SOME MEN, TWO VOTES: DOES THE PROBLEM THAT IT IS SUPPOSED TO SOLVE REALLY EXIST?

20 Jun 1994

        Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew's proposal  to give 
Singaporeans aged between 35 and 60 who are married with children 
doubly weighted votes has sparked a lively discussion. It is odd then 
that, after expending so much ink and newsprint, the proponents of 
SM's proposal have yet to show that the increase in the proportion of 
the aged will actually result in their domination of the political process.
        Demographic data suggests that 25% of the population will be 
above the age of 60 by the year 2030; it also projects 2.2 workers 
supporting one aged person by 2030, compared to the present ratio of 8 
workers to one aged person now (ST, 21 May).
        Unfortunately, some opinion-makers have accepted 
uncritically the premise that these demographic changes will lead to the 
problem of political domination by the aged. The following statements 
are typical:

"There is no question that this is an urgent demographic problem: 
Singapore society is one of the fastest ageing in the world." - Han 
Fook Kwang, (ST, 28 May).

"[An ageing population] creates ... the danger that the aged sector 
... would hold the rest to ransom by voting for a government that 
jeopardises tomorrow by over-spending today." - Chua Mui 
Hoong, (ST, 22 May).

"[H]ard figures cannot be disputed." - Leslie Fong, (ST, 21 May).

        Emotive words - such as "urgent" and "hold to ransom" - 
should not be bandied about carelessly. We must also guard against 
being stampeded into suspending our critical faculties and accepting 
blindly the pronouncements of opinion-makers.
        While "hard figures cannot be disputed", data interpretation 
can, and should be scrutinised. We are told that the aged will dominate 
Singapore politics in the future. But is this interpretation supported by 
the facts?  I think not. The danger of the aged holding everyone else to 
ransom is a mirage.
        A reasonable start to any analysis would be to ask: What are 
the upper and lower limits to the clout of the aged?
        At the upper limit, the aged comprise one-third (2 workers to 1 
aged person translates into the aged holding one-third of the vote) of 
the total number of constituencies and return a third of the Members of 
Parliament. However, with only one-third of Parliament, they cannot 
possibly dominate the country, much less hold the rest to ransom.
        At the lower limit, the aged are dispersed uniformly and 
comprise one-third of the voters in every constituency. In our first-past-
the-post electoral system, they get zero representation in Parliament.
        Our simple analysis shows that, even at the peak of its power, 
the aged bloc will not dominate Singapore politics. This means that the 
problem which the proposal is supposed to address is non-existent!
        The weakness in our analysis is in the reliance on the same 
assumption inherent in the proposal: that voters will vote according to 
narrow sectoral interests, i.e. the aged will vote for more welfare 
benefits while the young will vote against them. This is extreme. It is 
more realistic to assume that the aged and young blocs will be split, 
with people voting according to their positions on the issues of the day. 
How then will the proposal ensure that some of those with doubly 
weighted votes will not vote with the aged bloc? Indeed, it seems 
probable that 35-  to 60-year-olds - the one with aged parents - are 
precisely the ones most likely to clamour for state welfare support for 
the aged.
        To conclude, I reject the prevailing but unjustified 
interpretation of the demographic data: that the aged will hold the rest 
of us to ransom. Proponents of "Some-men-two-votes" should either 
refute the results of the above analysis or provide a better rationale for 
it. Failing both, the proposal should be discarded.



Updated on 9 July 1996 by Tan Chong Kee.
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