toys in the attic: 158 3
Systems of Value-Orientation Patterns
of value-orientation have been singled out as the most crucial cultural
elements in the organization of systems of action. It has, however, been made clear at a number of points above that
value-orientation is only part of what has been defined as culture. Before entering into a more detailed
consideration of the nature of value systems and their articulation with the
other elements of action, it will be useful to attempt a somewhat more complete
delineation of culture than has yet been set
forth. THE
PLACE OF VALUE-ORIENTATION PATTERNS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE Culture
has been distinguished from the other elements of action by the fact that it is intrinsically transmissible from one action
system to another - from personality to personality by learning and from
social system to social system by diffusion.
This is because culture is constituted by "ways
of orienting and acting," these ways being
"embodied in" meaningful symbols. Concrete orientations and concrete
interactions are events in time and space.
Within the personality these orientations and interactions are grouped
according to the need-dispositions denoting tendencies which
the concrete orientations and interactions exhibit.
Within the society they are grouped according to roles and
role-expectancies denoting requirements which the
concrete orientations and interactions both stipulate and fulfill. Both need-dispositions
and role-expectancies are, in
another sense, postulated entities, internal to personalities, and internal to social systems,
controlling the orientations which constitute their concrete referents. As such, they cannot either of them be
separated from the concrete actions systems which
have and exhibit them. A need-disposition
in this sense is an entity internal to a personality system which controls a
system of concrete orientations and actions aimed at securing for the
personality certain relationships with objects. A system of role-expectations is a system of need-dispositions
in various personalities which controls a system of concrete mutual
orientations and interactions aimed by each actor at gaining
certain relationships with other social objects, and functioning for the
collectivity in which it is institutionalized to bring about integrated
interaction. In either case, the postulated entity is internal to and inseparable from
the system of action which it helps to regulate. Cultural objects
are similar to need-dispositions and role-expectations in two senses: (1) since they are ways of orienting and acting,
their concrete referent consists in a set of orientations and interactions, a
set which follows a certain pattern. (2) In another sense cultural objects are postulated
entities controlling the orientations which constitute their concrete
referents. However, unlike
need-dispositions and role-expectations, the symbols which are the postulated
controlling entities in this case are not internal
to the systems whose orientations they control. Symbols control systems of orientations, just as do
need-dispositions and role-expectalions, but they exist not as postulated internal factors but as objects of orientalion
(seen as existing in the external world along side
of the other objects oriented by a system of action). 160 Because
of the internal character of need-dispositions and role-expectalions, they cannot exist, except insofar as they
represent actual internal (structural) factors in some concrete action
system. This holds both for elemental need-dispositions and
role-expectations and for complex patterned need-dispositions and
role-expectations (these being complex structures of the simpler ones). Elemental symbols are similarly tied to
concrete systems of action, in the sense that no external embodiment is a
symbol unless it is capable of controlling certain concrete orientations in
some action systems. (This means that
each eIemental symbol must have its counterpart in terms of a need-disposition
on the part of an actor to orient to this object as a symbol, and thus to
orient in a certain way wherever this symbol is given.). On the other hand, a complex "manner of
orienting" (which can be termed either a complex cultural object or a
complex symbol, the two terms meaning the same thing) can
be preserved in an external symbol structure even though, for a
time, it may have no counterpart in any
concrete system of action. That is,
symbols, being objectifiable in writing and in graphic and plastic
representation, can be separated from the action systems in which they
originally occurred and yet preserve intact the "way of orienting"
which they represent; for, when they do happen to be oriented by an actor (to
whom each element is meaningful) they will arouse in him the original complex
manner of orientation. By the
same token, a complex external symbol structure (each element of which has a
counterpart in terms of need-dispositions on the parts of the several actors
who participate in a collectivity) can bring about roughly the same type of
orientation in any or all of the actors who
happen to orient to it. And since the concrete referent
of the symbol is not the external object but rather the "way of
orienting" which it controls, we may say that complex symbols are
transmissible from actor to actor (i.e., from action system to action
system). That is, by becoming a symbol,
a way of orienting can be transmitted from one actor to another. This is because the physical embodiment of
the symbol is a first or second order 1 derivative
from the orientation of the actor who produces the symbol, and it
controls (because it is a symbol) roughly the same orientations in the other actors who orient
to it. Thus symbols differ from
need-dispositions and role expectations in that they are separable from the
action systems in which they arise, and in that they are transmissible from one
action system to another.2
Both of these differences derive from the fact that they have external "objective" embodiments,
rather than internal "unobservable" embodiments. On the other hand, insofar as they are
"ways or patterns of orienting and acting" and insofar as their
concrete referent is a set of orientations (which follow a pattern, or better,
of which the pattern is an ingredient), they have
exactly the same status as role-expectancies and need-dispositions. To
show what symbolization does for action systems, we may point out that symbols
or cultural objects involve "interpersonalizing" the kind of
"abstraction" or "generalization" which characterizes all
stable systems of orientation (which, by the same token, characterizes the
organization of concrete orientations into the subsystems, here called
need-dispositions). This calls for some
digression to show how the word "generalization"
(which was originally introduced in the General Statement in the section on
behavior psychology) can be rendered
equivalent to the term "abstraction" and used in this
context. Action is said to be
generalized when the same form of action (according to a set of criteria
formulated either by ego or by an observer) is given in different situations or
in different states of the same situation or by different persons, as we will
show shortly. This is what is meant by
the term when it is used in behavior psychology. In terms of the theory of action, this
occurs whenever a need-disposition is constructed. For every need-disposition groups situations on the
basis of selected criteria (thus constituting for the actor a generalized
object) and causes them all to be oriented to in the same fashion (or as one
object). Thus every need-disposition,
when it is formed, constitutes a generalization of orientation, and by the same
token "creates" an object (the
object being created in terms of the criteria whereby the generalized
orientation is rendered relevant). But
here, it may be noted, we have the process called abstraction, which is nothing more than the creation of
objects from the field of experience by grouping situations according to
selected criteria. Every
need-disposition within a personality system is therefore a generalized orientation (or an abstraction, in
one manner of speaking) which allows the actor to orient different concrete
events as all of one class, and thus brings about roughly similar action with
respect to all these events. Within a
personality, therefore, the term generalization
refers to "orienting in the same way" at several different times (and
places). Or at least, such similarity
of orientations is generalization when it occurs by virtue of some systematic
internal controlling factor and not by chance. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 1
We say a first or second order derivative because action itself is the first order derivative from the orientation;
that is, it is caused by the orientation.
Sometimes the action itself is the symbol. Other times the symbol
derives from (is caused by) the action.
2
It can be noted here that role-expectations, insofar as they have a status at
all different from complex need-dispositions (for social-object relationships),
have that status by virtue of the fact that they are complex (internalized)
need-dispositions which have symbolic counterparts, and which thus can be the
same for both ego and alter. Thus
role-expectations are a specific interpersonal class of need-dispositions
controlling complementarv expectations because they are symbols as well as
need-dispositions. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 162 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action We have
already suggested that a "way of orienting" may be exemplified not
only at different times within the same personality system, but also within different personality systems, and
this may be a systematic and not a random occurrence if the various persons within whom the
way of orienting occurs are controlled by the same complex symbol system.3 Thus, we say, symbolization allows
"interpersonalized" generalization.
It is this very capacity for
"interpersonal-generalization" which is the essence of culture. And, in turn, this capacity is the
prerequisite of its crucially important role in systems of ~ action; for it implies the transmissibility of ways of
orienting from person to person, and hence a dimension of development which is
known only rudimentarily among nonhuman species of the biological universe. In other words, communication, culture, and systems of human
action are inherently linked together. THE CLASSIFICATION OF
THE ELEMENTS OF CULTURE The
various elements of culture have different types of significance. The criteria of classification for these
elements are to be sought in the categories of the fundamental paradigm of
action. Every concrete act, as we have
seen, involves cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative components organized
together. These categories provide the
major points of reference for analyzing the differentiations of the symbol
systems (just as they do for need-dispositions). Hence the content of culture may be
classified in accordance with the primacies 4 of the three
fundamental components of the orientation of action. ___________________________________________________________________________________ 3
This may of course involve broadening the criteria of "sameness" so
that the various orientations of different actors to one system of symbols may
all be classified as following one "manner of orientation." 4
We have said that symbols are ways of orienting controlled by external physical
objects. Now, just as a single
orientation may he primarily cathectic, evaluative, or cognitive (as in the
case where a person is "merely considering a fact" which has very
little motivational importance), so also may a way of orienting (a cultural
object) be characterized by the primacy of such modes. 5
Beliefs, since they are primarily
cognitive, always relate the individual to his environment. Thus they are all existential
(even mathematics and logic provide concepts and rules for assertion of
existential propositions). On the other
hand, existential beliefs may be empirical or nonempirical, depending on
whether or not they are amenable to the verification procedures of modern
science. ================================================================================= Systems of Value-Orientation 163 The
classification of symbol systems based on these primacies runs as follows. Symbol systems in which the cognitive
function has primacy may be called "beliefs"
or ideas.5 Symbol systems
in which the cathectic function has primacy may be called "expressive" symbols. As compared with cognitive symbols the primary reference of the orientations involved
in cathectic symbols is more inward toward
the affective state which accompanies the orientation than outward toward the properties of the object
oriented to.6 The object is
significant as the occasion of the affective state in question and cognition of
its properties is subordinated in this context. Symbol systems in which the evaluative function has primacy may
be called "normative ideas" or "regulatory
symbols." They are the standards
of value-orientation or the value- orientation modes about which we have said so much. In a moment, we will see that these
evaluative standards themselves can be subclassified into cognitive,
appreciative, and moral standards.
First, we must clarify briefly the
distinction between the classification of symbols into cognitive
symbols, expressive symbols, and value standards; and the classification of the
standards themselves into cognitive, appreciative and moral standards. We
have already said that symbols are ways of orienting which are embodied in or
controlled by the external symbolic objects.
It is roughly true, now, to state the following equivalencies: (1) Systems of cognitive symbols (beliefs)
are ways of cognizing, these ways being controlled by the external symbolic
objects. (2) Systems of expressive symbols are ways of cathecting (similarly
controlled by symbolic objects). (3) Systems of value-orientation standards are ways of evaluating (also controlled
by symbolic objects) ; that is, ways of solving conflicts between various
units. Thus they can be ways for
solving conflicts between various beliefs,
between various cathexes (or wants), and between various evaluative mechanisms. It is
immediately apparent, therefore, that the third type of symbols (the
evaluative ones), which have been called the value-orientation standards, can be subdassified again on the basis of the cognitive-cathectic-evaluative
distinction. Thus, the
evaluative symbols which outline ways of solving cognitive problems are cognitive standards; those which outline ways of
solving cathectic problems are appreciative
standards; and those which outline ways of handling purely
evaluative problems are moral
standards. The three
types of systems of value standards, it must be noted, are all systems of
evaluative symbols. And thus they are to be distinguished from
systems of cognitive symbols and of expressive symbols. For example, a single
belief may be a part of a system of cognitive symbols, but it is not necessarily part of a system of cognitive standards. A criterion of truth, on the other hand, on
the basis of which the belief may be judged
true or false, is a cognitive standard (and thus an evaluative symbol). ____________________________________________________________________________________ 6
Systems of expressive symbols will often be fused with elaborate systems of
ideas, so that as a result aesthetic experience and criticism will often have a
very profound outward tendency. The
ultimate criterion remains, however, the actor's sense of fitness,
appropriateness, or beauty. ____________________________________________________________________________________ 164 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action It
seems to us that these standards, which we have variously called patterns of value-orientation,
normative ideas, and evaluative symbols, are symbols of a somewhat
different type from the cognitive and expressive symbols. This is perhaps because they are ways the actor has of orienting to (and acting with respect to) his own orientations, rather than ways of
orienting to objects outside alone. Let us
discuss for a moment the complex (and still poorly understood) differences
between the standards and the other classes of symbols. In the first place, they all seem to
represent in some fashion a synthesis of cognitive and cathectic elements. Objects cognized
are evaluated in terms of whether or not they will help the actor get what he wants.
Thus, in this sense, a cognition
cannot be evaluated except insofar as its long-run cathectic consequences are
taken into account. Similarly, a cathexis cannot be evaluated except
insofar as the object cathected is cognized in its patterned relationships to
other cathected objects. In
other words, when a particular cathectic component is evaluated, its implications
must first be developed. It must
be synthesized into a wider cognitive structure,
and then the balance of catheetic attachment to the whole set or system of
implications may be discovered. This is
cathectic
evaluation. Similarly, when a particular cognized object or fact is to
be evaluated, its cathectic implications must be developed. One must, in a certain sense, find out whether a fact may be cathected as a
truly instrumental means to some ulterior goal, before one can evaluate
it as true or false. In both
of these cases of evaluation, therefore, the actor has a commitment to orient himself in terms of a balance of consequences and implications rather
than being free to orient himself to the particular cultural symbol on its
immediate and intrinsic merits. Thus
his orientation to a particular complex of symbols must conform with the imperatives of the larger system of normative
orientation of which it is a part. Otherwise, the normative system becomes
disorganized. It is,
indeed, in the evaluative synthesis of
cognitive and cathectie modes of orientation that the major lines of the
patterns of value-orientation of a system of action emerge. This source of patterns of value-orientation
helps to explain their particularly strategic significance in action. But it also helps to explain their relative lack of functional independence. The cognitive reference connects the orientation with the object world,
particularly with respect to the anticipation of consequences, which flow from
actual commitments to action and which might flow from hypothetical courses,
which, because of these anticipated consequences, may indeed be rejected as
alternatives in the situation of choice.
The cognitive orientation provides one of the bases of the range of freedom which we have called choice,
and of which one of the most important aspects is
the choice among alternatives in time. There is also the cathectic
dimension, which has its meaning in terms of gratification-deprivation. Alternatives are selected with respect to
their different consequences for the actor on this level. Value-orientations become organized into
systems of generalized, normative patterns which require consistency of
cognitive-cathectic and consequently evaluative orientation from one particular situation to another. Systems of Value-Orientation 165 Value-orientations
elaborated into cultural patterns possess (in their categorial
organizations) the potentiality of becoming the common values of the members of
a collectivity. Concretely, value-orientations are overwhelmingly involved in
processes of social interaction.
For this reason consistency of normative orientation cannot be confined to one actor in
his action in different situations and at different times; there must also be
integration on an interindividual level.
Rules, that is, must be
generalized in a manner to apply to all actors in the relevant situations in
the interaction system. This is an
elementary prerequisite of social order.
On a psychological level, systems of
symbols may have cognitive or cathectic primacy in their relation to particular
actions of individuals. Where they are
constitutive of the role-expectation systems
of a social system, however, they must necessarily
involve an evaluative primacy, since roles must be organized relative to
alternatives of time and situation. It
does not follow that systems of cognitive symbols and of expressive symbols do not have functional significance. But there is a sense in which ideas and
expressive symbols branch off from the trunk of the ramifying tree of action
lower down than do the modes of value-orientation themselves. Ideas,
evaluative standards, and expressive symbols, respectively, can become the primary foci of orientation of certain types
of concrete action.
Action where cognitive beliefs have primacy in relation to the
attainment of a given goal may be called instrumental action.
Action where expressive symbols have primacy will be called expressive action. Where evaluative standards have primacy (and
where there is usually a concern for the gratification of other actors) the
action will be called moral action. Instrumental actions
are subsidiary in the sense that the desirability of the goal is given by
patterns of value-orientation, as is the assessment of cost which is felt to be
worth while to pay for its realization (i.e., the sacrifice of potential,
alternative goals). But given the goal and the assessment of
the permissible sacrifice, the problem of action is
instrumental, and is to be solved in accordance with given standards of efficiency.
It becomes a question of what the situation is, and this is answerable in cognitive terms. Thus the cultural element in instrumental action consists solely of beliefs, or ideas. Skills
constitute the integration of these ideas with the motivational and
physiological capacities of individual actors.
The ideas which enter into the skill have been internalized. The
category of instrumental actions is a very broad one indeed. It includes the cultural aspects not only of
the skills ordinarily used in a utilitarian context but at least a large
component of those employed in the expressive
field, as in ritual and art.
It also applies in such basic general activities as the use of language,
which is, of course, not exhausted by it.
The essential criterion is subordination
of action in a particular situation to a given
goal. 166 Expressive
orientations of action are concerned not with goals beyond the immediate action
context but with organized gratifications in relation to cathected
objects. The element of normative
ordering to which this gratification process is subjected in a culture is the
manifestation of appreciative standards of value-orientation. These appreciative standards have the same
function of furthering the generalized consistency
of behavior in this field as cognitive standards perform in the instrumental
field. The normative regulation of religious ritual or of artistic style are familiar
examples. The
focus of moral value standards is, as we have asserted previously, on the
integration of a larger system of action.
Moral standards set the limits of the permissible costs of
an expressive gratification or an instrumental achievement - by referring
to the consequences of such action for the other parts of the system and for
the system as a whole. The
basic components of the structure of culture may be
classified as follows. (This analysis
is based on the modes of orientation as these were given in Chapter I.) (1)
Types of Cultural Symbol Systems.7
(a)
Systems of ideas (cognitive primacy). (b)
Systems of expressive symbols (cathectic primacy). (c) Systems of standards of value-orientation (evaluative primacy) - (2)
Types of Standards of Value-Orientation. (a)
Cognitive. (b) Appreciative. (c) Moral. (3)
Types of Orientation of Action. (a) Instrumental: here, expressive and moral
problems are treated by the actor as solved, and the primary focus of attention
is on cognitive problems which must be solved by reference to cognitive
standards. Thus the problem is one of discovering the most efficient means
vis-a'-vis a given goal, subject
to given moral rules. (b) Expressive: here, cognitive and moral problems
are treated as solved (the actor knows what the situation is, and he knows
which actions are "good" in this situation), and the primary focus of
attention is on cathectic problems which must be solved by reference to
appreciative standards. Thus the problem is one of discovering whether or not
it is appropriate for the actor to want or "like" a given cognized
object, after it has already been determined that there is no moral reason why
the object should be either liked or disliked. (c) Moral: here, cognitive and cathectic problems
are treated as solved (the actor knows what he sees, and he knows what he wants), and the primary
focus of attention is on evaluative problems which must be solved by reference
to moral standards. Thus the problem is
one of discovering whether or nor it is right
(in the light of the norms expressing the values of the system of action as a
whole) for an actor to adopt a certain course of action whose outcome is both
known and wanted. ____________________________________________________________________________________ 7
A good deal of confusion in the analysis of culture has arisen from failure to
distinguish these three major aspects of culture. ____________________________________________________________________________________ 167 This is
an analytical classification. In
concrete cultural phenomena, many combinations and nuances are possible. The fact that by no means every empirical
case can be put neatly into one and only one category of an analytical
classification will not be a valid objection to the classification itself. From
the point of view of comparative cultural analysis, which is our primary
interest here, an especially great significance rests with the category of cognitive
orientation or, more specifically, existential beliefs. This is because systems of beliefs
constitute in the nature of the case a generalizing, systematizing, organizing component of systems of action. COGNITIVE SYMBOLS Existential
ideas are an integral part of the system
of culture which in turn is an integral part of action systems. They are therefore in principle
tnterdependent with all the other elements of action. A concrete system of ideas, therefore, is a resultant of this interdependence. Even science
is not simply a reflection of reality,5
but is a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality - to parts or
aspects of the situation of action. The
cognitive element has special significance for the integration and consistency
of a cultural system as well as for the adaptation of action to the exigencies
of the situation. This is perhaps
particularly true of the non-empirical aspects (those aspects not testable by
modern, scientific methods of verification) of the system of existential
ideas. As compared with empirical
tdeas, the nonempirical ones are less controlled
by the process of verification. Choices
among the cognitive possibilities are therefore less subject to control by the
immediate consequence of action in the situation. They enjoy therefore a greater range
of freedom. The question, “Is it a fact?" cannot so readily be
given a definite answer. The larger measure of freedom permits more flexible adaptation and therefore a more harmonious relationship with other elements
in the cultural system. There
are many reasons why noncognitive interests are often particularly pressing in
many spheres in which empirical cognitive orientations cannot operate. In the
areas which Max Weber called the "problems of meaning," 9 cognitive answers are required which
cannot be conclusively demonstrated by empirical means. Thus, why rewards and deprivations should be
so unevenly distributed among men, and what the relation of this distribution
to their "deserts" may be, are not questions satisfactorily
answerable in scientific terms. Whatever the ultimate state
of knowledge may turn out to be, at any given
stage of the advancement of knowledge, there is always a range of cognitive
problems which are vital to human beings but which cannot be authoritatively
answered by science. Hence, because of
their great importance in reconciling normative expectations and actual
responses (rewards and allocations) common
orientation through nonempirical ideas has great significance for the social
system. 8
It is worth noting here that "facts" are not "realities"
but statements about reality.
They may be "true" and yet highly selective in relation to any
conception of the "total reality."
9
The word "meaning" here has a somewhat teleological import. It refers
to the desire on the part of human beings to know why things ought to be one way
or another. ____________________________________________________________________________________ 168 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action Various
possibilities of disequilibrium arise from the fact that these nonempirical
ideas are not always common to all the members of a collectivity (as they need
to be in order to maintain stability). It is, in fact, more difficult to get common acceptance in
this area owing to the relatively greater indeterminacy of the answers to nonempirical cognitive
problems. However, these possibilities
of disequilibrium are reduced by the intervention of noncognitive mechanisms in
the "enforcement" of uniformity and stability in beliefs. These mechanisms are of two major types,
"traditionalism" and au- thoritative or administrative enforcement. At the same time the functional necessity of
resort to such mechanisms of control creates strains since in a system of
cognitive values it is inherent that the ultimate criteria of truth should be
cognitive, not traditional or authoritarian. Systems
of beliefs, or cognitive orientations relate the actor to his situation. Hence the classification of the elements of
the situation, of the different types of object, should provide a set of
invariant points of reference for the classification of the most important
ranges of variation of systems of ideas.
The classification set forth in Fig.
6 (page 254) may be used for this
purpose. We have recurrently
emphasized that the most important distinction is that between social and nonsocial
objects. Here, however, the distinction
between physical and cultural objects within the category of the nonsocial
objects is also highly important. Hence the invariant points of reference of
the cognitive orientations may be classified in four categories as
follows: (1) Persons
constitute one invariant point of reference. Although it is essential, in the
analysis of action, to discriminate between ego as actor and alter as actor, in
the analysis of systems of belief this distinction may be disregarded. A unified cultural tradition will not
maintain fundamentally different sets of beliefs about the ways in which human
beings act and hence they will not need to distinguish between ego and alter. They must accordingly be classed together in
the cognitive orientation system as persons or human beings. Otherwise, without these common beliefs
about human action, complementarity of orientation would not be possible. This sector of the cognitive orientation
system of a culture may be called its conception
of human nature. (2) The collectivity
as an object is another invariant point of reference, whether or not ego is one
of its members. The collectivity
figures as an object of central importance in political and economic
ideologies; for example, "capitalism" or
"socialism." (3) From this we
must distinguish cognitive orientations toward physical objects (including
organisms) and their connections in systems and subsystems. In the Western
world we ordinarily call this nature. (4) Finally the cultural tradition itself, the tradition of
the society in question and of others of which knowledge is current,10
will be the object of cultural
orientations. Systems of Value-Orientation 169 The
question of the ranges of variation of cognitive orientations with respect to
each of these classes of situational objects is complex and cannot be
systematically explored here. Only a
few suggestions may be made. First,
the primacy of cognitive interests in relation to systems of belief means that
the grounds of validity of beliefs are always a crucially important
problem. Hence the
"epistemology" which is always implicit, if not explicit, in a
cultural tradition constitutes a highly significant set of problems with
respect to which variant beliefs may be held.
Second, the problem of the "meaning" of the phenomena in each of these categories, as they are cognized
in the culture in question, will always be crucial. We refer here to the conceptions of their bearing on human
interests and goals, and specifically the interests and goals of the actors in
the society which incorporates the culture.
The problem of meaning, as can be seen, is inevitably and intricately
bound up with the gratification-deprivation balance. ilence it contains a judgment of objects on the basis of their
relative favorableness or unfavorableness to what are conceived as the
worth-while human goals and interests.
Nature, for instance, may he thought of as compliant or resistant in its
relation to human goals. Finally,
there must be an over-all integration of a culture's system of ideas or beliefs
which may be more or less explicitly worked out in cognitive terms. This will include, so far as it is explicit,
a set of beliefs about man's relation to time and the ordering of his actions
in time and to the nonempirical grounds of the world in general.
This is essentially the cosmology of the culture, its way of looking at
the universe and life, which is the primary cognitive foundation of the "ethos" of the culture. It is not possible to go further at
present. But the next step would be to
attempt to approach the problem of working out a typology of cognitive
orientation systems. EXPRESSIVE SYMBOLS Systems
of expressive symbols also may be differentiated according to the classes of
objects in relation to which they organize the actors' cathexes. Following the above classification of
objects, we may distinguish (1)
the appreciative symbolization of responses to nature, such as landscape art and
appreciation; (2)
the appreciative organization of responses to human personalities, for example the
conception of the admirable or beautiful person; (3)
the appreciative
organization of responses to collectivities,
for instance a conception of "good company"; (4)
the appreciative
orientation to cultural objects, for
example, a poem or a mathematical demonstration.11 ============================================================================= 10
This classification of the principal foci of cognitive orientation resembles in
some respects and is indebted to Dr. Florence Klnckhohn's, in her
"Dominant and Substitute Profiles of Cultural Orientations: Their Significance for the Analysis of Social
Stratification," Social Forces, May 1950. ============================================================================ 170 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action EVALUATIVE SYMBOLS A
system of evaluative symbols comprises: (1)
a subsystem of standards for solving cognitive problems, (2)
a subsystem of standards for solving cathectic or appreciative problems, and (3)
a subsystem of "moral"
standards for the over-all integration of the various units of the
system, the various processes of the system, and the various other standards
involved into a single unified system. These are collectivity-oriented or
self-oriented moral values, depending on whether the system to which they have
reference is a collectivity or a personality.
Thus, the evaluative symbols, which are the value standards, can be
subdassified, as we have said, as cognitive, appreciative, and moral. The moral standards may be considered to
represent the superordinate integrative techniques of a system of action
(whether they are collectivity-oriented or self-oriented). In another sense, they are ways of combining
all the other ingredients of action, or recipes for the arrangement of the
elements or aspects that make up concrete orientations. The
moral value standards, as we can see, are diffuse patterns of
value-orientation. They are organizers
which define and integrate whole systems of action (and also many subsystems). These patterns are, above all else,
classifiable in terms of the pattern variables. Thus, we might say, we have thirty-two cells for the
subdassification (or categorization) of the moral standards, the number of
cells deriving from the cross-classification of the five pattern
variables. The strategic place of the
pattern variables in the analysis of action derives from the fact that they
present a very general set of categories which comprise all the possible ways
of relating the personality processes of cognix- mg, cathecting, and evaluating, with cultural standards on
the one hand and social objects on the other. Thus they give us a typology, in
some sense, of the moral value possibilities.12 ====================================================================== 11
These classes of objects are likewise subject, in all cultural traditions, to
evaluations which are elaborated systems of value-orientation. Thus there will be (1)
normative or moral judgments which organize responses toward environmental objects (e.g., judgments of the
benevolence or hostility of nature towards the realization of human ends). There will be (2) normative or moral
judgments which govern responses toward personalities
as systems or toward segments Of personalities; these are expressed in the
value-orientations which define and prescribe the good or virtuous man, or the
good or virtuous action. There will be (3) normative or moral
judgments governing responses toward collectivities;
these judgments are expressed in conceptions of the good society or the ideal
commonwealth and in prescriptions of the right social policy. Finally (4) normative or moral judgments
will organize our responses toward cultural
objects. Among these
judgments will be found those which evaluate the goodness of the pursuit of
truth in the economy of human life, or which judge the moral status of
aesthetic or expressive activities. 12
The pattern variables do seem to define, above all, ways of integrating all the
ingredients of action into systems.
Thus they present a classification of the moral value standards of
persons and collectivities. On the other hand, the moral standards of a
culture, ============================================================================== Systems of Value-Orientation 171 We
shall begin the analysis of the systems of moral standards by calling attention
to a certain congruence with the functional problems of systems of action. This congruence resides in the fact that
there is a certain range of problems of orientation which are inherent in the
structure of systems of action and that an orientation to each of the problems
is a functional imperative of action.
These are problems which are produced by the very nature of action - by
the very nature of orientations to objects - and particular moral values may be regarded as pragmatic solutions of these
problems. Since the problems have a
determinate form arising from the nature of action, the number and logical
relations of the types of alternative solutions is also determinate. Each of the pattern variables states a set
of possibilities of selective response to the alternatives presented by the
situation of action. We have enumerated
five such pattern variables and we have given reasons for believtng that it is
legitimate to consider them an exhaustive set.
The exhaustive character of the classification of pattern variables has
far-reaching implications for the analysis of systems of moral standards; it
provides a determinate range of variability and it allows only a number of
combinations of alternatives which - on this level of generality at least - is
sufficiently small to permit analysis with the resources we possess at
present. There has been a tendency,
under the impact of insight into the wider range of differences among cultures
to think, implicitly at least, of a limitlessly pluralistic
value-universe. In its extreme form, the proponents of this view have even
asserted that every moral standard is necessarily unique. There is much aesthetic sensibility underlying
and justifying this contention, but it is neither convincing logically nor fruitful scientifically. If carried to its logical conclusions, it
denies the possibility of systematic analysis of cultural values. In
fact, of course, all patterns of moral standards are interdependent with all
the other factors which operate in the determination of action. They will, as systems, inevitably fall short
of "perfect integration" which in the
case ol cultural pattern systems must be interpreted to mean consistency of
pattern. At the same time the imperative of approximating consistency
of pattern arising from the need to minimize the strain of conflict within a
system of action is so strong that it is improbable that the actual ranges of
variation of systems of moral standards will coincide with the range of
possible combinations of orientations to different classes of objects. ================================================================================ which govern the integration of the other standards (and
particular moral standards them. selves) into action systems, color the other standards (and
the other symbols and need- dispositions, too, for that matter). That is, cognitive and
cathectic standards tend to differ depending on the kind of moral standards which
control their integration into action. Therefore, the pattern variables can be seen as presenting a
typology of all evaluative symbols (of all value-orientation patterns) owing to the
fact that they primarily present a classification of various types of moral standards. ============================================================================== 172 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action Moral
standards are not logical deductions from systems of beliefs or manifestations
of systems of expressive symbols, nor do they derive from cognitive or
appreciative standards. They depend in
part on such systems, but they draw on all the elements of cognitive,
cathectic, and evaluative selection from the alternatives of action. The
important alternatives (which define the problems of action) emerge for the
actor only when he, armed with his cognitive and cathectic symbols and
standards, directly confronts the relevant situation with all its functional
exigencies. As he develops general
methods for making choices among these alternatives, he thereby gains a new set
of superordinate standards, These are moral value standards. The
pattern variables are crucial here because they are the alternatives of action
and provide the problems of the actor, the problems which are solved by
reference to moral standards. These
problems of action are (1) the basis of choice (or treatment) of the object to
which an orientation applies (ascription-achievement), (2) the appropriateness or inappropriateness of immediate
gratification through expressive action in the particular context
(effectivity-neutrality), (3) the scope of interest in and obligation toward the
object (specificity-diffuseness), (4) the type of norm governing the orientation toward it
(universalism-particularism) and (5) the relevance or irrelevance of collective obligations
in the immediate context (self-collective orientation). Whatever
may prove to be the most useful way of classifying the elements and types of
systems of moral standards the resultant classification will enumerate those
choices among pattern-variable alternatives to which, in the context of
commitments to action, they predispose the actor. A
concrete orientation of action cannot be confronted just by any one or two of
these pairs of alternatives; it must explicitly or implicitly confront all five
and accept commitments in all five directions.
If the pattern variables are to be used to characterize
concrete systems of moral standards, rather than specially abstracted aspects of them, all five variables
must be explicitly included. The consistency of pattern of such a system will
exist to the extent to which the same combination of value judgments formulated
in these terms runs consistently throughout the actors' responses to different
situations; that is, to different classes of objects, different objects in the
same class, and the same objects on different occasions. A type of moral system then will be characterized by the dominance in all major types of situation of
a particular pattern-variable combination, that is, the content of a cell or
group of cells in, for instance, Figs. 3 and 4 (Chapter I), or a particular integration of two or more such combinations
of the values of pattern variables. PATTERN CONSISTENCY
AND SOURCES OF STRAIN Complete
consistency of pattern is an ideal type.
The moral standards which are actually held and acted upon by a concrete
personality or social system cannot possess complete consistency of pattern; it
is indeed probable that complete empirical pattern consistency is
impossible. The inconsistency of
pattern which we frequently observe is engendered by the adjustive problems
which arise from the difficulties of articulation of value-orientation systems
with personality or social systems. It
is an empirical problem, growing up from the relation between cultural systems
and systems of action and from the coexistence of a plurality of cultural
subsystems in the same society or personality. The
evaluation of all the strategically significant categories of the object world
is a functional imperative of a
system of moral standards. It is
imposed by the nature of human action.
Another principal imperative, which is not necessarily harmonious with
the first, is the maximization of the consistency of pattern.13 Evaluative
orientation confronts situational events which may be both
"reinterpreted" and creatively transformed, but Only within limits.
The recalcitrance of events, particularly the foci of man's organic nature and
the scarcity of means or resources, imposes certain functional imperatives on
action. There is no necessity, and
certainly little likelihood, that all the facts of a situation which in a
pragmatic sense must be faced can be dealt with by the actor in accordance with
all the canons of a given value system.
The various value systems will be
differentially selective as to which facts fit and which do not, and how well
or how badly, but there will always be some facts 14 that will be problematical for every value system. They can be dealt with only on the basis of
standards that will be inconsistent with the principal standards of the actor,
whatever these may be. 13
Systems of action are functional systems; cultural systems are symbolic systems
in which the components have logical or meaningful rather than functional
relationships with one another. Hence
the imperatives which are characteristic of the two classes of Systems are
different. In systems of action the imperatives which impose certain
adaptations on the components result from the empirical possibilities or
necessities of coexistence which we designate as
scarcity, and from the properties of the actor as an organism;
in cultural systems the internal imperatives are independent of the
compatihilities or incompatihilities of coexistence. In cultural systems the
systemic feature is coherence;
the components of the cultural system are either logically
consistent or meaningfully congruous. 14
Problematical facts in the
present sense are those which it Is functionally imperative to face and which
necessitate reactions with value implications incompatible with the actor's
paramount value system. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 174 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action In one
sense the facts of the system of
social objects are more malleable than the other classes. They are, to an
important degree, themselves a product of the cultural system prevailing in the
action system. Thus both a man and a
society are in some measure what
they believe. A favorable response from alter never strains ego's own values; the interacting
plurality of individuals which share common values therefore stands in a sense
united in defense against threats to those values. However, there are definite limits to the effectiveness of such
common defense if the values in question conflict seriously
with functional imperatives of systems of action, which must be dealt
with. Some
of these functional imperatives make it most improbable that the actual
concrete structure of any
concrete action system will permit the realization of full consistency of the
various parts of any value system. There must therefore be some sort of
adjustment or accommodation between them.
One mode of adjustment is the tendency to "force" the
structure of the system of social objects into conformity with the value
system, at the cost of increased strain.
Another mode of adjustment is to tolerate and in varying degrees to
institutionalize into the social system or to internalize in the personality
system value patterns which are not in harmony with the major emphases of the
dominant value system. The
inconsistencies of value patterns are intra-individually adjusted through the mechanisms of
defense, and inter-individually adjusted through such social control
mechanisms as isolation and segregation. It is
impossible for a functionally important sector of the social system to be
organized and stabilized without some degree of institutionalization, and for a
correspondingly important sector of the personality to be organized and
stabilized without internalization of values.
In those sectors of the system of action which are out of harmony
with the dominant value-system, "adaptive institutionalization"
will tend to occur. There will
be a special mode of integration into the action system of that sector of the
value-orientation system which is more or less in conflict with the main
value-orientation system and its related institutions. There will consequently exist more or less
fully institutionalized value-patterns, at variance
with the paramount value system; these are "endemic" in the social system, and on
occasion may become important foci for structural change. An
example may be drawn from American social structure. In our value system the
"individualistic achievement complex"
is dominant. It is most fully
institutionalized in the occupational system, but penetrates very far into the
rest of society. One of the systems,
however, in which it is most difficult to institutionalize is kinship, since
occupation is predominantly universalistic, specific, and oriented toward
achievement, while kinship is much more particularistic, diffuse, and
necessarily contains elements of ascription.
Although our kinship system is less incompatible with the complex of
individualistic achievement than are most, there still remains a significant
amount of strain between the dominant value-orientations and that contained in
the kinship system. The balance between
them is consequently not always stable.
Occasionally, the type of value-orientation characteristic
of kinship may become dominant; for example, in situations in which kinship or ethnic group membership becomes
the decisive criterion in allocation of roles and rewards. Where
this order of strain exists, the accommodation will often he facilitated by
"rationalization" or ideological "masking" of the
conflict. This reduces awareness of the
existence of a conflict and its extent and ramifications. Mechanisms of defense in the personality and
mechanism of social control in the social system operate in these areas of
strain to bring the system into equilibrium.
Their inadequacy to reestablish such an equilibrium constitutes a source
of change. Systems of Value-Orientation 175 Inconsistencies
within the value system result in strain in the system of action, personal and
social. Such inconsistencies often originate through historical circumstances
which resulted in exposure to inconsistent value-orientation patterns so that
two or more sets may have been internalized or institutionalized in some sector of the system. This source of strain, however, can only add
to the original sources of strain inherent in the nature of systems of
action. This original source of strain
lies in the fact that no fully
integrated internally consistent system of value-orientation can be adequate to
the functional needs of any concrete system of action. Given the inevitability of strain, there
must therefore be adaptive value-integrations in the sectors in which the
dominant value-integration is least adequate and which compensate for these
inadequacies. Were it not for this
basis of malintegration in the nature of action in a system, historical
malintegrations would certainly not be either severe or persistent. Alongside
the tendency for inconsistencies in the value system to engender strains in the
system of action and vice versa, there is a tendency of systems of action to
build up and maintain levels of consistency as high as the exigencies of action
will permit. The basis of this tendency
rests in the functional need for order which underlies any action system, and
which entails the need for integration of its cultural components. The need for order is seen in its simplest
and most elementary form in the complementarity of role expectations.
Without stability and consequently predictability, which is the essence
of order, ego and alter could not respond to one another's expectations in a
mutually gratifying way.
Correspondingly the need-dispositions within a personality system must
be organized into a stable pattern as a condition of avoiding frustration and holding down anxiety. The recognition of this need for order in
systems of action is the central reason for our introduction of evaluation as
one of the few most fundamental categories.
The fundamental need for order in a system is the root of
the strain which appears when an inconsistent value system is translated into
action. In
relatively stable systems of action there are then the two tendencies to huild
consistent systems of value-orientation and the contrary tendency to generate
and to tolerate inconsistent subsystems with the strain which they
produce. There will be a delicate
dynamic equilibrium between the two main tamed by a wide variety of
accommodating mechanisms. Empirically
the value-orientation is not autonomous except in the sense that it may be
treated as an independent variable, interdependent with other variables in a
system. Among the basic components of
an action system, there is no causal priority of any factor as the initiator of
change. Change may come from any source
in the system. The outcome will depend
on the balance of forces in the system at the time. 176 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action THE INTEGRATION OF
SYSTEMS OF VALUE-ORIENTATIONS IN THE SOCIAL SYSTEM Although
a set of dominant themes or an ethos may be preeminent in the concrete value
system prevailing in a given society, still there will in addition be many
lesser themes representing some or all of the possible pattern-variable
combinations to be found in it. They
will have functions homologous to the adjustive mechanisms of the personality (see Chapter II).
For this reason, the "emanationist" hypothesis which asserts
that action is simply a consequence of the prevailing value system cannot be
accepted. A further deficiency of this view is its assertion that all
sectors of the value systein are explicable by logical derivation from the
central themes or premises. It is on
this account that it is necessary to conceive of both a functional integration of value-orientations
arid a pattern integration. The latter refers to the extent to which a
given pattern or theme of orientation is consistently
manifested in the specific evaluative attitudes of the actors throughout the
social system. Functional integration
refers to the integration of values with systems of action and it therefore
involves priorities and allocations of diverse value components among proper
occasions and relationships. This is
one of the principal aspects of the structure of social systems, and it is by
these mechanisms that standards which are not integrated with respect to their
patterns are brought into a measure of functional integration
sufficient to allow the social system to operate. If we
examine the list of pattern variables and the list of components of a society
described in Chapter II and Fig. 9, we will see that each possible variant of the
value patterns will find a situation in which it has primacy. In general, without some affective
expression no personality and hence no society could function, but neither
could it function without the institutionalization of discipline over otherwise
spontaneous affective expression. Conversely, the complete absorption of
personality, or of subgroup interest into the larger collectivity, would
involve a rigidity of social control incompatible with the functional
conditions of a society as well as with the inevitable need of human beings for
some expressive spontaneity. Some
amount of subordination of private interests or expression remains, however,
indispensable for the operation of a society. Particularistic ties and
solidarities, such as those of kinship, are found in every society, but at the
same time universalistic criteria of skill, efficiency, and classificatory
qualities are never entirely ignored by any of these societies. Certain ascriptive qualities of social
objects are given and are not and cannot be subordinated in all situations to
performances, but performance is so crucial in some situations for all
societies that ascriptive qualities do not and cannot always take
precedence. The segregation of certain
significance-contexts of objects such as the instrumental seems to be essential
at times, but many social relationships are of such a character that the
diffuse type of significance - for instance, in a parent- child relation - also inevitably develops. Systems of Value-Orientation 177 The
functional imperatives (which arise from the nature of the organism and the
pressures of scarcity of time, opportunity and resources in the object
situation) are unevenly distributed within any given social system. The kinship cluster imposes a strong
tendency toward particularistic, diffuse, and ascriptive commitments. The nature of the personality system and the
nature of the roles of the child-parent relationship make affective expression
more likely in the kinship situation than elsewhere. Hence there is an irreducible minimum of commitments to that
combination of pattern variables within the kinship sphere. At the same time,
however, beyond this irreducible minimum, values institutionalized in the
actual role structure of kinship systems may vary very considerably, in
accordance with the value-orientations dominant throughout the society. Thus classical Chinese kinship has a strong
preponderance of particularistic emphasis, placing kinship loyalties very high
in the general priority scale of social values. The American kinship system, on
the other hand, while granting a place to particularistic commitments, tends to
restrict them even within kinship. It
tends, as far as possible, to accept a commitment to reward universalistically
judged classificatory qualities, such as intelligence and the kinds of performances
which are assessed by uiiiversalistic criteria rather than particularistically
judged qualities such as blood ties.
Even obligation to a parent comes to be measured to a considerable
degree by the extent to which the parent is considered "worthy" in
universalistic terms. For example, the definition of a son's gratitude and
hence his obligation toward his mother, is based less on the biological jact of
the relationship than on her services and
attitudes on his behalf. Integration, both within an individual's value
system and within the value system prevailing in a society is a compromise
between the functional imperatives of the situation and the dominant
value-orientation patterns of the society.
Every society is of necessity shot through with such compromises. Therefore it may be well briefly to review the main
elements of such a value system insofar as they are relevant to integration of
different value patterns within the social system. 8/18/01 Notice here that
reconciliation was not a theme in CAC’s case: instead in both their intent was
to paint criminality. Mainly coming
from they would not paint their actual position. The leading element in the real
interindividual or systemic integration is the major
value-orientation pattern dominant in the system (ethos). The basic standards of the social
system are, as we have seen, characterized by the two variables
of universalism-particularism and ascription-achievement. Each of the four basic types will be
further differentiated by admixtures of elements from the other three
types. The second element is the
sub-orientations, which are described by the
combinations of the two basic pattern variables with the other three. Thirdly,
there are adaptive value-orientations such as authoritarianism, traditionalism,
and so forth, which often come to play a part in the concrete value
system. 178 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action The ethos will tend to be relatively fully
institutionalized in some sectors of the social system, less fully in others,
and not at all in still others. The
main mechanism of accommodation is the priority
scale which is implicit in the existence of a dominant value-orientation. This may vary in character from the
prescription of a rather loose hierarchy to the
virtual exclusion of any alternative values; in extremely
authoritarian cultures, for example, evaluations which are in any way critical
of authority are suppressed. Short of
this extreme there will be various degrees of tolerance toward alternative
value patterns. Allocation of conflicting standards between
different sectors of the social system is another of the mechanisms of
accommodation. Values which are not
consistent with the dominant ethos may be confined to special contexts and
roles. Thus even in a highly
universalistic system, particularism may still be sanctioned
in kinship and friendship.
Affective expression will be allowed a place even though the general
trend toward discipline is dominant. Such allocated subvalues are usually integrated in a certain way
with the main system. Their position is
not merely permitted; conformity
with them is often enjoined upon those in the relevant roles. Freedom is another of
the mechanisms of accommodation of unintegrated patterns
of moral standards. Varying widely in
scope and distribution within different societies, spheres exist within which
persons or collectivities may act freely within limits. The area of freedom in
this sense is not necessarily identical with the area of self-orientation
in the institutionahzed
pattern-variable sense. In the area of
self-orientation there may be, apart from direct obligations to a collectivity
or to several collectivities including the society as a whole, an obligation to act autonomously, which
may entail an obligation to pursue certain types of private self-interest. The particular content of the actions in
such cases is not institutionally prescribed, but some important elements of
the choice may be; for example, self-interest and
universalism. Even there however
the specific content of the goals to be pursued by self-interest might be
limited by expectations of pecuniary gain and the procedures will be limited
too by the prohibition of violence. Freedom, however, need not entail so much prescription,
and may accordingly allow more tolerance.
There is, for example, no approval in the current American ethos for certain ethnic value patterns, such as the
immanent-perfection ideal of the Spanish Americans. Within limits, however, tolerance is institutionalized in America
so that usually there is felt to be an obligation to allow a minority to live
its own life, although its principal value patterns do not conform with those
of the dominant sector of the society.
Similarly, some of the values held among the
intelligentsia in Western society since the French Revolution have
deviated widely from the prevailing ethos, but the mechanism of toleration has
held in check what under other conditions would have been severe conflict and
repression. Systems of Value-Orientation 179 Openly
tolerated patterns of divergence from the ethos shade into those which are not
tolerated and which, if they exist at all, have to be protected by a mechanism
of withdrawal or isolation. There are
certain activities and their associated values which manage to exist alongside
the prevailing ethos by the operation of the mechanisms of withdrawal or
isolation which separate the bearers of the divergent value-orientations from
one another, thus reducing the possibility of conflict. In most social systems
considerable sections of the borderline between conformity and deviance are
indistinct. This has great functional
significance. The ambiguity of the
standards or expectations and the legitimately divergent interpretability may
also allow diverse value patterns to coexist by holding frustration and
conflict in restraint. The
functional inevitability of imperfections of value integration in the social
system does not, as we have seen, necessarily destroy the social system, because a set of mechanisms, which are homologous
with the mechanisms of defense in the personality, limit the disintegratedness
and confine its repercussions.
These mechanisms render possible the continued operation of the social
system; that is, the interdependent coexistence of the various parts of the
system. These mechanisms moreover may
even render possible a measure of limited collaboration
between the sectors of the society committed in other respects to incompatible
values. Just as in the personality
certain defense mechanisms keep dangerous impulses below the level of
consciousness, thus keeping down the level of anxiety and conflict, so in the social system certain
accommodative mechanisms permit contradictory
patterns to coexist by allocating them
to different situations and groups within
the society. The extreme rationalist or the doctrinaire who
takes a system of institutionalized values as something to be rigorously and consistently applied in all situations
can for this reason be a seriously disturbing
influence in a social system. Social
systems and especially large-scale societies
are inescapably caught in a very fundamental dilemma. On the one hand they can only live by a system of
institutionalized values, to which the members must be seriously committed and
to which they must adhere in their actions.
On the other hand, they must be able to accept compromises and
accommodations, tolerating many actions which from the point of view of their
own dominant values are wrong. Their
failure to do so precipitates rebellion and withdrawal
and endangers the continuation of the system even
at the level of integration which it has hitherto achieved. In this paradox lies a principle source of strain and
instability in social systems, and many of the most important seeds of social
change.15 15
At the same time this situation is, from the theoretical point of view, the
main reason for refusing to regard the problems of the integration of systems
of cultural value-orientations and of social systems as homologous. It is also
the predominant reason why the type of analysis of value-orientation associated
particularly with the name of the late Ruth Benedict cannot serve as the sole
or even primary basis for an analysis of the
dynamic processes of the social system. 180 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action SYSTEMS OF PERSONAL
VALUES We have
been considering largely the integration of moral
standards into social systems. It is equally relevant to examine some of the problems
arising in connection with the integration of these standards into the personality system. In certain respects, the considerations
which were relevant above are equally valid here.
It is in the combinations of the values of the pattern variables that
variability of moral values is to be sought.
The system of moral standards of the individual actor will have its
elements of consistency and inconsistency, developing from the history of the
individual personality, from its genetic processes of development, and from the
various influences to which it has been exposed in its course. Where there is
imperfect integration of pattern, as to some degree there always must be, there
will also be strain, which can within the limits imposed by the nature of
the inconsistency be ameliorated by the
mechanisms of defense. The
relation between social and personal systems of values cannot, however, be
wholly symmetrical. We have seen that
culture as a system of symbolic meanings inherently embodies the generalized or
interpersonalized aspects of the organization of action. What is commonly
referred to as a culture cannot therefore be limited to the sector
incorporated in a single personality. The latter is in some sense a particularized
variant of emphases and selections from the major combination of themes
which in the social system is generalized for many personalities. The culture of a
personality, so far as it is more than a microcosm of a set of
generalized patterns, is a particularized version, selected from a more
comprehensive total pattern. Adding
usually something of its own through interpretation and adaptation, it consists of the elements which are relevant
and congenial to the particular actor in the light of his particular situations. Order - peaceful coexistence under conditions
of scarcity - is one of the very first of the functional imperatives of social
systems. A social system has no independent
source of motivation of its own; this comes only from the component individuals. The personality is in a sense a motivational
"engine"; the structure and direction of its motives are derived from
the modifications imposed on the innate structure by social interaction and
culture. Gratification
- the most general concept for the fulfiillment of its motives is the primary functional need of personality. The personality has been treated as an organized
complex of need-dispositions. The
combinations of the pattern variables, as we have shown in Chapter I, describe in one sense the fundamental
types of need-disposition organizations.
From the exigencies confronting the need-dispositions in the external situation and in relations to each
other, the further elements which we have
called mechanisms of defense and adjustment are developed. The problems of the appropriate occasions
for gratification or its renunciation, of diffuse attachment to an object or
the specific limitation of its cathectic significance are the primary orientational
dilemmas. Problems of the
character of norms and of the modalities of objects are less immediately crucial
and hence their solutions are more likely to be imposed by situational factors.
Systems of Value-Orientation 181 The generality
of the values of the larger culture which are
institutionalized in the social system gives them a greater share in the creation of this framework
of imposed order. The range of
variability available to the values of particular
personalities is fixed primarily by the
limits which are part of this framework. From
these considerations it becomes evident that there are two primary ranges of variability of personal
moral patterns. First, like
social value systems, personal value systems are constituted by the choices
from the alternatives represented in the pattern variables. In addition, however, the existing institutionalized value system of the society must always
be an independent point of reference.
Regardless of its content, by virtue of his membership in the society, the individual is confronted with the problem of
the degrees and modes of his acceptance or rejection of these values. Unless the social system approaches a state
of extreme disorganization, the personal consequences of radical deviance are
always serious. Some of
the most subtle problems of the relations of personality and culture arise in
this context. Personalities as systems are
thoroughly permeated by culture - the very composition of the
need-dispositions which are constitutive of personality is a fusion of organic
energy into a framework made up of commitments to the alternatives of value-orientation. Even after the personality has become a
relatively stabilized system of need-dispositions allocated among various
occasions for gratification and integrated into
some approximation to a working unity, it is still continuously
confronting the cultural patterns as situational
objects of orientation. Even in a simple society, the cultural pattern
presented as a situational object will be richer in
content, more varied in scope, and of course, more contradictory than a
single personality system, with its functional imperative of integration as a
basic gratification, can incorporate. The
personality system will therefore tend to select particular
elements from the available cultural pattern which will then become
parts of the, orientation system of the actor.
It is certainly not permissible to assert that the actor chooses only
those elements of the pattern (as a situational object) which are identical with his existing need-dispositions. If that were so, there could be no changes
in the behavior of actors through their exposure to different culture patterns
in the course of their lifetime. Nor is
the selection a random one. There
must therefore be some correspondence in general
orientation between the need-disposition system of the personality and
the elements selected from the available cultural patterns; that is, the
pattern elements which become incorporated into the actor's orientation must
still permit an adequate balance of the gratification of the various
need-dispositions. The cognitive
orientations accepted must have some congruity
or consistency with the cognitive orientations already
operative in the personality system.
But it certainly need
not be and is extremely unlikely to be a very detailed identity. 182 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action The reasons for this relative looseness of fit between
personality systems and the selection of cultural orientations from situational
cultural patterns are numerous. There
seem to be two main reasons. First,
need-dispositions are relatively generalized orientations
in the personality system and the cultural object system is also relatively generalized, but they cannot
exactly coincide. Hence in
confrontation with concrete situations, the need-dispositions must become particularized and integrated with a
correspondingly particularized
interpretation of the relevant sector of the culture. Their balance undergoes a momentary change in accordance with the
pressure of the circumstances, and the capacity of
the generalized orientation to guide behavior gratifyingly is inadequate. Hence some more differentiated or
particularized orientation pattern must be added
to the actor's orientation system to increase his ability to maintain
the level of gratification. The second reason lies on a
different plane. In the first instance
we spoke of the substantive content of culture patterns and their potency in
providing gratifying orientations; but there is another selective factor at
work: the conformity-alienation need-disposition, which in some magnitude or
direction is operative in every personality.
Hence there is a factor at work in the selection of cultural patterns which is independent of their content and which is
determined primarily by the strength and direction of the conformity-alienation
need-disposition. Cultural
patterns which in their general content are quite contradictory to the
value-orientation of the other need-dispositions
in the personality system might well be accepted if their acceptance gratifies
the conformity-alienation need-disposition.
There need not necessarily be a conflict between these two criteria of
selection of elements from the cultural object situation. They might well coincide and often do. What has been said here about
selection is true also of the creation of new
value patterns in the personality.
This occurs not only through selection but also through integration and
adaptation. Here the strength of the
need-dispositions and their consequent potentiality for
resisting the pressure of expectations -
independently of alienative need-dispositions - might be said to be one of the
most important factors in determining a creative variant
of an available cultural pattern.
Creativity here refers to the production
of new patterns of personal value-orientation which diverge
significantly from any of the available cultural patterns. The newly created pattern will probably stand in closer correspondence
substantively or formally to the need-dispositions of the personality than in
the case of selection from situationally available patterns. But here too it is not merely a matter of finding a correspondence with the
value-orientations implicit in the need-dispositions. It is the creation of a new pattern which adds to the existing body of orientations in the cultural pattern. It extends to new objects or new relations
among them; it entails new patterns of cognition, expression, or
value-orientation. Some important
aspects of the newly created pattern will always
reveal its continuity, even though remote and complex, with the
elaborated need-disposition system which makes up the personality. Systems of Value-Orientation 183 8/18/01: note the
following confronts the thought that new orientation arises only from
personality needs: the culture itself may have suggested it. The
personal creation of new cultural orientations
might itself be a function of the selection of certain specific cultural
patterns in the situation.
The personal pattern of orientation toward creativity on the part of the
scientist or poet, with its high evaluation of new truths and new images, is
greatly promoted by the presence in the cultural orientation
system of a positive pattern which highly evaluates
creativity in the search for truth without requiring the acceptance
of any particular substantive truths. The
differentiation of personal value systems with respect to their degree of
creativity or its absence must not be confused
with that of need-dispositions to conform with or be alienated from
institutionalized culture patterns.
These two sets of categories cut across each other. The scientist within a culture which highly
values scientific creation might be much more creative than the revolutionary
or the religious prophet who stands in rebellion against the prevailing patterns
of his culture. Creativity is not identical with rebellion; while
conformity with existing patterns may be the result of an orientation toward its mere existence or toward
its content. THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION
OF VALUE SYSTEMS Our
previous discussion has assumed the possibility of a
systematic classification of types of moral standards. The task however still remains to be
done. It should of course be placed in
the context of the larger problem of classification of cultural orientations in
general. This could not, however, be
undertaken within the limits of this monograph.16 Variations
in the structure of these standards may be described systematically by the
various possible combinations of the values of the pattern variables. Of the five pattern variables, it was
asserted in Chapter I that one, self- versus collectivity-orientation,
can be omitted from the more basic treatment of the structural variability
of the two kinds of systems of action.
The reason for this is that it refers to the integration of action
systems which is equally a
functional problem to both types
of system. The form and scope of
integration depends on the nature of the elements
to be integrated, and not the other way
around. This should not be understood to imply that there is no
significant variation with respect
to this variable; the variation, however, is primarily a resultant of the
problems of the functional integration of
the system and it is not constituent of that type of system. 16
A tentative attempt in this direction has been made in Talcott Parsons, The
Social System, chaps. viii and ix. 184 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action Attention
may now again be directed to what was called in Chapter
I (pp. 88, ff.) the "symmetrical asymmetry" of the relations
among the remaining four pattern variables.
Two of them, affectivity-neutrality and specificity-diffuseness, are, as
we saw, peculiarly applicable to personality
systems; the other two, universalism-particularism and
ascription-achievement are primarily applicable to social
systems. The primary significance of the two pattern
variables more closely related to personality
lies in their organization of orientation in
relative independence of the type of situation; the two pattern
variables more closely related to social systems
have their primary significance in the organization of the situation in relative independence of the type of orientation. Both pairs are very important in each type
of action system, but their position is not the same in each. Proceeding
from this assumption, the four main types in the four cells in Fig. 4 (page 251), further elaborated in terms of
their cultural significance as Fig. 10, provide
the basic framework for the classification of systems of values for the social
system. This classification will give
us the systems of common values which are, in relation to the situational
factors, the primary focus of the main institutional structure of the social system. The types in Fig. .3 (page 249)
provide the corresponding framework for value systems of the personality. Of the two classifications, however, the social value-orientations (Fig. 4) have greater significance for the analysis
of cultures. Cultures,
being shared by many actors, comprise the values which define the common
elements in the situations in which they act. (Fig. 10
is on page 258.) The
best correspondence between these major types of value patterns and social
systems will be found in the more comprehensive or macroscopic kinds of
comparative analysis. They will also be
found in those sectors of the social system which are freest for variability,
as a result of being least determined by certain of the more specific functional
imperatives. For
example, governmental structures and those centering about the stratification
subsystem should show on the whole closer correspondence with dominant
value patterns than kinship, which is bound to the relatively more
specific functional conditions of man's biological nature. Kinship systems therefore do not vary as
widely in terms of pattern variables,17 and they are also less
likely to fit the dominant value-orientation than are the larger governmental
and stratification subsystems. Thus an increase in size introduces new
functional imperatives which tend to shift the balance in the direction of
universalism, specificity, etc. A
complete survey of the variability of social value systems is out of the
question here; only a few illustrations can be provided. The universalism-achievement
combination (Fig. 10, cell 1) approximates the
dominant American "achievement
complex." The particularism-achievement combination (cell 2) fits the classical Chinese value system rather closely. Universalism-ascription
(cell 3) fits the pre-Nazi
German value system, and finally, particularism-ascription
(cell 4) seems to correspond to the Spanish American pattern.18 17
They do, of course, vary widely in terms of their composition and relations
among the constituent solidary groupings. Systems of Value-Orientation 185 Fig. 10a further elaborates these four main types of
logically possible value systems. Fig. 11
classifies each of the four main types of value patterns by each of the six
classes of situational objects distinguished in Fig. 6
(page 254). For the sake of refinement and
completeness, three foci of orientation are distinguished within each object class: (1)
the significance of the object for the actor's symbol system
(i.e., the diagnostic definition of the object with reference to which the
actor prepares to act) ; (2)
the types of striving toward a goal which, in terms of the
value-orientation, it will be appropriate for the actor to undertake; and (3) the principal locus of strain in relation to the object. The third aspect is particularly important
in the analysis of the integration of a system of moral standards into an
empirical action system. If the
present approach is consistently adhered to, each subtype of each of the four
main types of value-orientation system may be
further differentiated by confrontation with each main object class. A sample of such a classification for sixteen
subtypes, omitting the self-collectivity variable and confining the elaboration to three selected object classes, is presented
in Fig. 12.19 The
general theory of action points to important determinate interrelations between the cultural standards institutionalized
in the social system and the distribution of personal standards
among its population. Within any social
system, even within any particular status within it, there will tend to be a
variety of personality types. (We use
the term personality type here to
refer to a personality system characterized by its dominant complex of
need-dispositions.) In principle all of
the possible personality types may appear in the same society, but the nature
of the relations between personality and social structure is such that their distribution cannot vary at
random in any given society. In view of
the special pertinence of the variables
of affectivity-neutrality and specificity-diffuseness to personality, the cells
within the main types of Fig. 11, in addition
to defining subtypes of cultural values of the social system, may also define the personality types most likely to be produced
in, or at least to be necessary for the functioning of, a society with a major
value system oriented in terms of one of the main cultural types. 18
These assertions would of course have to be justified by more detailed
discussion than is possible here, and they are in any case acknowledged to be
only first approximations. 19
For instance, within the transcendent-achievement pattern, the most significant
variations lie perhaps between the subtypes distinguished by affectivity and
discipline. The commitment to the
transcendent-achievement pattern precludes a prominent position for diffuse
obligations. The disciplined alternative more nearly characterizes the American
value system with its strong emphasis on instrumental
achievement and the puritanical
attitude toward pleasure which prevailed until recently; it might be
suggested very tentatively that the affective alternative comes close to
certain aspects of the French with their greater emphasis on the
style of life with its refined patterns for affective expression in
consumption, convivial relations, etc.
186 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action This
possibility may be illustrated with respect to the universalistic-achievement
orientation which is rather characteristic of important tendencies in American
culture. In Fig.
3 the four major need-disposition types are designated as the segmental gratification value-orientation
(affectivity-specificity), approval (neutrality-specificity),
love (affectivity-diffuseness)
and esteem
(neutrality-diffuseness). The high
evaluation of approval is perhaps most peculiarly American. In one direction,
this fuses with the hedonistic (segmental gratification)
value-orientation producing an orientation toward achievement, with an
inclination toward immediate gratifications.
This is certainly one of the directions of the break-down of Puritan
discipline in American society in recent decades. Hence such orientations may be deviant, and thus likely to be in
conflict with the predominant value system.
A second direction of deviance is from orientation toward specific performances assessed by
universalistic standards to a diffuseness
leading to the "esteem" orientation. This
too finds its counterpart in American culture in recent years and is enhanced by
the growth of mass communications. The personality
types that seek to be the center of attention, who are not content with
specific achievements and the corresponding approval by themselves and others,
and who must be recognized as generally
superior, would fall into this category.
In American culture, this type has tended to be defined as somewhat
deviant - although perhaps less so now than a half-century ago - and certain
attendant strains have thereby been produced. Perhaps the least common of the four orientations in American
society is the "love"
pattern. Quite understandably it is
more likely to be found among women than men because women have been excluded
from the achievement complex and they have a special role in the kinship
structure. But it is by no means
necessarily confined to women. Even
though not frequently found as a dominant orientation among men, it frequently
is a very important counterfoil as a partial
orientation pattern in such contexts as the romantic-love complex, where
it represents a segregated revolt against some of the other tendencies of the
culture. These
remarks are at best intended only to be suggestive of the possibilities of
analysis through the use of these categories.
Both
the major orientations and the subtypes are ideal
types and there is no reason why any concrete and in particular any dominant
value-orientation should conform exactly to any one of them. There are undoubtedly many significant marginal cases. Because of this ideal-typical character,
this scheme is highly formal and can be only a first step in the analysis of
actual or historical systems of value-orientation. Much more would have to be added before the scheme could be used
for detailed concrete analysis. For
instance, our treatment of the
universalistic-achievement pattern of orientation does not specify which
particular classes of achievements are valued. These might be scientific, technological, artistic, military, and
so on, and concrete cultural orientations certainly do differ markedly in these
respects. Moreover, the pattern-variable
scheme, at this stage of the logical construction of the categories of cultural
orientations, does not explicitly formulate the types of value-orientations
which are embodied in unequal but complementary social relations such as
dominance-submission. The
value-orientations implicit in these social relationships are to be analyzed as
adaptive mechanisms mediating between major cultural patterns and the
exigencies of social situations.20
Systems of Value-Orientation 187 This
formal quality, although a limitation, is not in principle a deficiency of the
scheme. The enormous empirical complexity of concrete
value-orientation systems is not subject to question. Any conceptual scheme which attempted
to take account of all this complexity at one stroke would be scien- tifically useless in the present stage of development of
social science because it would be far too cumbersome to handle systematically
without mathematical techniques, which, for a variety of reasons, cannot yet be
applied to the relevant social science concepts. The question is not, therefore,
whether the pattern-variable scheme, by being formal,
"oversimplifies" empirical reality; any analytical scheme
would do so. The question is whether
the selection of variables incorporated in this scheme is more or less useful
than an alternative selection. There are
two kinds of criteria of the usefulness of such a selection. One is its
fruitfulness in research. This test is
still to be made. The other is the relationship of the chosen set of variables
to other variables in a highly generalized conceptual scheme,
which in its various parts has already proved itself useful in research. From this source the pattern-variable scheme
draws strong support. It employs analytical concepts which have been derived
from the basic categories of action, which themselves in more concrete versions
have been applied with success to the study of cultures as various as ancient Israel, China, India, and modern Christendom. The
derivability of a variety of concepts from the major categories of the
definition of action merits further consideration. In Chapter II, principal need-disposition orientations were derived from
the general orientation scheme, through the pattern variables by means
of certain techniques of conceptual derivation. The same can be done for systems of cultural orientation. A value system which appraises authority
very highly is, for instance, conceptually homologous
to the need for dominance in the personality and to a high
degree of concentration of authority in the social system and it seems,
similarly, to derive from combinations of the pattern variables. Concretely,
the type of value-orientation toward
authority which will develop will depend on the combination of pattern-variable
values which is associated with it.
Thus in the universalism-achievement orientation authority will be
linked to status based on achievement.
At the opposite pole, in the particularism-ascription orientation, there will be a
tendency to acknowledge the authority exercised by persons with an ascribed
status within a particularistic structure.21 ========================================================================= 20
A similar limitation in the use of the most elementary pattern-variable
combinations in concrete description was observed in onr discussion of
personality. ============================================================= 188 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action By similar techniques other
aspects of orientations toward authority can be derived from combinations of
the pattern variables within given cultural
and social contexts without making orientation toward authority itself
one of the basic types of value-orientation. In the present conceptual scheme, orientations toward authority belong on a derivative level
of concreteness in the classification of systems of value-orientations. They are not a fundamental type. What is true of
the place of the evaluation of authority would also be true of adherence to tradition
or of other differentiated concepts such as the evaluation of prudence,
or of adventurousness, or even the evaluation of the things of this
world as distinguished from those of the "next." 22 The
different pattern.variable combinations, when integrated into action systems,
will of course predispose the actors toward those derivative patterns of
value.orientation which are consistent with them. Thus the universalism-ascription
pattern has a tendency to authoritarianism,
because the authoritarian "ideal state" involves allocation according to qualities and the
implication that this "ideal state" should be acknowledged by everyone. Given the likelihood of deviant tendencies
in all systems the resort to authoritarian enforcement in
universahstic.ascriphvely oriented culture is highly probable. Similarly, in a
culture with a predominantly particularistic
value-orientation, a universalistic
orientation is enabled to exist only if it is "projected"
into an "other worldly" sphere, thereby reducing the strain which it
would otherwise cause. Thus the
attainment of Nirvana in Buddhism is very
strictly a universalistic-achievement value, which has been enabled to flourish
in the particularistically organized social structures of Oriental societies
only by virtue of its other-worldliness.
Such inferences, however, must be drawn with caution; and the concrete
orientations will be a resultant of many factors ranging from the functional
imperatives imposed by the organism and the situation and the general
value-orientations involved. Systems of Value-Orientation 189 This
chapter has presented an exceedingly sketchy treatment of a very complicated
subject. Its aim has not been to produce a complete analysis but to indicate
the main lines along which the general analysis of action presented in Chapter I could be developed in the study of
value-orientations. Compared to other
current modes of analysis, it possesses two distinctive features which may be
regarded as significant. First, by
showing the relation between cultural value-orientations and the
pattern.variable scheme, it relates the former directly to the constitutive
structural elements of personality and social systems in a way which is
theoretically both generalized and systematic. For purposes of theory construction, it makes the place of cultural orientations in systems of action much
clearer, and helps greatly to clear away some of the confusions
involved in many current controversies in the field. It gives a general theoretical
demonstration of why the analysis of value-orientations
on the cultural level is of such crucial importance in the theory of
action and in all its special branches.
It also shows that the interpretation of concrete action exclusively
in categories of value-orientation is not admissible,
except as a special case. The second distinctive
feature of this analysis is that it provides points of departure for a
systematic classification of systems of value-orientation. This leads into the systematic
classification of types of systems of action themselves as wholes and of their
component parts. In both fields there
has been a great need for a better basis of such systematic
classification. It is hoped that the
present scheme might provide the ground work for a more fundamental solution of
the problem. However,
the formidable nature of the task of elaborating in detail the implications of
such a scheme in relation to the infinitely various nuances of empirical
differentiations should not be underestimated.
We are under no illusion that more has been done here than to indicate
certain fundamental starting points for
such a process of elaboration. 21 This is
the predominant feature of what Weber called "traditional authority." 22
It may be noted incidentally that the distinction between transcendence and
immanence of reference, which is
involved in th 'iniversa1ism~particnlarism variable, is not the same as the
distinction between worldly and other-worldly orientations. _________________________________________________________________________________
ideological furnishings for the homeless
mind
daurril
library: talcott parsons