Socializing nature : Achuar and Makuna

 

 

Comparing Descola's Spears of twilight and

Viveiros' From the point of view of the Enemy

  

by

Olivier Charnoz

 

 Question:

 

1. Examine similarities/differences between the Achuar and Makuna in terms of their understanding of nature, society, and cosmos (N.B. the term 'surface similarity' suggests that there are apparent similarities that should not prevent us from pointing out deeply seated differences)

2. How do these differences help us to understand social and institutional differences (e.g. inward/outward-lookingness)

 

 Introduction

 

The question is difficult to process as it potentially involves a comparison of every single aspects of both societies, as it asks to compare social practices in the light of cosmologies. Yet it 1) allows to focus on 'specific sites' 2) asks to move from 'surface similarities' to the 'underlying differences in the society'.

 

In order to give some order to this comparative effort, this paper will focus on the most striking similarity to the reader's eyes, namely the continuity between nature and society. This feature is clearly present in both Achuar and Makuna cultures. We will explore it, without, at this stage, giving any opinion over whether it should be called a 'surface' or a 'true' similarity. We can thus rephrase our specific question as follows :

 

When one look at the Achuar and the Makuna societies, is one in presence of truly similar conceptions of the nature/society continuity (merely differently expressed), or in presence of qualitatively different modes of continuity ?

 

For the sake of clarity, we will analyze the ways nature is merged with society (and society with nature) firstly in the Achuar and secondly in the Makuna culture. In doing so, we will point out ideological material, as well as social practices, so as to get a sense of how differently these societies are merged with nature. Finally, we will raise the question whether the initial similarity should be called a 'surface' or a 'true' one. This paper is therefore meant to help "showing the creativity each culture brings to its manner of socializing nature"

 

 

 

 

Descola's central claim is that the clear distinction nature/society, to which we are so used in western societies has no relevance in the case of the Achuar, as what we call 'nature' is thought of as a cultural whole (326). 'Nature' is "nearly untouched by human hands, but profoundly socialized by human thought" (35). What interest us here is understanding what thought and practical mechanisms are used by the Achuar to carry out this "socialization of nature" (1), so as to be able to compare them with those used by the Makuna. We can group them into four main categories : cosmological/ontological, anthropomorphism/animism , social interactions with 'nature', and primacy of the domestic.

 

· Cosmological and ontological thought processes

As Descola notes, the Achuar do not spontaneously comment on the organization of their cosmos, "unlike other Amazonian societies" (63). It is therefore somewhat artificial to extract these elements from praxis. However, they still deserve a specific analysis, that isolate them from social and technical practices which they inform.

On the cosmological side, one should note the stratification that divides the cosmos into three isolated layers : a surface, an upper and a lower layers. Achuar dwell on the surface (75). Before the Moon commanded celestial liana to be severed, the Achuar used to go walking in the sky. They regret the definitive disappearance of these 'celestial stroll' (76). The world beneath is of a different nature : it is in a way closer, as soul migration is sometimes possible, and the beings that inhabit it are "the tutelary spirits which ensure that hunting and fishing are performed in the proper way". Man is therefore at the border of two worlds, to which they related very differently : through everyday social interactions with the lower layer, desire and regret with the upper layer. Emotion and rituals link the Achuar to the whole cosmos which is thereby socialized.

On the ontological side, socialization of what we call nature is performed through a specific "chain of beings". Its primary characteristic is that it establishes a "continuum between human beings and nature's beings" (93). Humans and most plants, and animals are "persons (aents) with a soul (wakan) and an individual life". However, and this is the crucial point, only Humans are "complete persons" (penke aents), which implies in turn that animals and plants are some 'deteriorated' kind of humans. Indeed, myths confirms this interpretation : in mythical times, "nature's beings had a human appearance too" (93). When they lost their human forms, they however "retained several features of their former state, to wit, consciousness, and for certain species, as social life (.) "(93). Thus, what is striking in this ontological chain, is that humans enjoy a very specific position, as if they were the original and ultimate reality of all forms of life in 'nature'. Descola is therefore right when he describe this ontology as an "anthropocentric order"(93).

One can therefore point out the contrast between a the intermediary cosmological position of the Achuar and their ultimate position in the chain of 'real' beings. This naturally reinforces by contrast the link between humanity and what we call 'nature'.

 

· Anthropomorphism and Animism

Largely as a consequence of the anthropocentric ontological order, we can be point out anthropomorphic and animistic conceptions of nature. Anthropomorphism / Animism both express a kind of 'projection' of human features onto the 'natural' world. Yet they need to be distinguished as the former project the human as an individual, whereas the latter projects humans as a group.

Anthropomorphic conceptions thus emphasis the common features of nature's beings and humans as individuals : every living being has its "own personality" (77), they have "human affects", they dream and are conscious (93). In a nutshell, they live as conscious individuals.

Animistic conceptions stress the social life of nature's beings. All species enjoy a 'social' life, which is confirmed by the idea that "each animal species as its own language" - thus presupposing some kind of society. The centrality of mankind is again expressed by the fact that the 'higher species' on the ontological chain share the same social rules as the 'complete persons' (93). For instance, highly socialized behaviors are imputed to the toucan and to the woolly monkey, "which is supposed to observe scrupulously the rules prescribed for contracting a marriage"(96). Human social structures are further projected through the idea that "wounded animals that has not been retrieved goes to see its species shaman to be doctored" (238).

This animistic projection is also extended to the cosmological realm, as for instance in "The myth of how day and night came to be". Indeed, the Achuar sexual division of labor appears to be shared by mythical beings : "like all men, Moon was a hunter", whereas, his wife Auju spent her life producing manioc beer for him (99).

Anthropomorphic and animistic features create a universal inter-subjectivity, that enables communication between beings : "Achuar understand some elements of these individuals languages inasmuch as they are stereotyped expression of conventional feelings familiar to humans, such as fear, pain, joy, love" (99). Moreover, humans speak to plants and animals by means of incantations.

 

· Social interactions with nature

As already suggested, they must be seen as the consequence of the animistic and anthropomorphic conceptions of the Achuar.

The most striking example of this causal link is arguably the Gardening magic. Dismissing any utilitarian interpretation of this magic practices (usually anents invoking Nunki) Descola suggests that they very logically follows the conceptions that plants are inhabited by spirits (213-214). As he puts it : "When one postulates that cultivated plants are beings with souls, it is obviously normal to attempt to keep up harmonious relations with them, using for this magical songs, which are employed to the same end in human relations " (214).

Hunting is not a pure act of predation, as it involves the management of specific social relations with both the game and its tutelary spirit. Typically, anents address games as brothers-in-law. If a game is to be caught, the hunter must subscribe to an implicit contract with the guardians spirits of the game : 1) the hunter must take with moderation 2) neither he or his family must show disrespect for the animal (258). Making fun of a slain animal can be terribly sanctioned by the "game mothers" (as show in The myth of Amasank and the Juriri 259). Hunting therefore amounts to some kind of "endo-cannibalism", as Descola suggests (268).

 

· Primacy of the domestic

Finally, and most importantly, the mental socialization of nature is strongly influenced (though not directly performed by) the domestic world. This influence is essentially twofold.

Firstly, the gendered internal structure of the domestic space can be seen as a model for the Achuar conceptualization of the 'natural' space. Indeed, within the house itself, both conjunctive and disjunctive spaces are to be found : ekent and tankamash. This basic scheme can be usefully applied to whole 'natural' world (diagrams p.132). As a result "nature is governed by the same social relations as those set in the house"(324).

Secondly, the house is "ideologically" turned upon itself (108), "inward looking" as James and Ben put it. It is dominated by a "self-sufficiency paradigm" (105). Domestic praxis centers on the house and spreads outward from there. Achuar representation of spatial segmentation is organized in ever less socialized concentric zones (107). As Descola puts it :

"If Achuar ecology can be termed domestic, it is because each household thinks of itself as a unique, autonomous center and the permanent starting point for all relations with the surroundings" (323-324). Or : " Households depend minimally upon each other for the concrete process of socializing nature". It is therefore praxis that gives the domestic setting its centrality in the Achuar mode of socialization, much more than its very tenuous cosmological significance (118).

 

· Conclusion

The Achuar mode of socializing nature can therefore be seen as

1.              giving mankind an ontological centrality

2.              giving each individual domestic house a social and spatial centrality.

3.               consequently emphasizing animistic conceptions rather than totemic ones

(even though some totemic elements are present e.g. the name Achuar, but do not carry many implications).

 

 

 

 

Kaj Arhem starts his article by referring to the same "relationship of continuity between nature and society"(185). Their specific mode of socializing nature functions along three different lines : a specific ontology, a cosmic foodweb, and totemism.

· Ontology

The central feature of Makuna cosmology is the deeply seated equality it entails between all living forms. This equality goes even further than the Achuar understanding of nature's as 'incomplete persons'.

This equality is reached through a 'doctrine' of dual reality (188) that grants any living form with a phenomenological form and a spiritual essence. The latter is qualitatively alike in every life form. All 'real' beings belong to a single ontological category : "masa" (people). On this basis, "spirits of plants, animals and humans can take a variety of material shapes. Humans are only one of them. They therefore have no ontological preeminence, thus contrasting with the Achuar ontology.

Just as the Achuar culture, the Makuna culture shows many animistic and anthropomorphic features. However, they are different from the Achuar's, as they express very different ontology. Arhem describes how Makuna think of animals as full persons (not incomplete), with a fully developed social life (190) : animals have similar houses as humans, have gardens, their own culture and goods. Consequently the living world is construed as a "cosmic society of interacting people and communities (.) a totalising animic system". In this great whole, again, mankind has no preeminence.

 

· The cosmic foodweb

Interactions between communities are regulated by a "cosmic foodweb" that make them dependent on one another. Functionally speaking, this foodweb generates social solidarity in the living world, just as the division of labor produces solidarity in the modern societies according to Durkheim. Death is conceived as a condition for reproduction, therefore legitimizing and making necessary human hunting to animal reproduction.

Killing is an exchange, commonly beneficial to both the hunter and the game's specie. Moreover, hunting involves various kinds of social interaction between spirits, men and animals, giving life and content to the united grand society. It even enables the various inabitants of this grand society to take over various roles, which is a basic process of socialization (cf Piaget) :

 

Spirits

Men

 

 

 

Animals

 

 

Chiefs / Affine

 

Affines/ Husbands

 

 

 

 

 Sons/Wives

 

Roles, norms, pact. All the key elements of a deep and complete socialization process are present. Sanction as well, as diseases can sanction failure to comply with the rule of reciprocity (196).

 

 

· Totemism

Totemism is essentially expressed in Makuna culture, through a self-identification. Part of the Makuna identify themselves as Water People, descending from the clan ancestor Water Anaconda (Ide hino) (187). Their territory is totally structured by the river itself, which is identified with the clan ancestor. The other Makuna-speaking clans identify themselves as Yiba People, Yiba being the mythical forest. Moreover, "there is a particularly close connection between Yiba and tapirs". Thus, "the social division between Water People and Yiba People corresponds to a distinction between cosmic domains and two prototypical classes of animals".

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

As we have seen, the Makuna mode of socializing nature is

1.      - gives no primacy to the domestic center

2.      - shows a much stronger totemism

3.      relies on a different kind of animism - explicitly linked to their ontology

It seems to me that the results is an even more socialized nature than in the Achuar case. It  is therefore tempting to conclude that :

 

1.            Makuna's socialization of nature is even deeper that the Achuar's, as in Makuna's culture, mankind has no particular preeminence or centrality in the great cosmic whole.

2.            The modes of socialization, beyond many 'surface similarities' are also qualitatively different : the Makuna's mode is primarily metaphysical, whereas the Achuar's is essentially based upon praxis.

 

 

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