Notes on Government and Politics in Africa by William Tordoff
1997, Macmillan Press, London.

Chapter One - Introduction: African Politics since Independence

There are approximately 53 African States, and with several exceptions (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia), most are new states, from the 1960s
- yet, "new states were also old societies with pre-colonial history of their own" (p.2)

despite many important differences, most were subject to colonial rule, and had several things in common:

- many (with important exceptions like Botswana) faced the task of "welding into a nation a variety of different peoples, speaking different languages and at different stages of social and political development" (p.2)

- many states were poor, and were dependent on world market prices for their prosperity

- there was no time lag between industrialization and democracy (as there was in the West) electoral expectations exceeded governments' capacities

- Political cultures were undeveloped - immature and inexperienced at government level administration; the new states were unmatched to Western power

note: we must remember that common characteristics mask important differences; both between and within states

"despite the briefness of colonial rule...colonialism has left a deep imprint of the new states of Africa" e.g. ex-British states in different parts of Africa share characteristics, ties with old Colonizers persist

several general trends among post-imperial states

ONE - "the move away from pluralism towards the centralization of power in the hands of a single party" (p.4)
(Botswana and the Gambia the exceptions in maintaining a multi-party democracy)
however we must recognise the important differences between one party states: (adapted from p.4)
- are they de facto or de jure
- do they have a strong or weak ideological basis
- do they have provisions for inner-party democracy (like the TANU in Tanzania) or not, as the case in Ghana CPP in the later period

later the "popular demand for an end to one-party rule and the institution of competitive multi-party politics became well-nigh universal" (p.4)

TWO - another general trend was the personalization of power; carried obvious risks, but also allowed exceptionally charismatic (in Weberian terms) leaders to bring important changes - Nyerere for example

THREE - Socialism, in various loosely held forms, often related to nationalism, became significant.
- rarely orthodox Marxist ideology - adapted to African conditions

some states had apparently 'socialist' policies without claiming to be socialist (military Ghana and Uganda for example)

FOUR - Decline of party power, and a rise in bureaucratic, administrative states

note: all sorts of systems were subject to the overall failure of the ruling party to be "the mobilizing agent projected at independence" (8)

FIVE - military coups became frequent - sharing several features;
often against, or claiming to be against, corrupt and inefficient politicians
sometimes to preserve the army's influence and power in society
occasionally with specific political objectives - e.g. national unity in Nigeria

military coups rarely involved any "fundamental restructuring of society" (p.9)

SIX - "the move away from federal and quasi-federal systems of government" (p.10), in an attempt to prevent sub-national dissent

SEVEN - urbanization, and lack of economic growth to provide jobs for the expanding numbers of educated people produced by expanded schooling.
The response, from nations like Botswana, Tanzania and Mali, was to make education applicable to rural development

EIGHT - "the determination of African states to pursue an independent foreign policy" (p.12)
- despite apparently unavoidable dependency on the West, many African states vigorously defended their autonomy

Recent Changes (80s to early 90s)

- reversal of two previous trends - socialism and one-party rule

"these tended to be closely linked to processes of change: economic crisis and the social problems caused by rising unemployment reinforced the demand for political change and led to the rejection of socialism in favour of elements of a capitalist system" (p.14)
- widespread feeling that "economic revival was dependent on getting rid of authoritarian, corrupt and inefficient regimes" (p.14)
- pressure for change came from widespread strikes from within and World Bank/IMF conditionality from outside

even populist socialist and Afro-Marxist states adopted elements of the market economy

overall, disappointing results, especially where war and chaos has made areas barely states at all - Zaire, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone

Study of Development [overview of modernisation and underdevelopment theories]

notes that "more modest alternative approaches, though limited in their application, are more conducive than any grand theory to a better understanding of development in individual African states" (p.19)

Huntingdon: "rapid modernization led to the weakening of political institutions and that the latter could not sustain the heavy demands placed on them by mass, mobilized and increasingly literate electorates" (p.20)

Sklar: underdevelopment theory "under-estimated the nationalism of the 'managerial bourgeoisie', as the pivotal comprador element in society" (p.20-21)

"such substantial revisions of modernisation and underdevelopment theories were made from within each school that the original theories no longer had much utility" (p.21) - or, citing Lonsdale - "too much theory chasing too little data" (p.21)

Immanuel Wallerstein - "socialist transition in backward, peripheral countries could only take place when the world capitalist system collapsed" (p.21) - similarly, Calinicos: "the solution lay in smashing the world economy, it was not enough just to opt out" (p.22)

Crawford Young "it is not necessary to deny cultural pluralism in order to assert class" (p.23)

Tordoff writes with the assumption that "while class is often an important determinant of political behaviour, it is not the only determinant" (p.23)

"Grand theories and methodologies have their place in the social sciences but need to be empirically validated when applied to particular cases...too great a reliance on them [the grand theories] may divert attention from the critical issues of politics and society, as identified on a more modest scale by Herbst and Reno"

Chapter Two - Colonialism and the Colonial Impact

While many advanced states did exist in pre-colonial Africa, they were not typical.
- "many Africans lived in stateless societies organised around the family, kinship groups and clan, although this did not necessarily mean that they were more 'backward'...Almost everywhere, the African was engaged in a constant struggle with a harsh environment" (p.28-9)

primary motivations of colonizers were security and economic profit
- trade relationships were unquestionably unequal, but some benefits were possible for Africans, especially in the development of infrastructure; healthcare, education, railways, roads

also, important to recognise that different colonial powers had different approaches

FRENCH POLICIES

12 Colonies - with ultimate power lying in Paris
- the colonies were divided and sub-divided into smaller areas, sometimes with power given to existing leaders - 'indirect rule', although in some instances, existing units deliberately broken-up

"overall, a highly centralised system, characterised by parallel administrative structures in each territory" (p.32)

Until 1944 (collapse of the Vichy regime); "the French system of administration was also strongly paternalist" (p.32) - meaning Africans were French subjects, as distinct from citizens, - victims of summary justice and forced labour.

Later, Africans became French citizens. "For at least ten years after 1945 the main thrust of most nationalist activity was to secure equal rights for Africans as citizens of an 'indivisible' Fourth Republic." (p.33) - not seeking independence.

BRITISH POLICIES

More pragmatic, less centralised than the French 
- policy "often seemed to be formulated ass a reaction to extraneous events, such as the post-1945 challenge of African nationalism" (p.33)
- "colonial governors were allowed considerable discretion, within the framework of policy laid down by the Colonial Office in London"

Lord Lugard's theory of indirect rule; that is "ruling through indigenous political institutions" (p.33)

"The system worked best in areas where chieftaincy was strongly entrenched...Indirect rule proved less satisfactory in areas were traditional rulers were weak or non-existent...closer administrative supervision was exercised over these areas" (p.33)

"While indirect rule, at its best, was a worthwhile exercise in local self-government and resulted in the preservation of certain...African traditions that might otherwise have been lost, it also...exacerbated existing communal differences (based on ethnicity, language or geographical region)" (p.34)

"the territories ruled by Britain were held in trust until their people could stand on their own feet" (p.34) but, "as Bernard Schaffer has pointed out, meaningful preparation for independence began 'very late indeed' and was all along rivalled by other values" (p.35)

"Preparation was seriously distorted in areas of substantial white settlement, such as Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and above all Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, it remains true that Britain did more to prepare its colonies for independence than any other European power; the contrast with Belgium and Portugal is sharp" (p.35)

BELGIAN POLICIES

Congo Free State was the personal property of Leopold II until 1908, when it became a Belgian colony. Ruled in an "extremely centralised" (p.35) manner.
- "a strongly paternalist system of rule, resting on three main pillars, the state, the Roman Catholic Church and big business" (p.35) - goal: "to create a materially prosperous and contented people, educated...to the primary level and subject to close European supervision. It rested on the conviction that social and political changed could be arrested and Belgian middle-class values inculcated"
- the Authoritarian nature of the state soon came to be resented

PORTUGUESE POLICIES

Saw territories not as colonies, but as "overseas provinces” - "forming an integrated whole" (p.36) with Portugal. 
- They "claimed to be undertaking in Africa an non-racial, Christian civilising mission, but in fact...economic exploitation and racial discrimination were cardinal features of Portuguese colonial rule" (p.36)
- after WWII, especially from the 1960s on, Portugal needed cheap raw materials to compete and develop economically, and relied on heavily authoritarian policies to deliver.

this model of periodisation was followed by the Portuguese
- up to 1926 "the colonies were neglected and left to foreign capital to exploit;
- "1926-50, when 'nationalist' economic policies were pursued, the colonies were more systematically exploited and 'labour-repressive policies were adopted;
- 1950-60, when Portugal was...dependent on the supply of cheap cotton from the colonies and
- 1960-74, a period mainly characterised by the impact of the nationalist struggle in the colonies"
(adapted from p.37)

"Throughout, colonial rule was authoritarian"
Munslow: "Portugal took no steps to decolonize because, unlike the other European powers, 'it could not neocolonize': that is Portugal, an economically backward country, could not be certain that it could exploit its ex-colonies economically after granting them their independence" (p.37)
 a three-stage periodisation (1880s/90s-WWI, WWI-WWII, WWII-independence) is broadly applicable to French and British powers:

"For more than 30 years after...'the scramble for Africa', the colonial powers largely neglected their territories...[they] sought to trade and govern rather than settle...Direct governmental activity was minimal and most social development - in the sphere of education, for example - was the result of missionary effort" (p.37-38)

Post WWI, Germany's empire was divided between Britain, France, Belgium and South Africa (Namibia). "The inter-war period was the high watermark of colonial rule" (p.38) Although developments still extremely limited, and provisions grossly inadequate.

"the shortages of foodstuffs and many raw materials in the post war period brought home to the European powers the great economic values of their colonies" (p.39)

greater African participation allowed for constitutionally was out-paced by mounting discontent; "The colonial powers seemed oblivious to this growing ferment of unrest and to the inherent contradiction between empire and liberal democracy, in defence of which the Second World War had been fought" (p.40)

- the timetable of decolonization eventually became the key-issue, with "the only seriously disputed areas... [being] those where it was not clear who should receive the transfer of power, notably the areas of white settlement" (p.40)

The French initially tried to resolve "the dilemma of how to reconcile liberty and empire by stressing equality" (p.40), but when this failed, the followed the British route - the only alternative being a repressive campaign.

The Colonial Legacy

the colonial legacy varies according to which colonial power is involved
- "the economies (and the communication networks) of African states were largely developed in accordance with the needs of the colonial power" (p.41)

"primary products...were exported to the European market in their raw state; in return, the colony imported manufactured goods from abroad, mainly from the mother-country" - "the price of African produce on the world market fluctuated widely" (p.41)

"though political independence was achieved...economic dependence remained, giving rise to charges - as formulated by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, for example of neo-colonialism" (p.42)

lack of capital, credit and experience "retard[ed] the pre-independence growth of an African middle-class" (p.42)

"a further effect was to deprive the post-independence state of the experienced manpower required to run the large public enterprises which...were almost everywhere established" (p.42)

another set of effects related to "the introduction of cash-crop farming...[which] led to the emergence of peasant societies integrated into the world economy" (p.42) e.g. Chagga & Haya in Tanzania, Ashanti in Ghana
- the effects of this were "increased social differentiation...increase[d] social mobility and to help further erode traditional institutions and values" (p.43)

the effect of colonialism was much more detrimental to women than to men" (p.43) - "whereas in pre-colonial Africa women often had effective control of economic resources. in money or land, they were disadvantaged as incorporation into a cash economy proceeded. One of two things happened: they were either excluded from areas of production in which they had previously involved and relegated to the 'domestic sphere', or the productive activities in which they continued to engage were deformed and devalued in a new context" (p.44)

rapid urbanization was also a feature, with people attracted by the, often false, hopes of employment

"Thus, the political leaders of the new African states inherited dependent economies that were still bound to the former colonial powers...They faced formidable problems, in the socio-economic as well as the political sphere" (p.45)
- "the alternative...was domination by multi-national companies" (p.45)

"Another colonial legacy was that the growth of a market economy resulted in economic imbalances between different regions of a country, as well as sometimes within a single region...Social differentiation had also taken place, though as yet on a limited scale: an incipient middle class existed in [some] states; the growth of this class was to be enormously facilitated in the post-independence period when the holdings of public office...gave more people...an opportunity for personal advancement." (p.45)

"Again new state leaders headed political parties which had to be transformed from parties of revolt into parties of rule. They also inherited bureaucracies whose strength and experience...was questionable." (p.45)

Chapter Three - Nationalism and the Transfer of Power

Nationalism in an African context is "expressed within the confines of the colonial state" (p.47)
- as the boundaries are largely artificial, states are almost always ethnically heterogeneous, unlike in Europe

major problem for many African nationalists: people tend to be more loyal to particular ethnic groups
- therefore the nationalists goal it to make local allegiances secondary to a national one

Tordoff argues that "the imposition of Western institutions and values...gave rise to a cultural self-awareness and a pride in the African past" (p.48) - the genesis of both popular nationalism and pan-Africanism can be found in the colonial period

"Popular, emotional appeals were buttresses by instrumental arguments, which condoned colonial rule as authoritarian, bureaucratic and exploitative" (p.48)

although "certain economic interests were involved" (p.48) the colonial struggle, by and large, "was not...a class conflict" - the various economic interests involved only ever united temporarily to oppose colonialism

religious associations were also sometimes "a vehicle for radical nationalism" (p.51)

political parties were often "loosely structure and mainly urban centred"

the National Liberation Movement (NLM) in Ghana defended Ashanti interests, which were perceived as being marginalized under Nkrumah - an example of persisting regional ethnic interests colliding with national ones

most, but by no means all, pre-independence parties were reformist, not revolutionary
- the struggle against colonialism was not necessarily a radical one

the charisma of leaders (Nyerere, Nkrumah), as well as their circumstances, was significant

trade unions and a wide variety of interest groups grew rapidly, largely as "a response to the sense of social and psychological insecurity felt by people who...entered a new and strange urban environment" (p.58)
- efforts were made by the large 'national parties' to politicise and unite these groups

Tordoff discusses the links between trade union groups and political parties

Gender: "technical relevance had passed most women by and relatively few of tem were in wage employment" (p.62)

The Ghanaian "one party state created in 1964 rested on flimsy foundations" (p.64) in terms of electoral success
- "the legacy of the party which took the country to independence was not impressive and meant...the designation 'mass party' was not warranted" (p.64)

French Africa represented a different context for the nationalist struggle - broad participation in elections, but they were "less meaningful from a nationalist perspective" (p.68)

[discussion of South African politics - will read later]

African nationalism is fundamentally different from Europe in the following ways
- class less significant
- industrial revolution
- lack of deep historical roots (therefore more of a protest movement)

difficult to gauge what impact the nationalist movement had on colonial policy - to what extent would independence have proceeded anyway?

nationalist movements required the participation of the black middle/professional class - even after liberation, the peasants contributions were therefore under-rewarded

Hugh Seton-Watson "If national consciousness, based on religion, language and deeply routed historical mythologies, were not available then the agent of continuity could only be central power" (p.80) 

while relatively secure in terms of international recognition, independent states were weak political and sociologically

Chapter Four – State and Society

Question: Can members of political parties victorious in the liberation struggled “adapt to their own purposes the structures of power established within the former colonial state” (p.82), especially when they lack experience and training

- 10 years after independence “executive presidencies and one party systems” were almost universal in Africa

Post-independence governments inherited the institutions of the colonial governments, and established parastatal organisations of their own, but trained man power was in short supply
- it was not possible to staff their administrations with experienced, skilled employees

there was a strong emphasis on education, with rapid expansion of all sectors – health and other social services were invested in as well

a process of mass urbanisation also took place – no cities of over 1m in 1960 – 28 in 1985

consequences – population growth overtook food production – need to import grain (increased external debt); food prices were subsidised to placate a volatile urban population

“African leaders, anxious to end their dependence on primary produce, sought to diversify their economies, with industrialisation as a favoured strategy. Unfortunately, the new manufacturing industries…tended to be capital-intensive and dependent on the importation of costly machinery from abroad; and they therefore only created a limited number of jobs” (84-5)

Michael Lofchie: “industrialisation in Africa (as distinct from the West) did not have healthy social pluralistic effects…social inequality deepened and increased social conflict resulted” (p.85)

Problems of legitimacy – states “had to establish the right to rule over culturally diverse societies” (p.85)
- e.g. Ghana – with its strong Ashanti sub-nationalism

“Ashanti [and other sub-national groups] sought not only to retain…[their] separate customs and traditions, but also to secure access to political power and economic resources” (p.86)

Molteno “Sectional groups are essentially interest groups competing for scarce resources” (p.87) not just ‘emotional’ tribalism

[discussion of ethnic conflict in Rwanda – not relevant here]

“Ethnic conflict models can both help to promote understanding of African political realties and distort them” (p.91)

Factional interests and patronage are significant concepts “in the African context, where a broad consensus on goals and values may be lacking” (p.91)

“patron-client networks sometimes cut across ethnic identities” (p.92) – not exclusively ‘tribal’

alternative to ethnic conflict model – Marxist Class Analysis

rests on two assumptions
1 – that classes exist in African society
2 – they have sufficient class-consciousness to form the primary explanation of political conflict

Class formation is distorted in areas with substantial white settler communities

Doubtful whether “urban works show political solidarity as a class” (p.98)

“the peasantry at independence also did not constitute a monolithic body” – plurality – subsistence farming, cash-crop farming, plantation workers
-	“African peasants generally exhibit very low levels of ‘classness’”

The middle class is termed by Sklar a ‘managerial bourgeoisie’ 
-	this class benefits from state expansion but often benefits even more when the state is in decline and institutions are collapsing

“the managerial bourgeoisie comprises different elements, with often divergent interests, and does not constitute a monolithic class united in pursuit of its own aggrandisement” (p.100)

the role of women -“women lacked rights over both land and over the means of production [and were therefore] adversely affected as their country became increasingly integrated into the global economy” (p.102)

various discussions about how useful class analysis is in understanding the political realities

Sklar and Molteno – “tribalism is a dependent, rather than an independent variable: it is a vehicle of expression, masking underlying economic divisions, rather than a primordial political force in the nation” (p.109)

Restates Crawford Young’s assertion that “It is not necessary to deny cultural pluralism in order to assert class
-	“competition for power and access to economic resources…are often expressed in non-ethnic terms (p.110)

conclusion: “motivational triggers of group conflict, while often rational, can also be both complex and laden with various ‘non-rational’ factors” (p.111)