Representing diffuse interests in EC policy-making
Mark A.
Pollack (December 1997)
1.
Introduction
· pb of representation of diffuse interests.
i.e collective interests held by a large number of individuals (> low incentive to mobilise) whose costs lay upon a limited number of actors, like firms (> high incentive to mobilise).
· In other words, the benefits are deconcentrated, meanwhile the costs are concentrated.
e.g : environmental protection, consumer protection, equal opportunities between men and women.
· Many scholars have argued that the EC systematically privileges concentrated and mobile interests (capital) over other societal interests, thus creating special challenges to diffuse interests. The EC has been said to reward concentrated interests, since they are better able to lobby at the EC level.
· Pollack challenges this monolithic view.
Streek (1996, studying social policy) an Scharpf (1994) have developed a normative critique of the EC as an institution which increases the market power of mobile capital at the expense of less mobile factors such as labour. Tow main arguments:
2.1 Economic integration harms diffuse interests
· Economic integration creates a process of competition among the various national systems of regulation. Free movement of capital ® pressure to adjust national regulations to make them more attractive to industry ® « race to the bottom ».
· Such competitive deregulation has been observed in the United States. It is referred as the « Delaware effect », after Delaware's relatively lax system of corporate regulation.
· However Sun and Pelkman point out that this process is not inevitable.
- firms might be unable to « arbitrage », because of imperfect information or fixed investments
- national governments may choose to leave higher regulations in place (especially if the domestic market is sufficiently large to remain attractive) because of electoral pressure. E.g : Germany, California.
2.2 Political integration does not help
· industry is better-organised and better ressourced at the EC level in Brussels than competing interests groups (labour, environmentalists, and women's groups).
·
the fundamentally intergovernmental system of governance favours the
deregulatory, neo-liberal agenda of business.
'Positive integration' (regulation - especially needed by diffuse
interests) is far more difficult to reach within the Council than 'Negative
integration' (deregulation).
·Ccl : diffuse interests
have lost influence at the national level thanks to economic integration, while
at the same time being marginalised by concentrated, capitalists interests at
the EC level, thanks to intergovernmental political integration (>neo-liberalism)
·Purpose of this article:
- to show that some diffuse interests have been successful in organising at the EC level
-
EC institutions are more welcoming to diffuse interest
supporters than Streek leads to
believe.
3.
Pollack'view : EC institutions offer Diffuse Interests risks as well as opportunities
3.1 Vogel's conclusion on the US
·
Pollack uses Vogel's comparative
study of environmental policy-making in Japan and in the USA (Vogel, 1993).
Vogel's conclusion is that the US political system offers both risks and opportunities
of diffuse interests.
· risks : 1) territorial fragmentation ® can lead to competitive deregulation and to insufficient implementation of federal decisions 2) separation of powers ® creates a multiplicity of 'veto points' for concentrated business ® can lead to stalemate.
· opportunities : 1) the same fragmentation provides diffuse interests with multiple access points (Congress, courts, independent executive agencies...) 2) difficulty to roll back legislation because of these veto points (e.g. : Reagan administration wanted to defund environmental policy ® the Congress opposed) ® stable, ratchetlike policies.
3.2 Pollack generalise these
conclusions to the EC institutions
·risks : competitive deregulation and insufficient implementation of directives are commonplace in the EC.
·opportunities : 1) institutions offer ratchetlike policies (the acquis communautaires are very difficult to change given the need for the agreement of the commission and the vote of the Council) 2) provide diffuse interests with multiple points of access to the policy-process.
Groups representing diffuse interests may follow a :
4.1 'National route' (Member governments and the Council of ministers)
·lobbying individual member governments for national regulation, and pressing their government to champion EC-level policies.
·least
demanding and most promising for diffuse interests, since it requires no
transnational organisation
·benefits from the direct responsibility of national officials to their electorate.
· in terms of public-interest legislation, the Community can be divided into high standard (Germany, Netherlands, Denmark) and low standard countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland).
·
the institutions of the EC remain largely intergovernmental but the
high-standard member states have nevertheless succeeded in introducing
progressive legislation (equal opportunity, consumer protection, environment).
The existence of such 'champions' is important.
4.2 'Brussels route' (Commission, entrepreneurial ally of diffuse
interest groups)
· the Commission has been magnet to numerous Euro-groups seeking to influence policies during the initial drafting of regulations (in the Commission's services) before they reach the Council of ministers.
· as a policy entrepreneur, a competence maximizer, and a purposeful opportunist (Majone, Cram), the Commission is a natural ally to diffuse interests seeking the establishment of EC-level policies.
· The various DGs (24) provide convenient access points for diffuse interest groups. They have promoted the development of such Euro-groups to provide them with interlocutors in the policy process.
- DG XI is often depicted as a green colony (imp of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth Europe, the European Environmental Bureau)
- DG XXIV in charge of the Consumer Protection - close contact with may consumer associations.
- DG V (social affairs) - financial support to the European Women's Lobby. (by contrast with environmental and consumer groups, women's groups have been poorly represented at the EC level for most the EC history, because of disagreements between traditional and radical feminists)
4.3 The European Parliament : champion of diffuse interests
· champion of diffuse interests because
electorally popular themes.
· remarkable success in the EP election of the Green Group. Puts pressure on the other political groups.
·
the EEP has largely used its budgetary power to support diffuse interests (E.g:
the EP restores funds regularly cut by the Council, for environmental and
consumer policies - which directly pay for the maintenance of groups in
Brussels)
4.4 The Court of justice
· in the area of implementation, the ECJ can play a fundamental role
· As in the United States, the court has adopted a broad, teleological reading of the Treaty, and of EC secondary legislation.
·
individuals can sue MS for non-implementation
In this section Pollack survey the record of Community policy-making of three diffuse interests :environmental protection, consumer protection, and protection of women's rights.
Begin by stating the acquis communautaires. He divides then the policy process into three stages : agenda setting, policy-making, and implementation.
5.1 The acquis
communautaires and diffuses interests
· each policy is more than simply the lowest common denominator of MS practices. In many cases EC policies have forced MS to tighten their national policy.
· Environmental policy: Oldest. Well over 200 directives, regulations and decisions. Started with product harmonisation. Then water, air, noises. Some directive have been particularly progressive (¹ lowest common denominator) E.g : various automobile emission directives of the 1980s and 1990s.
· Consumer protection: intimately bound up with the creation of the internal market. And the CAP. Dominant theme in the 1970s: health protection. In the 1890s: economic interest. Consumer Council.
· Women's rights: Has focused almost exclusively on the rights of women in the workplace (Article 119 ® equal pay and treatment for equal job). Fails to address the fundamental causes of women's inequality, including issues of family life, childcare, pornography and reproductive rights. Especially important role of the ECJ.
5.2 Diffuse interests and agenda setting
· here, diffuse interests rely upon member governments and the Commission. Importance of high-standards countries as 'champions'.
5.3 Diffuse interests and EC policy-making
· the Council's success in adopting regulations with high standards has varied over time.
· prior to the SEA, unanimous vote was required ® greater difficulty. However, one must realise that the Council has adopted considerable numbers of regulations and directives. In order to reach agreements, massive use of 'transitional periods' and 'derogations for less advanced member states'.
· Since the SEA, much better : QMV for internal market, health and safety at work + new EP powers.
·
with Maastricht : more QMV in internal market, environmental and consumer
issues.
5.4 Diffuse interests, implementation and the Court of Justice
· the step by step amendment of the Treaties has not guarenteed effective implementation.
· fortunately for diffuse interest groups, the EC's institutional system also provides access to the ECJ, via Article 177.
· famous Defrenne case of 1971 ® Article 119 has direct effect within the ms, conferring rights on individuals.
·
these legal victories were won largely at the national level, through Article
177 ® hence, without the need
for women's groups to organise at the Community level
6. Conclusion
· the EC is not the ideal institutional structure for protecting diffuse interests
· but, real opportunities (multiple access points) and locked acquis communautaires.