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Abstract
This paper has two parts. The first discusses some of the recent developments
in telecommunications industries and their sociological significance. Recent
claims that the Internet marks an end of Geography are problematised. The
argument is advanced that we need an approach which maps social, economic
and historical forces to provide a "virtual geography". The second half
of the paper situates this general discussion in a specific case study:
The formation of a modern Rhodesian national identity. A particular focus
of this analysis concerns the impact of Internet based interaction in the
formation of national identities and the problematic relationship of these
with the state. The persistence and development of Rhodesian nationalism,
decades after the ending of the UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence)
period, through the medium of the internet, is explored to illustrate the
"virtuality" inherent in all national imaginings(Anderson, 1983). The simulated
realities of internet based Rhodesiana contain no state elements. By contrast
the real Rhodesia can be argued to have consisted almost entirely of a
small minority of "whites" whose control over state apparatus was matched
with little or no credible claim to nationhood. Only by mapping these processes
can any sense be made of the development of "virtual Rhodesia." The paper
explores the extent to which processes attributed to new telecommunications
industries, such as those of space/time, or nation/state dislocation can
be better understood as products of modern industrial societies. Telematics
may provide the promise of a greater manipulation of geographical realities,
a plasticity of spatial relations and an extension of time. Yet all of
these processes occur within specific social and historical boundaries.
These boundaries indicate sites where power has been exercised and contested.
The internet rather then marking the end of "Geography" contains the potentiality
for the invention of new geographies.
Key words: virtual geography, nationalism, cyberdemocracy, Rhodesia,
Cyberia.
The growth of the new telecommunications
industry over the last decade has been extraordinary. Perhaps almost equally
remarkable have been some of the claims made about the importance and the
impact of these developments. It is a commonplace that spatial significances
have been eradicated and even that the digital revolution marks an "end
of geography".
Nothing more clearly epitomises the
claim that the Internet has ended geography than the notion that it constitutes
in itself a super-geographical realm. This is the mythical sounding realm
of Cyberia. Recent accounts present telecommunication industries as more
like a nation then a tool. Mark Poster writing on Cyberdemocracy comments,
"The Internet is more like a social space than a thing so its effects are
more like those of Germany than those of hammers."(1997: 216) The argument
here is that the failure to realise the importance of the Internet as a
"context" reproduces a modernist simplisiticsm in which pre-conceived individuals
are instruments of other (grand) narratives which are being read off at
a level of theory.
Of course it is important to explore
how interactive socialisation occurs within the consumption of any form
of media and not treat consumers or users as pre-given. In media studies
the problematisation of the "audience" has long had this concern. However
what is being argued for here is significantly more then a need to identify
the "uses and gratifications" derived by audiences from the Internet. The
argument here goes much further. The information revolution provides a
technological front end for post-modernity itself. David Holmes argues
that in Virtual Reality, "Truth is not determined as the adequacy of knowledge
to reality."(1997: 10) The simulated reality of Cyberia is itself a simulation.
Whereas modernist science sought to accurately represent reality so it
could control it, post-modern science changes reality so that our representations
of it seem more real. Holmes claims that "we can bring the real to us in
whatever form we so desire and, in doing so, abolish the real"(1997: 11).
The reason for the collapsing of all
spaces and temporalities in Cyberian unrealities is the quality of new
digital media themselves. Because they allow endless reproduction and consumption
in contexts which may bear no relation to their production, Internet communications
according to Holmes, become disembodied and come to have "no more significance
than a note in a bottle floating between continents"(1997: 37). The meaning
of such messages may fortuitously be grasped but will never become a basis
for forming community or for the production of social knowledge.
Disembodiment of messages paradoxically
is why the Internet is claimed as a liberatory medium undermining or dissolving
old social divides.
Participants in virtual communities
can thus escape their own embodied identities and accordingly can also
escape any social inequalities and attitudes relating to various forms
of embodiment. Race, gender of physical disability is indiscernible over
the Internet. Any basis for enacting embodiment discrimination is removed,
freeing access to participation and granting each participant equal status
within the network.(Wilson, 1997:149)
Predictably, however, such utopian promise
serves only to disguise dis-empowerment and dis-association. The individual
far from becoming an active citizen through being able to play with identity
in this way becomes disconnected or abstracted "from physical action and
a sense of social and personal responsibility to others"(Wilson, 1997:
153).
Cyberia appears to stand for an embodiment
of post-modern malaise. As a technology it disembodies and fragments identity
and leaves cultural meaning rootless and capable of any kind of assembly
or bricolage into new meanings. But does the Internet really do all of
this and do it all the time? I use the Internet to check train times but
I would soon stop doing so if there was no relationship between the knowledge
it gives me and reality. (The alternative possibility that the trains are
running at times set by the web page is too silly to bear serious discussion.)
In this sense the Internet is very like a hammer. Of course not all Internet
usage is so instrumental (although more and more of it is likely to become
so), and the point that the Internet serves as "context" for the production
of meanings is important. Again however the disembodiment of textually
based exchanges as discussed in most of the literature is a function of
the primitive stage of the Internet - as evidenced in examples drawn from
the early days of the WELL.
The revolutionary freedom offered by
the Internet is in reality a product of the limitations of its origins
in text based exchanges. The nature of these limitations is not altogether
clear. Some of the most profound and emotionally engaging ideas to be encountered
are based in what is after all "just text". We need also to recognise that
in "real life" some people are also able to escape the confines of their
gender and other social signifiers. It is not clear that there is any quantifiable
difference in the extent to which they are able to do so in "virtual" realms
even when these are limited to text. If internet communication is made
using a Webcam with live pictures are gender, ethnicity and so on all still
equally indiscernible? On Home Pages littered with pictures of flags, wives,
boyfriends, children, pets and even plants are the meanings necessarily
disembodied because they are on the Internet? More problematically if cultural
meanings are more embodied on the Internet by means of images, music, video
and all the other cultural baggage of the modern World Wide Web, does this
mean that a more meaningful basis is created for the production of communities?
Even less post-modern writers suggest
the Internet is eroding geography, and clearly this has implications for
the formation of communities. According to Mike Holderness ?everyone who
is on the Internet is in the same place" and as a result,
Communities of communication can therefore
be expected to form around common interests and not around common physical
location: Ideography replaces geography.(1998: 35-36)
However at one level the displacing
of geography in the formation of community is surely a feature of industrial
societies. The Internet may mark an even greater displacement but it is
not anything new. Neither is it very clear what is meant by geography other
than in a common-sense use to designate natural spaces. Geography like
history is important because it marks sites (as history marks periods)
of social struggle. In geography we can trace the exercise of social power,
the operations of class and the other constraints that govern peoples lives.
Actually most Internet usage is probably
local, certainly the people I e-mail most frequently are probably people
I teach with. We can think of the University as a community of "ideography"
as many academics do have interests in common. However, the level of ideas
seems to say little about either the conditions of work or of the social
processes operating in the geographical and historical production of the
University. Constructed spaces are legitimate subjects for geography. If
India is suitably studied as a geographical entity then so too are uses
made of digital spaces.
The fundamental weakness of the problematic
of studying telecommunications as if they are independent of all other
social variables was grasped long before the Internet was fashionable object
of study. Writing in New Left Review in 1984 Fredric Jameson argued against
the idea that technology was "in any way ?the ultimately determining instance?"
of either social life or cultural production.
Our faulty representations of some immense
communicational and computer network are themselves but a distorted figuration
of something even deeper, namely the whole world system of present-day
multinational capitalism(Jameson, 1984).
It is not possible to deal with a contentious
question of various definitions of postmodernity here. At the very least,
however, Jameson"s formulation of the problem usefully indicates for example
that the real problem of digital reproduction lies in the realm of copyright
and branding. The ability to make digital copies, for example of musical
works, that are identical to the original recording means that copies can
become indistinguishable from the branded and expensive commercial product.
This combined with a global unregulated distribution system poses massive
problems for the music industry. Similarly the erosion of traditional points
of control in national boundaries poses problems for commerce more then
it does for culture.
The problems of identity and culture
described as inherent characteristics of the Internet are standard tenants
of post-modern theory that have been layered onto the study of new telecommunications
industries. Using the Internet to disguise larger social and economic processes
(not merely contexts) has become an important part of pop culture. This
is how the Utopian and distinctly post-modern magazine Wired presents the
case for what it calls "The Information Standard":
Q:Why is the power of the state in decline?
Money goes where it's wanted and stays
where it is well treated, and that's all she wrote.
This annoys governments no end
The Information Standard
Stateless money functions as a plebiscite
on your policy. There are 300,000 screens out there, lit up with all the
news that traders need to make value judgements on how well you are running
your economy.
The Information Standard
The information standard is more draconian
then the gold standard, because the government has lost control of the
marketplace
Technology has overwhelmed public policy
The Information Standard
Q: As the power of sovereign governments
wanes who will be left in charge?Error! Bookmark not defined.
(Wired 6.01, January 1998)
The problem with this is not the nature
of information flows, differential access to information, or the effect
of information on society. The problem is the erosion of democratic process
by market forces with little accountability. Such processes of course are
contradictory and may produce many unintended consequences. What they certainly
mark is an erosion of our position in society as citizens and the securing
merely of our rights as consumers.(Elliott, 1986)
The constitution of identities or communities on the Internet must
be set in the frame of the problems of their formation in our time not
as an independent variable. Recognising the agency of individuals participating
in Internet exchanges is important, but this agency is to varying degrees
also created and situated outside of the realm of the Internet. This may
create problems for the use of the Internet as source for ethnographic
research in itself. The same point could be made, for example, about the
use of agony columns in Women"s magazines as guide to understanding social
life. Above all there is nothing new about the Internet to make C. Wright
Mills (1959) observation that any sociology worth the name is historical
sociology and perhaps one should add "geographical sociology".
Benedict Anderson's definition of nationalism
as "imagined community" was intended in part as a corrective to more reductionist
accounts which had failed to take sufficient account of the imaginative
and creative process involved. There is nothing imaginary about nationalism
in the sense of its construction being a falsity. Anderson points out that
all communities larger then those of "face to face contact (and perhaps
even these) are imagined"(Anderson, 1986: 89). This is a helpful starting
point for considering Rhodesian nationalism as it presents an extreme case
which at the surface appears to have even more "no there there" then most
nationalisms.
From its foundation in the late nineteenth
century the Rhodesian state was a problematic construct. The handful of
settlers and speculators were part of an outrageous and only quasi legal
experiment in venture capital. Although nominally part of the great expanding
empire, British influence was initially limited to a charter licensing
the mining activities (and these activities alone) of Cecil Rhodes"s British
South Africa Company. For the first decades of the extraordinarily brutal
regime the government was the private company. Its lasting legacy can be
seen in the fact that the police force continued to called the British
South Africa Police until independence in 1980. The legitimisation of a
settler presence in the territory, a contravention of the charter, required
an extraordinary media campaign and two wars, known by Zimbabweans as the
First Chimurenga.
The Rhodesian administration despite
its control of state apparatus had little success in extending its hegemony
over the massive majority of the population. Not until the internal settlement
of 1978 did it manage to co-opt even moderate black support. The bitter
and prolonged war of independence, or second Chimurenga, saw large swathes
of countryside where effectively the new Zimbabwean state was already in
control long before final independence(Frederikse, 1982: 5) . At a level
of national imagining the fact that old soldiers of the first Chimurenga
lived to see the second being fought illustrates the transient nature of
Rhodesian nationhood. In addition colonial Rhodesian nationalism presents
a by no means monolithic front. Only a few years before Ian Smith"s declaration
of Independence in 1965 Rhodesians had returned the moderate liberal Garfield
Todd to power on a platform that envisaged a gradual transition to majority
rule.
It was the UDI experience which formed
the focal point for the development of Rhodesian nationalism. Yet this
period lasted for only thirteen years. Furthermore the massive emigration
of whites during UDI and following independence put paid to the propaganda
slogan of "We"re here to stay".
This briefly is the setting against
which the development of a revived Internet based form of Rhodesian nationalism
needs to be considered. This is how one page describes the phenomena:
INTERNET "RESCUES" LOST TRIBE OF RHODESIANS
Rhodesians are nothing if not resourceful.
Their country might have been taken from them by politicians, but the spirit
still roams the world, looking for a home. Taking advantage of late 20th
century technology, they are creating a virtual country on computers around
the world.
They've logged in from more than 20
US states, from Canada's Yukon and from Port Elizabeth to Perth.
Rhodesians are everywhere, and they've
taken to the Internet with a vengeance.(H.Ref. 1)
How is that decades after the ending
of the UDI period groups of people are elaborating a Rhodesian national
identity, especially when the life stories of many reveal they were first
generation settlers in the first place? Can this extreme case reveal anything
about the formation of national identities? Does it provide any insights
into how these processes are mediated by modern telecommunications?
The virtual imagining of Rhodesian identity
appears to mirror image the reality. The real Rhodesia consisted of minority
rule (by about 3% of the population) in which the power of the state was
in the hands of a group with little claim to national hegemony. Most definitions
of nationhood stress that as a form of community it must contain what Anderson
describes as "deep horizontal comradeship" regardless of exploitation and
inequality(1986: 89). At least members of nations need to share what Nira
Yuval-Davis refers to as "common destiny"(1997: 19). The extent to which
this was true for most people in the territory of Rhodesia is highly questionable.
The "them and us" complex of nationhood in this instance was an internal
division. Rhodesian nationalism was always racist.
The plasticity of time and space offered
by new information technologies has created the possibility of a re-creation
of Rhodesian nationalism. There is even a site which declares itself as
the "Government of Rhodesia in Exile". The opening paragraph of the page
describes the current state of Rhodesian"s: "Homeless, stateless, rudderless,
brainless..." and urges a return to the good old days adding, "If it cannot
be done peacefully, we will return to the bush and wage a new Chimp-urenga,
or Gorilla war." (H.Ref. 2) The intention is joke which is meant to be
offensive.
Flouting the conventions of what is
perceived as politically correct "pommie" "yankee" or "ozie" society is
popular theme. Being a Rhodesian is construed as act of resistance. The
"them and us" becomes Rhodesians against the rest of the world. A site
by the name of "Rhodesians at War" encourages responses:
I invite you, and anybody you know who
was there, to contribute, in an attempt to tell the story of how ordinary
Rhodesians soldiered on regardless.
I'd like your family snaps, the backyard
braai, the fishing trip to the lake. Anything that says: We're bloody coping
despite international attempts to cow us into submission!(H.Ref. 3)
In this instance Tom Nairn's observation
that nationalism is a social neurosis the equivalent of infantilism in
individuals may seem to have some truth(cited in Anderson, 1986) . "We
promise to carry the Rhodesian spirit to our graves and we promise to spread
the word of our "Faith" to all we come in contact with" writes a correspondent
in Australia who bemoans leaving Rhodesia in 1978 at age 16 before he had
a chance to fight in the war.
I feel as though we are part of this
Rhodesian global community and can help each other in the process, this
adds to our purpose of existence and who knows where this might lead: to
another Rhodesia where we can all be together again perhaps? (H.Ref. 4)
Sentiments like these are not easily
or usefully disassociated with the concept of nationalism despite their
problematic formulation. The theme of the lost tribe has a particular significance.
A popular Rhodesian myth concerned the building of Great Zimbabwe (an impressive
group of ruins from which the modern country takes it name), by either
the queen of Sheba or a lost tribe of Israel. Against all historical evidence
Rhodesians denied that local Shona people's ancestors could ever have built
such an impressive structure. In some way this established a prior claim
to the land and implied that African were just as much interlopers as white
settlers. The notion of being specially chosen by God and that Rhodesian
independence marked a resistance to communist, atheistic, immoral and decadent
Western social and political developments was a popular theme of Rhodesian
propaganda. It too finds expression on the Internet in images of Rhodesia
cradled in caring hands with the slogan "God's Own Country".(H.Ref. 5)
This brief resume of the considerable
and rapidly growing "virtual Rhodesia" requires both historical and geographical
mapping for any kind of useful analysis. A plasticity and invention in
the uses of the Internet are evident rather then abstraction and disembodying.
These pages contain a rich imagery of photographs, anthems, waving flags,
recipes, reminiscences, novels, noticeboards, virtual embassies and more.
Unlike the early examples of Internet communications they provide a great
deal more than just abstracted text.
It may be that these pages are being
produced merely because the medium allows it. Creating a web page is relatively
easy and cheap and the presence of such material on the World Wide Web
cannot be taken to indicate a significant social movement. In point of
fact most of the materials are derived from paper sources initially. The
circulation of these paper materials would have been limited previously
to specific distribution networks. Now the Internet allows a revolution
in dissemination and arguably allows the development of some kind of new
communal identity. The meaning and significance of communities of this
sort requires a mapping process. A process that begins with the recognition
of the continuing importance of geographical realities in social life,
and a recognition that these geographical realities were always virtual.
References
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H.Ref. 2: Welcome to the new web site of the Rhodesian Government in
exile!
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/9465/index.html.
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