The following are extracts of articles written by Tan Chong Kee.
1. Asian vs. Liberal Democracy
Singapore has been at the forefront of advocating a system of government call Confucian or Asian Democracy and several Asian countries (e.g. China, Malaysia) have been concurring with her. Critics from within and without Asia have questioned whether the political system in Singapore is democratic or even if it is Asian. Leaving the cultural aspect aside, I would like to consider how well such a political system fit into Terry Karl's definition of democracy, and perhaps raise some questions regarding the Western assumption of liberal democracy's legitimacy.
Karl's defination: "Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. "
...rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm ...: Singapore theoretically satisfies these conditions, but can probably be more accurately described as a one party state in feel, a parliamentary democracy in form, and a Neo-Athenian democracy in some of its operations. It is a one party state in feel because the same party has been in power since independence. However, there are several active opposition parties and the possibility that the ruling party gets voted out of office is a fact of constant political deliberation -- the ruling party's majority has been falling with each election. It is a parliamentary democracy in form because it has inherited the British political system and the government is structured along these lines. British style partisan politics is not practised though, because the opposition MPs in parliament, although increasing with each election, are still too few in number to be an effective counter political force. It is a Neo-Athenian democracy in some of its operations because direct feedback from the citizenry is sometimes more effective in changing policy directions than debate in parliament. Hence, elections are held regularly but many decisions are not open for public scrutiny. Direct feedback to key ministers is sometimes more effective in changing policy directions than debate in parliament. Many have argued that such a system serve the public good better than an adversarial one where partisan bickering destroys all efficiency and preclude timely and effective government actions. The Singapore School thinkers has now departed from previous arguments surrounding the letter and spirit of its form of democracy to boldly state that in Asia, a benevolent authoritarianism is preferable to liberal democracy. To them, how democratic a government is is not as important a source of legitimacy as how well a government manages the economy so as to increase general living standard. Because democracy is such a loaded word, they chose to use the appellation 'Confucian' or 'Asian democracy' in favor of terms like benevolent authoritarianism. In Chinese, where the term 'democracy' is not so loaded, the translation is Neo-authoritarianism. Similar things can also be said of the polities of China, Indonesia, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong, who all have a system of elected representatives but with power concentrated in the hands of one ruler. Naturally, corruption, especially of high government official can be a problem in these countries. However, there is still disagreement as to how serious these corruption are when compared to the US. One could perhaps argue that a powerful and clean ruler is just as able, if not more, to check corruption within his government than a public that is without political power and access to the inner workings of the state. One may concede that China and Indonesia have more corruption, but Singapore asserts and had generally succeeded in showing that it is much less corrupt than the US. Checks on politicians are not done at the procedural level but at the entrance: a stringent meritocratic selection process for politicians is in place to weed out those whom the regime feels is not suitable for office. Hence, for these rulers, the thesis that a formal system of public accountability and scrutiny is necessary or desirable is by no means a given.
...by citizens...: 'citizen' connotes the ideology of equality between all members of a country. Many nationals of Asian country do not have as strong a sense of personal efficacy as their Western counterpart. Many Chinese for example believe that politics are the concerns of highly placed CCP officials and amateurish involvement by students and activists are akin to social disruptions. Singaporeans too tend not to hold any strong political opinions contrary to the status quo and are generally content to leave politics to the politicians. Furthermore, in Singapore, one becomes a politician by way of an invitation to the selection process from the ruling party. Such differences arise because of different conceptions of what the roles of the rulers and ruled should be. To simplify, they are similar to the workers and management of a developmental state, this is a term that was first used to describe Japan. Measuring how 'democratic' they are by the citizen yard stick (e.g. extent of civil society etc.) runs the risk of ethnocentrically measuring only how 'American' they are.
...acting indirectly..: MPs in Singapore usually act less in their constituents' concerns than in the national concern. A considerable amount of political decision in Singapore occur not in parliament but in the ministries through ministers using public sentiments as gauge. Citizens can sometimes act more directly to affect the direction of policy through their feedback to the government than indirectly through MPs arguing for their interest in parliament. For example, the Graduate Mother Bill which gave financial incentives to women with tertiary degrees to bear children was repealed due to extremely unpopular reception although it was passed in parliament almost unanimously. Another example would be the decision not to table the one man two vote bill because of very unfavorable ground reaction when the idea was floated by Lee Kuan Yew even though many MPs and ministers spoke in favor of it.
...through the competition and cooperation of their elected representative:...:the key word in Singaporean parliament is not competition but consensus. Even the opposition is expected to assist the ruling party in bettering Singapore. Economic advancement is always assumed to be the first priority. The idea of a loyal opposition is generally assumed (loyalty to national, not local interests) and the ruling party will accuse the opposition of opposing for the sake of opposing, when they feel that the oppositions are not keeping the greater collective good in mind. The picture to have in mind is the prime minister by himself or with a group of ministers managing the country with the backbenchers and oppositions giving constructive comments and criticisms of their policies. 'Competition' lacks the legitimacy of 'cooperation.'
In such a system, minority interests are safeguarded by the state. They argue that such an arrangement is less likely to disadvantage those who are financially unable to organize and lobby in the American manner. Hence, if civil society is defined as 'cooperation and deliberation via autonomous group activity' and these activities are required to remain independent of the state, one will conclude that there is not much civil society. It might be helpful here to think about two types of polities: state centered and society centered; and two types of society: individual based and community based.(Meyer) The US is society centered and individual based, Norway is society centered and community based, France is state centered and individual based, and Singapore is state centered and community based. A Karlian or Dahlian definition of democracy tend to privilegize US-like states as more 'democratic' and continental European and Asian states as less.
Culture could affect the political process and constrain the type of government that eventually develops. For example, in cultures where collectivism not individualism hold sway, a system whereby technocrats take fairly authoritarian charge to efficiently advance the country's economic well-being would have a lot more legitimacy. Furthermore, when contrasting democracy with other forms of government, the assumption seems to be that oppressions do not exist in democracies. This ignores the vast Marxist scholarship critiquing the oppressive nature of capitalism in democratic states.
Whereas in Southern Europe, Latin America and Africa, the question to ask may be when or how they will democratize; in Asia, the most important question is often what are the trade offs of democratization. This question can be asked not just from the perspective of the ruling elite, but also from the perspectives of the populace. Upper class who control greater proportion of wealth have a vested interest in a stable regime to safeguard their investments. Middle class and lower class see their living standard rising and are not certain that a different regime can deliver the same economic growth. In contrast, the government in Philippines is a mirror image of the US system but is under constant criticism for inefficiency and corruption.
If the term 'democracy' is to incorporate 'Asian democracy' in its semantics, it will be widened to: a system of governance in which elected rulers take into consideration the will of their citizens through public debate and/or private consultation. This is still a narrower definition than that of Fukuyama and could avoid some of the pitfalls of electorism. Alternatively, one could stick to Dahl's or Terry Karl's definition and de-privilegize democracy. Finally, one could reject the claim of Confucian democracy as a democracy. What one does would depend on where one stands with respect to the desirability of liberal democracy.
Liberal democracy has as its basis the ideology of pluralism. In order to get elected in such a system, politicians will have to appeal to as great a number of voter as possible by saying everything and hence nothing. Policy decision in such a state will be highly sensitive to pressures from interest groups and tend to be directed by big money and often lack consistency. Furthermore, long term intelligent planning is almost impossible since short term interests must be satisfied to win votes. The present Clinton administration's inability to reform welfare is a case in point. Since wealth determines the amount of political influence, poor communities such as African-American, Latinos and various other less privilege groups are practically locked out of the political process. Such a system has a tendency to pamper the upper and middle class and penalize the lower class. It also tends to be racist, as the US, UK, Australia and many other Western states testify.
To conclude, as the euphoria of Eastern Europe subsides and former socialist states begin to run into serious problems in their attempts to democratize, voices in Asia are rising to challenge the supremacy of liberal democracy. Their challenge is on all three of the politics, economics and social fronts: institutions of liberal democracy do not guarantee equal opportunity of political participation, neither do they guarantee economic and social well-being. Such a challenge cannot be dismissed easily.
2. Asian particularism vs Western universalism
Why is there tension in the discourse on the comparative study of democracy between the US and some parts of Asia? I would try to answer this question by considering the academic and political issues, and finish by considering if cross system comparison is possible.
Some American political scientists seem to have various normative views about a certain form of government termed 'democracy' which understandably is based on historical and contemporaneous experiences in the US. They however, tend to forget that these norms are products of particular social, cultural and economic conditions, and although they might be applicable in other settings, are nevertheless not necessarily universal . Consequently, by ignoring the particular and insisting on such universality, these comparatists could well ironically be engaging in cultural hegemony. The Philipines is a case in point where an almost exact copy of the American constitution produced the like of Marcos, and even now, one could make the case that Filipino development happens despite, not because of, its foreign imposed constitution. Singapore is another example where an almost exact copy of the British system functions under very different logic (briefly outlined in my previous essay on Asian democracy). For some comparatists, the central questions are not analytical ones such as how and why do these systems differ, but frequenty value judgemental ones such as how 'democratic' these systems are. These value judgement questions have a tendency to reduce to essentially this self-centered question: 'how much are they like us?' with the unspoken assumption that 'we' are the model against which all must be measured.
Coupled with such a view in the academia is the American government's high-handed manner of 'promoting' democracy in the world. Take human rights for example, despite seeing itself fit to judge other nations' human rights record, the US government had consistently refused to rectify the UN human rights convention, signed by President Carter in 1976. When President Bush did so in 1992, he made it 'non self-executing,' meaning basically that they are not binding in the courts, prompting human rights lawyer Paul Hoffman to comment that: 'Rectification is only for international consumption, not for American citizens to claim any rights.' (talk given in the Stanford Law School in April 1995) Consequently, problems such as discrimination and abuse of new immigrants, police brutality etc. (many of them have serious ethnic and racial undercurrents) are routinely swept under the carpet. Faced with such a situation, it should not be surprising that many Asian countries use their newly gained confidence from the current Pacific boom to resist what they see as ignorant and hypocritical American meddling. What is interesting in this scenario though, is the discourses employed by such resistance, and why were those particular discourses used.
With regard to liberal democratic universalism, the counter argument used to be national soverignty but has now started shifting towards cultural particularism (for example, Chinese culture is not suitable for democracy). With regards to human (in particular individual's) rights, the argument of economic and social (ie. community's) rights is now gaining momentum (for example free speech vs. social stability and economic development). For those who might be puzzled why certain current debates on culture are taking on such ideological hue, it might be enlightening to see them as the American positions generating their own opposites. This is one reason why voices in Asian had never been united on these fronts: very few Asians actually believe in these positions as we see how ideological they potentially are. Nevertheless, a considerable number are willing to use them because an equally ideological counter discourse is needed to balance the one habitually used by the US. In a sense, US foreign policy is gradually pushing the world on to a ideological clash now disguised as a cultural clash. By mistaking the smoke screen for the troop, Huntington's analysis serves only to cloud the issues and provide a convenient excuse for US policy makers to avoid serious re-examination of the implications of what they are doing.
3. Some critique of Huntington (esp of his book "The Third Wave -- democratization in the late 20th century")
Although Huntington and others have popularized the appellation 'third wave of democratization,' it is a term that appears to me very problematic. On the surface, 'wave' conjures up the image of sea tide, whose rise and ebb seem an apt metaphor for the advances and retreats of democracy in the 20th century. However, temporal proximity does not necessarily imply any unifying logic that would enable us to analytically lump all these transitions together into one phenomenon. Such an appellation also conceals under its surface the implication that one particular form of government called 'democracy' (whatever that is) has universal appeal and was in fact sweeping through the world. I would start by taking a critical look at Huntington's analysis of the processes at work in these transitions and ask if it is reasonable to even label this 'wave' of 'democratization' 'third.'
Huntington was aware that not one but several processes were at work in these regime transitions (different eddies of the wave?) and that depending on the country, the combinations of each of these factors were also different. He listed these factors as: declining legitimacy and performance dilemma of authoritarian regimes, economic crisis and development, Catholic church's support, promotion by international actors, and snowballing effect. In his argument, they worked interelatedly and resulted in the transitions. Now, these factors can also be said to be present during the second wave as he had defined it. Allied victory and the colonial rule gave democracy much legitimacy whereas fascism and authoritarianism were in disrepute. Marshall plan and general US investments generated enormous growth and recovery in Europe and Asia. The English, French and US governments actively promoted democracy and there was likewise a snowballing effect as newly independent states chose democracy as the preferred form of government. The only factor not present was the Catholic church's change of heart. The question then is, since the dynamics of two waves were so much alike, how justified are we in labelling the present one 'third' as oppose to an interrupted (by communism) second wave?
I would argue that these two waves are quite distinct. Their seeming similarity in Huntington's book was not surprisingly due to his rather partial account of international actors, in particular US foreign policy, which was a key factor in sustaining many authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. If we agree that East European regimes were the imposition of the former USSR, we must than also admit that US support had propped up many African, Asian, Caribbean, Central and probably several South American dictators. Russian and American behavior were quite similar in this respect: supporting dictators during the Cold War (which built up a store of authoritarian regimes) and promoting liberalization after it (which unleashed a wave of transitions). International actors are therefore a crucial distinguishing factor and based on that, one could divide this wave of transitions into three sub-categories: a South European region enticed by the prospect of joining the EC; an East European region whose authoritarian regimes broke down because of the withdrawal of Soviet support; and countries whose authoritarian regime fell because of the withdrawal of American support (this category would also include Asian states like the Philippines and South Korea). This might settle the question of 'second' vs. 'third' but we still haven't dealt with the question of whether it wss one wave or several waves that were temporally close together. We should note that many South American countries that oscillate between military and civilian government might be better placed in a separate category and not included in the third wave at all since as Huntington has pointed out, such oscillation might well be their political system. Their transitions during the same moment were probably related to the demonstration effect of the Iberian transitions but they operated with their own separate logic.
The transition of former USSR and Taiwan do not belong to the above two categories since former USSR was one player in the super power game and Taiwan was fairly isolated from the international arena. I would argue that the authoritarian regimes in these countries broke down because of economics: an impending crisis in the former USSR and wealth in Taiwan. Personal leadership of Gorbachev and Chiang Ching Kuo were probably quite pivotal too.
In short, the temporal third wave can be divided into three distinct processes: one, international actors in South European, East European, Central American, Caribbean and Asian; two, cyclical pattern in various Latin American countries; and three, economic reasons in former USSR and Taiwan. I have not put religion on par as explanation with the other factors because I feel that Papal influence was not the primary support of these authoritarian regimes nor was it a primary cause of subsequent transitions.
Having dealt with 'third' and 'wave,' let's now move to 'democracy.' Stopping as he did at 1992 and catching the tail end of the euphoric mood of the time, Huntington did not fully acknowledge that many of these transitions were just breakdowns of authoritarianism and that whether or not a democratic form of government will eventually consolidate in many of these countries was and is still in doubt.
From my analysis above, we can now say that the universal term here is not 'democracy' but the desire for prosperity and the abhorrence of dictators who were more often than not corrupt. For commentators such as Huntington, Fukuyama, etc., there was an illusion of democracy as the universal because they, like many of the people in the transitioning regimes, willingly bought into the myth that democracy will automatically bring prosperity. Granted, for many it was this believe that drove the revolt and that for some South European countries this was true because by becoming a democracy, they could join the EC and enjoy many European subsidies. For the East European and Latin American countries however, there was no equivalent economic bloc to join and rich democratic states like the US, Europe and Japan simply would not nor could they underwrite their transition the way the West Germans underwrote the East Germans. This has led to the often heard first world complaint that the third world uses 'democracy' as a blackmail for aid and the third world's disillusionment with democracy altogether.
Hence, if we understand clearly that the universal in question here is the desire for prosperity and the abhorrent of corrupt dictatorships, we can better explain why Asia does not seem to fit into this global movement towards 'democracy' and realize that the question is not so much, as Pei termed it 'East Asian exceptionalism' (it is more than East Asian of course, since he had forgotten Brunei, Nepal, Bhutan, Cambodia and Laos; and countries like Singapore, Malaysia, etc. are also more commonly termed South East Asia) but simple Western misconception. The crux of this misconception is the mistaking of the secondary values of liberalism (freedom of expression, individual's rights, etc.) for the primary need for food and a roof over one's head. Put another way, it matters little to a homeless woman in any American city that theoretically she has equal rights and freedom of speech as Bill Gates because in reality, and this is the reality of capitalism on which democracy is based, she doesn't. Many Asians appear impervious to the spell of democracy simply because they are more aware that no one owes them a living.
The primacy of economics goes some way in explaining why countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, China and so on can persuade their citizens to concentrate on economic development under an authoritarian government, provided that the government does succeed in delivering growth. But one still needs to explain why rich Asian states such as Hong Kong and Singapore are willing to accept strict government. What is involved here is the assessment of the trade-off between a more liberal government and economic growth. If the regime is sufficiently laissez faire as in the case of Hong Kong, people are willing to leave politics to the politicians and get on with making money. However, if the regime is sufficiently intrusive as in the case of Singapore, people will ask serious questions about the necessity of such intrusiveness and would even contemplate exchanging some economic growth for personal space. Such a way of posing a trade-off would probably appear strange to an observer since economic growth and personal space are not quite exchangeable in such manner. In order to explain this, we should first answer the question: Why does Singapore appear to be the champion of 'Asian values'?
A lot of the championing is done by Lee Kuan Yew and the 'Singapore school' of writers that include Tommy Koh, Chan Heng Chee and Kishore Mahubhani. I believe that although Lee Kuan Yew probably does think that his brand of authoritarianism works best, the other proponents believe that there are alternatives but would back the cultural argument anyway because they all know that these alternatives do not include the US model (recall here my argument in an earlier paper that US promotion of democracy in several instances amounted in effect to cultural hegemony). Because Lee Kuan Yew's line has been that Singapore achieved such growth and development because of his authoritarian ways, once Singapore becomes rich enough, one of the first thing people did was quite naturally to turn that argument around and ask 'aren't we now developed enough to afford less government?' Tommy Koh did just that when he posed the question: 'is Singapore over-regulated' and answered in the affirmative a few years ago in the local papers. Likewise, Chan Heng Chee spoke against efforts to institutionalize Confucianism in the Singapore education system during a public debate when Lee Kuan Yew brought in Tu Wei Ming to back him up. No one is simple mindedly claiming that Asian culture is somehow uniquely suited for authoritarianism. However, when confronted with the rhetoric of writers such as William Safire who has scant understanding of why certain Asian countries developed the way they did and blithely assumes that American brand democracy is the be all and end all of governing systems, is it any wonder that everyone in this group ended up sounding like Lee?
Be that as it may, political landscape in Singapore has nonetheless been subtly changing. More western educated professionals are beginning to debate issues such as the right of citizens to be critical of government policy without being stigmatized as 'unpatriotic.' This does not imply that Singapore will become more like the US in the near future though, because there is one fundamental difference between the political discourses of these two countries. Whereas the Americans' faith lies with the system and their believe that if one party is not delivering, they can vote in another to do a better job; Singaporeans' faith lies with the party and our believe that through either subtle prodding or not so subtle voting for the opposition, we can slowly push our leaders towards a more liberal stance. No one is seriously thinking about rule by another party as none of sufficient caliber exists. Even if an opposition party does manage to build up as impressive a store of talent as the ruling party (this is in itself already an impossibly tall order), they have the even more difficult task of accumulating sufficient legitimacy for an electoral victory to be plausible. So much of the Singapore economy is tied up with the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) that the middle class, who are the majority, are generally very cautious about a change as dramatic as voting the PAP out of power.
To conclude, I have singled out in this essay international actors and conditions as the distinguishing logic of third wave transition; argued that it is not a wave of democratization but of authoritarian breakdowns although some of the regimes will eventually arrive at consolidated democracy; and pointed out that the desire for prosperity, not liberalism, was the universal value that drove this wave. Such an approach makes Asian exceptionalism a non question and enables political commentators to be less self-congratulatory about the advances of democracy and less morally indignant when it retreats.
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