The
Nationalism Project:
What is Nationalism?
There
are four core debates which permeate the study of nations and nationalism. First
among these is the question of how to define the terms "nation" and
"nationalism." Second, scholars argue about when nations first
appeared. Academics have suggested a variety of time frames, including (but not
limited to!) the following:
It
should not be surprising that the third major debate centers on how nations and
nationalism developed. If nations are naturally occurring, then there is little
reason to explain the birth of nations. On the other hand, if one sees nations
as constructed, then it is important to be able to explain why and how nations
developed. Finally, many of the original "classic" texts on
nationalism have focused on European nationalism at the expense of non-western
experiences. This has sparked a debate about whether nationalism developed on
its own in places like China, or whether it merely spread to non-western
countries from Europe.
In
this section of The Nationalism Project you will find a collection of quotations
from prominent scholars of nationalism. I hope that you will find this resource
a helpful introduction to the scholarly views of nations and nationalism.
INDEX: A - DEFINITIONS ( B. Anderson / R.
handler / E. Gellner / J. Breuilly / M. Hroch / E. Renan / M. Billig / R.
Brubaker )
B - ANCIENT
OR MODERN? ( E. Gellner /A. D. Smith / L. Greenfeld / E. Hobsbawm / A.
Hastings )
A -
DEFINITIONS
Benedict Anderson
The Nation as Imagined Community
NOTE: Benedict Anderson's book Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism first
appeared in 1983. Since that time it has become one of the standard texts on the
topic of nations and nationalism. The following definition is one of the most
commonly used by scholars in the field.
"In
an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the
nation: it is an imagined political community - - and imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign.
"It
is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion. Renan referred to this
imagining in his suavely back-handed way when he wrote that 'Or l’essence
d'une nation est que tons les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et
aussi que tous aient oublié bien des choses.” With a certain ferocity Gellner
makes a comparable point when he rules that 'Nationalism is not the awakening of
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.' The
drawback to this formulation, however, is that Gellner is so anxious to show
that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates
'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and
'creation'. In this way he implies that 'true' communities exist which can be
advantageously juxtaposed to nations. In fact, all communities larger than
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are
imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness,
but by the style in which they are imagined. Javanese villagers have always
known that they are connected to people they have never seen, but these ties
were once imagined particularistically-as indefinitely stretchable nets of
kinship and clientship. Until quite recently, the Javanese language had no word
meaning the abstraction 'society.' We may today think of the French aristocracy
of the ancien régime as a class; but surely it was imagined this way only very
late. To the question 'Who is the ‘Comte de X?’ the normal answer would have
been, not 'a member of the aristocracy,' but 'the lord of X, 'the uncle of the
Baronne de Y,'or 'a client of the Duc de Z.'
"The
nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them
encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic
boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself
coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day
when all the members of the human race will join their nation in the way that it
was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a wholly
Christian planet.
"It
is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which
Enlightenment and Revolution were destorying the legitamcy of the
devinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of
human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were
inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the
allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch,
nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem
of this freedom is the sovereign state.
"Finally,
it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity
that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.
"These
deaths bring us abruptly face to face with the central problem posed by
nationalism: what makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history (scarcely more
than two centuries) generate such colossal sacrifices? I believe that the
beginnings of an answer lie in the cultural roots of nationalism."
Anderson,
Benedict. Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
Revised Edition ed. London and New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 5-7.
Richard Handler
Defining "Nationalism"
NOTE: Richard Handler is a
Professor of Anthropology at the University of Virginia. He is an expert on
nationalism and politics in Quebec. His book, Nationalism and the Politics of
Culture in Quebec, is an excellent study of the interplay between politics,
culture, and nationalism.
"Nationalism
is an ideology about individuated being. It is an ideology concerned with
boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing diversity. It is an
ideology in which social reality, conceived in terms of nationhood, is endowed
with the reality of natural things.
"In
principle the individuated being of a nation—its life, its reality—is
defined by boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing diversity. In
principle a nation is bounded—that is, precisely delimited—in space and
time: in space, by the inviolability of its borders and the exclusive allegiance
of its members; in time, by its birth or beginning in history. In principle the
national entity is continuous: in time, by virtue of the uninterruptedness of
its history; in space, by the integrity of the national territory. In principle
national being is defined by a homogeneity which encompasses diversity: however
individual members of the nation may differ, they share essential attributes
that constitute their national identity; sameness overrides difference.
"In
principle an individuated actor manifests his life through the exercise of
choice, and through the consistent action that follows therefrom. Consistent
action is both characteristic and rational: the nation acts in accord with its
essence, and according to its needs.
"In
principle the life of an individuated actor is celebrated through creativity,
which is the imposition of one's choices on the physical and social world, and
in proprietorship, which is the establishment of permanent bonds between self
and the products resulting from creative activity. Nationalism is an ideology of
what C. B. Macpherson (1962) called possessive individualism.
"It
is customary in the literature on nations and ethnic nationalism to distinguish
between "nation" and "state." A nation, it is said, is a
human group that may or may not control its own state; while a state is a
political organization that may or may not correspond to all of one, and only
one, nation. It is customary to point out that there are many more nations or
potential nations than states; that most nations aspire to statehood yet many
have not and will not attain it; and that many states, federal or unitary,
encompass more than one nation. It is only slightly less customary to point out
that states have created nations perhaps more frequently that nations states; in
the classic nation-states of Western Europe state-building bred national
identity rather than simply following from it.
"It
is much less customary to observe that our notions of "nation" and
"state" imply similar senses of boundedness, continuity, and
homogeneity encompassing diversity. The state is viewed as a rational,
instrumental, power-concentrating organization. The nation is imagined to
represent less calculating, more sentimental aspects of collective reality. Yet
both are, in principle, integrated: well-organized and precisely delimited
social organisms. And, in principle, the two coincide.
"The
nationalist desire for an integrated nation-state can be compared to the
overriding concern of social scientists to speak about and privilege integrated
social units of whatever level of complexity. Here I intentionally correlate
actors'desires and observers' epistemology. The presuppositions concerning
boundedness that dominate nationalist discourse equally dominate our
social-scientific discourse, which takes discrete social entities, such as
"societies" and "cultures," as the normal units of analysis,
and the "integration" of such units as the normal and healthy state of
social life.
"Of
course, everyone knows that social life is not neatly integrated: the boundaries
of nations, states, societies, and cultures are permeable and even vague. Yet to
recognize (and then rationalize) "fuzzy boundaries" does not
fundamentally question the epistemology of "entitivity" (Cohen 1978)
upon which the notion of boundedness depends. In the study of nationalism and
ethnicity the characteristic ploy used to get round the fuzzy-boundaries problem
is to posit a distinction between objective and subjective groups. A human
group, it is argued, can be bounded by attributes or characteristics that each
of its members "possesses." This is objective boundedness, though what
is objectively shared may be subjective states of mind of the group members
-characteristic modes of thought and affecct that lead to characteristic actions
and social organizations. Objective boundedness means that the group actually
exists as a group, and can be shown to exist by an external observer. Subjective
boundedness is the sense that group members themselves have of forming a group;
that is, national or ethnic self-consciousness. It is customary to point out
that an objectively existent group may not be subjectively self-conscious, and
that nations and nationalisms become possible only after the emergence of group
self-consousness. It is only slightly less customary to point out that the
actors' sense of group integration may be grounded in an illusion and that their
perception of sameness may obscure important objective differences among group
members. In the face of the continued emergence of evidence of such
differences-and of mal- or dis-integration, permeableness, and vagueness of
boundaries—many scholars of nationalism and ethnicity have de-emphasized the
objective reality of groups and insisted instead on subjective boundedness as
the sine qua non of collective existence. Proponents of this position argue that
whatever the degree of objective boundedness, it is only the subjective
perception (or delusion) of identity that launches a group on its career of
collective action. The perception of group identity may even be sufficient to
overcome large objective differences and bring a national entity into historical
existence.
"This
appeal to the subjective basis of group unity respects the entitivity
assumptions-boundedness, continuity, homogeneity that both nationalists and
social scientists presuppose in their discussions of the reality of nations. The
reality that may be denied by a lack of shared objective traits is reestablished
by the subjective sharing of a sense of identity, and the nation or ethnic group
can again be proclaimed to exist. Once again we find a close congruence between
actors' ideologies and observers' theories: the "common will to live
together" that nationalists see as the necessary capstone to the list of
objective traits which form a national entity becomes "group identity"
in the jargon of social scientists."
Handler,
Richard. Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec. New
Directions in Antropoligical Writing: History, Poetics, Cultural Criticism, ed.
George E.; Clifford Marcus, James. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
1988, pp. 6-8.
Ernest Gellner
Defining "nation"
NOTE: Ernest Gellner was one of
the most important scholars of nationalism. His book, Nations and Nationalism
(1983) remains one of the most important books in the field.
"In
fact, nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity.
Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances.
Moreover, nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds
that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is
incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy. But before they could become intended for
each other, each of them had to emerge, and their emergence was independent and
contingent. The state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some
nations have certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state. It is
more debatable whether the normative idea of the nation, in its modern sense,
did not presuppose the prior existence of the state.
"What
then is this contingent, but in our age seemingly universal and normative, idea
of the nation? Discussion of two very makeshift, temporary definitions will help
to pinpoint this elusive concept.
"Each
of these provisional definitions, the cultural and the voluntaristic, has some
merit. Each of them singles out an element which is of real importance in the
understanding of nationalism. But neither is adequate. Definitions of culture,
presupposed by the first definition, in the anthropological rather than the
normative sense, are notoriously difficult and unsatisfactory. It is probably
best to approach this problem by using this term without attempting too much in
the way of formal definition, and looking at what culture does."
Gellner,
Ernest. Nations
and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983, pp. 6-7.
John Breuilly
Defining and Classifying Nationalism
NOTE: John Breuilly's book Nationalism
and the State is a classic
discussion of the politics of nationalism in a comparative and historical
perspective.
"The
term 'nationalism' is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising
state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.
"A
nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions:
a.
There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
b.
The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other
interests and values.
c. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignity." (p.3).
"So
the definition employed here can avoid the danger of being too vague and
all-embracing and, among other things, draws attention to the modernity of
nationalism.
"The
definition also excludes from consideration political movements which demand
independence on the basis of universal principles. The term 'nationhood' is
often used to describe the achievement of such independence, as, for example,
the creation of the United States of America. But the leaders of the
independence movement did not refer to a cultural identity to justify their
claims. They demanded equality and, failing that, independence, and justified
the demand by an appeal to universal human rights. Parts of North America were
simply the areas in which these rights were being asserted. Admittedly a sense
of national identity developed after the achievement of independence but by then
nationalism had a rather different and less distinctive function." (pp.
6-7).
"These
general remarks have served to define and narrow down the area of investigation.
I am concerned with significant political movements, principally of opposition,
which seek to gain or exercise state power and justify their objectives in terms
of nationalist doctrine. This still covers a large number of political movements
and it is necessary to subdivide them. To do so one requires some principle of
classification.
"Classifications
are simply sets of interrelated definitions. Utility is their justification.
There are numerous ways of classifying nationalism....
"The
concern here is with nationalism as a form of politics, primarily opposition
politics. This suggests that the principle of classification should be based on
the relationship between the nationalist movement and the existing state. Very
broadly, a nationalist opposition can stand in one of three relationships to the
existing state. It can seek to break away from it, to take it over and reform
it, or to unite it with other states. I call these objectives separation, reform
and unification.
"In
addition the state to which such a nationalist movement is opposed may or may
not define itself as a nation-state. If it does, conflict may arise between
governmental and opposition nationalisms, conflict which cannot occur when the
state does not define itself as a nation-state. The position of a nationalist
opposition having to counter governmental nationalism is fundamentally different
from that of one which does not.
"These
distinctions yield six classes, which are set out here with examples for each
class:
|
Non-nation
states a |
Nation
states |
Separation |
Magyar,
Greek, Nigerian |
Basque,
lbo |
Reform |
Turkish,
Japanese |
Fascism,
National Socialism |
Unification |
German,
Italian |
Arab,
Pan-African |
"(a)
A rather clumsy term but I can think of nothing better" (pp. 11-12).
Breuilly,
John. Nationalism
and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
Miroslav Hroch
Defining "Nation"
NOTE: Miroslav Hroch is a
important Czech political theorist. The essay cited from here offers an
important definition of "nation."
Now
the 'nation is not, of course, an eternal category, but was the product of a
long and complicated process of historical development in Europe. For our
purposes, let us define it at the outset as a large social group integrated not
by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships
(economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical,
historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. Many
of these ties could be mutually substituable - some playing a particularly
important role in one nation-building process, and no more than a subidiary part
in others. But among them, three stand out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of
some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group - or at least of its core
constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher
degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception
of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society.
Hroch,
Miroslav. "From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The
Nation-building Process in Europe," in Balakrishnan, Gopal, ed. Mapping
the Nation. New York and London: Verso, 1996: pp. 78-97. See especially p.
79.
Ernest Renan
What is a Nation?
NOTE: Ernest Renan (1823-1892) was
an important French theorist who wrote about a variety of topics. His famous
essay "What is a Nation?" (Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?) was first
delivered as a lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882. It continues to be an important
influence on scholars. One can see Renan's influence in the scholarship of
people like Benedict Anderson.
A
nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one,
constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the
present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other
is present- day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the
value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. Man,
Gentlemen, does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the
culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all cults,
that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us
what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine
glory), this is the social capital upon which one bases a national idea. To have
common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have
performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more-these are the
essential conditions for being a people. One loves in proportion to the
sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one
has suffered. One loves the house that one has built and that one has handed
down. The Spartan song-"We are what you were; we will be what you are"
-- is, in its simplicity, the abridged hymmn of every patrie.
More
valuable by far than common customs posts and frontiers conforming to strategic
ideas is the fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and
of having, in the future, [a shared] programme to put into effect, or the fact
of having suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together. These are the kinds of things
that can be understood in spite of differences of race and language. I spoke
just now of "having suffered together" and, indeed, suffering in
common unifies more than joy does. Where national memories are concerned, griefs
are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common
effort.
A
nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the
sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to
make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the
present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to
continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the
metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual
affirmation of life. That, I know full well, is less metaphysical than divine
right and less brutal than so called historical right. According to the ideas
that I am outlining to you, a nation has no more right than a king does to say
to a province: "You belong to me, I am seizing you." A province, as
far as I am concerned, is its inhabitants; if anyone has the right to be
consulted in such an affair, it is the inbabitant. A nation never has any real
interest in annexing or holding on to a country against its will. The wish of
nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one to which one must
always return.
We
have driven metaphysical and theological abstractions out of politics. What then
remains? Man, with his desires and his needs. The secession, you will say to me,
and, in the long term, the disintegration of nations will be the outcome of a
system which places these old organisms at the mercy of wills which are often
none too enlightened. It is clear that, in such matters, no principle must be
pushed too far. Truths of this order are only applicable as a whole in a very
general fashion. Human wills change, but what is there here below that does not
change? The nations are not something eternal. They had their beginnings and
they will end. A European confederation will very probably replace them. But
such is not the law of the century in which we are living. At the present time,
the existence of nations is a good thing, a necessity even. Their existence is
the guarantee of liberty, which would be lost if the world had only one law and
only one master.
Through
their various and often opposed powers, nations participate in the common work
of civilization; each sounds a note in the great concert of humanity, which,
after all, is the highest ideal reality that we are capable of attaining.
Isolated, each has its weak point. I often tell myself that an individual who
had those faults which in nations are taken for good qualities, who fed off
vainglory, who was to that degree jealous, egotistical, and quarrelsome, and who
would draw his sword on the smallest pretext, would be the most intolerable of
men. Yet all these discordant details disappear in the overall context. Poor
humanity, how you have suffered! How many trials still await you! May the spirit
of wisdom guide you, in order to preserve you from the countless dangers with
which your path is strewn!
Let
me sum up, Gentlemen. Man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor
of his religion, nor of the course of rivers nor of the direction taken by
mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart,
creates the kind of moral conscience which we call a nation. So long as this
moral consciousness gives proof of its strength by the sacrifices which demand
the abdication of the individual to the advantage of the community, it is
legitimate and has the right to exist. If doubts arise regarding its frontiers,
consult the populations in the areas under dispute. They undoubtedly have the
right to a say in the matter. This recommendation will bring a smile to the lips
of the transcendants of politics, these infallible beings who spend their lives
deceiving themselves and who, from the height of their superior principles, take
pity upon our mundane concerns. "Consult the populations, for heaven's
sake! How naive! A fine example of those wretched French ideas which claim to
replace diplomacy and war by childishly simple methods." Wait a while,
Gentlemen; let the reign of the transcendants pass; bear the scorn of the
powerful with patience. It may be that, after many fruitless gropings, people
will revert to our more modest empirical solutions. The best way of being right
in the future is, in certain periods, to know how to resign oneself to being out
of fashion.
Renan,
Ernest. "What is a Nation?" in Eley, Geoff and Suny, Ronald Grigor,
ed. 1996. Becoming
National: A Reader. New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996: pp. 41-55. See especially pp. 52-54.
Michael Billig
"Banal Nationalism"
NOTE: Michael Billig suggests that
nationalism is more than just a set of ideas expressed of separatists. Instead,
Billig argues that nationalism is omnipresent - often unexpressed, but always
ready to be mobilized in the wake of catalytic events.
"...
there is something misleading about this accepted use of the word
‘nationalism’. It always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery.
Separatists are often to be found in the outer regions of states; the extremists
lurk on the margins of political life in established democracies, usually
shunned by the sensible politicians of the centre. The guerrilla figures,
seeking to establish their new homelands, operate in conditions where existing
structures of state have collapsed, typically at a distance from the established
centres of the West. From the perspective of Paris, peripherally placed on the
edge of Europe. All these factors combine to make nationalism not merely an
exotic force, but a peripheral one. In consequence, those in established nations
– at the centre of things – are led to see nationalism as the property of
others, not of ‘us’.
"This
is where the accepted view becomes misleading: it overlooks the nationalism of
the West’s nation-states. In a world of nation-states, nationalism cannot be
confined to the peripheries. That might be conceded, but still it might be
objected that nationalism only strikes the established nation-states on special
occasions. Crises, such as the Falklands or Gulf Wars, infect a sore spot,
causing bodily fevers: the symptoms are an inflamed rhetoric and an outbreak of
ensigns. But the irruption soon dies down; the temperature passes; the flags are
rolled up; and, then, it is business as usual." (p.
5)
"...
the term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits
which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued
that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have
supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its
citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established
nations, is the endemic condition." (p.6)
"The
central thesis of the present book is that, in the established nations, there is
a continual ‘flagging’, or reminding, of nationhood. The established nations
are those states that have confidence in their own continuity, and that,
particularly, are part of what is conventionally described as ‘the West’.
The political leaders of such nations – whether France, the USA, the United
Kingdom or New Zealand – are not typically termed ‘nationalists’. However,
as will be suggested, nationhood provides a continual background for their
political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of
newspapers. In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their
national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so
continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic
image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with
fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building.
"National
identity embraces all these forgotten reminders. Consequently, an identity is to
be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of
thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of
talking about nationhood. As a number of critical social psychologists have been
emphasizing, the social psychological study of identity should involve the
detailed study of discourse…. Having a national identity also involves being
situated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally: typically, it
means being situated within a homeland, which itself is situated within the
world of nations. And, only if people believe that they have national
identities, will such homelands, and the world of national homelands, be
reproduced.
"In
many ways, this book itself aims to be a reminder. Because the concept of
nationalism has been restricted to exotic and passionate exemplars, the routine
and familiar forms of nationalism have been overlooked. In this case, ‘our’
daily nationalism slips from attention. There is a growing body of opinion that
nation-states are declining. Nationalism, or so it is said, is no longer a major
force: globalization is the order of the day. But a reminder is necessary.
Nationhood is still being reproduced: it can still call for ultimate sacrifices;
and, daily, its symbols and assumptions are flagged." (pp.8-9)
Billig,
Michael. Banal
Nationalism. London: Sage Publications, 1995.
Rogers Brubaker
Nationalism Reframed
NOTE: Rogers Brubaker is Professor
of Sociology at UCLA and a member of The Nationalism Project's advisory
committee. In addition to several other works on nationalism, Nationalism
Reframed, has established Brubaker as an important voice in the study of
nationalism. Noting that nationalism did not disappear as some scholars have
suggested, Brubaker concerns himself with the need to explain the form that
nationalism has taken in the late Twentieth century and the manner in which
nationalism has been "reframed" to meet contemporary demands.
"Nationalism
has been both cause and effect of the great reorganizations of political space
that framed the "short twentieth century" in Central and Eastern
Europe. But the forms of nationalism that have resulted from the nationalization
of political space are different from - and less familiar than - those that
helped engender it. The nationalist movements that preceded and (in conjunction
with a variety of other factors) produced the redrawing of political boundaries
have been intensively studied. By contrast, the nationalisms that (again in
conjunction with a variety of other factors) were produced by this redrawing of
political boundaries have received much less attention. This book addresses the
distinctive forms and dynamics of these latter nationalisms, those that have
emerged in the wake of the nationalization of political space.
"These
nationalisms are interlocking and interactive, bound together in a single
relational nexus. This can be characterized on first approximation as a triad
linking national minorities, the newly nationalizing states in which they live,
and the external national "homelands" to which they belong, or can be
construed as belonging, by ethnocultural affinity though not by legal
citizenship.
"This
triadic nexus involves three distinct and mutually antagonistic nationalisms.
The first are the "nationalizing" nationalisms of newly independent
(or newly reconfigured) states. Nationalizing nationalisms involve claims made
in the name of a "core nation" or nationality, defined in
ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole.
The core nation is understood as the legitimate "owner" of the state,
which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation. Despite having
"its own" state, however, the core nation is conceived as being in a
weak cultural, economic, or demographic position within the state. This weak
position - seen as a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it
attained independence - is held to justify the "remedial" or
"compensatory" project of using state power to promote the specific
(and previously inadequately served) interests of the core nation.
"Directly
challenging these "nationalizing" nationalisms are, the transborder
nationalisms of what I call "external national homelands." Homeland
nationalisms assert states' right - indeed their obligation - to monitor the
condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, assert
the rights, and protect the interests of "their" ethnonational kin in
other states. Such claims are typically made when the ethnonational kin in
question are seen as threatened by the nationalizing (and thereby, from the
point of view of the ethnonational kin, de-nationalizing) policies and practices
of the state in which they live. Homeland nationalisms thus arise in direct
opposition to and in dynamic interaction with nationalizing nationalisms.
Against nationalizing states' characteristic assertion that the status of
minorities is a strictly internal matter, "homeland" states claim that
their rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis ethnonational kin transcend the
boundaries of territory and citizenship. "Homeland," in this sense, is
a political, not an ethnographic category. A state becomes an external national
"homeland" when cultural or political elites construe certain
residents and citizens of other States as co-nationals, as fellow members of a
single transborder nation, and when they assert that this shared nationhood
makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its own citizens but
also for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states and possess other
citizenships.
"Caught
between two mutually antagonistic nationalisms - those of the nationalizing
states in which they live and those of the external national homelands to which
they belong by ethnonational affinity though not by legal citizenship - are the
national minorities. They have their own nationalism: they too make claims on
the grounds of their nationality. "Indeed it is such claims that make them
a national minority. "National minority," like "external national
homeland" or "nationalizing state," designates a political
stance,- not an ethnodemographic fact. Minority nationalist stances
characteristically involve a self-understanding in specifically
"national" rather than merely "ethnic" terms, a demand for
state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion
of certain collective, nationality-based cultural or political rights. Although
national minority and homeland nationalisms both define themselves in opposition
to the "nationalizing" nationalisms of the state in which the
minorities live, they are not necessarily harmoniously aligned. Divergence is
especially likely when homeland nationalisms are strategically adopted by the
homeland state as a means of advancing other, non-nationalist political goals;
in this case ethnic co-nationals abroad may be precipitously abandoned when, for
example, geopolitical goals require this.
"The
triadic relational interplay between national minorities, nationalizing states,
and external national homelands has not been confined to Europe. One of the most
important instances, for example, has involved the overseas Chinese, the
nationalizing southeast Asian states in which they live, and China as external
national homeland.5 Within Europe, moreover, the triadic nexus existed before
the great twentieth-century reconfigurations of political space: thus in the
final "dualist" phase of the Habsburg Empire, when Hungary was (in the
domestic sphere) virtually an independent state, there was a tense triadic
relation between Hungarian Serbs as national minority, Hungary as nationalizing
state, and the Kingdom of Serbia as external national homeland.
"The
locus classicus of the triadic nexus, however, was interwar East Central Europe.
The post-World War I settlements, though ostensibly based on the principle of
national self-determination, in fact assigned tens of millions of people to
nation-states other than "their own" at the same time that they
focused unprecedented attention on the national or putatively national quality
of both persons and territories. Most fatefully, millions of Germans were left
as minorities in the region's new or reconstituted (and strongly nationalizing)
states, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. They belonged by citizenship to
these new states but by ethnic nationality to an initially prostrate but
obviously still powerful external national homeland. Similarly, more than three
million Hungarians suddenly became national minorities in Romania,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, linked by shared ethnicity to their openly
irredentist "homeland"; while substantial Bulgarian and Macedonian
minorities, assigned to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania, were linked by shared
(or in the case of Macedonians, putatively shared) ethnic nationality to equally
irredentist Bulgaria. Some 6 or 7 million Ukrainians and Belarusians in the
eastern borderlands of nationalizing Poland were linked to larger co-ethnic
populations in the Soviet Union who possessed their own nominally sovereign (and
in the 1920s, culturally quite autonomous) "national states" in the
Soviet federal scheme.
"The
post-Communist reorganization of political space has had similar consequences.
Again, tens of millions of people became residents and citizens of new states
conceived as "belonging to" an ethnic nationality other than their
own. Most dramatically, some 25 million ethnic Russians have been transformed,
by a drastic shrinkage of political space, from privileged national group,
culturally and politically at home throughout the Soviet Union, into minorities
of precarious status, disputed membership, and uncertain identity in a host of
incipient nonRussian nation-states. But many other groups in the region -
including large numbers of Hungarians, Albanians, Serbs, Turks, and Armenians -
found themselves similarly "mismatched," attached by formal
citizenship to one state (in most cases a new - and nationalizing - state) yet
by ethnonational affinity to another."
"This
book is not about the resurgence of nationalism. Nationalism is not a
"force" to be measured as resurgent or receding. It is a heterogeneous
set of "nation"-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are
continuously available or "endemic" in modem cultural and political
life. "Nation" is so central, and protean, a category of modem
political and cultural thought, discourse, and practice that it is hard indeed
to imagine a world without nationalism. But precisely because nationalism is so
protean and polymorphous, it makes little sense to ask how strong nationalism
is, or whether it is receding or advancing.
"My
concern in this book is not with the resurgence but with the reframing of
nationalism, not with how much nationalism there is but with what kind, not with
the strength but with the characteristic structure and style of nationalist
politics in post-Communist Europe and Eurasia. These old-new nationalisms, while
strikingly similar in some respects to those of interwar Central and Eastern
Europe, differ sharply from the state-seeking and nation-building nationalisms
on which most theories of nationalism have been built. To attend seriously to
the distinctive forms, dynamics, and consequences of these old-new nationalisms
will be a key challenge for the study of nationalism in the next decade. Ibis
book is offered as a preliminary step toward meeting that challenge."
Brubaker,
Rogers. Nationalism
Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
B -
NATIONALISM: ANCIENT OR MODERN?
Ernest Gellner
Do Nations Have Navels?
NOTE: Ernest Gellner was one of
the most important scholars of nationalism. His book, Nations and Nationalism
(1983) remains one of the most important books in the field. The quote included
here is from the Warwick Debate which was held 24 October 1995. This was an
exchange between Gellner and his former student Anthony D. Smith. It was
Gellner's final comment on nationalism before his death on 5 November 1995. The
entire text of the Warwick Debate is available online at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/Government/gellner/Warwick0.html.
"The
question I'm going to now address myself to of course is: do nations have navels
or not? Now the point about Adam's navel of course is not as simple as you might
think. It's perfectly possible to imagine a navel-less Adam because navels, once
they were engendered by the original process by which they were engendered,
perform no further function. I mean you could live navel-less and there is no
problem. Now on the other hand there are other aspects of a human organism,
supposing creation did occur at a definite date and mankind was suddenly
created, which are rather navel-like but which would have to be there anyway in
a kind of misleading way. There are all kinds of rhythms; I'm not a
physiologist, but there are all kinds of rhythms about one's breathing, about
one's digestion, about one's blood-beat, which come in cycles and the cycle has
to be continuous. So even if Adam was created at a given date, his blood
circulation or his food consumption or his breathing would have to be in a
condition such that he'd been going through these cycles anyway, even though he
hadn't been, because he had just been created. For instance, I imagine his
digestive tract wouldn't function unless it had some sort of content so that he
would have signs of a meal, remnants of a meal which in fact he had never had
because he had only just been created.
"Now
it's the same with nations. How important are these cyclical processes? My main
case for modernism that I'm trying to highlight in this debate, is that on the
whole the ethnic, the cultural national community, which is such an important
part of Anthony's case, is rather like the navel. Some nations have it and some
don't and in any case it's inessential. What in a way Anthony is saying is that
he is anti-creationist and we have this plethora of navels and they are
essential, as he said, and this I think is the crux of the issue between him and
me. He says modernism only tells half the story. Well if it tells half the
story, that for me is enough, because it means that the additional bits of the
story in the other half are redundant. He may not have meant it this way but if
the modernist theory accounts for half of 60 per cent or 40 per cent or 30 per
cent of the nations this is good for me. There are very, very clear cases of
modernism in a sense being true. I mean, take the Estonians. At the beginning of
the nineteenth century they didn't even have a name for themselves. They were
just referred to as people who lived on the land as opposed to German or Swedish
burghers and aristocrats and Russian administrators. They had no ethnonym. They
were just a category without any ethnic self-consciousness. Since then they've
been brilliantly successful in creating a vibrant culture.(3) This is obviously
very much alive in the Ethnographic Museum in Tartu, which has one object for
every ten Estonians and there are only a million of them. (The Museum has a
collection of 100,000 ethnographic objects). Estonian culture is obviously in no
danger although they make a fuss about the Russian minority they've inherited
from the Soviet system. It's a very vital and vibrant culture, but, it was
created by the kind of modernist process which I then generalise for nationalism
and nations in general. And if that kind of account is accepted for some, then
the exceptions which are credited to other nations are redundant.
"The
central fact seems to me that what has really happened in the modern world is
that the role of culture in human life was totally transformed by that cluster
of economic and scientific changes which have transformed the world since the
seventeenth century. The prime role of culture in agrarian society was to
underwrite peoples status and peoples identity. Its role was really to embed
their position in a complex, usually hierarchical and relatively stable
structure. The world as it is now is one where people have no stable position or
structure. They are members of ephemeral professional bureaucracies which are
not deeply internalised and which are temporary. They are members of
increasingly loose family associations. What really matters is their
incorporation and their mastery of high culture; I mean a literate codified
culture which permits context-free communication. Their membership of such a
community and their accept- ability in it, that is a nation. It is the
consequence of the mobility and anonymity of modern society and of the semantic
non-physical nature of work that mastery of such culture and acceptability in it
is the most valuable possession a man has. It is a precondition of all other
privileges and participation. This automatically makes him into a nationalist
because if there is non-congruence between the culture in which he is operating
and the culture of the surrounding economic, political and educational bureau-
cracies, then he is in trouble. He and his off-spring are exposed to sustained
humiliation. Moreover, the maintenance of the kind of high culture, the kind of
medium in which society operates, is politically precarious and expensive. It is
linked to the state as a protector and usually the financier or at the very
least the quality controller of the educational process which makes people
members of this kind of culture. This is the theory."
Gellner,
Ernest and Anthony D. Smith. "The nation: real or imagined?: The Warwick
Debates on Nationalism." Nations and Nationalism 2, no. 3 (1996):
357-370. See pages 367-368.
The
Warwick Debate is also online.
Anthony D. Smith
Nationalism and the Reconstruction of Nations
NOTE: Anthony D. Smith is one of
most important contemporary scholars of nationalism. He is Editor-in-Chief of
the scholarly journal Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge University
Press) and is the author of many books on the subject including his
"classic" The
Ethnic Origins of Nations.
"Perhaps
the central question in our understanding of nationalism is the role of the past
in the creation of the present. This is certainly the area in which there have
been the sharpest divisions between theorists of nationalism. Nationalists,
perennialists, modernists and post-modernists have presented us with very
different interpretations of that role. The manner in which they have viewed the
place of ethnic history has largely determined their understanding of nations
and nationalism today.
"For
nationalists themselves, the role of the past is clear and unproblematic. The
nation was always there, indeed it is part of the natural order, even when it
was submerged in the hearts of its members. The task of the nationalist is
simply to remind his or her compatriots of their glorious past, so that they can
recreate and relive those glories.
"For
perennialists, too, the nation is immemorial. National forms may change and
particular nations may dissolve, but the identity of a nation is unchanging. Yet
the nation is not part of any natural order, so one can choose one's nation, and
later generations can build something new on their ancient ethnic foundations.
The task of nationalism is to rediscover and appropriate a submerged past in
order the better to build on it.
"For
the modernist, in contrast, the past is largely irrelevant. The nation is a
modern phenomenon, the product of nationalist ideologies, which themselves are
the expression of modern, industrial society. The nationalist is free to use
ethnic heritages, but nation-building can proceed without the aid of an ethnic
past. Hence, nations are phenomena of a particular stage of history, and
embedded in purely modern conditions.
"For
the post-modernist, the past is more problematic. Though nations are modern and
the product of modern cultural conditions, nationalists who want to disseminate
the concept of the nation will make liberal use of elements from the ethnic
past, where they appear to answer to present needs and preoccupations. The
present creates the past in its own image. So modem nationalist intellectuals
will freely select, invent and mix traditions in their quest for the imagined
political community.
"None
of these formulations seems to be satisfactory. History is no sweetshop in which
its children may 'pick and mix'; but neither is it an unchanging essence or
succession of superimposed strata. Nor can history be simply disregarded, as
more than one nationalism has found to its cost. The challenge for scholars as
well as nations is to represent the relationship of ethnic past to modem nation
more accurately and convincingly.
"...
nationalists have a vital role to play in the construction of nations, not as
culinary artists or social engineers, but as political archaeologists
rediscovering and reinterpreting the communal past in order to regenerate the
community. Their task is indeed selective - they forget as well as remember the
past - but to succeed in their task they must meet certain criteria. Their
interpretations must be consonant not only with the ideological demands of
nationalism, but also with the scientific evidence, popular resonance and
patterning of particular ethnohistories. Episodes like the recovery of Hatsor
and Masada, of the tomb of Tutankhamun, the legends of the Kalevala, and the
ruins of Teotihuacan, have met these criteria and in different ways have come to
underpin and define the sense of modern nationality in Israel, Egypt, Finland
and Mexico. Yigal Yadin, Howard Carter, Elias Lonnrot and Manuel Gamio form
essential links in the complex relationship between an active national present
and an often ancient ethnic heritage, between the defining ethnic past and its
modern nationalist authenticators and appropriators. In this continually renewed
two-way relationship between ethnic past and nationalist present lies the secret
of the nation's explosive energy and the awful power it exerts over its
members."
Smith,
Anthony D. "Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the
reconstruction of nations." Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 1 (1994):
3-23. See pages
18-19.
Liah Greenfeld
"Five Roads to Modernity"
NOTE: Liah Greenfeld is the author
of Nationalism:
Five Roads to Modernity—an
important, if controversial, book—which attempts to explain the increasing
violence of nationalism by offering the model summarized below.
"I
shall very briefly recapitulate certain parts of the argument I made in Nationalism:
Five Roads to Modernity. The inventors of nationalism were members of the
new Tudor aristocracy in England in the sixteenth century. Upwardly mobile
commoners who reached the top of the social ladder, they found unacceptable the
traditional image of society in which social mobility was an anomaly and
substituted a new image for it, that of a nation as it came to be understood in
modern times. Before this happened, the word "nation" meant something
entirely different; it referred to a political and cultural elite, rather than
to a society as a whole. Tudor aristocrats, however, made the "nation"
synonymous with the English "people," a concept which previously-in
English as in other languages referred specifically to the lower orders of
society, the commons (or worse: the rabble or plebs), as members of which so
many of the new aristocrats were born. As a result of this redefinition, every
member of the people was elevated to the dignity of the elite becoming, in
principle, equal to any other member, as well as free, in vested with the right
of self-government, or, in other words, sovereignty, and the people or the
nation collectively was, in turn, defined as sovereign.
"It
is important to recognize that the sovereignty of the nation was, in this case,
derived from the assumed sovereignties of each member in the national
collectivity. The nation was defined as a composite entity existing only insofar
as its members kept the social compact and had neither interests nor will
separate from the individual interests and wills of these members. This original
nationalism, therefore, was essentially individualistic (which, it should be
noted, in no way prevented it from serving as a very firm foundation for social
solidarity). It was also civic in the sense that national
identity-nationality-was in effect identical with citizenship, and since the
nation existed only insofar as its members kept the social compact, could be in
principle acquired or abandoned of one's free will.
"The
principles of this original individualistic and civic nationalism, the location
of sovereignty within a people defined as a social compact of free and equal
individuals, are the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy, which is
considered the essential characteristic of a Western society. This type of
nationalism, however, though historically first, is the rarest type of all. Much
more often a nation is defined not as a composite entity but as a collective
individual, endowed with a will and interest of its own, which are independent
of and take priority over the wills and interests of human individuals within
the nation. Such a definition of the nation results in collectivistic
nationalism. Collectivistic nationalisms tend to be authoritarian and imply a
fundamental in equality between a small group of self-appointed interpreters of
the will of the nation-the leaders-and the masses, who have to adapt to the
elite's interpretations. Collectivistic nationalisms thus favor the political
culture of populist democracy or socialism, and as such furnish the ideological
bases of modern tyrannies.
"Collective
nationalisms can be civic. French nationalism is a nationalism of a
collectivistic and civic type, which was historically the second type of
nationalism to evolve. The civic criteria of national membership acknowledge the
freedom of the individual members, which the collectivistic definition of the
nation denies. Collectivistic and civic nationalism is therefore an ambivalent,
problematic type, necessarily plagued by internal contradictions. The turbulent
political history of the French nation is eloquent testimony to these
contradictions. Few would doubt the West European and simply Western identity of
France, and yet it is interesting that French nationalism began as an
anti-English-and by derivation anti- Western -sentiment. France, therefore, at
least in the days of its national infancy, could be seen as the first
anti-Western nation.
"The
purely anti-Western (and thus Eastern?) type of nationalism, however, was
historically the third and the latest type to appear. It developed first in
Russia and very soon after that in Germany. It also became the most common type
of nationalism, today characteristic of all East European nations (with the
possible exception of the Czech Republic) and, no doubt, of some West European
nations as well. This type combines ~w collectivistic definition of the nation
with ethnic criteria of nationality. Ethnic nationalism sees nationality as
determined genetically, entirely independent of the individual volition, and
thus inherent. It can be neither acquired, if one is not born with it, nor lost,
if one is. The freedom of the individual in this type of nationalism is denied
consistently, or rather it is redefined as inner freedom or as recognized
necessity. This denial and redefinition are predicated on the rejection of the
individual as a rational being and an autonomous actor. Individuality itself is
equated with the true human nature, which expresses itself in self-abnegation
and submersion or dissolution in the collectivity.
"In
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, I analyzed how the three types of
nationalism developed and how they acquired their specific forms in England and
the United States (which represent the first type of the individualistic and
civic nationalism), in France (the model of the second type of collectivistic
and civic nationalism), and in Russia and Germany (which represent the third,
the collectivistic and ethnic type). Here I shall only note some general
tendencies. The initial definition of the nation in every case (whether it is
defined as a composite entity or in unitary terms) depends on the nature of the
groups actively involved in the articulation of the new ideology, and the
situations they face. The individualistic type of nationalism is likely to
develop if during its formative period nationalism appeals to and serves the
interests of wide sectors of the population (e.g., the English squires and newly
literate urban masses, the American colonists, the French bourgeoisie, etc.),
and new, open, upwardly mobile influential groups. (Examples in this case are
the sixteenth-century English aristocracy and squirearchy. The German
Bildungsbiirger as a group were new, fairly open, and upwardly mobile, but
before the intellectuals were incorporated into the traditional elite, they had
no influence.) The collectivistic type is to be expected if originally the
social basis of nationalism is limited: that is, if nationalism is adopted by
and serves the interests of a narrow traditional elite intent on preserving its
status (such as the French or the Russian nobility), or a new group trying to
attain status within the traditional social framework (German
Bildungsbiirgertum), which then transmits it to the masses by indoctrination. A
significant change in the situation of the relevant participants may result in a
change in the definition of the nation (the American South provides an example
of this). But such changes are extremely rare. It must be noted that geography
plays no part in this process and, what is perhaps more important, neither does
the date of the emergence of a particular nationalism relative to other
nationalisms: a society which is among the first to define itself as a nation
may develop a collectivistic nationalism, and a recent nation may have an
individualistic nationalism.
"What
does play a part, and especially in determining whether a particularnationalism
will be defined as Civic Or as ethnic, is the perception of a nation's status
relative to other nations, or its symbolic place-specifically, whether it is
perceived as a part of the West or not. To a certain extent, such perception is
dependent on the traditional, prenational beliefs in the society in question,
which in all cases exert a significant formative influence on the nature of the
developing national identity. Sometimes, as in Russia, the central factor in the
development of ethnic nationalisms has been ressentiment, a sustained sentiment
of existential envy and resentment based on a sense of one's inferiority
vis-a-vis the societies from which the ideas of nationalism were imported, and
which therefore were originally seen as models. Historically, the sources of
importation were to the west of the importers and, more important, were
invariably defined as parts of the symbolic West. In consequence, ethnic
nationalisms developed as variants of an explicitly anti-Western ideology.
Societies which imported national ideas from elsewherewhether they defined
themselves as nations early or late-but which did not at the moment of the
adoption of national identity believe themselves to be inferior to their models,
tended to define themselves in civic terms. In such cases, the record of their
achievement provided them with sufficient reasons for national pride, and they
had no need to resort to the claim that their superiority was inherent (in their
blood, soul, soil, unadulterated language, or whatnot).
"It
is therefore possible to distinguish between Western, less Western, and
anti-Western nationalisms in Europe and elsewhere. But the geographical location
of a nation does not tell us which type of nationalism is characteristic of it.
On the contrary, the type of nationalism characteristic of a given society
allows one to locate it on the symbolic map as we have charted it, and define it
as a part of the West or of the East, and of Western or Eastern Europe.
"For
the purposes of this volume it is, of course, important to compare Eastern and
Western Europe. And the crucial question to ask is whether it is likely at East
European societies, recently liberated from the Soviet yoke, will go the way of
the West and, like the core West European societies, develop into liberal
democracies. Since this is directly related to the kind of nationalism in these
societies, the question may be reformulated to inquire about the likelihood that
East European nations will exchange their ethnic nationalisms for nationalisms
characteristic of some West European nations, for example the individualistic
and civic nationalism of the English, or the collectivistic but civic
nationalism of the French.
"It
must be understood that what this implies is nothing less than a transformation
of the identities of these nations. Such transformations, while possible, do not
seem likely in most of the East European societies and former Soviet republics
today. They are unlikely, first of all, because the respective social elites of
these societies, namely their intelligentsias, have a vested interest in ethnic
nationalism (to which they owe their position as social elites). By the same
token, they have absolutely no interest, whatever they may say, in
democratization, which implies equality and therefore leveling of their group
status with that of the rest of the population. Of course, an identity may also
be transformed under pressure from outside. Germany, which was the
quintessential example of ethnic nationalism, may be the model of a successful
transformation of identity under pressure from without. But as Germany proves, a
transformation of identity from without requires a very heavy pressure indeed-as
heavy as a long-term occupation or partition. The sad experience of
Bosnia-Herzegovina teaches us that the international community is not ready for
such measures even under the worst of circumstances."
Greenfeld,
Liah. "Nationalism in Western and Eastern Europe Compared," in Can
Europe Work? Germany & the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies,
eds. Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn. Seattle & London: University of
Washington Press, 1995.
Eric Hobsbawm
Nations and Nationalism since 1780
NOTE: Eric Hobsbawm is one of the
best known historians of the Twentieth Century. In addition to many books on a
variety of topics, Hobsbawm has written two important texts dealing with the
subject of nationalism. These include: Nations
and Nationalism Since 1780 and The
Invention of Tradition. The excerpt included here is drawn from Nations
and Nationalism since 1780.
Neither
objective nor subjective definitions are thus satisfactory, and both are
misleading. In any case, agnosticism is the best initial posture of a student in
this field, and so this book assumes no a priori definition of what
constitutes a nation. As an initial working assumption any sufficiently large
body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be
treated as such. However, whether such a body of people does so regard itself
cannot be established simply by consulting writers or political spokesmen of
organizations claiming the status of 'nation' for it. The appearance of a group
of spokesmen for some 'national idea' is not insignificant, but the word
'nation' is today used so widely and imprecisely that the use of the vocabulary
of nationalism today may mean very little indeed.
Nevertheless,
in approaching 'the national question' 'it is more profitable to begin with the
concept of "the nation" (i.e. with "nationalism") than with
the reality it represents'. For 'The ‘nation’ as conceived by nationalism,
can be recognized prospectively; the real "nation" can only be
recognized a posteriori.'
This
is the approach of the present book. It pays particular attention to the changes
and transformations of the concept, particularly towards the end of the
nineteenth century. Concepts, of course, are not part of free-floating
philosophical discourse, but socially, historically and locally rooted, and must
be explained in terms of these realities.
For
the rest, the position of the writer may be summarized as follows.
Finally,
I cannot but add that no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a
committed political nationalist, except in the sense in which believers in the
literal truth of the Scriptures, while unable to make contributions to
evolutionary theory, are not precluded from making contributions to archaeology
and Semitic philology. Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently
not so. As Renan said: 'Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.'
Historians are professionally obliged not to get it wrong, or at least to make
an effort not to. To be Irish and proudly attached to Ireland - even to be
proudly Catholic-Irish or Ulster Protestant Irish - is not in itself
incompatible with the serious study of Irish history. To be a Fenian or an
Orangeman, I would judge, is not so compatible, any more than being a Zionist is
compatible with writing a genuinely serious history of the Jews; unless the
historian leaves his or her convictions behind when entering the library or the
study. Some nationalist historians have been unable to do so. Fortunately, in
setting out to write the present book I have not needed to leave my
non-historical convictions behind.
Hobsbawm,
Eric J. Nations
and Nationalism Since 1780.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Adrian Hastings
A reply to Hobsbawm
NOTE: Adrian Hastings is an
Emeritus Professor of Theology at the University of Leeds. He is author of a
number of books, including The Construction of Nationhood which is quoted
from below. This book represents a direct reply to Eric Hobsbawm and is based on
a series of Wiles Lectures which Hastings delivered in Belfast in May 1996.
(Interestingly, Hobsbawm's Nations and Nationalism since 1780 is based on
a series of Wiles Lectures which he delivered in May 1985.)
Let
me begin by briefly setting out my central theses, themes to which we will
return from one angle or another again and again.
I
will be suggesting that England presents the prototype of both a nation and a
nation-state in the fullest sense, that its national development, while not
wholly uncomparable with that of other Atlantic coastal societies, does precede
every other - both in the date at which it can fairly be detected and in the
roundness that it achieved centuries before the eighteenth. It most clearly
manifests, in the pre- Enlightenment era, almost every appropriate 'national'
characteristic. Indeed it does more than 'manifest' the nature of a nation, it
establishes it. In the words of a very recent writer, Liah Greenfeld, 'The birth
of the English nation was not the birth of a nation, it was the birth of the
nations, the birth of nationalism.' Moreover, its importance for us lies too
both in its relationship with religion and in the precise impact of English
nationalism on its neighbours and colonies. Much of this, I will be claiming,
was detectable already in Saxon times by the end of the tenth century. Despite
the, often exaggerated, counter-action of the Norman Conquest, an English
nation-state survived 1066, grew fairly steadily in the strength of its national
consciousness through the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but emerged
still more vociferously with its vernacular literary renaissance and the
pressures of the Hundred Years War by the end of the fourteenth. Nevertheless
the greatest intensity of its nationalist experience together with its overseas
impact must undoubtedly be located in and after the late sixteenth century.
I
will argue that there appears to be no comparable case in Europe and that it was
this English model, wholly preceding the late eighteenth century, in which this
sort of process is held by modernist theory to find its roots, which was then
re-employed, remarkably little changed, in America and elsewhere. I will not
suggest that English nationalism preceded an English nationhood. On the
contrary. However English nationalism of a sort was present already in the
fourteenth century in the long wars with France and still more in the sixteenth
and seventeenth. Indeed, without the impact of English nationalism, the history
of England's neighbours seems virtually unintelligible.
Hastings,
Adrian. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism.
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 2-5.
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