I have already explained the reasons which prevented us from keeping Lenin under constant observation. The telegrams definitely named him as one of the several people in regular touch with Ganetsky—a German agent and a confidant of Parvus. Such contacts in time of war would, 8nder normal circumstances, be regarded as so compromising as to call for the immediate arrest of the persons concerned. In no country would it be considered necessary to produce signed receipts of the money paid to a spy as evidence of his guilt, but unfortunately the conditions under which we were working were such that even stamped bank receipts were considered inadequate as evidence.

The telegrams enable a clear distinction to be made between the principals and the less important persons involved and in this respect they were of the utmost value to the Counter-Espionage Bureau, as they told us the names of the people who required special attention. This information allowed us to make a good deal of progress and further investigations yielded startling results hour by hour. The first we ever heard of Sumenson's existence was through these telegrams and I immediately sent one of our agents to find out all about her. When he reported that she was a demi-mondaine—and not a \very high-class one at that—I promptly detailed a young man, a highly efficient and experienced secret agent named Y—— to look after the lady. It is usual, in such cases, not to tell the agent everything, but merely to direct his attention to certain aspects of the case.

When instructing Y——, I made no reference whatever to the Bolsheviks, but only remarked that "Sumenon seems to be engaged in some trade or other."

The young man duly made Sumenson's acquaintance one evening, and on the 11 July he came and reported that Sumenson had gone to her country house in Pavlovsk and that he had engaged a room from her, which he proposed to occupy that night.

"our information does not appear to be quite correct ; I do not think she is engaged in any sort of trade," was Y——'s smiling comment on concluding his report.

IN consequence of a report that Sumenson had called at the Siberian Bank, I sent Alexandrov there, accompanied by a finance expert. They ascertained that in the last few months Sumenson had drawn about 800,000 roubles and that there were still 180,000 in her current account. After the Rising, Alexandrov discovered that this money came to her through the Nye Banken in Stockholm—from Fürstenberg (Ganetsky). There could be no question of any denial on the part of Sumenson, even if a search failed to disclose any results ; the bank books and paying-in slips signed by Sumenson constituted ample evidence for our purpose. Subsequently several ministers declared that the premature announcement of Lenin's treason enabled the Bolsheviks to cover up their tracks, but the bank evidence remained, together with all the letters and telegrams showing that Lenin was in close and constant touch with German agents.

These same ministers stated that our premature action deterred Ganetsky from coming to Petrograd, although we had no need of the evidence contained in such documents as these ministers expected to find in his possession, to expose the Bolsheviks.

The events described in the next chapter will enable the reader to judge whether our action was premature or not. We knew, of course, from Sumenson's telegrams that Ganetsky was expected in Petrograd, but we could scarcely hope to find him in possession of documents signed by the German Chancellor or of a bundle of banknotes with a letter of introduction from the Diskonto-Gesellschaft (incidentally, subsequent investigations revealed that Ganetsky did receive the money in the Nye Banken from the Diskonto-Gesellschaft). The Counter-Espionage Bureau could not build up a case of high treason of such importance to the defence of the realm on hypotheses concerning Ganetsky's proposed trip to Petrograd with incriminating documents.

My only regret was that he did not come and thereby escaped being sent to the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul.

When Sumenson was arrested, at the time of the July Rising, she made a full and frank confession to the officials of the Bureau who questioned her in my presence. She testified that she was instructed by Ganetsky to pay Kozlovsky, who was, at that time, a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party such sums as he might require, without any receipt. The counterfoils of the cheque-books showed that some of these unreceipted payments amounted to as much as 100,000 roubles.

Letters found in Sumenson's possession indicated that Ganetsky remitted funds to Sumenson on the pretext that they were required for the purposes of trade, chiefly in pharmaceutical products. Spies have from time immemorial endeavoured to conceal their activities by some system of business correspondence, but it was significant that Sumenson made no attempt whatever to hide her doings in this manner, but said straight out that she had never handled any pharmaceutical products or engaged in any trade whatever.

Her evidence was so complete and I happened to be so busy just then, that I did not even consider it necessary to be present at her further cross-examinations.

The normal procedure was for the Counter-Espionage Bureau to conduct all investigations and to leave the examination of persons arrested inconsequence to the prosecuting counsel attached to the department. The conditions under which we worked, however, necessitated our carrying our normal procedure much further ; our prosecuting counsel had legal assistants, but no means of conducting further investigations and searches.

Early in July we found ourselves in possession of sufficient evidence to bring charges of high treason against the Bolsheviks, collected through three separate channesl—Stepin, Parvus and his connections via Finland and Sumenson-Ganetsky. All these channels undoubtedly led back to Germany and served to distribute German money through the banks, foment sedition and incite people to take part in Bolshevik demonstrations. The counter-Espionage Bureau never attempted to compute the total \ amount of money received by the Bolsheviks from German sources, neither was any estimate of it ever made. There were so many different ways of remitting funds that we merely confined ourselves to the securing of documentary evidence relating to some particular channel through which it had actually flowed.

( pages 108 - 127 )