toys in the attic: TALCOTT PARSONS EDWARD A. SHILS With the assistance of JAMES OLDS This section is, in a sense, a
continuation of the enterprise started in the General Statement of Part I. That statement sets forth a conceptual
scheme concerning the nature of action.
It holds that the elements of action can be organized into three different
interdependent and interpenetrating, but not mutually reducible, kinds of
systems. These three kinds of systems -
personalities, social systems, and cultural systems - are all important in
social theory. The
conceptual scheme set forth in the General Statement is the framework we share
with our collaborators. It underlies our
work and it will be taken for granted here.
Our aim in the present section is to develop, from these starting
points, a more technical and more highly differentiated conceptual scheme. The body of Part II falls into four
chapters. The first chapter defines more completely than has
been done heretofore certain elements of the orientation of action and certain
elements of the structure of the situation.
These elements of orientation and structure are important in all three kinds of
systems. In the same chapter, a further
analysis of the interrelations of these elements is carried out. Specifically, the
scheme of five "pattern variables" of value-orientation will
be developed as a tool for analysis of such interrelations. The pattern-variable scheme presents a
systematization of one of the crucial points of articulation of the three kinds
of systems. The second chapter is
concerned with the way the action of the individual is organized into a personality system. The chapter attempts to organize certain motivational variables
with those of the theory of action so as to form the two into one coherent
system. Particularly, it points up
relationships that obtain between motivational and value-orientation
variables. And, it tries to show the
relationship of the latter to the defensive and adjustive mechanisms by which
the individual personality system copes with the exigencies of its situation. The third chapter is
concerned with culture. It takes up
the systematic analysis of value patterns themselves and their organization
into systems. It places them in the
context of larger culture systems and analyzes their articulation with social
systems and personalities. Sources of
imperfect integration of certain
value systems are also discussed; these are such as expose the systems to
processes of change. The fourth chapter takes
up the social system, analyzing its
bases of organization and its functional problems. It shows how value-orientation patterns enter into the
institutionalization of roles and of the allocative and integrative structures
of the social system and how the motivation of individual actors is channeled
into role behavior. There is also
consideration of the problem of the bases of structural variability and change
of social systems. The final chapter briefly summarizes
the main analysis and suggests certain lines of promising work for further
development. 48
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action The most important thread of
continuity running through Part II is the "pattern
variable" scheme. It might be well to familiarize the reader with this
scheme here at the outset so that he will be prepared for some of the complex
material that will precede its technical introduction into the text of this
work. The following paragraph, therefore, will show the reader
something of what is to come. The pattern-variable scheme
defines a set of five dichotomies.
Any course of action by any actor involves (according to theory) a
pattern of choices with respect to these five sets of alternatives.1
Ignoring
technical terminology, we may define the five dichotomies as follows. The first is that between accepting an opportunity
for gratification without regard for its consequences,
on the one hand, and evaluating it with regard to its consequences, on the
other. The second is that between considering an act solely
with respect to its personal significance,
on the one hand, and considering it with respect to its significance for a
collectivity or a moral code, on the other. The third is that between evaluating
the object of an action in terms of its relations to a generalized frame of
reference, on the one hand, and evaluating it in terms of its relations to the
actor and his own specific relations to objects, on the other. The fourth is that between seeing the social object
with respect to which an action is oriented as a composite
of performances (actions), on the one hand, and seeing it as a composite of
ascribed qualities, on the other. The fifth is that between conceding
to the social object with respect to which action is oriented an undefined set
of rights (to be delimited only by feasibility in the light of other demands),
on the one hand, and conceding to that social object only a clearly specified
set of rights on the other. The pattern-variable
scheme to be presented below will attempt to formulate the way each and every
social action, long- or short-term, proposed or concrete, prescribed or carried
out, can be analyzed into five choices (conscious or unconscious, implicit or explicit)
formulated by these five dichotomies. We should perhaps give a brief
resume' of the problems which gave rise to this method of analysis. Certain
elements of this scheme were developed some years ago in an attempt by one of
the authors to systematize the analysis of social role-patterns.2 This attempt in turn grew out of
dissatisfaction with then current
dichotomous classifications of types of social relationships, of which
Toennies' Gemeinschajt and Gesellscha/t was the most prominent. Though applied to the analysis of
professional roles and elsewhere, the pattern-variable scheme remained
incomplete and its grounding in general theory obscure. This line of thought converged with ideas
derived by the other author largely from critical consideration of Max Weber's
four types of action and the difficulties in Weber's scheme.3 _______________________________________________________________________________ 1 Actions may he
long-term or short-term; they may he planned or concrete; they may be prescribed
or carried out. A long-term action may
be comprised by a sequence of shorter-term actions. A planned action may or may not eventuate in a concrete
action; similarly, a prescrihed course of action may or may not be carried out.
Nevertheless, any specifiable course of action, short- or long-term, proposed
or concrete, prescribed or carried out, is by theory analyzable into a pattern
of choices with respect to these five dichotomies. _________________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
49 The problems posed by these
concepts have proved to open up one of the main paths to the higher level of
systematic integration of theory presented here. It appeared above all that these variables were not peculiar to
social structure but were grounded in the general structure of action - they
were hence involved in personalities as well as in
social systems. It further
appeared that they were patterns of value-orientation and as such were part of
culture. This insight contributed
greatly to the understanding of culture and of the ways in
which it became integrated in personalities and social systems. The pattern variables have proved to form,
indeed, a peculiarly strategic focus
of the whole theory of action. Several questions may arise
about whether the substance of this
monograph constitutes a "system"
in the theoretical sense.4
In one sense every carefully defined and logically integrated conceptual
scheme constitutes a "system," and in this sense scientific theory of
any kind consists of systems. Beyond
this, however, there are three questions relevant to the
"systematic" nature of a theoretical
work. The first has to do with the generality and
complexity of the scheme. The second is concerned with the degree to which it
may claim "closure"; here the problem is whether the implications of
its assertions in some parts are systematically supported or contradicted by
assertions in other parts. The third is concerned with the level of
systematization; that is, with how far the theory is advanced toward the
ultimate goals of science. Let us propose, in advance, some
answers to these questions about the systematic nature of our work. Since we carry deductive procedures further
than is common in the social sciences (excluding, perhaps, economic theory), we
may justly be called system-builders on the first count. In default of formal, logical, or
mathematical tests of completeness or closure, however, we are unable to judge
how far the present scheme approaches such a standard; it seems almost certain
that it is relatively incomplete in this sense. We do feel that we have carried the implications of our
assumptions somewhat further than others have carried theirs; yet we do not feel
that the fruitful implications of our assumptions have been even nearly
exhausted. We believe that there is
much more to be done. _______________________________________________________________________________ 2
Cf. Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, esp. chap. viii. 3
E. A. Shils, "Some Remarks on the Theory of Social and Economic
Organization," Economica,
1948. 4
Here the notion of a "theoretical system" should
he kept separate from the notion of an
"empirical system." The
latter notion will he defined and discussed at the end of Chapter I. In the present section we are concerned with
whether or not our conceptual scheme constitutes a theoretical system. Thus we are asking about the coherence and
utility of our scheme. The other
question (about an empirical system) has to do with criteria for coherence and
harmony to be applied to some specific body of subject matter. _______________________________________________________________________________ 50
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action So far as the "level"
of systematization is concerned, it seems useful to distinguish four
different levels of systematization of conceptual schemes, in order of their
“primitiveness" relative to the final goals of scientific endeavor: (1) ad
hoc classificatory systems, (2) categorial systems, (3) theoretical systems,
and (4) empirical-theoretical systems. The first type involves
the use of more or less arbitrary classes for the sake of making summary
statements about the subject matter. No
attempt is made to fit the classes to the subject
matter in such a way that the relations among the classes will be
patterned upon the relations among the items of the subject matter summarized by these classes. The classes arc quite independent of one
another and any relations which may be discovered must come from ad hoc
researches. Such common-sense classifications as that of "fish, flesh, or fowl" are illustrative of this
type of classificatory system. The second, the categorial type, involves a system of classes
which is formed to fit the subject matter, so that there are intrinsic relations among the classes, and these
are in accord with the relations among the items of the subject matter. Thus,
in these systems, the principles of classification,5 themselves, include statements of certain
relationships among classes. The
elements are so defined as to constitute an interdependent system. And the system has sufficient complexity and
articulation to duplicate, in some sense, the interdependence of the empirical
systems which are the subject matter. A
categorial system, thus, is constituted by the definition of a set of
interrelated elements, their interrelatedness being intrinsic to their
definition. Thus in classical mechanics
such concepts as space, time, particle, mass, motion, location, velocity,
acceleration and their logical interrelations constitute a categorial
system. A
categorial system in this sense is always logically
prior to the laws which state further relations between its
elements. The laws state generalized
relationships of interdependence between variables in the system. The laws presuppose the definitions of the variables, and
they presuppose those relations which are
logically implied by the definitions and by the kind of system in
question. Insofar as specific laws can
be formulated and verified, a categorial system evolves into a theoretical
system. Thus a categorial system whose laws
relating elements have been formulated is a theoretical system. But it is quite possible to have a
categorial system or many parts of one before
we have more than a rudimentary knowledge of laws. In the field of action, our
knowledge of laws is both vague and fragmentary. We know, for instance, that there is a positive relationship
between reward and learning, but we cannot say in any specific situation how
reward or its absence will interact with other variables; we do not know, that
is, what effect will be produced by a concrete interaction of many variables
even when reward is one of the ingredients of the situation. We do know, of course, that certain
variables are highly significant, and we know certain things about the
direction of their influence and how they combine with other variables. Knowing that a variable is significant,
having a definite conception of it and its logical distinctions from other
variables and other aspects of the empirical system is categorial knowledge;
and that is where most of our theoretical knowledge
of action stands today. ______________________________________________________________________________ 5
The principles of classification are the definitions of the elements of the
system. ______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction
51 We have already said that a
theoretical system is a categorial system whose laws relating elements have
been formulated. The classical
mechanics is the commonest example of what we mean here by a theoretical
system. By logical manipulation of this
system it is possible to make detailed predictions about the consequences of specific changes in the values
of specific variables; this is because the general laws of the system are
known. It should be noted, however,
that the classical mechanics does not tell us how empirical systems will
actually behave; it tells us rather how they might behave if an ideal set of
scientific or "standard" conditions were to exist. Insofar as an
empirical system can be subjected to such standard conditions in a laboratory,
or insofar as it exists in some "pure" medium, so far is the theoretical
system an adequate tool for the prediction of the changes which actually occur
in the empirical system. Thus, in
certain empirical fields, such as the astronomy of
the solar system, the theoretical system of classical mechanics is, to a
close approximation, empirically adequate. But in other fields, such as ballistics, or practical mechanics, the classical
system by itself gives only much rougher approximations. This is because of the
intervention of such variables as air-resistance and friction. The latter variables, insofar as they have
no place in the system itself, bring about "error" in prediction,
that is, error in the fit between the theoretical and the empirical systems. This
gives us the basis for our definition of empirical-theoretical systems. We speak of an empirical-theoretical system
whenever a sufficient number of relevant variables can be brought together in a
single (theoretical) system of interdependence adequate for a high level of precision
in predicting changes in empirical
systems outside special experimental conditions. This is the long-term goal of scientific endeavor. It has often been said that in
our field we have a "structural-functional"
theory. This refers to the fact that we have achieved in our field the stage
where the categorial requirements are
relatively well met; the knowledge of laws has not yet reached far enough to
justify calling ours a theoretical system in the
sense of the classical mechanics. The
progress of knowledge will, however, move it steadily in that direction. The present monograph is a
straightforward exposition of a conceptual scheme. We deliberately decided to forego documentation by references to
the relevant literature. This would
have been a heavy task, would have greatly increased the already considerable
bulk of the monograph, and would have substantially
delayed publication. We would like this
monograph to be received as an essay in theory
construction as such, not as a work of scholarship in the traditional
sense. 52
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action It is always difficult to
acknowledge adequately indebtedness for others' contributions to such a work.
In the deepest sense our debt is to the work of the great founders of modern
social science theory, among whom we may single out Durkheim, Freud, and Max
Weber; but in addition to these many other
psychologists and anthropologists have influenced us greatly. More directly, our collaborators in the
present project have stimulated us profoundly through many discussions, formal
and informal; by their criticisms; and, of course, by their writings. Among them Professor Tolman and Mr. Sheldon,
with whom we shared the privilege of release from normal academic obligations,
stand out. Members of the Harvard Department of Social Relations also played a
very important part. The debts to our
Harvard colleagues are relatively immediate because of the discussions in which
we have jointly participated. These
acknowledgements should not obscure the great indebtedness we feel to many colleagues
and writers outside Harvard. The
final draft of this manuscript was turned over to Mr. James Olds for careful
editing in the interest of clarity and readability. Mr. Olds's services were on a level far above that normally
expected of an editor. He has
contributed substantially to the content of the monograph at a number of important points as well as to the
improvement of the presentation. We are
most happy to acknowledge his contribution and to have him associated with us
in the authorship of the monograph. Finally, because of their close
relationship to this work, we should mention two publications. The Social
System, by Talcott Parsons, will be published in 1951 by the Free Press of
Glencoe, Illinois. This book
could be regarded as a second volume to the
present monograph; it takes essentially the subject matter of
Chapter IV and elaborates it into a full volume. The general foundations in the theory of action on which it
builds are those developed in the General Statement of Part I and the present
monograph. The Primary Group in the Social Structure by Edward A.
Shils, will also be published by the Free Press. In a somewhat more special
field, it analyzes the interrelations of personality systems, primary groups,
and larger social systems, using much of the conceptual scheme presented here
in Part II. T. P. E. A. S. The theory of action 1
is a conceptual scheme for the analysis of the behavior of living organisms. It conceives of this behavior as oriented to the
attainment of ends in situations, by means of the normatively regulated
expenditure of energy. There are four
points to be noted in this conceptualization of behavior: (1) Behavior is oriented to the attainment of ends or goals or other
anticipated states of affairs. (2) It takes place in situations. (3) It is normatively regulated. (4)
It involves expenditure of energy or effort or "motivation" (which
may be more or less organized independently of its involvement in action) - Thus, for
example, a man driving his automobile to a lake to
go fishing might be the behavior to be analyzed. In this case, (1) to
be fishing is the "end" toward which our man's behavior is
oriented; (2) his situation is the road
and the car and the place where he is; (3) his energy expenditures are
normatively regulated - for example, this driving behavior is an intelligent 2 means of getting to the
lake; (4)
but he does spend energy to get there; he holds the wheel, presses the
accelerator, pays attention, and adapts his action to changing road and traffic
conditions. When
behavior can be and is so analyzed, it is called "action."
This means that any behavior of a living organism might be called action;
but to be so called, it must be analyzed in terms
of the anticipated states of affairs toward which it is directed, the
situation in which it occurs, the normative regulation (e.g., the intelligence)
of the behavior, and the expenditure of energy or "motivation"
involved. Behavior which is reducible
to these terms, then, is action. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 1 The present
exposition of the theory of action represents in one major respect a revision and extension of the position stated in
Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (pp.43-51, 732-733),
particularly in the light of psychoanalytic theory, of developments in behavior
psychology, and of developments in the anthropological analysis of
culture. It has become possible to
incorporate these elements effectively, largely because of the conception of a
system of action in both the social and psychological spheres and their integration with systems of cultural patterns has been
considerably extended and refined in the intervening years. 2 Norms of
intelligence are one set among several possible sets of norms that function in
the regulation of energy expenditure. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 54
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action Each action is the action of an
actor, and it takes place in a situation
consisting of objects. The objects may
be other actors or physical or cultural objects. Each actor has a system of relations-to-objects; this is called
his "system of orientations."
The objects may be goal objects, resources, means, conditions,
obstacles, or symbols. They may become
cathected (wanted or not wanted), and they may have different significances
attached to them (that is, they may mean different things to different people)
- objects, by the significances
and cathexes attached to them, become organized into the actor's system of
orientations. The actor's system of orientations is constituted by a great number
of specific orientations. Each of these "orientations of action" is a
"conception" (explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious) which
the actor has of the situation in terms of what he wants (his ends), what he
sees (how the situation looks to him), and how he intends to get from the
objects he sees the things he wants (his explicit or implicit, normatively
regulated "plan" of action). Next, let us speak briefly about
the sources of energy or
motivation. These presumably lie
ultimately in the energy potential of the physiological
organisms. However, the manner
in which the energy is expended is a problem which requires the explicit
analysis of the orientation of action, that is, analysis of the normatively regulated relations of the actor to the
situation. For, it is the system
of orientations which establishes the modes in which this energy becomes
attached and distributed among specific goals and objects; it is the system of
orientations which regulates its flow and which integrates its many channels of
expression into a system. We have introduced the terms
action and actor . We have said something about the goals of action, the
situation of action, the orientation of action, and the motivation of action. Let us now
say something about the organization of action into
systems. Actions are not empirically
discrete but occur in constellations which we call systems. We are concerned with three systems, three
modes of organization of the elements of action; these elements are organized
as social systems, as personalities, and as cultural systems. Though all three modes are conceptually
abstracted from concrete social behavior, the empirial referents of the three
abstractions are not on the same plane.
Social systems and personalities are conceived as modes of organization
of motivated action (social
systems are systems of motivated action organized about the relations of actors to
each other; personalities are systems of motivated action organized about the
living organism). Cultural systems, on the other hand, are systems of symbolic patterns (these patterns are created
or manifested by individual actors and are transmitted among social systems by
diffusion and among personalities by learning). Orientation
and Organization of Action 55 A social
system is a system of action which has the following
characteristics: (1) It involves a process of
interaction between two or more actors; the interaction process as such is a
focus of the observer's attention. (2)
The situation toward which the actors are oriented includes other actors. These other actors (alters) are objects of
cathexis. Alter's actions are taken
cognitively into account as data. Alter's
various orientations may be either goals to be pursued or means for the
accomplishment of goals. Alter's orientations may thus be objects for
evaluative judgment. (3) There is (in a social
system) interdependent and, in part, concerted action in which the concert is a
function of collective goal orientation or common values, a and of a consensus
of normative and cognitive expectations. A personality
system is a system of action which has the following
characteristics: (1) It is the system comprising
the interconnections of the actions of an individual actor. (2) The actor's actions are
organized by a structure of need-dispositions. (3) Just
as the actions of a plurality of actors cannot be randomly assorted but
must have a determinate organization of compatibility or integration, so the
actions of the single actor have a determinate organization
of compatibility or integration with one another. Just as the goals or norms
which an actor in a social system will pursue or accept will be affected and
limited by those pursued or accepted by the other actors, so the goals or norms
involved in a single action of one actor will be affected and limited by one
another and by other goals and norms of the same actor. A cultural
system is a system which has the following characteristics: (1) The system is constituted neither by the organization of interactions nor by the organization of the actions of a single
actor (as such), but rather by the organization of the values, norms, and
symbols which guide the choices made by actors and which limit the types of
interaction which may occur among actors. (2) Thus a cultural system is not an empirical system in the same sense as a
personality or social system, because it represents a special kind of
abstraction of elements from these systems.
These elements, however, may exist
separately as physical symbols and be transmitted from one empirical action
system to another. (3) In a cultural system the
patterns of regulatory norms (and the other cultural elements which guide
choices of concrete actors) cannot be made up of random or unrelated elements.
If, that is, a system of culture is to be manifest in the organization of
an empirical action system it must have a certain degree of consistency. (4) Thus a cultural system is a pattern of culture whose
different parts are interrelated to form value systems, belief systems, and systems of expressive
symbols. Social
systems, personality systems, and cultural systems are critical subject matter
for the theory of action. In the first
two cases, the systems themselves are
conceived to be actors whose action is conceived as oriented to
goals and the gratification of need-dispositions, as occurring in situations, using energy, and as being normatively regulated. Analysis of
the third kind of system is essential to the theory of action because systems of value standards (criteria of selection)
and other patterns of culture, when institutionalized
in social systems and internalized in
personality systems, guide the actor with respect to both the orientation to ends and the normative regulation of means and of expressive
activities, whenever the need-dispositions of the actor allow choices in these
matters. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 2 A person is said to
have "common values" with another when either (1) be
wants the group in which he and the other belong to achieve a certain group
goal which the other also
wants, or (2) be intrinsically values conformity with the
requirements laid down by the other. 56
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action 1. The frame of reference of the theory of action involves
actors, a situation of action, and the orientation of the actor to that
situation. a.
One or more actors is involved.
An actor is an empirical system of action.
The actor is an individual or a collectivity which may be taken as a
point of reference for the analysis of the modes of its orientation and of its
processes of action in relation to objects.
Action itself is a process of change of
state in such empirical systems of action. b.
A situation of action is
involved. It is that part of the
external world which means something to the actor whose behavior is being
analyzed. It is only part of the whole
realm of objects that might be seen. Specifically, it is that part to which the
actor is oriented and in which the actor acts. The
situation thus consists of objects of orientation. c.
The orientation of the actor to the situation
is involved. It is the set of
cognitions, cathexes, plans, and relevant standards which relates the actor to
the situation. 2. The actor is both a system of action and a point
of reference. As a system of action the
actor may be either an individual or a collectivity. As a point of reference the actor may be either an actor-subject
(sometimes called simply actor)
or a social object. a. The individual-collectivity distinction is made
on the basis of whether the actor in question is a personality system or a
social system (a society or subsystem).
b. The subject-object distinction is made on the
basis of whether the actor in question occupies a central position (as a point
of reference) within a frame of reference or a peripheral position (as an
object of orientation for an actor taken as the point of reference. When an actor is taken as the central point of reference, he
is an actor-subject. (In an interaction
situation, this actor is called ego.) When he is taken as an object of orientation for an
actor-subject, he is a social object. (In an interaction situation, this actor
is called alter.) Thus, the actor-subject (the actor) is an orienting subject; the
social object is the actor who is oriented to.
This distinction cross-cuts the individual-collectivity
distinction. Thus an individual or a
collectivity may be either actor-subject or social object in a given analysis. Orientation
and Organization of Action 57 3.
The situation of action may be divided into a class of social objects
(individuals and collectivities) and a class of nonsocial (physical and
cultural) objects. a. Social objects include actors as persons and
as collectivities (i.e., systems of action composed of a plurality of
individual actors in determinate relations to one another). The actor-subject
may be oriented to himself as an object as well as to other social
objects. A collectivity, when
it is considered as a social object, is never constituted by all the action of the participating
individual actors; it may, however, be constituted by
anything from a specified segment of their actions - for
example, their actions in a specific system of roles - to
a very inclusive grouping of their actions – for example, all of their many
roles in a society. Social
objects, whether individuals or collectivities, may be subjected to two further
types of classification which cross-cut each other: they may be divided on the
basis of whether they are significant to the actor-subject as "quality" or
"performance" complexes; and they may be divided on the basis of the
"scope of their significance" to the actor-subject. i. The quality-performance distinction: In the first
place, social objects may be significant to the actor-subject as complexes of qualities. When the actor-subject sees another actor
solely in terms of what that actor is
and irrespective of what that actor does,
then we say that actor-object is significant to the subject as a complex of
qualities. In other words, whenever the
actor-subject considers another actor only in terms of that actor's attributes, and whenever the actor-subject is
not, in the specific context, concerned with how the actor will perform, then
the actor being oriented to is a complex of qualities. The qualities are those attributes of the
other actor which are for the nonce(?)
divorced from any immediate connection with the actor's performances. The significant question about the object is
what it is at the relevant time
and in the relevant context, regardless of actual or expected activities. For our purposes, qualities in this sense
shall include memberships in
collectivities and possessions,
whenever the possession of an acknowledged claim to property is considered as
one of the actor's attributes. In the second place, social
objects may be significant to the actor-subject as complexes of performances. When the actor-subject sees another actor
solely in terms of what that actor does
and irrespective of what that actor is,
then we say that the actor-object is significant to ego as a complex of
performances. In other words, whenever
the actor-subject considers another actor
Only in terms of that actor's capacity to accomplish things (what that
actor has done in the past, what he is doing, what he may be expected to do)
then the other actor is a complex of performances. ii. The scope of significance distinction: In the
first place, social objects may have such a broad and undefined significance
for the actor-subject that he feels obliged
to grant them any demand they make of
him, so long as the granting of the demand does not force him to fail in other
obligations higher on a priority scale of values. In this case we may say the object has for the actor-subject
a broad scope of significance . Its significance is diffuse. In the second place, social
objects may have such a narrow and clearly defined
significance for the actor-subject that the actor-subject does not feel obliged
to grant them anything that is not clearly called for in
the definition of the relationship which obtains between them. In this case we say the scope of significance
of the object for the actor-subject is specific. 58
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action b.
Nonsocial objects are any objects
which are not actors. Nonsocial objects may be classified on the basis of
whether they are physical objects or cultural objects. i. Physical objects are those objects which are located in
space and time; which do
not "interact" with the actor-subject, as other actors do; and which
constitute only objects, not subjects, of cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative
orientation. Thus they can constitute instrumentally significant means, conditions, goal
objects, obstacles or significant symbols. ii. Cultural objects are elements of the cultural
tradition or heritage (for example,
laws, ideas, recipes) when these are taken as objects
of orientation. These too may be
objects of cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative orientation in the sense that
one may understand the meaning of a law, want a
law, decide what to do about a law.
Also, these may serve as normative rules, as instrumentally significant
means, and as conditions or obstacles of action, or as systems of significant
symbols. These cultural objects are the
laws, ideas, and so forth, as the actor-subject sees these
things existing outside of himself. The same laws and ideas may eventually
become internalized elements of
culture for the actor-subject; as such
they will not be cultural objects but components of the actor-subject's system of action. Cultural objects as norms may be divided
into classes (cognitive, appreciative, and moral) exactly parallel to the three
classes into which the value standards of the motivational orientation of the
actor will be divided in the next section of this outline. Since these three classes will be defined at
that point, we need not define them here. 4. The orientation of the actor to the situation may be
broken down into a set of analytic elements.
These elements are not separate within the orientation process; they
might be conceived as different aspects or different ingredients of that
process. They may be divided into two
analytically independent categories: a category of elements of motivational orientation (appearances, wants,
plans), and a category of elements of value-orientation
(cognitive standards, aesthetic standards, moral standards). a.
Motivational orientation refers
to those aspects of the actor's orientation to his situation which are related
to actual or potential gratification or deprivation of the actor's
need-dispositions. We will
speak of three modes of motivational orientation. Orientation
and Organization of Action 59 i. The cognitive mode involves the various processes
by which an actor sees an object in relation to his system of
need-dispositions. Thus it would
include the "location" of an object in the actor's total
object-world, the determination of its properties and actual and potential
functions, its
differentiations from other objects, and its relations to certain general
classes.4 ii. The cathectic 5 mode involves the
various processes by which an actor invests an object with affective significance. Thus it would include the positive or
negative cathexes implanted upon objects by their gratificational or
deprivational significance with respect to the actor's need-dispositions or
drives. iii. The evaluative
mode involves the various processes by which an actor allocates
his energy among the various actions with respect to various cathected
objects in an attempt to optimize gratification. Thus it would include the processes by which
an actor organizes his cognitive and cathectic orientations into intelligent
plans. These processes make use of cognitive norms (bits of knowledge)
in order to distribute attention and action with respect to various objects and
their possible modalities, with respect to various occasions for gratification,
and with respect to the demands of different need-dispositions. Evaluation is functionally necessary for the
resolution of conflicts among interests
and among cognitive interpretations which are not
resolved automatically; and which thus necessitate choice, or at least
specific selective mechanisms. b. Value-orientation 6 refers to
those aspects of the actor's orientation which commit him to the observance of
certain norms, standards, criteria of selection, whenever he is in a contingent
situation which allows (and requires) him to make a choice. Whenever an actor is forced to choose among
various means
objects, whenever he is forced to choose among various goal objects, whenever
he is forced to choose which need-disposition he will gratify, or how much he
will gratify a need-disposition whenever he is forced to make any choice
whatever - his value-orientations may commit
him to certain norms that will guide him in his choices. The value-orientations which commit a man to
the observance of certain rules in making selections from available
alternatives are not random but tend to form a system of value-orientations which
commit the individual to some organized set of rules (so that the rules
themselves do not contradict one another).
On a cultural level we view the organized set of rules or standards as
such, abstracted, so to speak, from the actor who is committed to them by his
own value-orientations and in whom they exist as need-dispositions to observe these
rules. Thus a culture includes a set of
standards. An individual's value-orientation is his commitment to these
standards. In either case our analysis of these standards of value-orientation
commitment may be the same. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 4 Tolman's concept
"cognitive mapping" well describes this mode. The extent to which this involves
instrumental Orientation will be taken up below, pp. 75-76. 5 It is through the
catbexis of objects that energy or motivation, in the technical sense, enters
the system of the orientation of action. The propositions about drive in the General
Statement are here taken br granted.
Their implications for action will be further elaborated in Chapter II. 6 Standards of
value-orientation are of course not the whole of a system of cultural
orientation. This has
been made clear in the General Statement.
They are however strategically
the most important parts of culture for the organization of systems of
action. Their relation to the other
parts will be more fully analyzed in Chapter III, below. ______________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 60 We shall speak of three
modes of value-orientation, which
parallel the modes of motivationa] orientation. i. The cognitive mode of value-orientation involves
the various commitments to standards by which the validity of cognitive
judgments is established. These standards include those concerning the
relevance of data and those concerning the importance of various problems. They also
include those categories often implicit in the structure of a language)
by which observations and problems are, often
unconsciously, assessed as valid. ii. The appreciative mode of value-orientation
involves the various commitments to standards by which the appropriateness or
consistency of the cathexis of an object or class of objects is assessed. These standards sometimes lay down a pattern
for a particular kind of gratification; for example, standards
of taste in music. The criterion in
formulating such appreciative standards is not what consequences the pursuit of
these patterns will have upon a system of action (a person or a collectivity). Rather, these standards purport to give us
rules for judging whether or not a given
object, sequence, or pattern
will have immediate gratificatory significance. iii.
The moral mode of
value-orientation involves the various commitments to standards
by which certain consequences of particular actions and types of action may be
assessed with respect to their effects upon systems of action. These standards define the actor's responsibility for these
consequences. Specifically, they guide
the actor's choices with a view to how the consequences of these choices will
affect (a) the integration of his own
personality system and (b) the integration
of the social systems in which he is a participant. Fig. 1
is an attempt to summarize this outline.
It shows that the frame of reference of the theory of action includes
subjects and objects. Only actors are
subjects; objects include actors and nonsocial objects. The box in the center
shows how social systems and personalities interpenetrate one another whether they
are subjects or objects: a role is the segment of a personality's actions (or
orientations) which goes into the constitution of any particular group (the
concept will be discussed in detail later).
At the bottom of the diagram is a section that indicates how cultural
systems are abstracted from the action frame of reference. (All figures
referred to in Part II are grouped, in sequence, following page 245.) O
& O of Action 61 The frame of reference of the
theory of action is a set of categories for the analysis of the relations of
one or more actors to and in a situation.
It is not directly concerned with the internal constitution or
physiological processes of the organisms which are in one respect the units of
the concrete system of action; its
essential concern is with the structure and processes involved in the actor's relations to his situation, which includes other actors (alters) as persons and as
members of collectivities. There is an
inherent relativity in this frame of reference. The determination of which is actor and which is object in a
situation will depend on the point of reference required by the problems under
consideration. In the course of an analysis this point of reference may shift
from one actor to another and it is always important to make such a shift
explicit. It is also fundamental that a
collectivity may be chosen as a
point of reference, in which case the relevant segments of the action of its
members do not belong to the situation, but to the collectivity as actor.7 By the same token the actor himself, as
either an organism or personality or as both, may be treated as an object of his own orientation. It is very important to understand that the
distinction between actor and situation is not that between concrete entities distinguished in
common-sense terms. It is an analytical distinction, the concrete
referents of which will shift according to the analytical uses to which it is
put. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 7 The collectivity as
an action system, whether it be subject or object in a given analysis, is not
the simple sum of the actions of the individual actors involved. It is rather composed of the segments of
their action; specifically, those segments of their action which are oriented
to and in this collectivity. To the
individual actors the collectivity is an object of orientation, that is, a
social object (thus an alter) and the
actions of the collectivity may themselves be more specific objects of
orientation for the individual actor. But when
the collectivity is taken as the actor-subject, the actions of these
individuals (the members of the collectivity) insofar as they are oriented to
the collectivity, are the actions of the collectivity. Thus, when the collectivity is the actor,
then the collectivity-oriented actions of its members are not objects of
orientation for the collectivity; they are the actions
of the collectivity. A
collectivity may be viewed as an actor in either of the following senses: (1) as a social system in
relation to a situation outside itself. In the most important case, the
collective actor is a subsystem of the larger social system interacting as a
unit with other subsystems and/or individual actors (which are taken as objects
of its situation). Viewed internally the collective actor must
be interpreted
as a concert of actions and reactions of individual actors, and the conceptual
scheme for its analysis will thus be that used for the analysis of social systems. The conceptual scheme used in the analysis of personality systems
is hence inappropriate for the description of a collective actor, especially in
the imputation of motivation. The mechanisms which explain the action of the
collective actor are those of the social system, not
of the personality. (2) A collectivity may be viewed
as an actor when it is the point of reference for the orientation of an
individual actor in a representative role.
In this usage, a member of a collectivity acts on behalf of his collectivity,
his role as representative being accepted by fellow members and by those who
are the situational context of the collective actor. (Collectivities as systems of action may of course be treated as
objects by the actors in a situation.) ______________________________________________________________________________________ 62
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action The frame of reference of the
theory of action differs in two ways from the biological frame of reference
which has, explicitly and implicitly, influenced much current thought about
behavior. In the first place,
the theory of action is not concerned with the internal physiological processes
of the organism. It is concerned
instead with the organization of the actor's processes of interaction with
objects in a situation; in this sense it is relational. The course of a stream may be said in the
same sense to be a relational matter; it is no property of water to flow in one
direction rather than another, nor is it the contour of the land alone which
determines the direction of the flow.
The stream's course is determined by a relationship between the
properties of the water and the contour of the land; however, the map-maker can
chart the flow of a stream by means of relational concepts without recourse to
any but a few of the intrinsic properties of land or water. The map-maker is
not interested in the principles of moisture-absorption, condensation, and
gravitation, which, in a sense, account for the direction of the stream's flow;
he is satisfied merely to plot the structure of the channel which actually
guides the water's flow. The structure of the river system, thus, is not the structure
of the water, but it is a structure - in this case, of the water's
relationships to the earth's undulations.
Similarly, the structure of action is not
the structure of the organism.
It is the structure of the organism's
relationships to the objects in the organism's situation. One of the apparent paradoxes of
the theory of action stems from this lack of concern for internal
structure. The paradox is that with all
its emphasis on structure, the theory
of action describes an actor who sometimes does not
seem to have any internal structure at all. This paradox arises only on one level of
conceptualization; 8 that level in which
the actor is treated as the unit of interaction within a larger system
of action. On the level dealing
with the dynamic analysis of social
interaction, however, the actor does indeed have very much of a structure. When we go beyond the description of an
orientation and seek to explain
what has occurred, the actor is not only a point
of reference, but also definitely a
system of action which we call personality. Even at this level, however, the internal, physiological process
of the organism, although highly relevant to the concrete phenomena of action,
is only relevant insofar as it affects the system of orientations. The physiological process will enter the
picture as the source of the viscerogenic drive or energy of action and in
various ways as part of the object system, as a system of qualities and of
capacities for performance. We
emphasize, however, that only the empirical consequences
of this aspect of the organism, formulated in terms of their relevance to the system of action, interest
us here. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 8 When the individual actor is seen as the
interacting unit within a larger scale structure (for example, within a social
system, or within the total action frame of reference which comprehends both
actors and objects) the actor does not seem to have a structure. This is similar to the notion that any
molecule of water in the stream is simply an unstructured unit of flow to the
man charting the river. But this is
true only on one
level of conceptualization: both the molecule and the actor may be analyzed as
systems in themselves if one seeks explanation on a deeper level. When we treat the actor as a unit in the
system of interaction with the object world, our abstraction ignores the
internal structure and processes of that unit and considers only its relations with the situation. Nevertheless, any particular act of this
unit may in fact be a very complex resultant of internal personality
factors. When these internal
complications are an object of study
the personality is not treated merely as an actor but as a system of
action. It will be recalled that there
is just as much interaction
between elements within the personality as a system as there is between persons
in the social system. ______________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 63 In the second place, the
frame of reference of the theory of action differs from common biologically
oriented approaches in the categories used to analyze the interaction of
organism and environment. The most
obvious difference is the explicit concern of our theory with selection among
alternative possibilities and hence with the evaluative process and ultimately
with value standards. Thus, our primary
concern in analyzing systems of action with respect to their aims is this: to what consequences has this actor been committed
by his selections or choices? 9 This contrasts
with the primary concern of biological theorists, who, in a motivational
analysis, would ask a parallel but quite different question: what does this
person have to do in order to survive? In the system of action the question is what
does this actor strive for, not what does he have to strive for in order to
survive as an organism. Further, we
ask: on what bases does the actor make his selections? Implicit is the notion that survival is not
the sole ground of these selections; on the contrary,
we hold that internalized cultural values
are the main grounds of such selective orientations. The role of choice may be
implicit in much biological analysis of behavior, hut in the frame of reference
of the theory of action it becomes explicit and central.10 The empirical significance of
selective or value standards as determinants of concrete action may be
considered problematical and should not be prejudged. But the theory of action analyzes action in such a way as to
leave the door open for attributing a major significance to these standards
(and their patterning). The older type of biological frame of reference did not
leave this door open and thus prejudged the question. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 9 The terms selection and choice
are used more or less interchangeably in this context. Where alternatives exist which cannot all he
realized, a selection must result. The
mechanisms by which this occurs are not at issue at this stage of the
analysis. The present problem is, then,
analysis of the structure of
the system of alternatives, not the determinants
of selection between them. 10 The notion of selection or choice in the present discussion
is closely connected with the notion of
expectations and normative orientations in the General Statement of Part
I. These concepts all underline and
define the voluntaristic or purposive aspects of systems of action as conceived
by the present analytical scheme. Without this purposive aspect, most of the
elements of the orientation of action under consideration here – and above all
the patterns of value-orientation - would become analytically superfluous epiphenomena. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 64
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action The theory of action formulates
the components of the action frame of reference in terms of their direct
relevance to choice orientation.11 The situation is treated as a constellation of
objects among which selections must be made.12 Action itself is the
resolution of an unending series of problems of selection which confront
actors. It is against the background of
these observations that the subjective viewpoint
of our frame of reference should be considered. We do not postulate
a substantive entity, a mind which is
somehow dissociated from the organism and the object world. The organization of observational data in
terms of the theory of
action is quite possible and fruitful in modified behavioristic terms, and such
formulation avoids many of the difficult questions of introspection or empathy.13 In Tolman's psychology, it is postulated that the rat is oriented
to the goal of hunger gratification and that he cognizes the situation in which
he pursues that goal. Tolman's concepts
of orientation and cognition are ways of generalizing the facts of observation
about the rat's behavior. The concept
of expectation is also essential to
this mode of organizing data. By
broadening this notion to include the "complementarity
of expectations" involved in the action of an ego and the reaction of an alter, we have all the essential components of the analysis of
action defined in Tolman's manner without raising further difficulties. What the actor thinks or feels can be
treated as a system of intervening
variables. The actor and his cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative processes are
neither more nor less real than the
"particle" of classical mechanics and its composition. The foregoing discussion
constitutes a commentary on items one and two of our outline. We have tried to give the reader a general
familiarity with the significant features of the action frame of reference, and
in the course of the discussion we have sought to clarify the relation of the
actor-subject to the frame of reference.
We shall proceed now to a discussion of the objects of the situation,
item three of our outline. Specifically, we shall discuss the
classification of objects in terms of the object
modalities. A modality is a property of
an object; it is one of the aspects of an object in terms of which the object
may be significant to an actor. Some (if not most) objects have several
modalities in terms of which they may have meaning to an actor. A given actor may "choose" to see
the object only in terms of one, or a specific set,
of these modalities. The relevant action of the actor will be a function of the
modalities he chooses. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 11 The terms choice orientation, selective orientation, and so forth, refer to
the actor's acts of choosing. That is,
they refer to the subjective processes involved while
the actor is making a choice. 12 Actually choices are
not made so much with respect to the objects themselves as among possible
relations to these objects. 13 This procedure
does not necessarily commit one to any specific position on the more ultimate
epistemological problem of the nature of our knowledge of other minds. ______________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 65 The most fundamental distinction
bearing on the object system is that between the social
and the nonsocial modalities of
objects. By social
in this context, we mean interactive. A
social object is an actor or system of action, whose reactions and attitudes
are significant to the actor who is the point of reference. The social
object, the alter, is seen by ego to have expectations which are complementary
to ego's own. The distinction
between those objects which do and those objects which do not have expectations
complementary to ego's is fundamental to the theory of action. It should, however, be clear that
the same concrete object may be
social or nonsocial in different contexts.
Thus, on the one hand, a human being may be treated only as a physical object and no account
taken of his possible reactions to ego's action, and, on the other, an animal
may be a social object. Within the category of social
objects a further discrimination has been made between complexes of qualities and complexes of performances. In one
sense, of course, all action is performance and all social objects are
"performers"; yet it is possible to orient objects either (1) in
terms of characteristics they possess regardless of
their performances, or (2) in
terms of characteristics they possess by virtue of
their performances. A social object is a complex of
qualities when the actor, in the orientation of action to the objects,
overlooks actual or possible performances and focuses
on "attributes" 14 as such. These
attributes may in the further developments of interaction be related to
performances in many ways, but in the immediate situation, it is the attribute
which is the basis of discrimination.
Thus, to take a very obvious example, for the normal
heterosexual person, the sex of an object rather than its "capacity
for giving erotic gratification" may be the first
criterion of object-choice. Only within the category of those possessing the
quality of belonging to the opposite sex
from ego do performance criteria become relevant.15 A social object is a complex of
performances when the actor, in the orietitation of action to the object, focuses on its processes of action and their outcomes rather than its qualities or
attributes. The
significant focus is not a given state. It may be remarked that orientation to
performance has become so central
in Western society that there has been a tendency to assimilate all social
objects to this modality. A comparative perspective will dissolve this
illusion. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 14 Confusion is very
easy here because logically anything
predicated of an object may be considered an attribute. Here we have a special
definition of the term in mind. An
attribute of a social object is some quality or descriptive term which would
characterize the object irrespective of any action that object might perform. 15 Of course the two
aspects are so fully integrated in the actual system of our cultural
orientations that it never occurs to most of us
to make such a distinction, and in daily life, there is no reason why it should
be done.
(jjd: how quaint!) ______________________________________________________________________________________ 66
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action Certainly the most obvious
reason for emphasis on the distinction is the very great importance in the organization
of social relations of ascriptive qualifications for status. But the
distinction will be seen to permeate systems of action very generally. It should be emphasized here that this
distinction, like the distinction between social and nonsocial objects, refers
to aspects of objects, not to discrete concrete entities. The same object may, in different contexts
of the same system of action, be significant for its qualities or for its
performances.16 In addition to the quality-performance distinction, a scope-of-significance distinction can also be
applied to social objects. An object's
scope of significance is not really a modality of the object; it is rather a
special relationship which obtains between the actor and the object. Thus a social object, whatever the content
of an actor's concern for it, may be significant to him in terms of one,
several, or numerous of its aspects.
The range or scope over which the object is significant to the actor
cannot be deduced from, and is thus analytically independent of, the modalities of the
object. It is likewise analytically
independent of motivational orientations and value-orientations, and it might
thus be regarded as an additional category of orientation. The category of nonsocial
objects comprises both physical and cultural objects. They have in common the fact that they do not, in the technical
sense, interact with actors. They do not and cannot constitute alters to
an ego; they do not have attitudes
or expectations concerning
ego. Both may, however, be immediately
cathected as objects; they may constitute conditions or means of instrumental
action, and as symbols they may become endowed with meaning. Although physical and cultural
objects have these features in common, there is a crucial set of differences
which centers on the fact that cultural objects can be internalized and thereby
transmitted from one actor to another, while only possession of claims to physical objects can be
transmitted. This difference rests on
the fact that the cultural object is a pattern which is reproducible in the
action of another person while it leaves the original actor unaffected. Only in a figurative sense does an actor have patterns of value-orientation. In a strict sense he is, among other things, a system of such
patterns. Of course, another actor, an alter, cannot be internalized
either. Only his cultural patterns -
for instance, his values - can be "taken over" by orientation or
identificahon.17 The distinction between cultural
patterns as objects, on the one hand, and as components of the actor's system of
orientation, on the other, must he held separate from the classification of types of culture patterns themselves - that
is, from the classification in terms of belief systems, systems of expressive
symbols, and systems of value-orientations. The first distinction is not a
differentiation among the parts of a cultural system; it distinguishes modes of
the relationship of cultural patterns to action, regardless of the type of the
pattern. In principle every kind
of cultural object is capable of internalization. It is this "transferability" from
the status of object to the internalized status and vice versa which is
the most distinctive property of culture and which is the fundamental reason why culture cannot be identified with
the concrete systems of action. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 16 The term performance has been chosen to avoid
confusion with the general meaning of the term
action. Orientation to an object
in terms of its qualities is action. 17 See Chapter II,
pp.116, 130. ______________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 67 The
Freudian hypothesis concerning the formation of the superego has made the
internalization of patterns of value-orientation widely known. It is also strategically the most important
case fdr us. But the internalization of instrumental and expressive patterns
such as skills and tastes is also of the highest importance in the analysis of
action. Before leaving the problem of
objects, we should speak briefly about the problem of the
"phenomenological" approach to the object world which we use. We are interested in the object world not as
an abstract scientific entity but as something which significantly affects the
action of an actor. Thus we are only
interested in those aspects of that world which do affect, which are relevant
to, ego's action. But, to become
relevant to ego's action, all classes of objects must be known or cognized in
some way or other. Thus our tendency is
to pattern our abstraction of the object world after ego's cognition of that
world. There is
always a distinction between the actually and the potentially known. Only the
hypothetical mind of God is omniscient.
An observer
may, however, know many things about another actor's situation and his
personality which the other actor himself does not know. The observer might thus well know much more
than ego about those properties of the objects in ego's situation which affect
ego's behavior indirectly. We should therefore recognize
the implicit if not always explicit distinction between the situation as known
to or knowable by an observer and as known to the actor in question. Of course, ego's knowledge may be increased
by processes of investigation; and through the search for knowledge, as well as by other processes arising from the properties of the
object situation, new objects not previously part of the situation of action
may enter. The most usual condition is
for relatively few of the knowable properties of the object situation to be
known to the actor. He will seldom know
the systemic interconnections of the objects of his situation which the
scientific observer might know and would have to know in order to account for
their behavior. Let us turn now from item three
of our outline, the situation, to
item four, the orientation of the actor
to that situation, and discuss the categories
for analysis of the actor's system of relations to the object world. 68
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action What can we say about the
actor's orientation to a situation? At
the outset we must mention two general features which characterize and
perhaps define all such orientations, but which are of such a general nature
that they are not treated as separate modes of orientation. These are (1) the choice aspect and
(2) the expectancy aspect of the
orientation. The first implies that every orientation is explicitly or
implicitly an orientation to alternatives; the orientation involves a scanning
of several possible courses of action and a choice from them. The second
implies that every orientation is an "expectancy" in the sense that
it is an orientation to the future state of the situation as well as to the
present. We mention these two points at
the outset as they pervade the following discussion of the modes or
orientation. Besides the aspects mentioned above, the salient features
of an actor's orientation are these: (1)
There is orientation to discriminated and related objects; various things are
seen or expected, and they are seen or expected in relational contexts. (2)
There is orientation to goals; various things are wanted. (3) There
is orientation to the gratification-deprivation significance of the various
courses of action suggested by the situation, and there is comparison of the
gratification.deprivation balance presented by each of the alternative courses.
(4) There is orientation to
standards of acceptability which (a)
narrow the range of cognitions, sorting "veridical" from
"nonveridical' object-orientation;
(b) narrow the range of
objects wanted, sorting "appropriate" from "inappropriate"
goal objects; and (c) narrow
the number of alternatives, sorting "moral" from "immoral"
courses of action. Points one, two, and three make
up the three modes of the motivation~orientation
in our classificatory scheme. Point
four is the value-orientation. We will discuss first the three modes
of motivational orientation and then the three modes of
value-orientahon. The first two modes of
motivational orientation, the cognitive
and cathectic modes, are the minimal
components of any act of orientation.
Similarly they are the minimal components of any act of selection or
choice (this is redundant in the sense that any orientation involves an
explicit or implicit choice, but it serves to emphasize another aspect of the
problem). One cannot "orient"
without discriminating objects, one cannot discriminate an object without its
arousing some interest either by virtue of its intrinsic gratificatory
significance, or by virtue of its relationships to other objects. Similarly, one cannot make a choice without
"cognizing" the alternatives; and also one cannot select except on
the basis of the cathectic interest aroused by the alternatives. The
discrimination of objects is the cognitive mode of motivational orientation. The having of interest in an object is the
cathectic mode of motivational orientation.
The "expectancy" aspect of the orientation enters into both
modes; both modes, that is, have a future reference: the cognitive
discrimination of an object includes a cognitive prediction regarding a future
state of the situation; the cathectic interest in an object includes a
readiness to receive gratification and avoid deprivation. Orientation
and Organization of Action 69 Let us dwell for a moment on the
notion, implicit in the paragraph above, that cognition and cathexis are simultaneously given and only analytically separable. In the first place, there can be no
orientation to the cathectic or gratificatory significance of objects without
discrimination, without location of the relevant object or objects in relation to
others, without discrimination between objects which produce gratification and
those which are noxious. Thus the cognitive mapping of the situation, or
relevant parts of it, is one essential aspect of any actor's orientation to
it. Nor can there be cognition without
an associated cathexis. Each object of
cognition is cathected in some degree either by virtue of its intrinsic
gratificatory significance or by virtue of its relationships to other objects
of intrinsic gratificatory significance.
The
limiting case is the object of "pure knowledge," and even this is
cathected in the limited sense implied by the existence of a cognitive interest
in it. Furthermore, the standards of
cognitive judgment must certainly be objects of cathexis and the act of
cognition might also be cathected. Of these two modes of
orientation, the cathectic mode is most specifically relational in the sense that we have already
said the orientation itself is relational. That is, a
cathexis relates an actor and an object. Specifically it refers on the one side to a
motivation - that is, a drive, need, wish, impulse, or
need-disposition - and on the other side to an object. It is only when the
motivation is attached to a determinate object or objects through the cathectic
mode of motivational orientation that an organized system of behavior 18
exists. We have just said that a
cathexis relates a motive to an object, and in the section of the General
Statement on behavior psychology, quite a bit is said about the motivation that
makes up one side of this picture.
Hitherto, however, we have said nothing about the kinds of objects that
become cathected - that is,
the kinds of objects which gratify need-dispositions - and it is not possible
to do more than indicate them briefly here.
Except for the objects which gratify specific organically engendered
need-dispositions, the most pervasive cathected object is a positive affective
response or attitude on the part of alter and the corresponding positive
affective attitude on the part of ego toward alter or toward himself as object
(e.g., love, approval, esteem). The
sensitivity to which we nlluded in the General Statement is primarily a sensitivity
to these positive affective attitudes.
This sensitivity enters as an ingredient into many need-dispositions
with complex institutional objects, such as the need-dispositions for
achievement, charity, and so forth. The
sensitivity is learned through a series of processes in which generalization,
substitution, and identification play preeminent parts. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 18 The degree to
which this organized system of behavior is an active pursuit of gratification
or merely a state of passive receptive gratification may of course vary. In either case we have action in the sense
that the active pursuit or passive reception is selected from alternatives by
the actor. Both activity and passivity
share elements of "expectancy."
Activity involves the expectation of gratification in consequence of
performance. Both are directed toward
future developments in the situation in both cognitive and cathectic modes. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 70
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action When an object is sufficiently
gratifying to the need-dispositions or set of need-dispositions which are
directed toward it over time, we may speak of an object-attachment. The actor will recurrently seek out the
object when the need-disposition is reactivated or he will seek to maintain (or
possess) at all times a given relation to it. This possession of objects, or
maintenance of relationships to them, serves to stabilize
the availability of objects and thus to stabilize
the orientation system of the individual actor (that is, he knows
where to find things; his little world is
not a chaos). Finally, it should
be remembered that through the mechanisms of generalization, categories of
objects may be themselves objects of attachment. The third of the three
basic modes of motivational orientation is evaluation. The evaluative mode is essentially the
organizational or integrative aspect
of a given actor's system of action and hence it is directly relevant to the
act of choice. It operates wherever a
selection problem is presented to the actor, where he wants or could want two
or more gratifications, both of which cannot be attained - where, in other
words, there is actually or potentially a situation in which one "wants to
eat one's cake and have it too." 19 That this situation exists
on the level of animal behavior is amply attested by Tolman's work. It becomes
particularly significant on the human level with the involvement of culture and
cultural standards in the act of choice. Several things are to be said about
this evaluative mode. The first
is that it cannot be understood properly except as an aspect of the
cognitive-cathectic orientation process; the evaluative mode tends to be inextricably related to the cognitive mode
whenever cognition is at all complex.
The second is that it is our organizational concept which
parallels the system of instincts in biological analysis of behavior. The third is that it is to be sharply
distinguished from the value standards of the value-orientation. The fourth is, on the other hand, that it designates the point in the system
of motivation at which these value or cultural standards of the
value-orientation become effective in guiding behavior. _________________________________________________________________________________ 19 The emphasis on
choice, choice alternatives, patterns of choice, etc., which is central to this
scheme of analyses, should not be interpreted to mean that the actor always
deliberately and consciously contemplates alternatives and then chooses among
them in the light of a value standard.
The decision regarding which of the
realistic alternatives he should choose is often made for him through his acceptance of a certain value-orientation.
(In a figurative sense, it might be said that the value-orientations which are
part of the cultural value system by being
institutionalized come to make the choice rather than the actor.) From one
point of view, the function of the institutionalization of value standards is
to narrow the range of effective choice to manageable proportions. Orientation
and Organization of Action 71 Let us return to our first
point, the relation between the evaluative and cognitive modes. The
evaluative process in some sense transforms the function of the cognitive mode
of motivational orientation. Abstracted
from the evaluative mode, cognition is simply in the service of specific
motivations or
need-dispositions, being instrumental to their gratification. In conjunction
with the evaluative process, cognition begins to serve not only the specific
motives one at a time, but the functional harmony of the whole. The actor learns to take account of the consequences of immediate gratification; in
the absence of
evaluation, he only takes account of how to arrive at that gratification. Thus, whenever cognition is involved in the
solution of any sort of conflict problem, it is inextricably related to the
evaluative mode. Second, let us point out
what we mean by saying that evaluation is our organizing principle. In any complex system, some mediating
mechanism is required to accomplish the discipline of the parts with a view to
the organization of the whole.
Biologically oriented theorists have been wont to postulate "instincts" or "systems of
instincts" as the mechanisms which mediate this discipline. Instincts were innate organizers, or innate
systems of discipline. In our theory,
instincts thus defined account for little of the over-all organization. That is, we believe that such innate
organization as may exist leaves a wide area of freedom; there is a certain
plasticity in the relation of the organism to the situation. Having given up instinct as the over-all
organizing principle, we require some compensative
element of organization. For us,
that element is the evaluative mode of
motivational orientation. It regulates
selection among alternatives when several courses of action are open to the
actor (owing to the plasticity of his relationship to the situation). Third, let us distinguish clearly between the evaluative
mode of motivational orientation and the value standards of value-orientation.
The evaluative mode involves the cognitive act of
balancing out the gratification-deprivation significances of various
alternative courses of action with a view to maximizing gratification in the
long run. The value
standards are various recipes or rules (usually passed from person to
person and from generation to generation) which may be observed by the actor in
the course of this balancing-out procedure.
They are rules which may help the actor to make his choice either by
narrowing the range of acceptable alternatives, or by helping the actor foresee
the long-run consequences of the various alternatives. Fourth, we say that the
evaluative mode designates the point in the system of motivation at which these
value or cultural standards of the value-orientation become effective. The way is cleared
for the orientation of value standards to have a decisive effect upon behavior
whenever there is a significant degree of
behavioral plasticity of the organism, that is, whenever the motivational
orientation allows two or more alternative courses of behavior. But it is precisely at this point that the
evaluative mode becomes relevant. The
evaluative mode itself concerns the weighing of alternatives and the act of
choosing. When this evaluation is made with an eye to any standards for guiding
choice, then the evaluative mode has brought in some aspect of the
value-orientation. It should be
remembered that the act of choosing
is essentially
the aspect of orientation implied by the term evaluative
mode; the standards on which
choices are based are the aspects of the orientation implied by
the term value~orientations. 72
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action At this point, we shall proceed
to a discussion of the value-orientation as such, and its various modes.20 We have already said that the way is cleared
for value standards to be effective whenever the plasticity of the organism
leaves a realm of freedom in the relation between the situation and the
organism and we said
that value standards are involved in the evaluative
mode of the motivational orientation as rules and recipes for
guiding selections. We have said too
that the value standards themselves constitute what we call the value-orientation
and we have mentioned in passing that these standards guide selection (a) by narrowing the range of
alternatives open and (b) by amplifying the
consequences of the various alternatives. In much the same vein, we have
said these are standards of acceptability and that they (i) narrow the range of cognitions, (ii) narrow the range of objects wanted, and (iii)
narrow the number of alternatives. We have also pointed out that
cultural values are effective in two main ways. On the one hand, through interaction, they
become built into the structure of personality through the learning process; on
the other hand, they are objects in the situation which become particularly
significant through their involvement in the sanction system which is
associated with roles in the social structure.
It is only through these
channels that value standards enter the motivational process and play a part in
the determination of action.21
By the same token a cathexis must be involved before action is affected. If not the standard itself in an abstract
sense, then at least the objects which are chosen in accord with it, must be
cathected for value standards to influence behavior. Value standards are classified
on the basis of their relationship to the three modes of motivational
orientation. Action is organized by
cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative modes of motivational orientation. There
are regulatory standards applicable to all three aspects of orientation; thus
there are cognitive, appreciative, and moral standards. Classification of standards along these
lines offers great convenience for the analysis of action. In the following
paragraphs we take up the three categories or modes of value-orientation
formulated by this method of classification. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 20 Let us emphasize
that we are not turning our attention from one kind of orientation to another
kind. The three elementary modes of motivational orientation do not define any
type of concrete act even when they are all taken together. The motivational orientation is inherently
involved in every act, but so also are the modes of value-orientation, and the
objects of the situation. It is only when the three sets of components - objects,
motivational orientations, and value-orientations - combine
that we even begin to he able to discuss concrete actions and types of actions. 21 It may again be
noted that value-orientation standards are only part
of culture. We do not mean, moreover,
to imply that a person's values are entirely
"internalized culture" or mere adherence to rules and
laws. The person makes creative modifications as he internalizes culture;
but the novel aspect is not the cultural
aspect. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 73 Every concrete action involving
a cognitive component (by definition, this is true of every action) entails the
operation, usually only below the level of deliberation, of standards of
cognitive validity. The standards of
cognitive validity enter into the construction of expectations (predictions),
the testing of observations. The
category of cognitive value-orientation is present in all cultural value
systems, although there may be variations in the
content of the standard with regard to different types of knowledge;
for example, the standards of validity of empirical knowledge might vary from
those applied in the demonstration of religious beliefs.22 It is desirable to distinguish between the
standards of cognitive validity and the organization
of cognitive content and perception; 23 cognitive
content comes more properly under the
cognitive mode of motivational orientation. The appreciative mode of value-orientation corresponds to the
cathectic mode of motivational orientation.
It is particularly important here to bear in mind that we are discussing
standards, not motivational
content. The standards applied in the
evaluation of the alternatives involved in cathectic choices 24 are
at issue here. As in all evaluation,
there is a disciplinary aspect of appreciative standards. The choice always involves at least an
implicit sacrifice, in that an actor cannot have
all of what are in one sense
potential gratifications, attd choosing one involves a "cost" in that
it excludes alternatives. The
payment of this cost is the
disciplinary element.25 The use of the term appreciative diverges from common usage. In its literal sense, aesthetic as connoting desirability would be
preferable, but it has come to be used so largely with regard to the fine arts,
and so forth, that it is too narrow for our purposes. The term expressive
has been suggested. If the choices
governed by these standards were simply choices with respect to which
need-disposition should be expressed, this term would suffice; but choices
between objects, modalities, and occasions also come under this head. Thus a broader
term is needed. The term expressive will be reserved for the type of action in which cathectic interests
and appreciative standards have primacy. The category of moral value standards extends and makes more
explicit the common meaning of the term moral. Moral value standards are the most
comprehensive integrative standards for assessing and regulating the entire system of action under consideration,
whether it be a personality or a society or a subsystem of either. They are the
"court of last appeal" in any
large-scale integrative problem within the system. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 22 But whatever the
range of criteria of validity which may be represented as clustering about a
mode, no fundamental epistemological question is raised here concerning the
validity of the criteria of empirical truth. 23 The organization
of cognitive content might involve the selection of foci of attention, or the
organization of knowledge. 24 Cathectic choices
may he among objects, object modalities, need-dispositions, or occasions. 25 Freud's conception
of the "economic" aspect of libido theory, which is the allocation of
gratifications within a feasible system, is the psychoanalytic equivalent of
the disciplinary element. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 74
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action Any specific system of morals is
adapted to the specific integrative problems confronted by the action system
which it, in one sense, controls.
Morals, in this sense, are relative.
It is the relativity of moral standards to the social system which may
be an unfamiliar element in the present definition of moral standards. We live in a
culture where the standards are mainly
"universalistic," and we therefore tend to think of a
moral standard as transcending the particular system of action of the society in
which it is exercised. The student of
society is concerned with the comparative analysis of different systems of action. He needs a category of value integration which
is relative to the system of action in question. The
category of moral value standards 26 serves such a purpose for
us. The significant criterion for
definition of the moral concept is concern for the
broader consequences for a system of action.27 The concluding paragraphs of
this discussion will be concerned with various kinds
of orientations or actions. It has been
stressed throughout our discussion of the modes
of orientation that these various modes are not different kinds of orientation but simply
different aspects that might be abstracted from any orientation. Now we are going to be concerned explicitly
with the problem of different kinds
or types of action. It is certanly fair at times to
speak of an intellectual activity, an expressive activity, and a responsible or
moral activity. Since these are types
of concrete action, all of them entail all modes
of motivational orientation and some value
standards. How, then, are the various
kinds of action differentiated? Two
problems of emphasis are involved. In the first place,
motivation attaches to activity as well as
to objects; that is, certain activities are cathected in their
own right as means or goal objects; even certain modes of activity may be
cathected. When we speak of a cognitive
interest, a cathectic interest, or an evaluative interest, we refer to the fact
that these modes of the action process are, to some small or large degree,
cathected in their own right. In the second place, when
there is orientation to standards, and these standards are guiding choices,
then, if several kinds of standards are
oriented at once, there is always the possibility of
a conflict. When there is a conflict among standards, there is a problem
of primacy. One standard or set of
standards must be emphasized, given primacy; it must
dominate, the other must give way. In any specific action,
primacy may be given to cognitive, appreciative, or moral standards. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 26 The moral value
standards might be universalistic, that is, concerned with the consequences for
a class of phenomena wherever found; or they might he particularistic, that is,
concerned with the consequences for a collectivity of which the actor is a
member. 27 It may be noted
that this is in accord with the usage of Sumner, Durkheim, and the French
anthropologists. ______________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 75 In order to make a basic
classification of types of action,
we will conjoin the problems of interest
(in the modes of motivational orientation) and of
primacy (among the modes of value-orientation). Thus the three basic
types are: (a) intellectual activity, where cognitive
interests prevail and cognitive value standards have primacy (i.e.,
investigation or the "search for knowledge"); (b) expressive action, where cathectic interests
and appreciative standards have primacy (i.e., the search for direct
gratification) ; and (c) responsible or moral
action, where evaluative interests and moral standards have
primacy (i.e., the attempt to integrate actions in the interest of a larger
system of action). A special position is occupied
by another derivative but very prominent type: instrumental
action. Here, the goal
of action is in the future. Cathectic interests and appreciative
standards have primacy with respect to the goal, yet cognitive standards 28
have primacy with respect to the process of its attaitiment.29 The primacy of cognitive considerations
therefore bifurcates into the purely cognitive type, here called
"intellectual activity" or investigation, and the instrumental type in the interest of a cathected goal. Before
leaving our discussion of the frame of reference, we should give some brief
treatment to the allocative and integrative foci
for the organization of empirical systems.
When we begin to treat this problem, we find we must first differentiate
the distinctive types of action systems from each other. Then we
must give the two types separate treatment.
The point is that when action occurs (when something is wanted or chosen
and thus brings forth action) it is simultaneously
embraced in two types of action systems:
personality systems and social systems. As we said in the General
Statement, these two systems are distinguished by the differences tn the foci around which
they are organized. The personality of
the individual is organized around the biological
unity of the organism. This is
its integrative focus. The allocative
mechanisms within the system are the need-disposition (and other motivational)
systems which serve to relate orientations to one another. The social system is organized around the unity of the interacting group. This is the integrative focus. The allocative
mechanisms within this system are the roles
which serve to relate various orientations to one another. The system of interaction among
individuals, however, cannot be organized in the same way as the system of action
of the individual actor; they each face different functional
problems. Personality and social
systems, thus, are constituted by the same actions and they are in continuous
causal interdependence, but as systems they are not
reducible to one another. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 28 Where an
orientation is only to immediate gratification, only cathectic-appreciative
(and possibly moral) interests and standards apply. 29 Evaluation is, of
course, also involved; it places both the particular goal and the processes of
attaining it within the larger system of action. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 76
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action Neither systems of
value-orientation nor systems of culture as a whole are action systems in
the same sense as are personalities and social systems. This is because neither
motivation nor action is directly
attributable to them. They may
conjoin with motivation to evoke action in social systems or personalities, but
they themselves cannot act, nor are they motivated. It seems desirable to treat them, however, because of the great
importance of the particular ways in which they are involved in action systems. With the transition to the analysis of systems of action – personalities
and social systems - the descriptive structural analysis with which we are
particularly concerned here begins to shade into
dynamic analysis. Dynamic
problems emerge as soon as we begin to deal with the functional problems of
allocation and integration. Our
knowledge of the fundamentals of motivation, as it will be analyzed in the next
chapter, is of course crucial for the analysis of dynamic processes. Much empirical insight into dynamic problems
on ad hoc levels has already been achieved. But without further analysis of the
structure of action, we could not have the
coordinates which would raise empirical insight to a higher level of
systematic generality. Those who have followed our
exposition thus far have acquired a familiarity with the definitions
of the basic elements of the theory of action.
There are further important conceptual entities and
classificatory systems to be defined, but these, in a sense, derive from the basic terms that have already been
defined. The point is that the further
entities can be defined largely in terms of the entities and relationships already defined, with the introduction of a
minimum of additional material. The next section of the present
chapter will be devoted to the highly important, derived, classificatory
system, the pattern-variable scheme. If
one were to look back over the sections of this chapter devoted to the objects
of the situation and to the orientation of the actor to the situation (items
three and four in
our outline), he would see that an actor in a situation is confronted by a
series of major dilemmas of orientation, a series of choices that the actor
must make before the situation has a determinate meaning for him. The objects of the situation do not interact
with the cognizing and cathecting organism in such a fashion as to determine
automatically the meaning of the situation.
Rather, the actor must make a series of
choices before the situation will have a determinate meaning. Specifically,
we maintain, the actor must make
five specific dichotomous choices before any situation will have a
determinate meaning. The five
dichotomies which formulate these choice alternatives are called the pattern variables because any specific
orientation (and consequently any action) is characterized by a pattern of the five
choices. Orientation
and Organization of Action 77 Three
of the pattern variables derive from the absence of any biologically given
hierarchy of rimacies among the various modes of orientation. In the first place, the
actor must choose whether to accept gratification from
the immediately cognized and cathected object or to evaluate such
gratification in terms of its consequences for
other aspects of the action system.
(That is, one must decide whether or not the evaluative mode is to be operative at all in a situation.) 30 In the second place, if the actor decides to
evaluate, he must choose whether or not to give
primacy to the moral standards of the social system or
subsystem. In the third place, whether or not he decides to
grant primacy to such moral standards, he must choose whether cognitive or
appreciative standards are to be dominant,
the one set with relation to the other.
If cognitive standards are dominant
over appreciative standards, the actor will tend to locate objects in terms of
their relation to some generalized frame of reference; if appreciative standards are dominant over
cognitive, the actor will tend to locate objects in terms of their relation to
himself, or to his motives. The other pattern variables emerge from indeterminacies intrinsic to
the object situation: social objects as relevant to a given choice situation
are either quality complexes or performance
complexes, depending on how the actor chooses to see them; social
objects are either functionally diffuse (so
that the actor grants them every feasible demand) or
functionally specific (so that the actor grants them only specifically
defined demands), depending on how the actor chooses to see them or how he is culturally expected to see
them. It will be noted now that the
three pattern variables which derive from the problems of primacy among the
modes of orientation are the first three of the pattern variables as these were
listed in our introduction; the two pattern variables which derive from the
indeterminacies in the object situation are the last two in that list. At the risk of being
repititious, let us restate our definition: a pattern
variable is a dichotomy, one side of which must be chosen by an
actor before the meaning of a situation is determinate for him, and thus before
he can act with respect to that situation. We maintain that there are only five
basic pattern variables (i.e.,
pattern variables deriving directly from the frame of reference of the theory
of action) and that, in the sense that they are all
of the pattern variables which so derive, they constitute a
system. Let us list them and
give them names and numbers so that we can more easily refer to them in the
future. They are: 1. Affectivity-Affective
neutrality. 2. Self-orientation-Collectivity-orientation. 3. Universalism-Particularism. 4. Ascription-Achievement. 5.
Specificity-Diffuseness. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 30 In a limited sense
the evaluative mode is operative, even when no thought is given to the
consequences of immediate gratification; this in the sense that aesthetic (appreciative)
standards
may be invoked to determine the "appropriateness" of the form of
gratification chosen. Only in this limited sense, however, does evaluation
enter the immediate gratification picture. 78
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action The first concerns the
problem of whether or not evaluation is to take place in a given
situation. The second concerns
the primacy of moral standards in an evaluative procedure. The third concerns the relative
primacy of cognitive and cathectic standards.
The fourth concerns the seeing of objects as quality or
performance complexes. The fifth
concerns the scope of significance of the object. These pattern variables enter
the action frame of reference at four different levels. In the first place, they
enter at the concrete level as five discrete choices (explicit or
implicit) which every actor makes before he can act. In the second place, they
enter on the personality level as habits of choice; the person has a set of
habits of choosing, ordinarily or relative to certain types of situations, one
horn or the other of each of these dilemmas.
Since this set of habits is usually a bit
of internalized culture, we will list it as a component of the
actor's value-orientation standards. In the third place, the pattern
variables enter on the collectivity level as aspects of role definition:
the
definitions of rights and duties of the members of a collectivity which specify
the actions of incumbents of roles,
and which often specify that the performer shall
exhibit a habit of choosing one side or the other of each of
these dilemmas. In the fourth place, the
variables enter on the cultural level as aspects of value standards; this is
because most value standards are rules or recipes for concrete action and thus
specify, among other things, that the actor abiding by the standard shall
exhibit a habit of choosing one horn or the other of each of the dilemmas. From the foregoing paragraph, it
should be obvious that, except for their integration in concrete acts as discrete
choices, the pattern variables are most important as characteristics of value
standards (whether these be the value standards of a personality, or the value
standards defining the roles of a society, or just value standards in the abstract). In the sense that each concrete act is made
up on the basis of a patterning of the choices formulated by the scheme, the
pattern variables are not necessarily attributes of value standards, because
any specific concrete choice may be a rather discrete and accidental
thing. But as soon as a certain
consistency of choosing can be inferred from a series of concrete acts, then we
can begin to make statements about the value standards involved and the
formulation of these standards in terms of the variables of the pattern-variable
scheme. Orientation
and Organization of Action 79 What is the bearing of the
pattern variables on our analysis of systems of action and cultural
orientation? Basically, the pattern
variables are the categories for the description of value-orientations which of
course are in various forms integral to all three systems. A given value-orientation or some particular
aspect of it may be interpreted as imposing a preference or giving a primacy to
one alternative over the other in a particular
type of situation. The
pattern variables therefore delineate the alternative preferences,
predispositions, or expectations; in all these forms the common element is the direction of
selection in defined situations.
In the personality system, the pattern variables describe essentially
the predispositions or expectations as evaluatively defined in terms of what
will below be called ego-organization 31 and
superego-organization. In the case of
the social system they are the crucial components
in the definition of role-expectations.
Culturally, they define patterns of value-orientation. The pattern variables apply to
the normative or ideal aspect of
the structure of systems of action; they apply to one part of its culture. They
are equally useful in the empirical description of the degree of conformity
with or divergence of concrete action from the patterns of expectation or
aspiration. When they
are used to characterize differences of empirical structure of personalities or
social systems, they contain an elliptical element. This element appears in such statements as, "The American
occupational system is universalistic and achievement-oriented and
specific." The more adequate,
though still sketchy, statement would be: "Compared to other possible ways
of organizing the division of labor, the predominant norms which are
institutionalized in the American society and which embody the predominant
value-orientation of the culture give rise to expectations that occupational
roles will be treated by their incumbents and those who are associated with
them universalistically and specifically and with regard to proficiency of
performance." These categories could equally
be employed to describe actual behavior as
well as normative expectations and are of sufficient exactitude for first
approximations in comparative analysis.
For more detailed work, however, much more precise analysis of the
degrees and incidence of deviance, with special reference to the magnitude,
location, and forms of the tendencies to particularism, to ascriptiveness, and
to diffuseness would have to be carried out. We will now proceed to define
the five pattern variables and the problems of alternative selection to which
they apply. They are inherently
patterns of cultural value-orientation, but they become integrated both in
personalities and in social systems. Hence the general definitions will in each
case be followed by definitions specific to each of the three types of
systems. These definitions will be
followed by an analysis of the places of the variables in the frame of
reference of the theory of action, the reasons why this list seems to be
logically complete on its own level of generality, and certain problems of
their systematic interrelations and use in structural analysis. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 31 The term ego is
here used in the sense current in the theory of personality, not as a point of
reference. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 80
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action 1. The dilemma of gratification of impulse versus discipline. When confronted with situations in which
particular impulses press for gratification, an actor faces the problem of
whether the impulses should be released or restrained. He can solve the problem by giving primacy,
at the relevant selection points, to evaluative considerations, at the cost of
interests in the possibility of immediate gratification; or by giving primacy
to such interests in immediate gratification, irrespective of evaluative
considerations. a.
Cultural
aspect. (1) Affectivity: the normative pattern which
grants the permission for an actor, in a given type of situation, to take
advantage of a given opportunity for immediate gratification without regard to
evaluative considerations. (2) Affective neutrality: the normative pattern
which prescribes for actors in a given type of situation renunciation of
certain types of immediate gratification for which opportunity exists, in the
interest of evaluative considerations regardless of the content of the latter. b. Personality aspect. (1) Affectivity:
a need-disposition on the part of the actor to permit himself, in a certain
situation, to take advantage of an opportunity for a given type of immediate
gratification and not to renounce this gratification for evaluative reasons. (2) Affective
neutrality: a need-disposition on the part of the actor in a certain
situation to be guided by evaluative considerations which prohibit his taking
advantage of the given opportunity for immediate gratification; in this
situation the gratification in question is to be renounced, regardless of the
grounds adduced for the renunciation. c. Social system aspect. (1) Affectivity:
the role-expectation 32 that the incumbent of the role may freely express certain affective reactions
to objects in the situation and need not attempt to
control them in the interest of discipline. (2) Affective
neutrality: the role-expectation that the incumbent of the role in
question should restrain any impulses to certain affective expressions and
subordinate them to considerations of discipline. In both cases the affect may
be positive or negative, and the discipline (or permissiveness) may apply only
to certain qualitative types of affective expression (e.g., sexual). ______________________________________________________________________________________ 32 A role-expectation
is, in an institutionally integrated
social system (or part of it), an expectation both
on the part of ego and of the alters with whom he interacts. The same sentiments are shared by both. In a
less than perfectly integrated social system, the concept is still useful for
describing the expectations of each of the actors, even though they diverge. ______________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 81 2. The dilemma of private versus collective
interests, or the distribution
between private permissiveness and collective obligation. The high frequency of situations in which
there is a disharmony of interests creates the problem of choosing between
action for private goals or on behalf of collective goals. This
dilemma may be resolved by the actor either by giving primacy to interests,
goals, and values shared with the other
members of a given collective unit of which he is a member or by giving primacy
to his personal or private interests without
considering their bearing on collective interests. a.
Cultural
aspect. (1)
Self-orientation: the normative pattern which prescribes a range
of permission for an actor, in a given type of situation, to take advantage of
a given opportunity for pursuing a private interest, regardless of the content
of the interest or its direct bearing on the interests of other actors. (2) Collectivity-orientation: a normative pattern
which prescribes the area within which an actor, in a given type of situation,
is obliged to take directly into account a given selection of values which he
shares with the other members of the collectivity in question. It defines his responsibility to this
collectivity. b.
Personality
aspect. (1) Self-orientation:
a need-disposition on the part of the actor to permit himself to pursue a given
goal or interest of his own - regardless whether from his standpoint it is only
cognitive-cathectic or involves evaluative considerations - but without regard
to its bearing one way or another on the interests of a collectivity of which
he is a member. (2) Collectivity-orientation:
a need-disposition on the part of the actor to be guided by the obligation to
take directly into account, in the given situation, values which he shares with
the other members of the collectivity in question; therefore the actor must
accept responsibility for attempting to realize those values in his
action. This includes the expectation
by ego that in the particular choice in question he will subordinate his
private interests, whether cognitive. cathectic or evaluative, and that he will
be motivated in superego terms. c.
Social system
aspect. (1) Self-orientation:
the role-expectation by the relevant actors that it is permissible for the incumbent of the role in
question to give priority in the given situation to his own private interests,
whatever their motivational content or quality, independently of their bearing
on the interests or values of a given collectivity of which he is a member, or
the interests of other actors. (2) Collectivity-orientation:
the role-expectation by the relevant actors that the actor is obliged, as an incumbent of the role in
question, to take directly into account the values and interests of the
collectivity of which, in this role, he is a member. When there is a potential conflict with his private interests, he
is expected in the particular choice to give priority to the collective
interest. This also applies to his
action in representative roles on behalf of the collectivity. 3. The dilemma of transcendence versus immanence. In confronting any situation, the actor
faces the dilemma whether to treat the objects in the situation in accordance
with a general norm covering all objects in that class or whether to treat them
in accordance with their standing in some particular relationship
to him or his collectivity, independently of the
objects' subsumibility under a general norm. This dilemma can be resolved by giving
primacy to norms or value standards which are maximally generalized and which
have a basis of validity transcending any
specific system of relationships in which ego is involved, or by giving primacy to value
standards which allot priority to standards integral
to the particular relationship
system in which the actor is involved with the object. 82
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action a.
Cultural
aspect. (1) Universalism: the normative pattern which
obliges an actor in a given situation to be oriented toward objects in the
light of general standards rather than in the light of the objects' possession
of properties (qualities or performances, classificatory or relational) which
have a particular
relation to the actor's own properties (traits or statuses). (2) Particularism: the normative pattern which
obliges an actor in a given type of situation to give priority to criteria of the object's
particular relations to the actor's own properties (qualities or performances,
classificatory or relational) over generalized attributes, capacities, or
performance standards. b.
Personality
aspect. (1) Universalism:
a need-disposition on the part of the actor in a given situation to respond
toward objects in conformity with a general standard rather than in the light
of their possession of properties (qualities or performances, classificatory or
relational) which have a particular relation to the actor's own. (2) Particularism:
a need-disposition on the part of the actor to be guided by criteria of choice
particular to his own and the object's position in an object-relationship
system rather than by criteria defined in generalized terms. c.
Social system
aspect. (1) Universalism:
the role-expectation that, in qualifications for memberships and decisions for
differential treatment, priority
will be given to standards defined in completely generalized terms, independent
of the particular relationship of the actor's own statuses (qualities or
performances, classificatory or relational) to those of the object. (2) Particularism:
the role-expectation that, in qualifications for memberships and
decisions for differential treatment, priority will be given to standards which
assert the primacy of the values attached to objects by their particular
relations to the actor's properties (qualities or performances, classificatory
or relational) as over against their general universally applicable class
properties. 4.The dilemma of object
modalities. When
confronting an object in a situation, the actor faces the dilemma of deciding
how to treat it. Is he to treat it in the light of what it is in itself or in
the light of what it does or what might flow from its actions?
This dilemma can be resolved by giving primacy, at the relevant
selection points, to the "qualities" aspect of social objects as a
focus of orientation, or by giving primacy to the objects' performances and
their outcomes. a.
Cultural
aspect. (1) Ascription: the normative pattern which
prescribes that an actor in a given type of situation should, in his selections
for differential treatment of social objects, give priority to certain
attributes that they possess (including collectivity memberships and
possessions) over any specific performances
(past, present, or prospective) of the objects. (2) Achievement: the normative pattern which
prescribes that an actor in a given type of
situation should, in his selection and differential treatment of social
objects, give priority to their specific performances (past, present, or
prospective) over their given attributes (including memberships and
possessions), insofar as the latter are not significant as direct conditions of
the relevant performances. b.
Personality
aspect. (1) Ascription:
the need-disposition on the part of the actor, at a given selection point, to respond
to specific given attributes of the social object, rather than to their past,
present, or prospective performances. (2) Achievement:
a need-disposition on the part of the actor to respond, at a given selection
point, to specific performances (past present, or prospective) of a social
object, rather than to its attributes which are not directly involved in the
relevant performances as "capacities," "skills," and so
forth. c.
Social system
aspect. (1)
Ascription: the role-expectation that the role incumbent, in
orienting himself to social objects in the relevant choice situation, will
accord priority to the objects' given attributes (whether
universalistically or
particularistically defined) over their actual or potential performances. (2) Achievement:
the role-expectation that the role incumbent, in orienting to social objects in
the relevant choice situation, will give priority to the objects' actual or
expected performances, and to their attributes only as directly relevant to
these performances, over attributes which are essentially independent of the
specific performances in question. 5. The dilemma of the scope of
significance of the object. In confronting an object, an actor must
choose among the various possible ranges in which he will respond to the
object. The dilemma consists in whether
he should respond to many aspects of the object or to a restricted range of
them - how
broadly is he to allow himself to be involved with the object? The dilemma may be resolved by accepting no
inherent or prior limitation of the scope of the actor's "concern"
with the object, either as an object of interest or of obligations, or by
according only a limited and specific type of significance to the object in his
system of orientation. a.
Cultural aspect.
(1) Diffuseness: the normative pattern which
prescribes that in a given situation the orientation of an actor to an object
should contain no prior specification of the actor's interest in or concern
with or for the object, but that the scope should vary with the exigencies of
the situation as they arise. (2) Specificity: the normative pattern which
prescribes that in a given type of situation an actor should confine his
concern with a given type of object to a specific sphere and not permit other
empirically possible concerns to enter. b.
Personality
aspect. (1)
Diffuseness: the need-disposition to respond to an object in any way
which the nature of the actor and the nature of the object and its actual
relation to ego require, actual significances varying as occasions arise. (2) Specificity:
the need-disposition of the actor to respond to a given object in a manner
limited to a specific mode or context of significance of a social object,
including obligation to it, which is compatible with exclusion of other
potential modes of significance of the object. 84
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action c. Social system aspect.
(1) Diffuseness:
the role-expectation that the role incumbent, at the relevant choice point, will
accept any potential significance of a social object, including obligation to
it, which is compatible with his other interests and obligations, and that he
will give priority to this expectation over any disposition to confine the role-orientation to a
specific range of significance of the object. (2) Specificity:
the role-expectation that the role incumbent, at the relevant choice point,
will be oriented to a social object only within a specific range of its
relevance as a cathectic object or as an instrumental means or condition and
that he will give priority to this expectation over any disposition to include
potential aspects of significance of the object not specifically defined in the
expectation pattern. Of the five pattern
variables defined above, the first three are determined by primacies
among the interests inherently differentiated within the system of
value-orientation itself and in the definition of the limits of its
applicability; the other two are determined by the application of value-orientations
to the alternatives which are inherent in the structure of the object system,
and in the actor's relation to it. The
derivation of the pattern variables from the basic categories of the action scheme
is presented in diagrammatic form in Fig. 2. (Figures follow page 245.) The first of the pattern
variables, affectivity versus affective neutrality, represents the problem of
whether any evaluative considerations at all should have priority. It is thus the marginal choice between
complete permissiveness, without
reference to value standards of any kind, and discipline
in the interests of any one
of the various kinds of value standards. This dilemma is inherent in any
system of action. There can in
principle be no such dilemma involving cognitive and cathectic modes of
orientation, since both modes are inherently operative in any action
whatever. But as soon as consequences for the functioning of a system
come into the picture, a problem of evaluation arises and it becomes necessary to
impose some discipline in order to restrict damaging consequences and
facilitate favorable ones. This is,
therejore, in a sense, the most elementary dilemma of systems of action. The second pattern
variable essentially reproduces the same basic dilemma in a somewhat different
perspective and with an additional complication deriving from a difference of
level. In the pattern variable of
affectivity-affective neutrality there is no reference to the beneficiary on whose
behalf discipline is exercised.
This problem becomes preeminent in the pattern variable of
self-orientation versus collectivity-orientation. The same basic distinction
between permissiveness and discipline is repeated, but permissiveness is
no longer solely for immediate gratification in the psychological sense; it now
includes action in terms of "ego-organization," with all the
discipline associated with that. The
occurrence of this problem in the personality system is dealt with in a very
similar way in Freud's later writings about ego and superego
organization.33 Orientation
and Organization of Action 85 When the actor accepts
discipline, the problem of the standards and the objects in behalf of which
discipline is to be exercised requires solution. Collectivity-orientation is the resolution of one of these
problems through the primacy of the moral value standards, either over other
types of value standards or over nonevaluative modes of orientation. In this connection it is important to refer
to the earlier definition of moral values (pp.60, 73-74). What is at issue here is not the concrete content of the relevant moral standards but -
whatever this may be - their primacy over other nonmoral
standards. Moral standards were specifically defined as those which
refer to consequences for the system of relation in question, whether it be the
society as a whole, a subcollectivity, or even a deviant
"subculture." Sometimes moral
standards are, as is usual in our culture, universalistically defined, in which
case they do in fact transcend the particular relational system. But this is a matter of the concrete content
of moral values, not of the definition of what moral
values themselves are. Cognitive
and appreciative values may be more or less fully integrated with moral values
in the total value system. The area in
which they are allowed primacy of a permissive or deviant nature may vary in
scope. These problems must be reserved
for the discussion of the patterns of value-orientation. Here we are merely concerned with defining
the variable elements which go into them. Even
when the actor has selected the moral value standards as his guiding star, he
still must make a decision about how he is to judge the object. Is he to respond to it in the light of
cognitive or appreciative standards? Is
he to judge objects by the class categories which he can apply to all of them,
or is he to judge them by what they mean to him in their particular
relationship to him? Cognitive
standards are by their very nature universalistic. They are assessments of
events, the demonstration of the existence of which does not depend
for validity on any particular
actor's need-dispositions, value patterns, or role-expectations. The
criteria of whether a proposition is true or false are not bound to a particular
time or place or object-relationship.34 If a proposition is true, it is, for the conditions (explicit or
implicit) to which it applies, true. It is not true for one person and false for
somebody else. Its significance
for or relevance to action may, of
course, vary in different relational contexts, but not its validity. A value standard, then, in which cognitive
propositions have primacy - and which may be put into the form, "this is
valid for me as a standard guiding my action because such-and-such a
proposition is cognitively true" - is universalistic, and its
applicability transcends any particular relational context. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 33 The distinction
between id and ego in Freud's later theory is essentially
the same as our distinction between affectivity and discipline. Indeed the
first two pattern variables form the major axis of Freud's conception of the
organization of personality or what psychoanalysts sometimes call the structural
point of view. 34 Ideas, to the
contrary, are, to be sure, current, especially among proponents of the
"sociology of knowledge," hut they rest on epistemological
confusions, failing to distinguish between the qualifications and adaptations
in the content of knowledge which
are indeed relative to and necessitated by the "perspective" of the
actor, and the criteria of validity,
which are not. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 86
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action On the other hand, insofar as
purely appreciative criteria are given primacy in the determination of a
standard, the values concerned have their validity in their relationship to the actor who is
judging. The
ultimate basis of validity of the appreciative standard comes to be that the
actor (or actors) admires or enjoys the object, which is thought or felt to be
in a suitable or appropriate relationship with him; "suitability" or
"appropriateness" means here harmony with a pattern which may have
already been internalized. Thus the
standard itself is particularistic;
that is, it is immanent in the
particular relationship complex or system of action of which it is a part. There is a possible source of confusion
here, similar to that involved in the concept of moral standards. In a culture
where universalistic values are prominent, many concrete
appreciative values are also universalistically defined. This is not the result of the primacy of
appreciative criteria in their definition; it happens rather because the particular appreciative standards are part of
a general
system of value-orientation in which cognitive standards have primacy, and the
cognitive standards therefore shape appreciative values as well as others.35 These first three pattern variables exhaust the
possibilities of relative primacies within the system of modes of
orientation. The fourth and fifth
pattern variables derive from choices that must be made with respect to the
modalities and scope of significance of the object system. The distinction between the modalities of
qualities and performances as foci for action orientation te has already been
discussed and does not need to be elaborated upon here, except to note that it
presents an authentic selection alternative involved in all systems of
interaction. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 35 Here as elsewhere
a clear distinction must he made between the analytical and the concrete. In a concrete standard contained in
judgments in the appreciative field, it is possible for cognitive,
appreciative, or moral criteria to have primacy. This is true also of the concrete standards governing cognitive
or moral judgments. But the present
concern is not with this concrete level.
It is with the classification of types of criteria
of value judgments and the consequences of differences of relative primacies
among such types of
criteria. 36 This distinction,
in its obverse form, is related to that frequently made in psychological
analysis in the distinction between activity
and passivity. Achievement criteria require activity, as a
qualification of the actor not the object, while ascriptive criteria do
not. See below, Chapter II. This
distinction has become known in Anglo-American anthropological and sociological
literature through Linton's The Study of Man,
in which it is applied to the analysis of social structure. ______________________________________________________________________________________ Orientation
and Organization of Action 87 The fifth pattern
variable presents the alternative modes of delimiting the actor's relationship
to a social object. It also is
distinctly a relational category,
specifying neither a general
characteristic of the actor nor an
intrinsic property of the object, but rather one aspect of the way a given actor is related to a specific
object. A social object either has
"defined" rights with respect to ego, or it has the rights of
"residual legatee." Let us be
more explicit. In the first place, if a social object is related to ego at all,
then it has some "rights," in the sense that it has some
significance. Ego, that is, is granting
alter some rights as soon as alter becomes a social object for him. This happens because alter's action has
consequences within ego's orientation of action and thus functions among the
determinants of ego's action.37
The rights of a social object with
respect to ego are either defined (so that ego and alter know the limits of
ego's obligations) or they are undefined (so that
ego must render to alter such of his efforts as are left over when all of his
other obligations are met). The
social object, that is, either has specific (segmental) significance for ego
(in which case obligations are clearly defined) ; or it has diffuse
significance (in which case obligations are only limited by other obligations). The
segmental significance of an object may, in a concrete orientation, coincide
with the primacy of one mode of motivational orientation, such as the
cognitive-cathectic. But analytically
these ranges of variation are independent of one another. The most feasible empirical
criterion of the difference between the two alternatives is the "burden of proof." If a question arises concerning the determination
of the range of responsibility, in the case of specificity,
the burden of proof rests on the side that claims a
certain responsibility to exist (to be included in the contract, so to
speak). A possible right of alter which
is not included in the mutual expectations which defines the relation between
ego and alter is prima facie to be
excluded as irrelevant, unless specific argument for its inclusion can be
adduced. In the case of diffuseness, the burden of proof is on the opposite side, on the side that claims a
responsibility does not exist. Any
possible right of alter is prima facie to be regarded as valid, even though
neither ego nor alter has heretofore given the right in question any
thought, unless ego can adduce specific other and more important obligations
which make it impossible for him to grant alter this right. Thus, even if an object's
significance is defined in diffuse terms, the range of obligation is not
unlimited, because the allocation of
orientation interests among objects is a basic functional imperative of all
action systems. Therefore, the range of diffuseness can never be unlimited,
because this would lead directly to
encroachment on the interests in, and
obligations to, other objects. In the case
of diffuseness, it is always the potential conflict with the relations to other
objects which limits the orientation to the first object; whereas it is the set
of expectations concerning the particular object which brings about the
limitation in the case of specificity.
When, therefore, a question of evaluation arises, the justification for
rejecting a claim, in the case of specificity, is simply the denial of an obligation (e.g., "it wasn't
in the contract"). In the case of
diffuseness, the rejection of a claim can be justified only by the invocation
of other obligations which are ranked higher
on some scale of priority. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 37 To grant an object
"rights" in the last analysis is nothing else than to allow it to
affect one's action. Alter's rights
over ego, that is, refer to those things which ego "has to do"
because of alter's relations to ego's motives and ego's system of values. ______________________________________________________________________________________ 88
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action As with the other pattern
variables, the dilemma presented in the specificity-diffuseness pattern
variable is inherent in any orientation of one actor to another. Almost invariably an explicit choice has to
be made. If the contact between two
people is fleeting and casual, the significance of one for the other may be
highly specific without any explicit choice occurring. But if the relationship continues,
the problem of its scope becomes explicit. The possibility of diffuse
attachments will then become more pressing and a decision will have to be made. THE INTERRELATIONS OF THE PATTERN VARIABLES We hold that the five pattern
variables constitute a system
covering all the fundamental alternatives which can arise directly out of the
frame of reference for the theory of action.
It should be remembered that the five pattern variables formulate five
fundamental choices which must be made by an actor when
he is confronted with a situation before
that situation can have definitive (unambiguous) meaning for him. We have said that objects do not
automatically determine the actors "orientation of action"; rather, a
number of choices must be made before
the meaning of the objects becomes definite. Now, we
maintain that when the situation is social (when one actor is orienting to
another), there are but five choices which are completely general (that is,
which must always be made) and which derive directly from the action frame of
reference; these choices must always be made to give the situation specific
defined meaning. Other choices are
often necessary to determine the meaning of a situation, but these may be
considered accidents of content, rather than genuine alternatives intrinsic to
the structure of all action. To be a
pattern variable, a set of alternatives must derive directly from the problems
of dominance among the modes of orientation, or from the problems arising from
the ambiguities of the object world which require choice on the part of ego for
their resolution. In order to show that
our five pattern variables constitute a system, we must show that they exhaust
these problems. Let us take up first
the problems of dominance among modes of orientation, and second,
problems arising from the ambiguities of relation to the object world. Orientation
and Organization of Action 89 There are only three
completely general problems of dominance arising directly from the modes of
orientation. Since the cognitive and
cathectic modes of motivational orientation are so inseparable as to abnegate
any problem of primacy, we do not find any conflict between them. Thus, the first pattern variable is between
them acting alone, on the one hand, and an evaluative orientation, on the
other. The problem is: Will evaluation
enter into the determination of this course of action? A decision must always be made (explicitly
or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously). The other two pattern variables
arising from primacy problems with respect to orientation modes are not on the
same level as the first in terms of generality within the concrete act, because
if affectivity is selected in the concrete situation instead of affective
neutrality, the problems presented by pattern variables two and three never arise. (If an actor does not evaluate, he does not
have to decide which standards will get primacy within the evaluative
process.) However, in discussing the
orientation habits which make up a value, a role-expectancy, or a need-disposition, we can
see that the second two pattern variables have just as much generality as the
first. Although an actor may be
regarded in affective terms in some concrete situations, and even though ego
may have the habit of affectivity with respect to alter, this still does not
mean that the "affectivity attitude" will apply to alter all of the
time. (The habit implies that in
perhaps a majority of the situations an attitude of affectivity will apply, but
no relationship between human beings can remain always on the affectivity level
- this, perhaps, is what we mean by sayiing "we are not beasts".) When on rare or frequent occasions the
affectively neutral attitude is assumed, when evaluation of the relationship
evokes value standards, the problems formulated in pattern variables two and
three immediately
become relevant, and choices must be made. Thus, one must choose, if one
evaluates, whether or not to give primacy to collectivity-integrating
moral standards. If moral
standards are invoked at all, they will have primacy owing to their status as
the "final court of appeal" on any problem of integration. Cognitive and appreciative standards, on the
contrary, are always invoked in any evaluative problem; thus, the problem of
their relative primacy with respect to one another always arises, whether or not moral standards are invoked. Hence, the problem of the relative primacy of
appreciative and cognitive standards must always be resolved. If cognitive standards are to dominate appreciative ones, then
the objects will be judged primarily in terms of their relationship to some
generalized frame of reference; if appreciative standards are to dominate cognitive ones, then
objects will be judged primarily in terms of ego as the center of the frame of
reference. Thus, these three problems
of choice and only these three, derive directly from problems of dominance
among the modes of orientation. Similarly, there are only two
completely general ambiguities with respect to social objects as these are
defined in our frame of reference.
These are (1) the quality-performance ambiguity and (2) the
diffuseness-specificity ambiguity. In
every social situation, anywhere, ego either implicitly or explicitly has to
resolve these two ambiguities by choosing one side or the other of both dichotomies
before the social object can have determinate meaning for him. Thus, we complete our case for the
exhaustiveness of our list of pattern variables.
ideological furnishings for the homeless
mind
daurril
library: talcott parsons
Toward
a General Theory of Action - 3:40 PM 7/24/01
2 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action
Introduction
1 Categories of the Orientation and
Organization of Action
ACTION AND ITS
ORIENTATION
COMPONENTS OF THE FRAME OF
REFERENCE OF THE
THEORY OF ACTION
COMMENTARY ON THE FRAME OF REFERENCE
CLASSIFICATION OF OBJECTS
ORIENTATION TO THE SITUATION
DILEMMAS OF ORIENTATION AND THE PATTERN
VARIABLES
THE DEFINITIONS OF
PATTERN VARIABLES