This article is very largely based on an article written by Phil Barker for the Courier magazine (Vol IV no 1 July-August 1982). In this article Phil was aiming to show that it was not only the British Army of the Napoleonic period which was able to develop effective countermeasures to new French tactics. I am not sure whether Phil would still argue as he does here but the model of combat in Horse Foot and Guns suggests that these ideas are not too far away from his current thinking.
Phil starts by pointing out that
The primary tactical problem for Napoleon's enemies lay in how to counter the forward impulse of French infantry columns of attack screened by skirmishers. It became universally accepted by all but hide bound conservatives that the stationary volleying of three deep lines was not a satisfactory method, and the experiences of the old gentlemen preserving the contrary view in time eliminated them or persuaded them to grudgingly fall in with the new majority.
It was equally demonstrated that the British two-deep lines usually did defeat the French columns. the traditional explanation of this, initially put forward by Oman and adopted later by Weller, Hughes and virtually everyone else, is that the column could not compete with the line in fire production, and was almost literally blown away by a close succession of aimed musket volleys. This was accepted even by the French, who then tried to weasel away from the suggestion that their logical and pragmatic nation had standardised on an inferior formation, by suggesting that they had really wanted to fight in line, but that the perfidious English had unfairly surprised them by by hiding behind hills, thus catching them undeployed."
It would be nice if Phil had indicated his sources in the article rather than simply 'the French'. I assume that the last sentence is a sly dig at writers such as Colin who argued just this in "The Transformation of War". I am not sure that this explanation of French practice has disappeared. Thus Nosworthy argues that the French commanders lost their bearings when advancing against the British and failed to deploy until it was too late. He suggests two main reasons for this:
Once Oman had pointed it out, everyone could see the logic. True, Napier, the previous major historian of the Peninsular War had not stressed such firefights, instead describing victories achieved with a ringing British cheer and a downhill charge with the bayonet after a single volley. Since it was dogma that bayonet wounds were rare, this was ascribed to an excess of schoolboyish chauvinism in the author, or with more charity, it was assumed that the British charged when the French had already been defeated and were ripe for flight. In any case, few read Napier after Oman had been published. He was out-dated, replaced by a new authority, so must be inferior. What they missed was that Napier was an eye-witness. Oman was not.
Even discarding Napier and other contemporaries, there were other clues. It was not easy to see why a two deep line should win by fire when a three deep line lost. Men in a third rank could not shoot effectively at those in front of them but neither could those on the ends of a two deep line, who when the centre were at a comfortably close range, were still at long range and shooting at a difficult angle.
Nosworthy and other defenders of the firepower explanation counter by arguing that this problem was solved because the British battalion “threw forward its wings in a Shallow Crescent” and fire was discharged from three sides.
Another explanation was that the British were taught and practised aiming. Fine if they were skirmishers shooting at individuals, but they were not. They were shooting at a large target which was difficult to miss. In effect, they could not miss for direction, only to go high or low, and all nations taught firers to level at the correct height. In 1813, the Prussians, who by then were taught marksmanship, held trials of all of the musket types they had in service, firing at a target representing a company front. It was notorious that the 'Old Prussian' musket could not be aimed at all due to the shape of its butt. At 100 paces, it scored 92 hits out of 200 shots. The British musket scored 94 and the French 151!
So may be it was rate of fire, those regular 15 second volleys that Weller describes on so little evidence? Had the Prussians slipped back so badly from Frederick the Greats requirements on rate of fire. I know of no evidence to suggest it.
I assume that the Prussians here are those of 1806 whose regular volleying did not stop French columns and Phil is arguing that volley rates cannot therefore explain British success.
Hughes, while not discarding Oman's theory, has undermined it but demonstrating how few musket balls of those fired under battle conditions actually caused casualties. Another artilleryman, the always entertaining and thought-provoking Shelford Bidwell, suggests that in British armies in India, musketry was relatively harmless, and that battalion accompanying guns produced most of the fire effect. Napoleon once made a comment that could be taken as partly supporting this view.
Which was? I'm never comfortable using comments from Napoleon. He is quoted so widely that his comments can and are used to support almost any position.
Paddy Griffiths' recent book 'Forward into Battle' has now reinstated the Napier version. He suggests, and to my mind proves conclusively, that British victories in teh Peninsular against columns were usually won by a single volley and charge against enemy psychologically disadvantaged by surprise, by having halted, by physical disorder caused by obstacles or artillery fire or for similar reasons. He shows that stationary fire fights occurred where terrain or other considerations prevented an initial charge, and that they were prolonged, indecisive and showed no great advantage of line over column. Casualties were heavy, but more because of the duration of the fight than its intensity.
But why should a thin British line counter-attack aggressively, while a thick Prussian or Austrian line did not? Paddy leaves us with the impression that the reason lies in an innate superiority of the British infantryman over his contemporaries. I submit that it was in fact a consequence of bad habits acquired in America!
At teh close of the Seven Years War, British infantry were as firmly committed to the three-deep slow maneuvering line firing successive volleys as any continental nation. However, in america they quickly learned that much of the opposition consisted of militia who could fire happily from cover or at a distance, but who, lacking bayonets and training, would take to their heels if charged.
The terrain was also far from ideal for linear warfare, being either wooded or cut up into small farms. Cavalry could not act effectively in large bodies, even if sufficient had been available. When Dundas later wrote his manual, he worried about the way that the British army was sticking to the two-deep line used in America, thinking it excessively vulnerable to cavalry. He may not have realised that officers also came back with a fixed impression that, if you charge the other side, it will run away.
Just as the Oman dogma obscured the truth about British methods, it also hid the truth about those Britain's allies took up when the three deep line proved wanting. Snide comments about Prussians, Austrians and Russians standing about stupidly in columns to be shot down abound in British authors. We are left with the impression that brainless continentals are just parroting French methods, and not very well at that. Nothing could be further from the truth. They had a new method of their own, not always applied well or completely but which adequately countered that of the French. Whether it was superior or inferior to the British method is debateable. Both had their special strengths, and both worked.
The Austrians were the first off the mark in 1807, but did not apply the new technique well, being a little rigid in their application. The Russians followed from 1811. They did not apply it well or completely at Borodino but did better in later battles. The Prussians started to to work on it in 1807, finally formalised it in 1812 and applied it well, with some inevitable exceptions.
In all three cases, the new system effectively abolished the three deep line while in theory retaining it. This was done by training the third rank as skirmishers and deploying the majority of these, usually at least two thirds, on first contact with the enemy. The remainder of the third rank were then fed forward gradually as replacements or reinforcements as required. The remainder of the unit occasionally deployed as a two deep line but more usually remained in column to the rear. It is worth noting that such a two deep wide colum was no deeper than the four deep line in which practically every British battalion fought at Waterloo!
This was the minimum deployment of skirmishers. Prussian fusiliers, jager and schutzen. Austrian grenzer and jagers and Russian jagers deployed a larger proportion, usually about half and sometimes all.
The difference between this and the French system in intention was that the French used the column as the main agent and the skirmisher screen to assist it forward, while that of the allies used the skirmishers as the main agent and the column in a secondary supporting role, feeding reserves forward and counterattacking in emergency. The essential difference in means was the proportion of skirmishers to the rest. While a British battalion deployed one of its ten companies as skirmishers, sometimes aided by a second company, either its own or borrowed, and a French battalion usually deployed one of its six companies, a Prussian, Austrian or Russian line battalion doubled the proportion of skirmishers.
The thickening of a thin skirmishing screen to a dense swarm had the disadvantage that suitable cover was harder to find for the individuals. However, the members of such a swarm still presented a less vulnerable target than a formed line, and the careful fire of individuals wa thought to be more effective than massed volleys. In a fire fight it might well overmatch the line and could certainly be relied upon to deal with the French screens and get at their main body. The fire would no more stop the attacking columns than would that that of the old line, but would upset them. The sight of the defending supports waiting behind ready to advance would then cause the French forward movement to falter. This possible scenario may shed new light on teh Prussian comment to Wellington at Ligny "Our men like to see the enemy".
Once the French columns had halted, the usual prolonged fire fight would ensue. Both sides would suffer badly, especially the supports waiting patiently under artillery fire "getting damnably mauled" in the cause of maintaining their skirmishers morale.
The losses to artillery were not however the main disadvantage of the new tactic which was that the skirmishers once engaged could rarely be induced to advance and gain a decision. This showed up clearly in 1870 when the Prussians found that troops deployed inline or column advanced nearer the enemy than those deployed early as skirmishers and actuallyhad lower casualties because of reduced exposure time. The problem had not affected the French as much, since the advancing columns hearened the much smaller number of skirmishers and mentally pushed or dragged them along. The individual skirmisher knew that all was well as long as the column kept advancing. The Prussian skirmisher knew that the decision depended on him and his mates, and was all too aware of teh dangers they faced.
Obviously, I am presenting a pure case. There were times when whole French or British battalions deployed as skirmishers, though this was rarer than you might think, even British light battalions rarely deployed more than four companies. There were also plenty of times where pig-headed Russian or muddle-headed austrian regmental commanders fought undeployed. Even if the factors that stopped a French column in its tracks or turned it back were mainly psychological, the casualties inflicted by enemy muskets must have been one of the more important inputs. However, while I may be simplifying the actual situation, I maintain that the currently accepted wargames practice of assuming all British to be two deep supermen and all others to be three-deep idiots, is a grosser simplification