitalism' vs. 'mechanism'.

The presence of an observer is, clearly, vital to there having any observation occur. The observed is necessary (as a matter of this language having some sense).

Vitalism should include and compass the entirety of any 'mechanism' — the latter having to do with any physical particles. There should be no 'dilemma' nor any opposition between such abstractions.

The facts are : the observer and the observed are ever present so long as anything at all is present.

This has been thoroughly confounded by the 'materialist' ; what good can you expect of any such "science" ?

WPT, 2008.

 

 

Selected bibliographic :

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title The science and philosophy of the organism / by Hans Driesch. Publisher New York : AMS Press, 1979. Description 2 v. ; 23 cm. Series Gifford lectures,1907- Gifford lectures,1908. Note "Delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the year 1907." Reprint of the 1908 ed. published by A. and C. Black, London, which was issued as the 1907-1908 Gifford lectures. Note Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 0404605001

Author Rhine, J. B. (Joseph Banks), 1895-1980. Title Neuland der seele, von J. B. Rhine. �bers. und eingeleitet von Prof. dr. Hans Driesch. Publisher Stuttgart, Berlin, Deutsche verlags-anstalt [1938] Description 236 p. 21 cm. Note Translation of: New frontiers of the mind. Note "Literaturverzeichnis": p. [235]-236.

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title Psychical research; the science of the super-normal, by Hans Driesch ... authorised translation by Theodore Besterman. Publisher London : G. Bell, 1933. Description xvi, 176 p. 20 cm. Note Includes bibliographical references.

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title Ethical principles in theory and practice / by Hans Driesch; translated by W. H. Johnston. Publisher New York : Norton, [1930] Description 248 p. ; 20 cm.

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title Man and the universe, Publisher London, G. Allen & Unwin, ltd. [1929] Description 172 p., 1 l. 20 cm.

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title Geschichte des Vitalismus von Hans Driesch. Edition 2. verb. und erw. Aufl. des ersten Hauptteils des Werkes: Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre. Publisher Leipzig, J.A. Barth, 1922. Description x, 213 p. 23 cm.

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title The problem of individuality; a course of four lectures delivered before the University of London in October 1913, Publisher London, Macmillan and co., limited, 1914. Description ix, 84 p. diagrs. 22 cm.

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941 Title The history & theory of vitalism, by Hans Driesch. Authorised translation by C. K. Ogden ...Rev. and in part rewritten for the English ed. by the author Publisher London, Macmillan and co., 1914 Description viii, 239 p. illus. 19 cm

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941 Title Ordnungslehre : ein System des nicht-metaphysischen Teiles der Philosophie / Hans Driesch ; mit besonderer Ber�cksichtigung der Lehre vom Werden Publisher Jena : Diederichs, 1912 Description 355 p. ; 24 cm

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941 Title The science and philosophy of the organism Publisher London, A. C. Black, 1908 Description 2 v. ill., 22 cm Series Gifford lectures.1907 and 1908

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941 Title Der vitalismus als geschichte und als lehre, von Dr. Hans Driesch Publisher Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1905 Description 246 p. diagrs

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title Die "Seele" als elementarer Naturfaktor. Studien über die Bewegungen der Organismen, von Hans Driesch. Publisher Leipzig : W. Engelmann, 1903. Description vi, 97, [1] p. 24 cm. Note "Zusätze und Literaturnachweise": p. [89]-97.

Author Driesch, Hans, 1867-1941. Title Die organischen Regulationen : Vorbereitungen zu einer Theorie des Lebens / von Hans Driesch. Publisher Leipzig : W. Engelmann, 1901. Description xv, 228 p. ; 24 cm. Note Bibliography: p. [221]-228.