Aristotle claims that the virtues are acquired through practice and habit, so that we become virtuous by doing virtuous things – e.g. we become just by doing just things. But in section four of book two of the Nicomachean Ethics, he raises a puzzle about this: How can it be that we become just by doing just things? For if we’re doing just things, mustn’t we already be just? Carefully explain and illustrate Aristotle’s solution to this puzzle, and explain whether or not you think it is successful. Be sure to discuss and develop the ideas relevant to the central distinction he relies on in his solution, explaining them carefully; don’t just summarize what he says. In the course of your explanation of his solution, you should develop an example to illustrate the point.
In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle attempts to identify what entails the just life, and explains how one acquires justice as a virtue. In the fourth section, he complicates things by raising the questions, "How can it be that we become just by doing just things? For if we’re doing just acts, mustn’t we already be just?" In order to answer this inquiry, Aristotle presents three criteria a person must necessitate to be truly just. In defense of Aristotle’s view, I will clarify the meaning behind these three criteria with simple and complex analogies.
To fully understand Aristotle’s argument, I must first present his arguments leading to the questions, "How can it be that we become just by doing just things? For if we’re doing just things, mustn’t we already be just?" Aristotle’s first contention is that "moral virtue, like the arts, is acquired by repetition of the corresponding acts" (Aristotle, p. 123). What he asserts by this statement is that in order to acquire the virtues, one must continually practice acts in accordance with the virtues just as one acquires a skill by continually practicing acts to hone that skill. Now, in making this assertion, one would have to consider the contrary, and the contrary would be that we are given virtues by nature, and that we do not have to acquire them, but that we simply have them. But this counter argument is false. As Aristotle declares, we are not just given our virtues, for that would be no different as to how we are given our senses. Otherwise, we would all be skillful at every art and be the master of every virtue without the need of instruction and schooling, just as we are all able to see, hear, taste, and feel without instruction and schooling. However, by nature we are given the potential to attain the virtues, as we are given the potential to attain the skill of the arts. Therefore, our moral virtue, our knowledge of justice, is not given to us by nature. It is, "acquired by repetition of the corresponding acts" (p. 123).
Now, Aristotle’s logic may present a little confusion, for the question he raises in the fourth section is a very good one. If one is doing just acts, mustn’t he already be just? Here, Aristotle introduces the three criteria a person must meet in order to be truly just. The first criterion is knowledge, and by this, Aristotle means that one must be able to know of his own actions and do his own actions on the basis of his own knowledge. In order to be able to do this, one has to have the ability to acquire knowledge. A good example would be Aristotle’s example of a rock and its inability to obtain knowledge because it does not have the capacity to habituate against its nature:
For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. (p. 123)
A rock, because it lacks a mind of its own, is unable to acquire knowledge just as Aristotle has presented, because it does not carry the capacity to habituate against its nature. You cannot train the rock to sing, or to play the violin, or to become skillful in any art. Furthermore, because a rock cannot have knowledge, it cannot ever attain moral virtue, and therefore, never become just or unjust because it lacks the ability to execute its own actions (if it is hurled downwards, it is not by its own action, the action is executed by another physical force).
Well, perhaps a comparison to a rock is absurd, or not analogous, and thus is incapable of explaining how one is to acquire knowledge and what Aristotle means when he says one has to have knowledge to be just. So now I present to you an example of a human being. As mentioned earlier, a virtue is acquired the same way a skill is acquired. Because nature gives us the gift of potential, we are equipped to obtain skills through practice. For example, if a young boy has yet to acquire the ability to swim, he cannot be considered a swimmer. He does not know how to swim, and if you threw him out in the middle of a lake, he would surely drown without much of a struggle. However, if the boy were to undergo training in swimming, over a period of time, the boy would be able to keep himself from drowning in that lake. He may even become a master of swimming and swim across the lake and back without wasting a breath. So, the boy who is now a skilled swimmer is no longer the boy who would have drowned had he been thrown in the middle of a lake a number of years before. Because of the boy’s acquired knowledge of swimming, he has become a swimmer, just as a man must acquire the knowledge of bravery before becoming a brave man. How could a man act bravely if he did not know how to be brave? He could not, just as the boy would have drowned had he not known how to swim.
Now, this raises another question. How can someone commit a seemingly just act and not be just? How could he not know of his just act? Take this scenario for example, a fat man feasting on a gigantic leg of lamb is wasteful and discards the meaty scraps out his window and into the street. A starving, homeless man hobbles along, comes upon the meaty scraps and dinner for that night is served. The fat man had indirectly fed the homeless man, and while feeding the homeless may be considered a virtuous act, the act was not in and of itself virtuous, for the fat man was ignorant that the act he committed helped homeless man. As stated earlier, in order to be in accordance with the virtues, one must be able to know of his own actions and do his own actions on the basis of his own knowledge. It was by chance that the homeless man was fed, not because the fat man had any knowledge that his trash would become someone else’s source of survival.
This brings us to Aristotle’s second criterion which is that one "must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes" (p. 126). This criterion can be partly explained by the fat man-homeless man scenario. The fat man did choose to throw the scraps out the window, but not in order to feed the homeless man. However, the scenario does not explain the full meaning of the second criterion, because one can still do an act in accordance with the virtues, be conscious of his act, and still not be virtuous. But why? If a man finds a lost dog and returns it to its master, is he not then just for doing a just act? Not necessarily, as Aristotle says that, "the agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them," that the situation and motivation behind doing the act must also be considered (p.126). Did the man return the dog to its master because of the large reward offered by the owner? Did he return the dog under the instruction of another? Or, did he simply return the dog out of his own care for the dog and his own concern for its master? It is only when the man does an act of justice for its own sake and by his own choice that he is just. Therefore, acts that may appear just are not called just unless the man, by his own will, chooses to do the act for its own sake.
Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does those that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them. (p.126)
Now this brings us to the third and final criterion that needs to be met in order to be virtuous, which is that a man’s "actions must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character" (p.126). What Aristotle means by this is that a man is only a just man if he continually chooses to do just acts. He cannot be flexible in character and do just acts sometimes while doing unjust acts at other times. The problem with this argument is its difficulty to comprehend, for it differs from acts in accordance with the arts. An artist who has painted for years and years will still be an artist if his practice in painting has decreased. He may even choose to practice a different skill, perhaps learn how to play the piano, and cease to paint. He will still be an artist, for his paintings are a testament of his great skill. On the contrary, acts in accordance with the virtues do not possess the weight carried by the acts in accordance with the arts. A man who arrives to an appointment on time every day is not permitted to arrive late the next day because of his diligence to arrive on time all those times before. In order to avoid being tardy, the man must arrive to his appointments on time, all the time. His behavior and character cannot change if he is to avoid being late, whereas the artist is not permitted to have to paint all the time in order to be an artist.
A man’s reputation may carry the weight as acts in accordance with the arts possess, but reputation is not the same as a virtue. Simply, it is a result that develops when a man’s character appears to be one way or another. But we are not discussing mere appearance, we are discussing the truth of a man’s character. For example, a man who makes just decisions in front of his people may by reputation appear just and good in character to his people. However, when apart from his people, he commits acts of injustice, perhaps refusing to care for his cattle. The man, by reputation is still just, but by character is not because of the injustice he is responsible for. Thus, a man cannot have a changeable character if he is to be just, for if he had a changeable character he would not always choose to do just acts.
I believe Aristotle’s arguments to be strong ones, for he presents a rebuttal for every argument to the contrary. A man cannot be just if he has no knowledge of justice, nor can he be just if he is not aware of the justness of his act. He cannot be just if he did not choose to commit the just act, nor is he just if he committed the act for another reason other than its own sake. Furthermore, a man cannot be just if he chooses to be just only some of the time and then unjust at other times. Although it may seem impossible for anyone then to be just, Aristotle’s arguments are remarkable, for they stand impeccable against any contrary argument, a testament that his argument holds validity.
(c) 2001 Nicomacheanus.