. . . The unhappy Romanoff (or Holstein-Gottdorp) family have since been sent to oblivion, to cure the intolerable ills they inflicted upon others and on themselves, by the direction of a man who had just then published an interesting little pamphlet on � War and the International.� This man was L. Trotsky. He regarded the German Majority Social Democrats with an unfriendly eye, and quoted from one of their own papers the statement that �Germany fights for industrial supremacy, and the welfare of the German proletariat is bound up with German Imperialism.�1 He went on to say �If a revolutionary movement did overthrow Tsardom, then the bayonets of the German army, led by the Hohenzollerns, would be ruthlessly turned against the Revolutionaries.� His words have, with a trifling difference, been fulfilled. The bayonets of the Bolshevists, led by the writer of that pamphlet and supported by German funds, were in due time turned against those very Revolutionaries2 who overthrew Tsardom in 1917.
Another pamphlet of rather different character was published by the I.L.P. in the spring of 1915. It was called �How the War came� and it roused Hyndman to great and justifiable anger. He sent the offending pamphlet to his old friend, Georges Clemenceau, then editing the Homme Enchainé, who was as incensed as he. What is more strange is that this book roused Jean Longuet of the Humanité to justifiable anger too ! He called it �un exposé détestablement tendencieux,� and said that, under the pretext of denouncing the general responsibility of the governing bourgeoisie of all countries �it is careful to omit the direct and frightful responsibilities of the German Government.� Vendervelde, who also wrote upon the pamphlet in Justice, is very strong in his condemnation of its pro-German pacifism. But it was left to Clemenceau to ask, quite clearly, where the money came from to produce this and other similar pamphlets.
( page 99 )
1. Strangely similar to the official 'national socialism' a few decades later.
2. The Provisional Government (most of the time led by Kerensky).
The German funds were promptly repaid, at least in some measure, after Lenin, Trotzky & Co., had laid their hands on the Russian treasury. To Germany then went considerable sums of the roubles, that had greatly contributed to the German defeat in the war 1914-18. (Some German authors argued that that was the chief cause of the Zusammenbruch-collapse ; this I do not know.) — (WPT)
. . . At the end of December, 1917, Lenin had "entered into negotiations" (entered is good) with Scheidemann and the majority German
Social Democrats by means of "Comrade" Parvus. Also representatives of Germany, Austria, Russia, Bulgaria and Turkey went to open peace negotiations at Brest- Litovsk.
Meantime, Hyndman and Gavronsky did not let the grass grow under their feet, and the former was in brisk correspondence with the Foreign Office. The Bolsheviks had been only a few weeks in power ; some sections of the army, with all the democratic political groups, were against them and in favour of continuing the war, while the peasantry were chiefly indifferent. The Ukraine, the Caucasus or Georgia, and Siberia, where most of the resources of Russia lay, were still independent, anti-Bolshevik, and anti-German. But the "Red Guard," which formed the chief support of the Bolshevists, officered and trained by Germans, was then a really fine body from a military point of view.
Looking back, it certainly seems as if what Gavronsky proposed—an expeditionary forces consisting of Russians now abroad, equipped and transported, but not otherwise assisted by the Allies—would probably have rallied all the independent movements within Russia, maintained some kind of a Russian front, and prevented Germany from withdrawing Eastern troops to make her terrific attack upon the Western front. In January, 1918, two things were just possible : the overthrow of the Bolsheviks by the remnant of the Provisional Government and the independent provinces, or the estrangement of the bolshevist dictators from Germany. Men like Radek, who have since become pillars of the present Russo-German policy, then wrote strongly against Germany ; and other things show that Lenin might have seized the opportunity to lead an anti-German movement—even had it first appeared in anti-Bolshevist form !
Simple Englishmen thought then, as they had done a few months earlier, that Russia might have whatever Government her people fancied, so long as they kept up the Russian front. But Cabinet Ministers have weightier matters to consider than a mere loss of men.
From the interesting correspondence between Hyndman, Gavronsky, and a certain Minister, it seems that Gavronsky's proposal was not dismissed at once. Had Hyndman pulled a few strings that were within reach of his hand, and gone to and for a little—had he realised where the point of importance actually lay—perhaps Government consent might have been won. The crux of the matter was this : the Cabinet
generally believed that, whether the Tsar made a German peace or not, money invested in Russian concerns would be safe as long as Tsarism lasted, and Russian loans would ultimately be repaid. They also thought that the Bolsheviks were only an unpleasant prelude, very unpopular, and likely to be soon overthrown, to the restoration of Monarchy, now that they had done their work in upsetting the Provisional Government. The English cabinet distrusted the latter body profoundly ; first because it was �mixed up with the Socialists here,� and secondly because it was likely to refuse to shoulder the staggering load of debt which Tsarism had contracted. As Hyndman rightly urged, any attempt to pay this off, even in a very long term of years, would put a millstone round the neck of Russia for centuries. Our rules had a notion that the Provisional Government were al �people holding Mr. Hyndman�s views,� while about the Bolsheviks they had no ideas at all. So they committed themselves in January, 1918, to a masterly policy of inaction as far as Russia wet, while making extremely ridiculous attempts at a secret peace with Austria, and trying to reach some understanding with Turkey.
. . . At the end of December, 1917, Lenin had "entered into negotiations" (entered is good) with Scheidemann and the majority German
Social Democrats by means of "Comrade" Parvus. Also representatives of Germany, Austria, Russia, Bulgaria and Turkey went to open peace negotiations at Brest- Litovsk.
Meantime, Hyndman and Gavronsky did not let the grass grow under their feet, and the former was in brisk correspondence with the Foreign Office. The Bolsheviks had been only a few weeks in power ; some sections of the army, with all the democratic political groups, were against them and in favour of continuing the war, while the peasantry were chiefly indifferent. The Ukraine, the Caucasus or Georgia, and Siberia, where most of the resources of Russia lay, were still independent, anti-Bolshevik, and anti-German. But the "Red Guard," which formed the chief support of the Bolshevists, officered and trained by Germans, was then a really fine body from a military point of view.
Looking back, it certainly seems as if what Gavronsky proposed—an expeditionary forces consisting of Russians now abroad, equipped and transported, but not otherwise assisted by the Allies—would probably have rallied all the independent movements within Russia, maintained some kind of a Russian front, and prevented Germany from withdrawing Eastern troops to make her terrific attack upon the Western front. In January, 1918, two things were just possible : the overthrow of the Bolsheviks by the remnant of the Provisional Government and the independent provinces, or the estrangement of the bolshevist dictators from Germany. Men like Radek, who have since become pillars of the present Russo-German policy, then wrote strongly against Germany ; and other things show that Lenin might have seized the opportunity to lead an anti-German movement—even had it first appeared in anti-Bolshevist form !
Simple Englishmen thought then, as they had done a few months earlier, that Russia might have whatever Government her people fancied, so long as they kept up the Russian front. But Cabinet Ministers have weightier matters to consider than a mere loss of men.
From the interesting correspondence between Hyndman, Gavronsky, and a certain Minister, it seems that Gavronsky's proposal was not dismissed at once. Had Hyndman pulled a few strings that were within reach of his hand, and gone to and for a little—had he realised where the point of importance actually lay—perhaps Government consent might have been won. The crux of the matter was this : the Cabinet
generally believed that, whether the Tsar made a German peace or not, money invested in Russian concerns would be safe as long as Tsarism lasted, and Russian loans would ultimately be repaid. They also thought that the Bolsheviks were only an unpleasant prelude, very unpopular, and likely to be soon overthrown, to the restoration of Monarchy, now that they had done their work in upsetting the Provisional Government. The English cabinet distrusted the latter body profoundly ; first because it was �mixed up with the Socialists here,� and secondly because it was likely to refuse to shoulder the staggering load of debt which Tsarism had contracted. As Hyndman rightly urged, any attempt to pay this off, even in a very long term of years, would put a millstone round the neck of Russia for centuries. Our rules had a notion that the Provisional Government were al �people holding Mr. Hyndman�s views,� while about the Bolsheviks they had no ideas at all. So they committed themselves in January, 1918, to a masterly policy of inaction as far as Russia wet, while making extremely ridiculous attempts at a secret peace with Austria, and trying to reach some understanding with Turkey.
A telegram was sent to President Wilson from Hyndman, as a Social Democrat, and Gavronsky as Commissioner of the Provisional Government, �protesting against any identification of the Bolsheviks with Democracy,� and stating that Russia would give hearty support to the Fourteen Points. A few days later the Labour Party showed certain yearnings towards Bolshevism by inviting Litvinoff to a conference at Nottingham. Hyndman very temperately suggested that they should invite Roubanovitch as well, to prove that English Labour was at least taking no sides, but that was not done.
Some weeks afterwards, the Cabinet decided to get in touch with the different districts of Russia which did not recognize Bolshevik authority, but it was too late for this to be any use, since the Germans had already obtained all the advantages they could from the Ukraine.
About eight months later, British troops, American troops and Japanese troops (of which more hereafter) were all engaged in fighting Bolsheviks and pro-Germans on Russian soil. In January the Cabinet had decided that it was �contrary to the principles of British diplomacy� to aid Russians to intervene in their own country. By September Allied
armies were fighting in Russia, and the rank-and-file faintly trusted the larger hope that they were struggling for the democratic re-organisation of that unhappy land. Certainly the �regional independent governments,� such as the Siberian Co-operative Republic, Tschaikowsky�s province at Archangel, and the Georgian Republic, all soundly anti-Monarchist and anti-Bolshevist, were with them, but most unfortunately a large Monarchist body, under Alexeieff and others, now definitely reactionary, was apparently with them also. And these Monarchists and their successors were openly receiving support from the English and the French administrations. Why ? The answer is Hyndman�s� words :
�The real reason for this Monarchist policy in London and in Paris is finance. The bankers and loan-mongers want to get �their� interest on �their� money. Policy follows cash with assiduous zeal. [Etc.]
There is no need to dwell upon the disastrous effect of the Allied intervention in Russia. One filibustering Russian general after another came to the fore ; and, however, else these differed, they all followed the same lunatic policy of trying to evict the peasantry from the lands, and restore the former more or less aristocratic land-owning class. Now the Russian peasants had at last got hold of their own soil, and they meant to keep out any force, native or foreign, Tsarist or otherwise, that tried to get it away. True, it came to them from the Provisional Government which made the Revolution and not from the Bolsheviks, but that was yesterday�s job : to-day�s business was just to keep what they held.
Thus, when representative Bolshevists complain of the Allied invasion of 1918, they display a quite Western
hypocrisy, for this was the one thing that established Lenin and Trotzky firmly in their seat.
( pages 161- 164 )