toys in the attic: Values
and Value-Orientations 365 4 The Theory
of Action and Its Application 4.1 Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological and Social Causation
- GORDON W. ALLPORT The problem of prejudice may be
viewed as one empirical focus in the wide region of social conflict and action.
It should, therefore, provide a test case for the fruitfulness of the theory of
action sketched in this
volume. Prejudice is manifestly a value-orientation. It can be, and should be, studied at the level of personality system, at the level of social system, and at tile level of cultural system. Each approach, as the present essay will show, is conceptually
independent in its handling. of the numerous elements of ac- tion
involved. But at the same time
prejudice as a concrete phenomenon cannot be
fully understood unless it is regarded as
reflecting simultaneously all three forms of systematization. Thus a methodological paradox exists:
prejudice (like other forms of social behavior) is many things; it is one
thing. It may well be that the solution to this paradox lies, as the present
volume suggests, in revising psychological theory - let us say - so that it
corresponds in every essential feature with cultural and social theory. Certainly in the long run quarrelsome
differences have no place in the scientific analysis of a single form of social
action. In the present essay I fear that
I do not offer a point-for-point analysis of prejudice in terms of
corresponding theories of action systems; nor do I attempt to fit the topic under
a generalized statement of action theory.
My approach is somewhat more timid. For several years I have struggled
with the task of organizing the voluminous research and interpretation in the
area of group conflict and prejudice. It would please me greatly if I could
locate it all under a unified theory.
While the direction taken by the present volume offers suggestions and
encouragement, I fear that my own thinking has not
progressed effectively beyond the comparatively pluralistic analysis
that I offer in this essay. I have
little to say concerning the eventual possibility of gathering the fragments
under an embracing action theory. It may sometime be accomplished. 366
The Theory and Its Application The form of this essay is
accounted for in part by the occasion for which it was written. In
September 1950 I delivered the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award Lecture to the Society
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.
Group conflict and prejudice was one of the areas of investigation to
which Lewin directed his genius (Lewin, 1948).
It seemed appropriate, therefore, for me to survey the trends of recent
research and to offer to a psychological audience such conceptualization and
organization as I could. Since this
self-set methodological assignment fits the scope of the present volume the
lecture is printed here - as one example of the halting steps that social
science is taking toward ~ more unified (or at least more broadminded)
conceptualization of central problems of social behavior. In recent years interest in
group conflict and prejudice has spread like a flood both in social psychology
and in adjacent social sciences.
Publications are cascading from the presses. The outpouring within the past decade surely exceeds the output
of all previous human history.
Thousands of facts and scores of
interpretations already lie before us.
A unified theory is lacking. Why
it is lacking and what we can do about the matter constitute the subject of
this lecture. IS RESEARCH ON PREJUDICE BASIC? My approach to the problem
differs from that of some of my colleagues.
A few of them, distressed by the complexity and present disorganization
of the field, are saying that the topic of prejudice is a scientific will-o'-the-wisp. They say it rests on nothing but a value
judgment of liberal intellectuals. They
say it is a sloppily descriptive concept; and that we would do better to give
our attention to more basic research in terms of perception, cognitive
reorganization, reinforcement, or the habit hierarchy. After all, prejudice, if it is not a mere value judgment, is a compound, and we
would do better to explore ingredients than to consider the compound as an
entity in itself. While we should heed these
criticisms, I for one do not find them particularly convincing. The fact that liberal intellectuals deplore
prejudice does not in the slightest degree affect its veridicality as a mode of
mental functioning. Psychopathologists
regard paranoia or neurosis as undesirable;
but paranoia and neurosis as syndromes nevertheless exist. School teachers regard certain mental sets
as objectionable; the mental sets are there.
Whatever our values may be prejudice is a fact of mental organization
and a mode of mental functioning.
It is our business to understand it.
Any definition of this
attitudinal syndrome must contain two propositions: one, that the
individual is affectively oriented toward an object of regard; and the other
that this object of regard is overgeneralized.
Most definitions observe these two conditions very well. Thus the New
Oxford Dictionary calls prejudice "a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward any
person or thing, prior to or not based on actual experience." There
are of course, favorable
prejudices - tendencies to accept objects or persons because of their membership
in a class that is categorically approved.
But for simplicity's sake we shall confine ourselves to negative prejudice and not at this time raise
the question whether affiliative prejudices in all respects follow the same
basic principles (cf. Allport, in Sorokin, 1950). We shall also confine ourselves to prejudice against people,
though one can surely be prejudiced against colleges, cities, or cookery. There is no reason to suppose that prejudice
against nonhuman objects differs in its essentials from prejudice against human
beings. Developmentally,
xenophobia is probably much like nosophobia. Also, if I may be accused, this chapter is
riddled with undersline, that I may assume because of the subject matter, done
by one of our Black bretheran.
Prejudice
367 But we shall limit ourselves to
the negative attitudes toward human beings that are held because of their
membership (or supposed membership) in a certain group. The prejudgment runs its course without due regard
for individual differences.. Misjudgment is also involved because no group as a
whole has attributes that each member unvaryingly shares (Vickery and Opler,
1948). Thomistic
psychology sums the matter up crisply.
Prejudice against human beings is a form of “rash judgment,” which,
simply said, is a matter
of "thinking
ill of others without sufficient warrant.” Jjd 8/28/01: by this
we may also say Prejudice is not an act of communication. And to be in error, it can only be formed in
advance. Thereafter the judgment is
after the fact, and it is not the presumed offender who in any present case
effect it. Which by the wa y is amplified
here in what follows … Some of our hostile acts and
repudiations are entirely realistic This Negro
we may know from experience, is untrustworthy; that Britisher bores us. In such cases we think ill of others with sufficient warrant. But as soon as our ill-thinking becomes
wholly or in part derivative - as soon as it borrows from the
fallacious generalization that all
Negroes are untrustworthy, or all
Britishers bores - then prejudice is at work.
Jjd 8/28/01:
so the liberal trick is that to deny their charge, we have to deny what
may be our own experiences … Three basic and universal
psychological functions underlie the syndrome.
Each in its way helps to account for the formation of fallacious
overgeneralizations and for their impress upon specific judgments. The first is the familiar process of concept formation, which so easily goes to
excessive lengths. Grouping,
constellating, rubricizing leap far ahead of experience. They do so partly because of the impetus of
culturally transmitted language. Aided
by labels, we generalize concerning matters where our experience is limited
concerning chiropractors, vitamins, Eskimos.
Every individual within the class is endowed
with the handful of attributes by which the class as a whole is known. We have come to call the overgeneralized
attribute, or constellation of attributes, by which the class is known a
stereotype. Exceptions, as Walter Lippmann pointed out, are often pooh-poohed, forgotten, or
otherwise not admitted to the category.
It was prejudice that made the Oxford student remark that he dispised
all Americans, but had never met one that he didn't like. Jjd 8/28/01: here we get a whole bunch of 50’s general
semantic ala Korzibski. Passed as deep
thought in 1950. 368 The second basic function
concerns the generalization of feeling and emotion – sometimes referred to as displacement,
spread, irradiation, or diffusion. A person who fears that he may lose his job
is, first and foremost, an anxious person. We must expect this diffused organismic condition to affect his
behavior generally. An individual
severely frustrated at home but unable to master the situation becomes an angry
and aggressive person whose
impulses understandably enough may be discharged upon irrelevant targets. This diffusion of the affective life, as Tolman says, is
all the greater "if the goal is perceptually blotted out by a type of
negative barrier." If, for
example, an individual does not understand his own problem - does not know,
that is, what pathways are appropriate to his goals - he may transfer his
anxiety to "similars, symbols, or associates." Discussing this matter in the Lewin Memorial Lecture
of last year, Tolman (1949) describes, as an example, the manner in which sex
repression may evade barriers of social disapproval by becoming charged with
other libidinous energy, including aggression, and finally lead the individual
to a socially permitted form of hostility toward out-groups. While, as Zawadski (1948) and Lindzey (1950)
have shown, displacement cannot serve as an omnibus explanation of
prejudice, still we shall not be able to understand our subject at all unless
we concede that a person’s distress may spread like a grease spot to
"similars, symbols, or associates."
The third function is one
that brings together the stereotype and the
distress in a particular situation.
It is the trick human beings have of rectifying their thought to conform
to their feelings. This rationalization, though common enough, is an
unrealistic and protective mental operation.
It is true
that mature and healthy minds often strive to rectify feelings to conform to
the state of the objective evidence.
But the very fact that some people do one
thing and some another is further proof
that the syndrome of prejudice is a special mode of mental functioning
requiring direct study. Any psychologist who admits
these basic mechanisms of categorization, displacement, and rationalization
to good standing ought to admit the product of their joint operation. Prejudice is some thing, and does
something. It is not the invention of
liberals. Its importance in society
merely adds urgency to what is in any case a basic psychological problem. As I have said, there is no
single adequate theory of prejudice. The scapegoat
theory, while partially valid, does not cover all the known facts. Explanations in terms of economic
determinism, childhood insecurity, institutionalized aggression, or perceptual
distortion, are all suggestive and demonstrably valid in part, but each by
itself is incomplete. We are confronted
here - as in many problems of interest to social psychology - with the phenomenon of multiple causation. In dealing with such problems it seems that
the social psychologist must allow for six valid levels of causal analysis (see Fig. 1) - He need not himself employ all six, but
he must constantly be aware of their importance. Prejudice
369 At the right of Figure 1 we see that investigations may center upon
the nature of the stimulus object
itself. This is a backward region of
research. Yet it has to do with the
most basic of all issues in the field of prejudice: the nature of group
differences. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSATION Etlological Approaches to Prejudice Fig. 1 If we were strictly logical, we would suspend further work
upon prejudice until the objective nature of the relevant stimulus patterns
were known. Thus if it should turn out
to be true that all Negroes are dull, shiftless, aggressive, it would be folly
to speak of prejudice when we reject Negro X for having these qualities. While we know that generalizations of this
order of certainty are unlikely to be correct, it is important to learn just
how false they are. After all, a
stereotype and a negative attitude would be partially admissible if they had a
high probability of according with facts.
Until we know more about national, racial, ethnic character we shall not be able to distinguish between prejudice and
what Zawadski calls "well-deserved reputation." What percentage of Jews, as compared with
gentiles, is aggressive, tax evading, or ostentatious? Does anyone know? If the percentage is
high,then current judgments are semirealistic though they cannot safely be
applied to a given individual; if low, then we shall have to invoke projection
and agree with Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) that the Jew is little more than a "living inkblot." It goes without saying that if accusations
against minority groups should turn out to be justified to an appreciable
degree the problem would still remain whether the traits in question were the
cause or the consequence of public prejudice.
It would not be surprising if some members of minority groups developed
certain defensive characteristics simply because people in the dominant group
persistently refuse to treat them as individuals according to their personal merits. 370
The Theory and Its Application The
stimulus-approach will likewise teach us more than we know about the factor of
visibility (Ichheiser, 1947). Unless
members of a minority group can in some way be identified they cannot be
victimized. What then are the
psychological implications of skin color, ethnic names, customs, language, and
- conceivably - odor? While some work
has been done in direction, there is much to learn. A few years ago, under the
impact of Gestalt theory, the concept of illusion was
virtually lost to psychology. This is
regrettable, for unless we know the objectively verifiable properties of the
stimulus, how can we ever tell how much subjective
rectification is taking place?
And so with prejudice, until we know to what
extent our generalized antipathy is based on provocative fact, we
shall not be able to determine the extent of the irrationality that
remains. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH But if the Gestalt revolution
unduly minimized the stimulus it brought compensatory gains. The
phenomenological level of analysis that it popularized invites us to determine
how the individual is perceiving the stimulus object, and therefore, from what
immediate regnancy (from what "causal integra- tion")
his behavior proceeds. Once
during a session of summer school a woman in my class came to me and with an
alarmed tone of voice said, "I think there is a student with some Negro
blood in this class" - and pointed out a dark brunette to me. To my non-committal "Really?" she
persisted, "But you wouldn't want a nigger in the class, would
you?" Next day she returned and
firmly informed me, "I know she's colored because I dropped a paper on the
floor and said to her, 'Pick that up.' She did so, and that proves she's just a
darky servant trying to
get above her station." The
woman's whole background had oversensitized her to a certain mode of seeing and
behaving. In the forefront of her life
she carried important hypotheses that selected her perceptions and sifted her
actions. In South Africa on a Public
Service Examination candidates were instructed to "underline the
percentage that you think Jews constitute of the whole population of South Africa:
1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 per cent."
When tabulated the modal estimate turned out to be 20 per cent. The true answer is just a little over 1 per
cent (Malkerbe, 1946). Here again we
see how prejudice accentuates features within the phenomenal world. In this connection the Chinese
doctrine of immortality contains a revealmg
belief. The spirits of one's ancestors
are presumed to grow smaller with each
generation. Thus as one’s memory and
interest fail one's representation of outer reality shrinks. Prejudice
371 A final example I borrow from
the Deutsch-Collins (1949) research on integrated
versus segregated biracial housing projects. The residential situations of two groups of white people cause
them to perceive Negroes in different ways.
The following tabulation (based on Deutsch-Collins, Table 18) shows the
replies of white people to the question: "Are they (the Negro people in
the project) pretty much the same as the white people who live here or are they
different?" Integrated
housing Segregated housing Reply units (%) units
(%) 'Same" 80 57 "Different" 14 22 "Don't
know" 6 20 We note how residential
contact affects the perception of sameness and difference. The same research contains even more subtle
evidence that perceptions of people's qualities change through alterations in
degree and kind of contact. When they
mentioned the chief faults they thought Negro people had, white people living
in segregated units tended to name aggressive traits: trouble-making, rowdy,
dangerous. Those living in the closer
association of integrated units mentioned predominantly an entirely different
type of trait, namely, feelings of inferiority or oversensitiveness to
prejudice. The shift here is from a
fear-sustained perception to one sustained by a friendly, "mental
hygiene" point of view. In this
instance we note the transformation from what Newcomb (1947) calls "autistic hostility" to social reality. Heider (1944) in his stimulating
work on social perception has pointed out how our interpre~ations of causality
are ordinarily anthropomorphic in character.
We ascribe change wherever possible to human agencies. For example, in deteriorated residential
districts we are far more likely to see the Negro who lives there as disfiguring
the district than to perceive the district as disfiguring the Negro. Memory, like perception, is selectively conditioned. Seeleman's study (1940) shows how people's
power to recognize individual Negro faces varies inversely with their anti-Negro
prejudice. In order to maintain our
perceptual hypotheses (i.e., our stereotypes) intact we
are forced to forget in a selective manner all the
dignified, well-behaved Negroes, all the generous Jews, all the liberal-minded
Catholics we have met. We think of them
simply as Americans. Only when we encounter the expected pushing in a
Negro, penny-pinching in a Jew, or narrow-mindedness in a Catholic, do we
revive our favored hypotheses in our minds and proceed through our perceptions
to confirm them. What has been called "motivated assimilation" in the process
of rumor distortion is of this same order (Allport and Postman,
1947). Stories
heard and told are tailored to preexisting hypotheses. Rumors seem more
often to conform to regnant hypotheses than to stimulus events. 372
The Theory and Its Application I have illustrated
the phenomenological approach to prejudice before I have defined
it. Brought to
prominence in recent years by Brunswik, Koffka, Krech and Crutchfield, Bruner
and Postman, MacLeod, ileider and others, phenomenology deals with the individual's definition of the situation he finds
himself in; that is, with his subjective reality. While this reality is in part a function of
the stimulus situation, it is in varying degrees also a function of personal
hypotheses within which are focused the needs and traits of the individual, the
situational context of the moment, as well as cultural and historical
influences (Bruner, 1950; Postman, 1950).
There is merit in this
approach. Like a lens it directs the
rays from remoter regions of causation upon the present need for
adjustment. As Figure
1 suggests, it represents the convergence of many etiological factors,
and defines the immediate regnancy that leads to specific acts of behavior. I have
attempted in the diagram to represent in a crude manner the law that every act
results from the final common path of convergent
tendencies, from a "causal integration." The phenomenal
field is a distillation of background forces and thus marks
the final distribution of energy systems just prior to innervation.1 Many of Lewin's topological diagrams depict these terminal
vectorial arrangements within the phenomenal field that eventuate in overt
behayior. Let me add just one final
example of the merits of this approach.
Much investigation in social psychology is conducted through interviewing.
Now it goes without saying that replies to questions will be determined by the way the respondent perceives the question
asked. Morton has pointed out that to
ask an individual, "Would you mind living next door to a Negro?" may
not tap his deeper attitudes toward Negroes at all. The question might mean to him, "Do you want to risk lower
status in the eyes of your friends and relatives?" Or, "Do you want to be cut off from
your present neighbors?" Or,
"Do you want to take an unnecessary chance that your daughter will fall in
love with a Negro boy?" The precaution
that we all take nowadays to pre-test our questionnaires proceeds, whether we
know it or not, from our recognition of the importance of phenomenological
causation. 1 A serious issue
arises when we ask whether the phenomenal field is, by definition, only the field of conscious meanings. If so, then we are compelled to say that the
value of the phenomenological approach, though by no means destroyed, is
limited. Any final common path, or
"causal integration," may run its course, wholly or in part, with
marginal consciousness, or even subliminally.
My own view is that it is wise to consider the phenomenological approach
as dealing with conscious meanings exclusively. To do so reveals an
important level of causal analysis. At
the same time it makes entirely clear the fact that phenomenology alone cannot
solve all the etiological problems involved.
373 Valuable as this approach is, it
obviously cannot serve as a complete conceptualization of prejudice. It deals only with the individual's
definition of the presenting situation and does not tell what determines this
definition. In etiological terms it
represents only proximate (i.e.,
immediate) causation. The pivotal
concepts in phenomenology such as "hypothesis," "cognitive
map" (Tolman), and "life space" (Lewin) all imply that every
factor required to formulate an event is operating in the field at the
moment. Yet the origin of these factors, their peculiar recurrence, and their functional significance in the life of the
individual can only be explained by pushing our causal analysis further. PERSONALITY DYNAMICS AND STRUCTURE: THE FUNCTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF PREJUDICE The
greater part of the recent outpouring of research and theory has had to do with
personality dynamics and structure. Implicit in this approach, I
should like first to point out, is a widespread acceptance
of the concept of attitude.
What we do with our measuring instruments, whether they be direct
questionnaires (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Allport and Kramer, 1946; Den et
al., 1948), polls (cf. Kramer, 1949), or clever projective and trap devices
(e.g., Razran, 1950; Gough, 1950) is to discover the range and intensity of
prejudiced attitudes. The evidence for the high internal reliability of
prejudice scales is conclusive (cf. Hartley, 1946), as is the evidence for
their repeat reliability (cf. Dodd, 1935).
In view of these facts it is surprising to note the various attempts
that have been made in recent years to dislodge
the concept of attitude. We may agree
with Doob (1947) that attitudes should be tied to a sound learning theory and
with Smith (1947A8) that attitudes should not
be considered apart from their functional value in the context of the
individual's life as a whole. But these, together with other recent critics, to my mind
have succeeded not in eliminating the concept but in helpfully refining and
establishing it. Perhaps the chief progress that
has been made in the psychology of attitudes during the past decade lies in the
growing recognition that attitudes serve a purpose in the life-economy of the individual. The California farmer who is prejudiced
against Japanese-Americans has a defineable attitude, but
this attitude is not isolated in his life. Rather it may be for him a means of excusing
his failures, maintaining his self-esteem, and enhancing his competitive
position. While many studies of
prejudice do run their course at the level
of polling or measurement with only first-order breakdowns or simple
accompanying correlations, those that have penetrated deeper disclose the
stabilizing function that prejudice may play in personality. Investigations such as those of Escalona
(1946) Ackerman and Jahoda (1950), Simmel (1946), Bettelheim and Janowitz
(1950), and Adorno et al. (1950) show beyond doubt that prejudiced attitudes may serve as a psychological crutch for
persons crippled in their encounters with life. 374 In such instances the dynamisms
involved are those we have mentioned categorization, displacement, and
rationalization; they also include projection,
reaction formation, and other sly
tricks of ego defense.
Summarizing the work in this area Theodore Newcomb concludes that
"the personality factors most closely related to attitudes of prejudice
are those which have to do with threat orientation” (1950, p. 588). From this point of view prejudice would seem
to be largely a device for handling basic insecurity. Campbell's discovery (1947) that job dissatisfaction is
associated with anti-Semitism is one of many lines of evidence supporting this
proposition. So too Bixler's case
(1948) of a domestic quarrel disrupting a truck driver's erstwhile friendly
relations with a Negro companion. Much
other evidence could be cited supporting this hypothesis. Yet manifestly some people
handle both outer and inner threats with complete equanimity. Although faced with a lowering standard of
living, with downward mobility, for example, they
do not necessarily react, as did many of the Chicago veterans,
with acute prejudice. What we need to
know, therefore, is the type of character
structure that resorts to prejudice when threats are felt. It is
at this point that some of the most brilliant advances have recently been made
. I refer first to an unpublished study by Nancy Carter Morse (1947). This investigator set herself the task of
testing many hypotheses concerning anti-Semitism: that it varies with outer
insecurity, with felt insecurity, with outer frustration, with
self-frustration, with past experience, with "belief in essence"
(e.g., "Jewishness"), and with different patterns of loyalty. She found that while several of these factors
correlated with anti-Semitism they did so only in a contingent manner. Unless high "national involvement"
were also present these etiological variables were not operative. Conversely, "national involvement"
correlated with hostility against the Jews when
everything else was held constant. The
higher the degree of "patriotism," the higher the anti-Semitism. To my mind the significance of this study lies in its
demonstration that prejudice is not merely a
response to threat. It is also
an element in a positive pattern of security.
The bigot is first and foremost an institutionalist. He cannot tolerate uncertainty of membership. He fashions an island of safety and clings
to it. The fact that the
intercorrelation of prejudiced attitudes is known to be high (cf. Hartley,
1946) offers support for this interpretation.
A person who is against one minority is in
most cases against all other minorities. In short, his mode of life is
exclusionist. He cannot
welcome strangers or out-groups of any kind to his island. For additional light on this
syndrome we are in debt to the California investigators (Adorno et al., 1950)
and to others whose results provide sup-port (cf. Allport, in Scientific
American). Without attempting a
final portrayal of the type of character structure in question, I list some of
the findings concerning the "authoritarian
personality." The type
is also depicted by Fromm (1947) who contrasts
it with the "productive personality"
and by Maslow (1943) who contrasts it
with the "self-actualizing"
personality (1949). Prejudice
375 The authontarian
person has a general trait of extropunitiveness. Blame is seldom directed toward
himself. He sees outer events, persons,
circumstances as accountable for his failures. His personal relations are characteristically regarded
in terms of power and status rather than in terms of love and friendship. Though he makes
protestations of love and accord for his parents,
deeper study shows that parent-child affection and trust were in fact lacking. Discipline and authority marked the
relationship. Latent rebellion, firmly held in check, is therefore detectable. Conventionalism and excessive institutionalism mark his life. Lacking a sense of
inner security he seeks safety in well-defined in-groups – in church, sorority,
or nation (cf. Morse, 1947). Categorical thinking is prominent, especially a
two-valued logic. What is not clearly
good is ipso facto evil; a woman is "pure" or else
"bad." Insight into his
own nature is lacking, although he is
usually well satisfied with himself. A rigidity marks the style of life. Preservative
mental sets are found even in areas that have nothing apparently to do
with prejudice (cf. Rokeach, 1948). A need for certainty characterizes the thinking. Seldom does the person say, "I don't
know." Roper (1946) finds that DK
responses among anti-Semites are less than among tolerant people. Such characters
live in fear of punishment and retaliation.
They are broadly suspicious. They agree with the proposition, "The
world is a hazardous place where men are basically evil and dangerous"
(Allport and Kramer, 1946). Much of the
world seems "ego alien" to
them. They clutch at certainties. Even their Rorschach responses seem compulsively meticulous (Reichard, 1948). To maintain a precarious integration, they
structure their island of safety rigidly lest confusion overwhelm them. Often such
individuals align themselves with authoritarian movements
in order to codify and justify their own bigotry. The agitator, the "prophet
of deceit," may be looked upon as an individual in whom this
syndrome is excessively marked and who possesses motivation and skill enough to
become a leader in exclusionist and persecutory
movements (Lowenthal and Guterman, 1949).
Paranoid characteristics may be present
in such individuals (Morlan, 1948). 376
The Theory and Its Application It is important to note that this syndrome, originally
established in adults, has been found to reach down into the middle years of
childhood by Frenkel-Brunswik (1948)
and Rokeach (1948), and even into the age of seven by Kutner
(1950). But we do not yet know for
certain - through these studies strongly imply it - that early childhood
training is responsible. Indications
are that harsh and capricious discipline, affectional deprivation, feelings of
rejection, may underlie the character structure thus formed. We dare not, however, rule out the possibility of a constitutional bent toward
rigidity, though concerning this important matter we know absolutely
nothing. Adults
- first encountering upsetting conditionns in later years – may likewise adopt
the safety-island method of adjustment and develop bigotry where apparently none existed
before. There is important work to be
done in establishing the conditions for latent bigotry that will develop only
if and when suitable situational factors arise. Most research on the dynamics
and structure of personality in relation to prejudice utilizes extreme and
contrasting groups. The subjects are
chosen from those "high" and "low" in prejudice. Median subjects are usually discarded. This heuristic
device leads to an overemphasis upon types. We study confirmed bigots and emerge with the concept of an
"authoritarian" personality; or we focus on markedly tolerant people
and emerge with the "productive," "mature," or
"self-actualizing" personality.
This procedure, though defensible, leads
subtly to the depiction of "ideal types." We sharpen our findings, so that the whole
complex subject falls a little too readily into a neat "schema of
comprehensibility." This procedure tempts us to forget the many mixtures
that occur in ordinary run-of-the-mill personalities. While we are examining somewhat
critically the methods employed in establishing the rigidity-prejudice
correlation, we should mark the almost universal absence
of a desirable control. It is not
sufficient, for example, to determine that people high in prejudice are
generally deficient in ability to change their mental set, but we must likewise
prove that groups deficient in their ability to change their mental set are
high in prejudice. Until we do so our parameters are not clearly
established. In framing our theories of
dynamisms and character structure we should make room for the apparently serious conflict between biological and psychogenic
motives that may enter into ethnic attitudes. In relations between white
men and Negroes, for example, there is a considerable and growing amount of
friendliness wherever cultivated and psychogenic
interests are involved. Negro
artists are in theaters, drawing rooms, sports arenas. Negro folk music is accepted as American
folk music. At concerts, church, and in
community activities we increasingly participate in a friendly fashion. In short, wherever there are mature areas of
interest, association is readily handled.
But where biological
gratifications are in question, the authoritarian mode of adjustment seems more
likely to assert itself. Two fiercely
possessive needs - property and sex - appear to be the final bastions of
conservatism. In a life where mature
adjustments in these regions are not worked out, and where anxiety dwells,
there seems to be a higher probability of rigid, exclusive, suspicious character
formation. And in one and the same
personality we find sentiments that are egalitarian up to a point, but that seem to turn turtle
when miscegenation or occupational equality are mentioned. This
suggested relation between "gut functions" and prejudice deserves
further study. Prejudice
377 CONFORMITY ATTITUDES
OF 150 RESPONDENTS TOWARD TWO MINORITY GROUPS (In Per Cent) Types 0/
Attitude Expressed Toward
Jews Toward Negroes Intensely
anti- (spontaneous) 4 16 Outspokenly
anti- (when questioned) 27 49 Stereotyped 28 27 Tolerant 41 8 Total 100 100 Data from Bettelbeim and
Janowitz, Dynamics ol Prejudice, pp. 16, 26. Now we dare not assume that
prejudiced attitudes are always psychological crutches employed by immature or
crippled individuals. Many studies
suggest that they may be peripheral to the personality, skin-deep as it
were. On the basis of interviews with
veterans, Bettelheim and Janowitz (1950; pp.16, 26) classify attitudes toward
Jews and Negroes as shown in the accompanying table. One has the impression that the "stereotyped" cases
(roughly one-quarter of each group), and perhaps some of the
"outspoken" cases may be little more than cultural parrots, repeating
idle chatter they have heard. These
individuals do not live by their prejudice; its functional significance for
them is low or else lacking. But, as I
have observed, latent prejudice now expressed
merely in stereotypes, may blaze with
functional significance when conditions are ripe. Prejudiced
attitudes may reflect a maximum degree of a maximum degree of functional significance sheer conformity (no functional significance) Fig.
2 378
The Theory and Its Application Again it is not that two
distinct types are involved, but rather as Figure 2
suggests, a continuum of cases. At any given
time a prejudiced individual presumably may be located at some point between a
maximum degree of ego-relevant functional significance, and a maximum degree of
sheer (not ego-involved) conformity. It
does not affect the continuum to argue that conformity itself has functional
significance for the individual. We may
grant that no person would adopt the folkways unless it served his purpose to
do so. Yet there
is a wide difference between, let us say, normal habits of cleanliness acquired
from parents and culture and compulsive hand-washing. A similar difference obtains between bigotry that is simply stereotyped and bigotry that is saturated with need and necessity. SOCIALIZATION The topic of conformity leads to
the problem of learning. As shown in Figure 1, the problem is properly located at the
junction of the individual approach and the situational, for it is always
through a concrete learning situation that the influences of a culture or
subculture reach the person. I shall say little about the
acquisition of prejudice, not because facts and theories are lacking, but
because the topic is inexhaustible. Let
me mention only a few well-established findings. (1) It takes considerable time for the young
child to make the in-group and out-group distinctions prescribed by his
culture. For example, to the simple
question, "What are you?" only 10 per cent of four-year-olds reply in
terms of racial, ethnic, or religious membership; whereas 75 per cent of
nine-year-olds do so (Hartley, Rosenbaum, and Schwartz, 1948). (2) Before the child can distinguish between various groups he often
acquires power-words of violent opprobrium such as "Rigger,"
"kike," "wop," whose affective significance he senses.
Through these symbols he thus learns to reject a group even before he knows to
what group they apply. Aggression may
thus be prechanneled upon groups before the child has any experience with them
(cf. Trager and Radke, 1947). (3) In general, the role of firsthand knowledge of, or experience with,
minority groups seems to be a negligible factor in the formation of prejudice
in childhood. From the point of view of
mental health it is regrettable that attitudes are
not the generalized product of firsthand experience, but in the
realm of ethnic attitudes, as in the case of most moral attitudes, they are taken over ready-made. Subsequent experience is ordinarily
interpreted in a selective fashion so that
it serves to confirm the secondhand
hypotheses acquired
from parents and associates (cf. Horowitz, 1936). Now these particular findings
bear primarily upon the conformity
aspects of prejudice. While they are
vastly important we should not forget that the ground work for an authoritarian
character structure may also be
laid through learning. Thus a rejected child, unable to identify
securely with his parents, may be forced into a survival pattern that will lead
in his later years to a rigid, out-group-hating mode of life. Therefore, research on the
acquisition of prejudice should deal equally with two basic problems which may well involve different
hinds of learning: (1) the
acgmrin~~9f~c~n{ent (i.e , of beliefs and categories) and (2) the acquiring
of functional predispositions ~ ~r a need for, prejudice in the economy
of the personal life (cf. Ailport, 1950b). 379 THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH The situational approach to the
study of prejudice is the least easily defined. Broadly speaking, it seeks
illumination from studying the confluence of outer forces that act upon
the individual. Causation is
seen as residing to a greater or lesser degree behind and beyond the
individual. Now many psychologists,
Lewin among them, might insist that it is the phenomenal field alone that
matters. The person acts not on the
basis of surrounding forces but on the basis of the subjective, causal
integration he has fashioned. Reasonable
as this argument sounds, the fact remains that we
cannot know the phenomenal field directly. We infer it partly from the resultant act and partly from the
outer situation. Any field is a state of energy
tension existing between two or more poles.
Sometimes it is viewed as existing in space-time, sometimes as a
dimension of thought. Often the two
modes of existence are confused. What we think of as a phenomenological field sometimes
turns out to be a space-time field. Even
Lewin's classic investigations of the autocratic and democratic group
atmosphere rest upon outer
situational criteria and not directly upon the subject's perceptual structuring
thereof. Valuable as the concept of
phenomenal field is, we are forced to admit that in
practice we often confuse what is phenomenal with what is situational. Take the common expression that we have
adopted from Lewin: we speak of someone "going out of the
field." Unless we were in fact
viewing the field situationally we could not speak of an individual leaving
it. For not even a Houdini could
"go out of" his own phenomenal field. An educator from South Africa
told me the following incident. The
pupils in a rural school were not making satisfactory progress in learning
English, so the district supervisor of English instruction visited the school
and asked the native teacher to give a demonstration to show how he
taught. Thereupon the teacher did
so, but only after speaking first to the children in the vernacular, "Come
now, children, put away your things and let us spend an hour wrestling with the
enemy's language." This is the
situation in which the learning proceeded, or failed to proceed. We may imagine
what structuring took place in the pupil's
phenomenal field, but actually we can only know for certain the outer situation. 380 When one studies the
relationship between unemployment and prejudice one is using the situational
approach. So too when one investigates
the effects of different types of contacts - residential, occupational, social,
and war-time contacts in combat situations.
A large number of important researches have dealt
with this particular situational problem (e.g., Stouffer et al., 1949; MacKenzie,
1948; AlIport and Kramer, 1946; Deutsch and Collins, 1949; Deutscher and Chein,
1948). The generalization that emerges
is to the effect that only in situations where
different groups meet on equal looting, enjoying equal status, does prejudice
diminish; the effect is greatly enhanced if the groups holding such equal
status engage in joint participation in a common task. Many if not most studies of the classroom employ the situational
approach. Educators are nowadays insisting that a democratic atmosphere must
mark relationships in the classroom if desirable intercultural attitudes are to
be fostered (e.g., Kilpatrick and Van Til, 1947). Lewin has repeatedly made the point that
the creator of group atmosphere is primarily the leader (or teacher) who
inevitably serves as the "gatekeeper of the channel of communication"
(1947). A good example of the importance
of the situation in the expression
of prejudice is contained in the researches of Robinson and Rohde (1946) who
found that Jewish-appearing interviewers, especially if introducing themselves
with Jewish names, obtained far less open expression of anti-Semitism than did
interviewers who seemed to the respondents to be non-Jewish. People of lower socio-economic levels were
more restrained in their expression of prejudice to Jewish-appearing
interviewers than were those of higher levels. What
I am here calling situational studies are, as these few examples show, diverse
in type. Some situations are as enduring as family structure, others as transitory
as a race riot. Some are as embracing
as the impact of press and radio upon us, others as specialized as the fleeting
anti-minority incidents in offices or tramways so cleverly studied by Citron,
Chein, and Harding (1950). Broadly speaking, in the concept
of situation we are approaching a level of theory congenial to sociological
investigators. Coutu (1949) has
recently advised us to abandon the concept of attitude altogether and to speak
exclusively of a tendency-in-a-situation. Prejudice would thus be defined as the range of situations in which an individual makes a
negative or hostile response. Prejudice
381 I feel that there is a desirable reciprocity between the individual
theories of causation and the situational.
They have a fortunate way of handling each
other’s exceptions. Thus if not
all members of an agitator's audience fall for his line, of if not all dwellers
in an area marked by Negro in-migration resent their arrival, we seek the
explanation for the exceptions in terms of individual differences (in
personality dynamics or structure).
Conversely, if a given individual, noted for his tolerance, suddenly
behaves out of character, explanation
can be sought in terms of the situation.
Take the case of the white woman living in an interracial
project who was not merely content but actually enthusiastic about her experience there. Yet in spite of this warm and friendly
attitude she decided to move away. The
contradiction, it developed, was due to the fact that she had a twelve-year old
daughter whom she expected "would just naturally fall in love with one of
the fine young Negro lads in the project." The mother had no objection to the prospect herself, but she knew
that the resulting situation would be fraught with trouble for her
daughter. The mother's decision was
contrary to her own attitudes; it
was determined by a situational and cultural structure quite alien to her own
nature (Duetsch, 1949). We may state the point at issue
a little more exactly. Few personalities
are completely integrated and conflictless.
Even the most consistent among us play many roles in the several groups
of which we are members. But there are
none the less bona fide psychophysical dispositions and habits within our own
organisms to correspond to these roles.
Sometimes one and sometimes another disposition or habit is evoked -
according to the situation (cf. Myrdal, 1944) - This insistence upon the
biophysical nature of conflict and of role behavior does not in the slightest
degree weaken the situational approach to the study of prejudice. Quite the contrary, it grows more and more
apparent that it is the varying situational contexts
that set off varying action tendencies. Unless we admit the situation in our total
analysis we shall never be able to deal adequately with the problem of
consistency and inconsistency in individual behavior. Nor shall we discover those conditions (for example, equal-status
contact) that are known to arouse tolerant, and to weaken intolerant, modes of
response. CULTURE AND SUBCULTURE We come now to another level of
causal theory favored by many.
Prejudice, we are told, is lock-stitched
with the folkways of a group, with its caste system, with its
institutionalized outlets for aggression.
One of the strongest arguments
in favor of the sociocultural approach is this: in every society on earth the
children are thought to belong to the social and religious groups of their
parents. By virtue of his kinship the child
is expected, among other things, to take on the prejudices of his parents, and also to become the
victim of whatever prejudice is directed against them. Thus prejudice is learned with all the
authoritative support of the kinship system; it is germinal in the child's
identifications, sometimes essential to his very
survival. 382
The Theory and Its Application This fact helps to explain why
prejudice is not easily changed by non-family
agencies - by school, church, or state.
Although the official creed of America is unexceptionably tolerant,
prejudice flourishes. The explanation
must lie in the fact that family influence outweighs official agencies in its
impact upon youth. A little girl, who
no doubt was receiving democratic training at school and church, burst into
tears when the Negro family in her neighborhood moved away. "Now,"
she sobbed, "there is no one that we are better than." We need this sociocultural
emphasis upon the demand of individual and family for status. Psychologists, at least until the recent
past, have talked more about hunger and sex than about self-esteem.
Sociologists and anthropologists, by and large, are more properly aware of the
basic importance of caste, power structure, and sanctions. Another merit of the
sociocultural approach lies in its insistence that there are "standard
meanings" which in a rough way each member of a social group admits. It is only in recent years, thanks to the
assistance of sociologists and anthropologists, that psychologists have begun
to employ culturally established
frames of reference as a starting point for an analysis of the social
consciousness and behavior of the individual. It is by and large a wholesome
thing to do.2 From the sociocultural approach
come many important findings, among them the following: Only in a highly differentiated
society where multiple secondary groups exist is there such a thing as group
prejudice. A homogeneous society, such
as the Navaho, may sanction hostility toward individual outcasts (witches) but
not toward groups within the society (cf. Kluckhohn, 1944). Even a differentiated society
does not generate acute intergroup hostility unless there is possible upward
mobility within the social structure. The more numerous the members in
an upwardly mobile minority group, the greater the prejudice against them. In times of rapid social change,
and in times of calamity and war, prejudice mounts. 2 Wholesome though it
is, there is a certain trap in this approach.
To illustrate, I refer to an excellent recent textbook. Within the space of a few pages the author
speaks of "shared meaning, shared
codes," "shared interests," "shared norms,"
"shared values," and "shared frame of reference." The trap lies in the Hegelian style of
terminology. Just where is the norm or code that we "share"? Do we in fact "share" it, or have
we in our minds only a personal
and approximate version of the code?
And is not the code itself
merely an abstraction from many different (though comparable) codes that
separate individuals have? The
psychologist should not forget that every person is a unique unit and that his
mental furnishing is his own - not "shared." It seems appropriate enough for
sociologists and anthropologists to speak of "shared values" and
"shared codes," for by the nature of their profession their view of
social conduct is normally "superorganic." But the psychologist has the inescapable duty to keep firmly in
sight the unique and personal formations of meaning and evaluation in which all
social norms are selectively rendered.
While such formations may in many cases be comparable individual by individual, they &e never
actually shared. Prejudice
383 Whenever a culture permits exploitative gains at the expense
of a minority group, prejudice is great. In our own society status-gains result
from social anti-Semitism (MeWilliams, 1948), economic gains from exploitation
of the Negro (Cox, 1948), sexual gains from intimidation of the Negro male
(Myrdal, 1944), and political gains from manipulated anti-Semitism (Lowenthal
and Guterman, 1949). Currently we see
the enormous political benefits that accrue to demagogues who fan the
flames of anti-Communist feeling.
To a truly extraordinary degree
the prejudices of the dominant society infect all subgroups within that
society. Thus even in such a diverse
culture area as America it is found that the order of preference for various
ethnic groups is nearly universal (cf. Newcomb, 1950, p.581). So prevalent is this standard of judgment
that members of certain minorities even become
infected with the prevailing scorn and dislike for themselves. All legends that sustain and
justify prejudice are part of the cultural heritage. To take but one important consequence of this fact: every nation
or clan has in its history the account of a "golden age." Modern Greeks can judge their worth in terms
of Greece's glorious antiquity.
Italians have their Renaissance.
The Catholic Church once held all of Christendom. Boston was once the hub of the universe.
Thanks to this golden-age legend - to its historical halo - nearly everyone on earth can, with a bit of contriving,
look down on nearly everyone else. THE HISTORICAL APPROACH This example leads us finally to
our need for historical perspective.
Without it all theories of prejudice seem foreshortened. One historian, in criticizing approaches
made exclusively in terms of personality structure, writes, "Such studies
are enlightening only within narrow limits.
For personality is itself
conditioned by social forces; in the last analysis, the search for
understanding must reach into the broad social context within which personality
is shaped" (Handlin, 1949). Take anti-Semitism - the most
ancient known form of prejudice that is still extant. Without the historical approach this phenomenon is almost
unintelligible. For one thing, only
history allows us to see how throughout the ages Jews have been forced to
occupy a position at the "fringe of stable
values" - as money-lenders, entertainers, entrepreneurs - in
addition to (or because of) their deviance in religious belief. The historical view helps us likewise to
understand why people at the fringe of stable values are regarded as
threatening agents by conservatives in every era; and why at certain periods of
time conditions have been ripe for persecution, pogroms, genocide. Using the historical method, Massing (1949)
has shown how the Nazi manipulations of anti-Semitism were a culmination of
events in German social and political life during the decades preceding
Hitler's rise to power. 384
The Theory and Its Application How could one comprehend the
peculiar pattern of prejudice against the Negro in this country without a
historical knowledge of slavery, emancipation, and carpetbagging? Historical patterns, even historical
"accidents," form an essential ground work for research in
prejudice. It may well be, as my col- league
Jerome Bruner has remarked, that it is the historical process that establishes
the Jew rather than the redhead as the object of prejudice. If perchance events had been such that the
villainy of Frederick Barbarossa had been perpetuated over the centuries by
other redheads, we might today have to cope with anti-rufutism. It is not necessary to multiply
instances. We have reason to regret the
almost complete separation of psychology and history in our programs of
teaching and research. While happy rapprochements are being effected between
psychology and other social sciences, the gap between psychology and history is still
wide. One type of historical theory,
economic determinism, should not be overlooked. Economic considerations enter not only in the broad sweep of
history but focus our attention upon the exploitative elements in all cultures. Economic conditions likewise create
situational fields to which the individual is forced to respond, sometimes in a prejudiced
manner. And finally within personality
structure itself, as I have pointed out, property demands, like sex, may
determine the functional significance of prejudice in a given life. It would be as great an error to overlook
economic considerations as to make them solely responsible for all group bias
as Cox (1944) has done. I have been
using the topic of prejudice in order to adumbrate
the problem of explanation and causation in social psychology.3 Conceivably the time may come when all
social science will employ a single set of descriptive dimensions and state its
causal propositions at one and the same level of abstraction. Pioneer efforts in this direction are made
in the present volume. But for the time
being I believe the best we can do is to regard any social issue as accessible
to several different but equally valid levels of analysis - analysis in terms
of the stimulus object, the phenomenal field, the dynamics and structure of the
individual life; the surrounding situation; the underlying cultural norms and
laws of social structure and action; and the total relevant historical
context. Not only prejudice but
religious behavior, economic behavior,
domestic behavior - almost any type of human conduct that is not exclusively
reflex or biological can and should be viewed through this series of
lenses. Causation may be proximate, or causation may be ultimate. Forces may be precipitating or
underlying; they may be in the foreground or in the background. A social
scientist is free to select his own level of approach, but he should be
respectfully aware of the whole etiological sweep. 3 Positivists will
object to the frank and naive use of "causation"
throughout this paper. I make no
apology. Methodologists who banish
causation from the front door often admit it surreptitiously at the back. Or else they spin their logic too fine for
the present needs of social science. To
my mind social science at its present stage of development will be concerned with causation, or else it will
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ideological furnishings for the homeless
mind
daurril
library: talcott parsons
Jjd 8/28/01: so here, things like
Oxford are the problem … like they forgot the terms of the action
analysis.
STIMULUS APPROACH
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY