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How the West Hasn't Won: The Problem of Proxy Warfare

    What is considered to be conventional wisdom these days changes with such rapidity that seemingly relevant and insightful commentary can become obsolete in a short period of time. In the case of the US�s ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, this tendency has been especially prevalent. The confidence in a speedy victory that prevailed in the first few weeks of the war yielded to more ambivalent feelings as success proved to be more elusive than expected. These doubts were to dissipate just as quickly as they appeared, however, as the Northern Alliance, in tandem with Pashtun tribal forces swept across Afghanistan, ousting the decrepit Taliban regime from power. Scores of haughty, triumphalist proclamations by the feverishly hawkish US punditry soon followed, perhaps best exemplified by the title of the ever gracious Christopher Hitchens Guardian piece, �Ha Ha Ha to the Pacifists�. To their credit, the Bush administration has eschewed such ostentatious displays of braggadocio, perhaps in the realization (which the would be Orwell�s of the world never understood) of just how negligible opposition to the war was in the first place. However, in my estimation, this may have more to do with their plans for the future than their opinions on the recent past as the �Afghan model� (precision strikes, indigenous troops and special forces) is now being touted as the panacea for troubling regimes the world through by the more hawkish members of the administration. Clearly, the perception of a victory of sorts, at least at this stage, is quite palpable and one that�s veracity has not been adequately scrutinized.
     At the very least, even the most bellicose hawks for expanding the war would have to admit that victory at this stage, for this stage, is partial at best. While the elimination of the Taliban as a ruling government is a laudable accomplishment in its own right, it is important to remember that this task was ancillary to the US�s primary goal of capturing or killing �the evildoer� and his top lieutenants, while putting his Al Qaeda network out of business for good.
Indeed, from before the hostilities began, prominent members of the Bush administration such as Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that the Taliban could avoid an attack by simply �coughing up� Bin Laden and shutting down the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Though this may have been merely a diplomatic maneuver to assuage recalcitrant world leaders, it represented well enough the position of the US at the time- focusing as it did on the Taliban�s harboring of terrorists rather than their repressive policies within their country. This concentration was on display clearly enough during the first week of air strikes, which as you might recall seemed to target terrorist training camps and urban targets more than the Taliban front lines of the ongoing civil war. However, as the war progressed, US strategy evolved and led to an approach that centered on regime change, the thinking being that catching Bin Laden would considerably easier if he no longer had the protection of a government.
     Fearing US casualties as well as �crusader backlash�, the US was reluctant to introduce large numbers of its own troops to the region. Consequently, the more proactive attempt at regime change necessitated backing whatever Anti-Taliban forces could be corralled, namely the Uzbek and Tajik fighters of the Northern Alliance, and later certain Pashtun tribes in the south and east. Faced with laser guided US strikes on their front lines, reinvigorated opposition forces, and (perhaps worst of all for the Taliban) the withdrawal of assistance from their primary benefactor, the Taliban fell with astonishing speed in Mazar-E-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad. While these developments were certainly in the US�s interests, it soon became apparent that their priorities and those of the heterogeneous collection of Anti-Taliban forces were not always congruent. First, as Northern Alliance troops were on the verge of capturing Kabul, the US urged restraint, suggesting (not without a little encouragement from Pakistan) that the Alliance wait until a settlement on a broad based government could be achieved. At this point, eager to establish �facts on the ground� before any negotiations took place, the Alliance had no intention of holding back on their long sought after goal, and soon seized the capital.
     Our allies in the south have proved to be even less reliable, at least if some of the reports that have been circulating throughout the press can be believed. Rumors of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces negotiating and buying their was to safety have been rampant, and the US/tribal siege of Kandahar notably failed to produce Mullah Omar, even though the �commander of the faithful� was very likely in the city until it fell. Last week, the Mullah again avoided capture despite early hopes that he was with the Taliban force that negotiated surrender near Bagram. Even after the US spent a small fortune in helping eastern tribes eliminate the Taliban/Al Qaeda presence in Tora Bora, our allies were prepared to give up and go home, until the US basically bribed them with clothes and money to stay and continue searching the caves in the region.   Besides this, there was the notorious case a few weeks back when the US allegedly received bad intelligence reports from our allies that was subsequently used to plan air strikes; intelligence that may well have had more to do with old tribal rivalries than any terrorist activity. As I write, evidence comes to fore that some of the highest level officials of the Taliban government, including the former Justice and Defense Ministers, were captured by anti-Taliban forces in the south but released shortly thereafter. When such critical suspects can be let go by those who are supposed to be our allies, men who were on the FBI�s list of most wanted terror suspects, than I think there is clearly reason to question the effectiveness of our current anti-terrorism strategy.
     For all the talk of the US shrewdly using local forces to achieve our political objectives, it seems that the reverse would be more accurate. As Bradley Graham stated in the Washington Post, �local leaders have appeared more interested in consolidating their power than pursuing additional US objectives�. Although this may be infuriating and smack of ingratitude to Americans, who after all paid for the Anti-Taliban forces victory, it should not come as that much of a surprise. The history of Afghanistan, particularly in recent years, shows that the warring factions in the country switch sides more often than Anne Heche (current Deputy Defense Minister Dostum is a prime example of this) and are fiercely resistant to outside control. With the civilian casualties from the US bombing now exceeding the number of people murdered on September 11th, and with few of the major Talban/Al Qaeda leaders killed of in custody, it seems appropriate to ask if the Pentagon�s proxy strategy has been as effective as advertised, and perhaps contemplate whether it is really a model worth replicating in Iraq and beyond.