Lenin was in Switzerland when the Revolution began in Russia. With the first news that the Provisional Government had been set up, he adopted toward it an
attitude of unmistakable hostility. On March 16 he wrote to Alexandra Kollontai : �A week of bloody slaughter of the workers, and Miliukov, Guchkov, and Kerensky are in power. It�s the old European story.�
In the first of these �letters from afar� Lenin described the events taking place in Russia:
The Petrograd workers and soldiers, like the workers and soldiers of all Russia, self-sacrificingly fought . . . .
This Government is no chance gathering of persons.
These are the representatives of a new class which has raised itself to political power in Russia, the class of capitalistic landowners and of the bourgeoisie . . .
For Lenin the Provisional Government was simply �a clerk for the multi-millionaire firms: England and France.�
Lenin wrote to Hanecki in Stockholm on March 30, �It is essential to overthrow the bourgeois governments, beginning with Russia, for otherwise it will be impossible to secure peace.� Living in Stockholm Hanecki was at that time the intermediary between Lenin and the Bolsheviks in Russia. For this purpose he obviously had at his disposal large sums of money, since in the letter which has been mentioned Lenin gave him this instruction, �In maintaining relations between Petrograd and Stockholm do not spare funds.�
From what source did the means come into Hanecki�s hands at that moment for Bolshevik propaganda in Russia? Up to the present time the Bolsheviks have published no information concerning the party budget for that period. So it is only possible to construct hypotheses.
Hanecki acted in Stockholm as commercial representative for Parvus. As has been see, Parvus held the view that coördination of activities between the German military command and the Russian revolutionaries was essential. He declared it publicly as his mission to serve as �an intellectual link� between the armed German and the revolutionary Russian proletariat. Lenin at one time had furiously criticized* certain aspects of the views of Parvus. Now however, Hanecki appeared in Stockholm as the representative of both Lenin and Parvus. Unquestionably Parvus had an opportunity to supply funds to Hanecki for use in Bolshevik propaganda. During the War Parvus was engaged in furnishing supplies to the German army and in huge speculations, and so considerable amounts of money passed through his hands. Quite apart from that, Parvus could also have procured money for the �deepening of the revolution�
in Russia directly from the �German Imperialists.� Whoever financed Hanecki, the fact remains that means to further Bolshevik propaganda were at his disposal in the spring of 1917.
* He was merely erecting an alibi (according to Kerensky). That would be just the tenor of those lying 'socialists'. — (WPT)
[Chapter V] 3.
Lenin was making every effort to go to Russia, as may be taken for granted, after receipt of the first news of the Russian Revolution. But to do this was for him no easy task. The route through
Germany was formally closed to all Russians in the period of war. The normal route from Switzerland to Russia at the time was through France and England. But because of Lenin�s defeatist convictions, affecting the cause of the Allies, opposition to his passage was to be expected from the French and English Governments.
After having thought over the situation, Lenin and the other Russian internationalists in Switzerland reached a decision to travel through Germany. Neither Lenin nor any of his sympathizers, it must be said, applied either to the English or the French authorities for permission to pass through their territory.
In order to go through Germany it was necessary not only to secure the permission of the German Government, but also to arrange the affair so that it would present as favorable an outward appearance as possible in the face of the unavoidable suspicion of treachery which the mere fact of traveling through the enemy territory was certain to arouse in patriotic Russian circles.
An appropriate plan was proposed by Martov, who had now become the leader of the Menshevik internationalists. A theorist who remained, as he had always been, far removed from the actualities of life, believing
in the power of formulas, Martov himself probably thought that the episode would seem quite blameless, once it was rendered theoretically blameless to him. In any conversations about a practical agreement with the German Imperialists, he could hardly have been involved. His plan consisted in proposing that Germany should allow the Russian exiles to pass in exchange for the corresponding number of Germans and Austrians interned in Russia.
At first it was decided to approach the Swiss Government, requesting its good offices to this end. So certain appearances of correct international decorum were preserved. As the man to carry on negotiations there was chosen the Swiss Socialist Grimm, one of the leaders of the Zimmerwald movement. According to his account, the statement was made to him in the political department of the Swiss Federal Council that the Swiss Government could not act as an official intermediary since this would constitute a violation of neutrality. Then Grimm turned privately to the representative of the German Government in Switzerland. After that he stood apart from any intermediation, and the further conversations were carried on by another Swiss Socialist, Platten, an intimate and sympathizer of Lenin�s and a member of the �Zimmerwald Left.� Platten presented at the German Embassy in Berne a rough outline made by Lenin of the proposed organization of the passage of the Russian exiles through Germany subject to Platten�s own personal responsibility. The days later the conditions submitted by Platten were confirmed by the German Government of course with the agreement of the German General Staff. General Hoffmann notes the name of the Reichstag deputy
Erzberger as the intermediary in these conversations. Scheidemann, the leader of the German Social Democratic party who later became Chancellor of the German Republic, affirms that Lenin�s journey through Germany was organized by Parvus.3
( . . . )
To afford Lenin and his comrades an opportunity of passage to Russia was in the nature of introducing disease germs into the organism of the Russian state. The calculation of Germany were clear . . . . The measure amounted to a continuation of the same policy followed earlier by the Austrian Government in freeing Lenin from arrest and allowing him to pass into Switzerland at the beginning of the War. The German Government certainly cold not have taken seriously the conditions under which Lenin camouflaged his journey, in the form of an exchange of Germans interned in Russia. . . .
The documents concerning Lenin�s trip through Germany have not been published by the German Government. As for Lenin himself, he published only the resolutions of the Russian Socialists and other Socialists in Switzerland, in regard to the beginning of negotiations, and the conditions proposed for the journey.
A railway car in which were Lenin, Martov, and other exiles was attached to the train leaving for Germany on April 8, 1917. On April 13 Lenin embarked on the steamer sailing from Sassnitz for Sweden. So the trip through Germany took at least four days, April 9, 10, 11, and 12. In Trälleborg Lenin was met by Hanecki who then accompanied him to Stockholm. On the morning of April 14 Lenin was in Stockholm, and late in the evening of April 16 he reached Petrograd. The Bolsheviks gave him an imposing demonstration of greeting. Workers, sailors, and soldiers thronged the entire Finland Station and the square in front of it.
An armored motor car which was at the disposal of the Bolshevik committee carried Lenin to the palace formerly occupied by the ballet dancer Kshesinskaya, which had been seized by the Bolshevik committee at the beginning of the Revolution and served as the staff headquarters of the Bolsheviks up to the days of the July uprising.
3. Philipp Scheidemann, Memoiren eines Sozialdemocrate (Dresden : Carl Reissner, 1928), I, 427 (�. . . die Reise Lenins . . . ein Arrangement Dr. Helphands gewesen ist . . .�). [ note on p. 333 ]
( pages 149 - 155 )
