The operations of the French and Prussian armies in September and October 1806 in Saxony have received scant attention from the hobby despite the endless popularity of Napoleon amongst American gamers in particular. Although these operations were arguably the most brilliant of Napoleon's career, I cannot think of any game which attempted to simulate these events on an operational level. I was very interested therefore to see the release of Iena from Clash of Arms as the game scale seemed to be just right for this level of simulation. I do confess however that I suspected that the game would be another anodyne NLB clone with little to offer as a representation of Napoleonic operational combat.
To Ed Wimble's credit, Iena is a good deal better than I had feared and I applaud the thought and ingenuity which he has shown in producing a playable game which gives a much better flavour of this level of combat than previous efforts I have encountered. Having said that, I do think that the game misses the mark quite widely in a number of areas and, as Charles has already reviewed the game in PA, I hope that Ed will forgive me if I concentrate on those areas
and not on the game's strengths. If nothing else, Iena has revived my interest in Napoleonic boardgaming and for this, I have a great deal to thank him!
The first aspect of the game which disappointed me was the Command system. In Iena, the Command rules for the French are the same old system used in these types of game since the early versions of Napoleon at Leipzig. Army commanders (Napoleon and Murat) are always in command and can command subordinates within a certain distance. Distant subordinates have to provide their own command through Initiative ratings. Unsurprisingly, Lannes and Davout rate highest as 5 and can act in independent roles while the much-maligned Bernadotte is a slothful 2 and will need close supervision from Napoleon or Murat in order to ensure his movement.
In my view, this system tells us very little about the way in which the French army actually functioned during this campaign and does little to illustrate the superior French staff work which was of the main reasons for their success. In particular, I think the game fails to show how critical Napoleon was in the operation of the system, misrepresents the function of the corps commander in the French system and does not demonstrate the advantages the the bataillon carre gave in terms of staff work. My opinion is based on my reading of Vachee: Napoleon at Work. The author analyses how Napoleon and his staff operated during this very operation and gives an illuminating insight into French practice.
The main impression from Vachee is how dependent the French were on Napoleon himself and on his capacity for sustained work. His activities on the night of 11-12 October are covered in detail by Vachee and demonstrate how the Emperor operated.
In the evening of the 11th, Napoleon was still unsure whether the Prussian army intended to contest his advance between the Saale and the Elster. He thought it likely that they would concentrate on the left bank and discussed an outline plan based on that assumption with Murat. However, he postponed a decision on this plan until further reports arrived. In a message to Ney at midight ordering the Marshal to Neustadt, he noted that further instructions on subsequent destinations would follow.
The information which Napoleon had been waiting for arrived after midnight. He first received a letter from Soult at Weyda, 16 k.m. away, dated 10 p.m. Soult informed the Emperor that the enemy were concentrating at Jena and that there were few enemy formations between the Saale and the Elster. The next letter was from Murat at Gera, 28 k.m. away, dated 11 p.m. Murat said that information gained from prisoners indicated that the Prussians were concentrated at Erfurt.
Both of these letters must have arrived well before 3 a.m. when Napoleon issued new orders to Ney.
Based on the new information in these two letters, Napoleon revised his plan, calculated the length of marches and noted where he intended to place the
various corps on the following days. This working note survives and is in his own handwriting. At 3 a.m. he sent a new order to Ney cancelling the march on Neustadt and ordering the Marshal to Auma instead.
The new plan was formed by 4 a.m. when he sent his general order for operations to Berthier who would translate Napoleons instructions into individual orders for the corps commanders. Davout was ordered to Naumburg, as were Murat and Bernadotte. Lannes was ordered to Jena, Augereau to Kahla and the reserve cavalry and artillery to Gera. Soult received a letter directly from the Emperor ordering him to Gera.
Perhaps surprisingly, these contain very little in the way of instruction. There is no information given regarding the enemy, or of the nature of the manoeuvre or of the role of the various corps. Where a corps commander was likely to come into contact with the enemy Napoleon might send a further personal letter direct to the commander to give some further explanation. Thus Lannes, Murat and Davout received letters which gave more details on the progress of the campaign. Interestingly, Augereau did not, despite being in a forward position and noted his concern to Lannes on the 13th.
Vachee notes that these orders did not specify the routes to be followed by each corps or the zones in which each would operate. These issues were left up to the individual corps commander and his staff though they were expected to notify imperial headquarters of the route taken. What the orders did specify was the destination to be reached and the time when Napoleon expected the corps to be at that destination.
The conclusion I take from this is that French Corps commanders in 1806 were not expected to operate on their own initiative in determining the destination of their marches. Lannes message to Napoleon on the 13 October is illustrative. The commander of V Corps pleaded for orders as he dared not assume responsibility for a false movement.
Once issued the orders were carried by courier to the recipient. Examining Vachee's figures, the average speed of the couriers delivering these orders in delivery was around 10km/hour (10 hexes). The speed of the couriers was complemented by the relatively short distances which they had to travel.
This was one of the advantages of the tight bataillon carre over more dispersed deployments.
Having reached the recipient, the delay between receipt and the start of the day's march for the various corps ranged between one hour (Davout) to four hours (Lannes) with the average being two hours.
This speed of operation does seems marked when the activities of the Prussians are examined. I have not seen a Prussian equivalent to Vachee but by trawling through the various general accounts of the campaign which I have it is possible to get a general idea of the comparative lack of efficiency in the Prussian system.
In the first instance, the Prussian subordinate commanders seem to have been slower at reporting their actions to their commanders than their French equivalents. Whereas French commanders seem to have been expected to report on their daily activities as quickly as possible, the Prussians seem to have been much more dilatory.
As an example, Louis at Saalfeld seems to have known on the 8th that the French had occupied Grafenthal that day but his report of that fact to Hohenlohe did not reach the latter till mid morning on the 9th despite the short distance between the two (approx. 35km). Consequently Hohenlohe could not expect any orders resulting on this information to be implemented before the 10th. If the information had reached Hohenlohe on the evening of the 8th, his orders for the 9th might have been different.
Similarly, Prussian higher command do not demonstrate the same speed of execution and of effort as Napoleon. Hohenlohe does not appear to have worked through the night as Napoleon does. His orders are generally sent during the day and consequently do not reach their destination in time to be executed that day.
The Prussian courier system also appears less efficient. When Hohenlohe sent an order to Louis on the evening of the 9th (say 9pm) to concentrate at Rudolstadt, this order does not arrive with Louis until 11 am on the 10th when the latter was already engaged at Saalfeld. 14 hours to travel 35 km is a very poor performance in comparison with the French.
This slowness was compounded by the wide spread of the Prussian forces in comparison to the tight bataillon carre of the French. The greater distance between commander and subordinate meant an increase in time necessary for couriers to cover the distance both in reporting from subordinate to HQ and in carrying orders to subordinates.
Thus, having received details of Muffling's report of the movements of the French army on the 8th Hohenlohe ordered a concentration of his army at Mittel Pollnitz on the 10th. This order was sent from headquartres at Kahla at 10 am on the 9 but can hardly have arrived with Tauenzien at Schleiz (a distance of 70 km) before 5 p.m. that day even if we allow a French rate of courier movement. The consequence was that by the time the order was received it was already too late. Similarly, a courier leaving Tauenzien at 5 p.m. on the 9th to report his retreat to Auma could not have reached Hohenlohe before midnight.
Interestingly, Ed does use something which approximates the reality of the situation in his rules for Prussian command.
The Prussians have two phases each day where the Player can issue orders to the subordinate commanders to march on a particular point.
These rules give a better representation of the command structure than do his rules for French command but still fall short.
In particular the Prussian Command rules make no allowance for distance or for the historical slowness of Prussian command to react. Thus in the game, the Prussian Player may order the retiral of Tauenzien on Mittel Pollnitz at 4 am on the 9th and this order will be immediately put into effect by Tauenzien on the next turn (8 am). As I have suggested above, this was simply not feasible for Hohenlohe historically given the rate at which information and orders were distributed in the Prussian army.
To be constructive, I don't think that it would be too difficult to devise rules for a system of orders which approximated reality based on Vachee's figures and scaling down for the Prussians. These ideas would require a good deal more work but, for example, I would suggest dropping the Orders phases for the Prussians. Instead dice each turn and deduct for the Command rating of the Commander (say rate Hohenlohe and Brunswick both 1). If the throw is less than or equal to the turn number then he may issue orders. They may only issue orders once per day. ADC counters could then be used to transmit the orders to their destination. The French on the other hand do have an Orders phase (12 am to 4 am) when Napoleon can issue orders. These orders are similarly carried by ADC counters which may start to move on the 4 - 8am turn.
In addition to this, I would institute a Reaction Test rule to determine the actions of a commander when his troops encountered the enemy. This would encompass the possibility of retreat along the line of march or stand and observe or attack. This could, in turn, affect the transition from March mode to Battle mode which Iena fails to cope along with every other operational Napoleonic game. Personally, I believe this is where the abilities of the French corps commanders were displayed and where initiative is a valid concept. The aggression of Lannes at Saalfeld and of Davout at Auerstadt was the quality
Napoleon looked for in his subordinates. Vachee is surely right that it was in this regard that Bernadotte fell short and that
Napoleon's recognition of this lay behind his orders of the 12th which sent Davout direct to Naumburg and Bernadotte to Zeitz
despite the relative distances each had to travel. As he notes, given Bernadotte's record it is unlikely that he would have
won or even fought the battle of Auerstadt.
Turning from Command to Combat, I think that Ed has developed a much better system but that it is still not quite what
I would like to see. Charles discussed Auerstadt in his review so I will concentrate on the other two main actions of
Saalfeld and Jena.
The first problem with Saalfeld is the map.
I know that Ed has a penchant for creative map design and tries to achieve a feel with his maps rather than strict accuracy.
However there seems little reason why the map should be so inaccurate in this case.
In reality, Saalfeld was situated at the mouth of a defile where the road from Grafenthal exits heavily wooded hills to the south-west.
Garnsdorf is between Saalfeld and the defile with Scharza about 4 hexes north west of Saalfeld.
I assume that Ed had some reason for designing the map in the way he has but it is difficult to see what it might be.
Personally, I would prefer the map to display the terrain as it was.
Looking at the forces engaged at Saalfeld, we have Suchet (11 battalions) and Treilhard (8 squadrons) with Lannes divisional battery
against Louis with 10 battalions, 10 squadrons and 2 and a half batteries.
The historical result was a rout of the Saxon forces after 4 hours (2 turns) of fighting.
In the game the Saxons seem to be somewhat underrepresented in their infantry numbers as Belvilaqua has only 3 SP
(6 if you include the fusilier battalions and jager companies) as opposed to Suchets 11.
The difficulty with representing the Prussians at this scale is that, unlike the French,
the composition of their brigades and divisions changed often and this is a problem here.
Despite being understrength I question whether the Saxons are likely to be routed in two turns using Ed's system.
What the game cannot represent is the flexible way in which Lannes handled his forces at the battle.
In reality Lannes extended his frontage to over 4 hexes in game terms, screening the Saxon left with skirmishers
and crushing their right with superior numbers. His performance in this battle was impressive and Foch later used Saalfeld
to illustrate how to handle a division in an advance guard battle.
Even ignoring the map problems I think it is difficult to simulate Saalfeld as the game stands.
In the first place, it would probably need some ability to break down the existing units into their component regiments.
If Ed ever produces a La Battaille on Jean then that would be ideal!
Then we would need some ability for Lannes to control units in multiple hexes whereas Louis would have a limited ability to do so.
Then again, an area game would not have this particular problem.
In the meantime, I would suggest that the French should be given some kind of bonus to represent their tactical
flexibility and that the relative ability of commanders in battle should be recognised in some way.
It would be reasonable to argue that Saalfeld was a minor encounter
and that the game combat system was designed with the main battles of Jena and Auerstadt in mind.
The map problems are less serious at Jena than at Saalfeld although Lutzeroda should be two hexes west of
Closewitz and not north. Once again, the system has difficulty representing the initial Prussian deployment
as Tauenzien had one battalion from Zechwitz (Prinz August) in his first line and three grenadier battalions
from Prittwitz in his second. The regimental nature of the Prussian army and the consequent difficulty in co-ordinating
formations is not clear from the game.
Like Charles in his review of the Auerstadt scenario, I have tried to replicate the actual sequence of combat at Jena
and found this very difficult. I would agree that retreat should not be possible without some kind of loss and
that combined arms bonuses are not appropriate for the Prussians
(or perhaps for anyone I have a problem with this concept which I think is based on miniatures rules and not reality).
I think would also be more appropriate to restrict defence of village hexes to fusiliers and jager
although I recognise that a village hex contains a large area of open ground for the musketeers to operate.
I simply think that this would give a better representation of the Prussian inability to defend villages at Saalfeld and Jena.
I also doubt whether the relative effectiveness of the units on both sides is accurate.
Just because a unit has a grenadier title doesn't necessarily make it any good as Bresonnet's description of the
dismal performance of the grenadier battalion Hundt would testify.
Although I do accept that the revisionist work on the Prussian army of 1806 has illustrated that it was
far from being a poor army, nonetheless their French opponents were largely veteran troops and I don't
think that the game represents this sufficiently.
I would also question whether Ed's odds based approach is the best way to simulate the
attack/counterattack nature of the combat at Jena. The only game which I have ever played which came close
to this was Le Beau Soliel where a formation could generally only attack with one SP with three others providing support.
Somewhat similar to Ed's system the combat results would then lead to counterattacks under the same restrictions.
This gave an excellent flavour and
Something along these lines might work better here although the hex layout is a bit of a problem.
Aside from these major areas of difficulty which I have with Iena,
I also see problems with the movement rates (e.g. Davout's march from Mittel Pollnitz to Naumburg)
and with the Victory conditions which seem distinctly odd.
However, these are relatively minor in comparison and probably not worth substantial comment.
In sum, therefore, while I applaud Ed s effort to produce a game which gives a better representation of reality
while retaining the simplicity of the NLB system, I'm afraid I don't think that the basic system is worth the effort.
It may be that my suggestions would result in a game which is much more difficult to play.
I would almost certainly hamper the Prussians much more than Ed has done which would upset any play balance in the game.
In doing so, I'm bound to say that this is in the nature of the historical situation and I would personally prefer
to play a game which encompassed these realities. Whether others would agree is open to question as few of the comments
on the game on the Internet have touched on these issues.
If I can ever get around to putting my ideas in a more concrete form then we'll see!