under consideration

From The Fatal Years by Colonel B. V. Nikitine, 1938

On the 4th April my office on the Znamenskaya was invaded by several members of the Soldiers� and Workmen�s Council who declared that it had been decided to place the Counter-Espionage Bureau under the Council�s authority. This decision was conveyed to me with much shouting and gesticulation, although I had already heard rumours of it in the Taurid Palace when I was arranging for the release of the former staff of the Bureau and was told that all of them, including their chief, were to be dismissed. This particular threat did not impress me and I pointed out to the Council that while I was in charge of the Bureau it would confine its activities to dealing with Germans and would refrain from any interference in political matters, so that it was hardly likely that I would prove a suitable person to work under them.

In view of this development I consulted Balabin, who agreed with me that any interference by the S. and W. Council (the Soviet) would have fatal results for the effectiveness of the Bureau�s work, but was powerless to do anything to help me ; he advised me to apply to Kerensky who, while Minister of Justice, was at the same time vice-chairman of the Soviet.

I saw Kerensky on the following morning and gave him full particulars of the demands put forward by the delegates of the Soviet. I emphasized the fact that our struggle against the Germans was a separate and national matter, quite unconnected with party politics, and begged him to use his influence with the Soviet. He promised to do so and within a few days I was notified that their resolution had been withdrawn.

I also called on the Director of Public Prosecutions, Pereversev, to whom the bureau usually turned over all fully investigated cases. He assured me that he attached the utmost importance to the functions of the Counter-Espionage bureau and that he would do all he could to help us. In the course of the following month (in May) he informed me that he had been appointed Minister of Justice. After expressing the customary congratulations, I remarked ; �Of course, it means good-bye to the Counter-Espionage Bureau,� but he warmly retorted ; �You are quite wrong, now I shall really be able to help you.� Pereversev kept his promise and his support did much to maintain my spirits in resisting the continuous baiting by the Soviet.

As a basic principle for our work, I laid it down that we cold only carry out our functions if we enjoyed the confidence and support of public opinion in Russia. Pereversev endeavoured to ensure this by every means in his power. One of our first asks was to rid ourselves of the stigma of �police� with which our department had been labeled in March, not so much because of its earlier activities by the machinations of Karl Gibson and his myrmidons.

Pereversev organized a series of meetings with representatives of various sections of public opinion in order to try and prove to them that the Counter-Espionage Bureau was in the hands of people who were receptive to any information and worthy of every confidence. As a matter of fact, quite a number of important cases did reach us through the co-operation of the general public. On occasions an element of humour crept into the proceedings—as when we were assembled for a meeting at the Mariinsky Palace, attended by Kerensky and a number of other ministers. Suddenly, several members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet appeared, among them being the Social-Democrat N. . D. Sokolov. They had heard something about our meetings with representative public bodies and, feeling offended at not having been invited themselves, decided to come and look into the matter. As usual, I was replying to all kinds of questions and it was then that I noticed several familiar figures at the foot of the table. They had fat portfolios in front of them—probably stuffed with old newspapers. . . .  
[ dots by the author Nikitin (WPT)]

I knew that these people would presently make mysterious speeches, with significant glances at their portfolios—presumably full of important documents, but never opened. They would be after money and would seek some convenient opportunity of making my acquaintance, being firmly convinced that the Head of the Counter-Espionage Bureau must be worth millions. . . .

Sokolov was holding forth at the other side of the table ; he was ingenuously raising the question of secret agents—which we never, by any chance, discussed. Sokolov was most emphatic in his declaration that, under no circumstances, should I enlist any �informers� in the Social-Democratic Party. Incidentally, two months later I realized that he had every cause for anxiety, if not for his personal safety at least for that that of his closest friends.

I briefly told Sokolov that I was sure that the Social-Democratic Party would not hesitate to denounce any German spy within its own ranks. The Military Judge-Advocate General Apushkin, who was sitting next to me, whispered : �In my opinion, it does not matter what you do provided you get results.�

After the meeting, we both stopped for a couple of minutes� chat and laughed at the absurd incident.

( pages 17 - 19 )

London   Edinburgh   Glasgow
William Hodge, 1938.

A Moscow lawyer named Karinsky, the State Prosecutor, sought the Prime Minister and entreated him to have the two arrested. At first K refused, but then asked for a delay before he made up his mind ; he caused secret information to be conveyed to L as to what he had been requested to do which enabled the latter to make his escape to Finland. B, however, was seized by an officer who had heard him make an anarchist speech in the street and carried him to the police station. The State Prosecutor signed a warrant for B's committal to the famous Kresty prison, where he was conveyed immediately, to the dismay of many people, including C, who at once dispatched a messenger to Sweden, through Finland, with instructions to wire the news to Berlin. In an incredibly short time, the captain received orders to secure B's release no matter how much he had to spend to accomplish it. This became an easy matter under the conditions. The Soviets, or rather some members of the organization — there was half a dozen of these bodies in Petrograd alone — were persuaded to clamor for B's release and heated discussion on this subject took place at the Tauride Palace. M. Perewiazeff, who at the time held the portfolio of Minister of Justice, attempted a lame explanation of the motives which had induced him to put an end to the activity of the famous agitator, but they were drowned in a general uproar, and after three days' confinement B was set free.

. . . during the night of the 4th, Minister of Justice Pereverzev permitted the release of part of the material collected by the Government indication German financial support of the Bolsheviks. As the information spread through the city, even before its premature and unauthorized publication on the 5th, a decided change of atmosphere and attitude became evident. The neutral troops rallied to the support of the Government, while the military and civilian demonstrators hesitated, shaken by the charge of treason against their leadership. The manifestation subsided, and the Government succeeded in restoring order, aided by popular revulsion against the Bolsheviks, the subsequent arrival of front units, and the first rumors of the German counteroffensive. Bolshevik headquarters and the editorial offices of Pravda were raided and closed, while the Government moved to arrest the Bolshevik leaders before they cold escape in the wake of the charges.

Although the release of the documents was undoubtedly instrumental in the suppression of the uprising, Kerensky, L�vov, Nekrasov, and Tereshchenko were indignant at the disclosure. In April they had received from the French Government through Albert Thomas detailed information pointing to Bolshevik-German collaboration and had secretly been gathering additional materials to support an indictment. In particular, they hoped to seize Gantskii, one of the principal financial intermediaries between the Bolsheviks and the Germans, who was momentarily expected to cross the Swedish-Finnish border. With the incriminating documents he was presumed to carry, they planned to move decisively against the leading Bolsheviks. Forewarned by the action of the Minister of Justice, Ganetskii remained in Sweden. Pereverzev was dismissed for making public the incomplete documentation in his possession and for violating the Government�s instructions that the information be withheld until arrests could be carried out.

Lenin and Zinoviev went into hiding the evening of July 4 and eluded the authorities, but a number of other leaders of the uprising were imprisoned. The Government inquest, according to the announcement of the Prosecutor for the Petrograd Court of Appeals published in the press on July 22, revealed sufficient evidence to establish the gilt of the accused of both armed rebellion and treason. . . .

( Browder / Kerensky (vol. iii) page 1332 )