INDIAN DEFENCE forces are the only entity whose voice is not yet heard in the debate on sending troops to Iraq. They are, quite rightly, neutral in the political debate swirling in the country. That does not mean that Indian military leaders do not ask hard questions of their political masters. It would not be wrong to say that in the rush to accede to the request from the United States for a sizeable Indian force, some restraint has been introduced by the military seeking critical clarifications from the political leadership. Like a professional and loyal force, it will abide by the final political decision. That does not mean such doubts and questions should be lightly set aside.

It was Cicero who wrote in one of his letters to Atticus that “I prefer the most unjust peace to the justest war that was ever waged.” The Indian military leadership would not be remiss in wondering over the nature of the proposed role in Iraq. The war waged in Iraq was unjust enough. The military action now continuing is not ushering in peace either. Will the Indian military be asked to continue a war declared unjust by the nation’s Parliament? Or will it be asked to impose an unjust peace by force?

The Indian force is required by the U.S. Command to be in the Kurd-controlled northern part of Iraq. It would therefore relieve the U.S. 101 Division that is currently operating in the area. The U.S. Division is apparently needed to bolster the faltering military control in central Iraq. Baghdad, Falujah, the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf have seen scenes of the U.S. military being attacked. Military ‘pacification’ of central Iraq is essential to establish a new government. The ratios of troops to space demand the deployment of a greater number of American troops in the Iraqi political heartland. Indian troops will thus enable the U.S. to impose a military dominance through which a political outcome can be enforced.

In the Kurd-held areas, two challenges will face Indian military commanders. The Kurds are sharply divided into two warring groups. They have held their peace on account of U.S. pressure and the hope of a political role for them in Iraq. That outcome is not even on the horizon since there is no legitimate government in Baghdad. What is certain is that if Iraq’s territorial and ethnic integrity is to be ensured, as promised by the U.S., the Kurds are likely to get no more than a subsidiary role in the future governance of Iraq. Add to this the substantial oil resources of the northern areas and the Kurds’ desire to control them and the situation is fraught with both political volatility and military turbulence.

Military leaders justifiably demand to know the political objectives that are to be obtained through military operations. In Iraq, the political objectives would be determined not by New Delhi but by Washington. The decision and judgment of Paul Bremer, the U.S.’ chief civilian administrator for Iraq, would be the critical input in determining political and, therefore, military objectives.

In other words, he would instruct Indian commanders on which political groups would be militarily subdued or marginalised. U.S. interests, as viewed through its geo-political prism, would determine Indian military operations. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 does not clarify this; nor was it expected to. The Foreign Secretary, Kanwal Sibal’s reference to “grey areas” in the Resolution points to this and other problematical aspects.

Indian military commanders have for long been wary of vague and unclear political directions. For 50 years, operations in India’s Northeast have been conducted without political clarity. The Sri Lanka experience remains embedded in Indian military memory as an example of ambivalent, uncertain and unclear political direction on the strategic purposes of military operations. Iraq will witness Indian commanders receiving command directions from U.S. authorities.

By the nature of U.S. strategic needs, the operations will need to be conducted in ways that will go against Indian interests in the region and Indian public sentiment. Indian military commanders will be left in an extremely invidious situation. They will have no support from Delhi in reconciling the demands of a U.S. chain of command against their understanding of ethical and just war principles. No greater disservice can be done to Indian troops.

The demand for Indian forces in Iraq is evidence of a significant conceptual shift in the U.S. approach to force projection. A half century following the Second World War saw the U.S. relying on bases in foreign countries and its own troops stationed abroad to maintain its strategic control. The U.S. leadership now believes that technological advances in military capabilities give it advantages thus far unavailable. Such advantages are also not going to be available to any other power in the foreseeable future.

Distant combat through missiles and unchallenged air operations can now support short and decisive campaigns by the U.S. of the kind seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such operations are short on casualties and therefore easy on collateral political damage at home. This also requires that after U.S. military power attains the objectives of defeating the adversary militarily, other countries’ troops are required to control the seized areas. This is witnessed in Afghanistan where a non-U.N. Force is operating under European leadership with NATO assets.

Indian military capability and efficiency place its forces high on the list of countries that can be used to work the new U.S. concept. The reality of a high tech military power using low and medium technology forces to work its interests should not be missed by Indian policy makers. The reality will be attractively packaged in euphemisms of strategic partnerships and partnerships for peace. Indian policy makers may even be offered their Holy Grail of Security Council membership. The fact however will remain of a smaller power buying major power partnership through provisioning competent military labour and paying for it.

The military is the easiest instrument to apply. It responds fast, gets to the scene of action fast and produces results quickly. Political leaders the world over grasp this instrument in haste and live to regret the decision later. Pulling back a military also imposes costs. The political costs of a pull-back of the military from Iraq, after a flawed choice of deployment, can have serious political costs.

It is the political leadership which must therefore ask the questions the Indian military is seeking answers to. Rushing to Iraq without clarity on the fundamentals of the national interest will place the military in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons.

The burden of maintaining a force in Iraq will tax the capacity of Indian authorities to breaking point. Maintaining the IPKF across the Palk Straits in Sri Lanka was bad enough. A supply line that extends by sea from Mumbai to Basra and then by land across Iraq to Mosul will deter any logistician. The costs cannot even be contemplated. Within weeks of Indian forces reaching Kurd areas, we can expect a ‘Mosul surcharge’ on income tax to fund the enterprise. The impact on internal turnovers of troops from Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast to the hinterland for rest and retraining will also be felt.

Among other things, a society is judged by the value it places on soldiers. India’s leaders and society would have placed themselves in an indefensible position by asking their military to operate against the interests of the Iraqi people. That this would be done under international media scrutiny and in the face of restrained but sullen reactions from Arab states in the region is not going to help India’s image either.

The Indian military functions on the basis of trust and confidence in its ranks. The question often asked is whether political leaders can keep trust with the military. Rushing to Iraq, without settling the terms of engagement and policy guidelines, will reinforce the belief in the military that the political leadership cannot be trusted to keep its interests in mind.

India and the United States have every need for working together in the international arena. This is in the mutual interests of the two countries. Their mutual interests in the international order emerging in the post 9/11 era, given India’s own terrorist traumas, need not however involve cooperation in military campaigns that are on the wrong side of Indian interests.