The Individual and Society II: Introduction to Political Philosophy (0910055) - Dr. Iain Law 

SRN: 513355  Word Count: 1383

	Citizens in Plato's ideal state would not have many of the rights we see as important. Are Plato's reasons for denying these rights adequate?

	The fact that Plato prohibits certain activities in his ideal state is beyond doubt. However, whether or not these activities constitute rights, and indeed what we mean by the term ‘rights’’ are more contentious points. An evaluation of the adequacy of Plato’s reasons for denying these rights requires us to address these issues, as well as considering why we perceive certain rights as inalienable, and whether it is valid to do so.

	Clearly, we must consider exactly what rights Plato wants to deny, with particular attention to those likely to cause us objection. In our society, the right to self-determination, to chose one’s own path in life, is considered significant. Yet, in Plato's society, an individual is not able to chose what he or she wants to do, at least in the sense of a career. Plato’s citizens have their aptitudes and abilities assessed at various stages in their childhood and are placed into one of three classes. They are then allocated the job which is deemed to suit them best. The emphasis here is on people doing jobs that will make them as productive as possible for society as a whole. He also places restriction on ownership of property. Extremes of wealth and poverty are not allowed to exist, because they are considered to be disruptive to societal unity. The Guardian class are particularly restricted, living lives of austere simplicity, debarred from any possession or family life. Perhaps most shocking of all, to the modern reader at least, is the system Plato has for regulating sex and reproduction. Plato argues that reproduction, like any other action in society, should serve the greater good, not the whims of individuals. Plato believes that the best way of doing this is a system of Eugenic breeding, whereby people are chosen to mate with others in combinations most likely to produce virtuous off-sping. It is also implied that infanticide will prevent both disabled children, and those conceived outside this procedure from joining the society.

	Most people in a modern, Western society place high value on these rights; many might even be seen as profound entitlements of human beings. We assign, for example, special status to our ability to produce children with whom we like, and, in a capitalist society at least, to acquire material possession without limit. However, we cannot just simply accept our own outlook on these issues as automatically being the right one. It is arrogant, even, to assume that we know what is best when so many apparently different cultures exist simultaneously on our planet. We must consider the possibility that the beliefs we hold are as much social constructions as they are rights, ideas that have become internalised by us as part of our upbringing, but no more. If it is the case that what we consider our rights are mere products of the society we live in, and nothing 'higher', this makes it much more problematic to defend them.

	Our defence of our rights also rests on the assumption that we actually hold them in the first place; we must question the extent to which we actually have these rights. We might argue that in our society we have the ability to choose our career, but it is questionable whether this actually the case. Many people, for example, with working class backgrounds progress into working class jobs, apparently unable to access the market for jobs with better wages and conditions. Similarly, we can clearly see many people living in what can be loosely termed 'the third world' have little more choice over their employment, in areas where subsistence agriculture is the primary mode of production for example, than if it were chosen for them, as in Plato's society.

	However, even if the origins of our conventional morality are convoluted, and our implementation of them unequal, we can still argue that many of our freedoms bring us happiness, or at least appear to. Love, in a passionate romantic sense, and family life, to take two examples, are sources of joy, many people claim, and to live in a world where these things are dramatically restricted and controlled is a very unappealing proposition for us.

Plato rejects the suggestion that these things bring us true happiness. He argues that things we value like love and families are, in fact sources of division and disunity. Over-emphasis on family in a ruler's society could lead to a dangerous system of nepotism, for example. Similarly, although love is a source of happiness, it can interfere with other pleasures. Crucial here is Plato's grading of different types of knowledge, and their arrangement in a hierarchy. He considers certain forms of knowledge to be 'real' and others to be 'illusory', with two intermediate levels. He argues that the higher the form of knowledge experienced by the individual, the greater the pleasure, with the highest form being a coherent knowledge of the forms of the good, experienced only by the philosopher rulers in his ideal state

	Plato therefore reaches the conclusion that conventional morality is confused and contradictory, and although he was writing with reference to the Athenian society contemporary to him, many of his comments are equally valid today, as many people appear to blindly accept society's rules and conventions without considering their moral basis. Plato argues that such an approach is 'injust'. In the Platonic sense, justice is served by people fulfilling the role that they are best able to do. As his society is 'just' in this sense, he argues, any measures are justified in realising it, as "the just man will have a good life, and the unjust a bad life". (p.101)

	Differing interpretations of human nature appear to be at the heart of the disagreement here. Plato has a explicitly defined theory of human nature, with its three types of desire, and he therefore constructs a society which would suit these best. His empirical basis for these arguments, however, seems weak. He argues that "justice['s] real concern is not with external actions, but with a man's inward self, his true concern and interest" (p.126). Plato appears not to adequately justify his view of what a man's 'inward self' is. I would argue that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discern what human nature is. In our modern society, our identies, decisions and actions are all influenced by a broad range of factors outside the self, our culture, the values of our society, interaction with friends and so on. Given that there is this complex process of negotiation and interaction between internal factors, i.e., our true nature, and the external factors outlined above, it is difficult to see how we can accurately observe human nature. Our ideas about simpler, more 'primitive' societies are frought with similar problems, and do not seem to get us closer to a true picture of human nature.

	If we take the Republic as a manifesto for a future society, a blueprint of something that should actually happen, the above criticisms are significant. However, we could argue that the problems associated with denying people their freedoms are exactly what Plato intended to highlight. It is a possibility that the Republic is written satircally, intending to shock us with an extreme vision of a society. Written in a same vein as '1984' or 'Brave New World', it might be a warning to us; saying that if we want to rid our society of conflict completely, this is the price we have to pay. However, it is far from certain that Plato actually wrote the book with this purpose, indeed he does say that "though difficult, it would not be impossible" to implement his ideas, suggesting a more literal reading of the text.
	
	Clearly, Plato's suggestions for an ideal society appall us, at least in part because his values are so different, and indeed in some cases, opposed, to the our own. However, even if we find Plato's reasons for denying rights to be inadequate, The Republic forces us to consider the basis for our rights, their origins and their importance. It seems that while we unlikely to ever adopt his ideas, we cannot dismiss those concerning the fulfilment of human desire and nature until we have fully discerned what these things are, something we seem unlikely to do soon, if ever.

Bibliography

Plato 1974 The Republic - Translated with an introduction by Desmond Lee - Second Edition (Revised). London: Penguin Books.