1. This week's villain
Suddenly, Israel unhappily finds itself awaiting the imminent arrival of
the UN
Secretary General's fact-finding committee, which is coming to assess
the
IDF's actions in Jenin during Operation Defensive Shield. The veto
imposed
by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon until the delegation's composition and
authority were redefined apparently did not make the desired impression
on
Kofi Annan: Two days ago, he instructed the three members of the
committee to get going, without waiting for the team of legal
specialists that
was urgently dispatched to apprise them of Israel's reservations.
The decision-makers in Jerusalem worried that Annan had launched a
dangerous weapon their way: In hastily called discussions with the prime
minister and defense minister, some warned that, because of the
procedure
put in place by the Secretary General, IDF officers could find
themselves put
on trial for war crimes before the International Court in the Hague.
To the ministers and senior officials in Jerusalem, Annan is the villain
of the
moment. They say he misled the Israeli delegation to the United Nations:
While he promised Israel's UN representative Yehuda Lancry that he would
give him an opportunity to respond to his proposal for the delegation's
composition and its mandate, he went ahead and publicized his decisions
before meeting with the Israeli ambassador and hearing his comments.
Did Israel's UN delegation fall asleep on the job? Why didn't the
government
alert the United States in time? Why didn't it coordinate its moves with
the
U.S.? (One official recalled this week that back when the UN committee
was
formed to evaluate compliance with the Grapes of Wrath understandings,
Israeli-American coordination was so close that the investigation's main
conclusions were agreed upon ahead of time.) Why didn't Israel obtain a
guarantee of an American veto regarding the dispatching of the
investigative
team if Israel did not consent to its composition and the definition of
its
mission?
This week, there was a rare closing of the ranks among the head honchos
in
Jerusalem. Hardly any mutual recriminations were heard. Everyone got
behind the rallying cry voiced by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres at a
meeting
two nights ago: We are going to fight the Palestinian blood libel. The
consensus was that Israel was being grievously wronged by the
Palestinian
propaganda accusing it of a massacre in Jenin. Israel has nothing to
hide:
When the ruins are cleared in Jenin, there won't be thousands or
hundreds or
even dozens of bodies found (Palestinian claims of the number of missing
have gradually decreased from 3,000 to 150). Forty-five bodies were
found in
the camp, only three of which were civilians; the rest were armed
fighters.
The Israeli claim of booby-trapped buildings and the need to cautiously
evacuate the bodies for fear of mines was fully proven when
international aid
teams were allowed into the area and were injured by explosives planted
there. The impression created of the scope of the destruction has also
been
exaggerated: At most, 10 percent of the camp was affected. The
prevailing
feeling at the meeting with the prime minister two nights ago was that
Israel
was being set up, and those present discussed what to do about the
perceived pernicious intentions of Kofi Annan (or his aides).
The Prime Minister's Bureau, the Defense Ministry and the Foreign
Ministry
all offered similar explanations of how Israel reached this state of
affairs with
the UN and its Secretary General: When the British proposal, which was
infinitely more amenable to Israel than the draft prepared by the Arab
countries, was submitted to the Security Council, the American
delegation to
the UN quickly made it clear to the Israeli delegation that it could not
oppose
it. Better to reserve the veto weapon for votes on weightier issues like
the
dispatching of an international force to the territories or a proposal
demanding a pullback of Israeli forces to the 1967 lines, said the
Americans.
The prime minister, defense minister and foreign minister concluded that
the
process could not be stopped, so the effort should be concentrated on
minimizing the damage: limiting the committee to a fact-finding role and
restricting its activity to the Jenin refugee camp. But Kofi Annan
caught them
by surprise: He put together a team of human rights experts, not
military
experts, and defined their mission in broad terms with far-reaching
legal
implications.
In discussions within the defense establishment, some charged that the
whole process was deliberately planned by Kofi Annan and that he was out
to embarrass Israel. The committee's composition and mandate were
interpreted as an effort by the Secretary General to investigate the
IDF's
behavior during Operation Defensive Shield - not just to clarify the
facts about
the fighting in the Jenin refugee camp - and to see several political
and
military leaders accused of war crimes as a result.
Angry and disappointed with Annan, some also decried his tolerant
attitude
toward Saddam Hussein and warned that the Secretary General's
transparent attempt to have the investigative team reach incriminating
conclusions about Israel is rife with danger: If military officers are
accused by
the committee and find themselves facing the possibility of standing
trial for
war crimes, this could have a very detrimental effect on the readiness
of
reservists to report for duty and to carry out the missions ordered by
the IDF.
2. The fundamental situation
Israel's current trouble with the UN appears to confirm opposition
leader
Yossi Sarid's predictions; Sarid warned Sharon to watch out for
unexpected
developments that would efface the achievements of the military
operation,
as happened with the unintentional shelling of Kafr Kana during the 1996
Grapes of Wrath campaign. But this conception of the consequences of the
fighting distorts the true picture.
Operation Defensive Shield was launched amid broad public consensus:
Only on the margins of the leftist camp were there some who opposed it
and
felt that Israel should continue to show restraint, even after the
horrific
Passover suicide bombing at the Park Hotel in Netanya.
The military operation was ordered after a relentless series of lethal
bombings that genuinely disrupted the country's ability to function. The
scope and nature of the operation were in direct response to the terror:
It was
designed to strike at the terrorist infrastructure and its leaders. The
operation
was carried out in keeping with this mission - including the fighting in
Jenin.
The destruction caused there was an unavoidable result of the tenacious
fighting by the Palestinians who had dug in there. As far as is known,
no
massacre occurred in the camp, nor are there signs that the IDF soldiers
engaged in irregular conduct, as the Palestinian Authority alleges.
Therefore,
there is no justification for badgering Israel with an international
committee of
inquiry. The war on terror is a necessity that derives from the right to
self-
defense.
This week, international legal experts stated that the Israeli operation
was in
accordance with UN Resolution 1373 (passed after the attack on the Twin
Towers) as well as Section 7 of the UN Charter, which proscribes the
sheltering of terror organizations; the PA, headed by Arafat, is
violating these
injunctions.
The trouble lies in the fundamental situation: Israel's sense that it is
being
wronged, that the world - led by the UN Secretary General - is ganging
up
against it and that it is internationally isolated. Israel is feeling
very lonely
indeed in its struggle against Palestinian terror. It is hamstrung by
the
perception that the Palestinians' violence is a legitimate tactic in
their
uprising. The results of the military operation also serve to prove the
truth of
the fundamental situation. Even when Israel brings the best of its
military
might to bear, it cannot quell the Palestinian revolt. This conflict
will not be
resolved with force, or with a partial territorial compromise; the only
way to
end it apparently is for Israel to relinquish its grip on the West Bank
and
Gaza Strip.
The establishment of this latest UN committee of inquiry marks the
implementation of a familiar Palestinian tactic, which succeeds every
time
because of the fundamental situation. The Palestinians' blatant
violations of
their agreements with Israel, their unrestrained embrace of terror and
the
straits they find themselves in as a result of Israeli military
responses - are
all transformed into aggrieved wailing about "Israeli war crimes." The
world
hears their outcry and takes it seriously.
This was the case when the intifada erupted at the end of Barak's tenure
as
prime minister: The Palestinians' murderous violence, which was
perceived in
Israel as a brazen repudiation of signed agreements and commitments, was
somehow translated into international sympathy for Arafat's demand for
an
international committee of inquiry to investigate Israel's behavior.
This
process was stalled by Israeli-American cooperation and eventually
diverted
into the Mitchell Plan, which set down parameters for an
Israeli-Palestinian
accord. In this way, Israel was able to rebuff the immediate
international
pressure to have its conduct following the events of October 2000
investigated, and Sharon even managed to effectively shelve the plan and
empty it of political content.
But these talents were of no avail this week when it came to dealing
with Kofi
Annan. There was a moment when Sharon sounded as if he was starting to
grasp the real lesson of the episode. At the cabinet meeting, when he
rejected criticism of Israel's handling of the UN plan to establish a
committee
of inquiry, the prime minister remarked: "Everyone thinks they know
better.
Some people used to say that we could flatten all the territories. Look
what
happened when we went in with Operation Defensive Shield and did just
what
we had to do."
© Copyright 2002 Ha`aretz