Lenin was making every effort to go to Russia, as may be taken for granted, after receipt of the first news of the Russian Revolution. But to do this was for him no easy task. The route through
Germany was formally closed to all Russians in the period of war. The normal route from Switzerland to Russia at the time was through France and England. But because of Lenin�s defeatist convictions, affecting the cause of the Allies, opposition to his passage was to be expected from the French and English Governments.
After having thought over the situation, Lenin and the other Russian internationalists in Switzerland reached a decision to travel through Germany. Neither Lenin nor any of his sympathizers, it must be said, applied either to the English or the French authorities for permission to pass through their territory.
In order to go through Germany it was necessary not only to secure the permission of the German Government, but also to arrange the affair so that it would present as favorable an outward appearance as possible in the face of the unavoidable suspicion of treachery which the mere fact of traveling through the enemy territory was certain to arouse in patriotic Russian circles.
An appropriate plan was proposed by Martov, who had now become the leader of the Menshevik internationalists. A theorist who remained, as he had always been, far removed from the actualities of life, believing
in the power of formulas, Martov himself probably thought that the episode would seem quite blameless, once it was rendered theoretically blameless to him. In any conversations about a practical agreement with the German Imperialists, he could hardly have been involved. His plan consisted in proposing that Germany should allow the Russian exiles to pass in exchange for the corresponding number of Germans and Austrians interned in Russia.
At first it was decided to approach the Swiss Government, requesting its good offices to this end. So certain appearances of correct international decorum were preserved. As the man to carry on negotiations there was chosen the Swiss Socialist Grimm, one of the leaders of the Zimmerwald movement. According to his account, the statement was made to him in the political department of the Swiss Federal Council that the Swiss Government could not act as an official intermediary since this would constitute a violation of neutrality. Then Grimm turned privately to the representative of the German Government in Switzerland. After that he stood apart from any intermediation, and the further conversations were carried on by another Swiss Socialist, Platten, an intimate and sympathizer of Lenin�s and a member of the �Zimmerwald Left.� Platten presented at the German Embassy in Berne a rough outline made by Lenin of the proposed organization of the passage of the Russian exiles through Germany subject to Platten�s own personal responsibility. The days later the conditions submitted by Platten were confirmed by the German Government of course with the agreement of the German General Staff. General Hoffmann notes the name of the Reichstag deputy
Erzberger as the intermediary in these conversations.2 Scheidemann, the leader of the German Social Democratic party who later became Chancellor of the German Republic, affirms that Lenin�s journey through Germany was organized by Parvus.3
The motives animating the German Government and the German Genera Staff were obvious, and may be judged by the brief comments that have been made by General Ludendorff and General Hoffman.
Ludendorff says ; "In having sent Lenin to Russia, our Government took upon itself a special responsibility. From the military point of view is journey was justified ; Russia had to fall."4
General Hoffmann writes thus : "Just as I launch grenades at the enemy trenches, just as I release poison gases against them, so as an enemy I have the right to make use of the means of propaganda against the opposed force."5
To afford Lenin and his comrades an opportunity of passage to Russia was in the nature of introducing disease germs into the organism of the Russian state. The calculation of Germany were clear . . . . The measure amounted to a continuation of the same policy followed earlier by the Austrian Government in freeing Lenin from arrest and allowing him to pass into Switzerland at the beginning of the War. The German Government certainly cold not have taken seriously the conditions under which Lenin camouflaged his journey, in the form of an exchange of Germans interned in Russia. . . .
The documents concerning Lenin�s trip through Germany have not been published by the German Government. As for Lenin himself, he published only the resolutions of the Russian Socialists and other Socialists in Switzerland, in regard to the beginning of negotiations, and the conditions proposed for the journey.
A railway car in which were Lenin, Martov, and other exiles was attached to the train leaving for Germany on April 8, 1917. On April 13 Lenin embarked on the steamer sailing from Sassnitz for Sweden. So the trip through Germany took at least four days, April 9, 10, 11, and 12. In Trälleborg Lenin was met by Hanecki who then accompanied him to Stockholm. On the morning of April 14 Lenin was in Stockholm, and late in the evening of April 16 he reached Petrograd. The Bolsheviks gave him an imposing demonstration of greeting. Workers, sailors, and soldiers thronged the entire Finland Station and the square in front of it.
An armored motor car which was at the disposal of the Bolshevik committee carried Lenin to the palace formerly occupied by the ballet dancer Kshesinskaya, which had been seized by the Bolshevik committee at the beginning of the Revolution and served as the staff headquarters of the Bolsheviks up to the days of the July uprising.
2. General Max Hoffmann, Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten (München: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924), p. 174
3. Philipp Scheidemann, Memoiren eines Sozialdemocrate (Dresden : Carl Reissner, 1928), I, 427 (�. . . die Reise Lenins . . . ein Arrangement Dr. Helphands gewesen ist . . ..�).
4. Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen (Sechste, unveränderte Auflage, Berlin: Ernst Siegfred Miller und Sohn Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920), p 407.
5. Hoffman, Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten, p. 174.
( pages 149 - 155 ; notes on p. 333 )