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From the World at the Corss Roads by Boris L. Brasol, 1921 Paris was overrun with a faceless mob of mediocre politicians all of whom were attentively listened to first by the “Big Ten,” then by the “Big Four” and ultimately, after Signor Orlando’s departure, by the “Big Three.” Hours and hours were spent with the Liberians, Haitians, Georgians, Letts, Armenians and Jews. Earnest endeavors were made to penetrate the very heart of their little quarrels and intrigues. But Mr. Wilson proved “too busy” to grant thirty minutes . . . for an interview with Grand Duke Alexander while the other “Bigs” systematically refused to deal with any of the Russian representatives. The most surprising thing was that the particular Russians who came to Paris all belong to the type which was so admired by both Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson. Prince Lvov was there ; Tchaikovsky was there ; Maklakoff was there ; Boris Savinkov — one of the assassins of Grand Duke Serge — was also there in worthy companionship with the rest of his revolutionary colleagues. In other words, all those who helped to foster the revolutionary intrigue in Russia, who had their revolutionary pedigrees in order, and who, therefore, so it would seem were precisely the men to deal with. Of course, Mr. Sazonov, who had more brains than all these cadet politicians combined, had a grave sin in his past, as he was Minister of Foreign Affairs under the old régime ; but even he, since the revolution, acquired a pinkish shade [?] and, therefore, there was really no reason for Mr. Wilson or any other of the Entente managers to isolate themselves from him. But so strong was the determination to uphold bolshevism that instead of dispatching a powerful expeditionary force to Russia, the Allies adopted a twofold policy : on the one hand, they were sending insignificant contingents of their troops to different Russian ports, while, on the other hand, they brought up one project after another with the view of reaching a friendly understanding with the Soviets. The so-called military intervention of the Allies was managed so incompetently that it could not help but irritate the Russian people not only against the Allies but also against the very idea of anti-Bolshevism. The population of the coast regions, held by the allied troops, was under constant fear that the Allies would suddenly withdraw their weak contingents, leaving the people at the mercy of the Red Guards. It was feared that then the terrible vengeance would come, and that there would be no one to protect them. The Archangel and Murmansk expeditions proved that such fears were neither unfounded nor exaggerated. At the same time the allied prickles to the body of Soviet Russia encouraged the Bolsheviki to accelerate their work for building up a powerful Red army. While the Allies were sending to Russia few battalions, Trotzky was feverishly engaged in organizing a monstrous weapon of destruction by forcing into the ranks of the Red army hundreds of thousands of innocent Russians. The “allied invasion” was used as a pretext and the masters of the “Internationale” did not miss any opportunity to foment nationalistic sentiment among the Russian masses. It was at that time that they issued their notorious appeal which was distributed among the Russian people in scores of thousands of copies :”Everything must be sacrificed for the sake of the Red army ! Merciless reprisals, most unjust confiscations and requisitions are permitted by military commissars in the interests of the Red army. Let the weak children perish ! Let the women starve ! Let the peasants be deprived of seeds for their crops ! Let tears and mourning prevail in villages ! but Trotzky’s order must be obeyed — the Red army should experience no need !”1
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Page created 10 December 2005
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W. Paul Tabaka
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