    Noam Chomsky and 'Left' Apologetics for Injustice in Palestine

    by Noah Cohen, 8/21/04

    (member of the New England Committee to Defend Palestine)

    1. It's particularly interesting in the case of Palestine to see where
    US intellectuals and progressives decide that it's necessary to be
    "realistic" and where "principled;" where they choose to accept more or
    less the general media consensus about "the boundaries of acceptable
    discourse" and where they reject it. In the case of Palestine, people
    who are generally on record as calling for forthrightness and honesty in
    the demand for justice in political discourse, who criticize a false
    "pragmatism" oriented toward the corporate media and academic political
    consultants and who question generalizing statements about popular
    consensus, suddenly become believers in pragmatism and the limits of
    what the discourse will allow. An interview with Noam Chomsky published
    on Znet under the title "Justice for Palestine?" (Znet, March 30, 2004)
    is an exemplary contribution to this genre of left apologetics. Since it
    contains so many of the arguments generally advanced to legitimize some
    form of continued existence for an Israeli system of colonialism and
    Apartheid--and to shore up rear-guard support for it among US
    progressives--it is worth examining in full.

    In general, the argument rests on two pillars:

    i) Israel's history of colonial occupation and expansion must be
    separated from all other colonial histories as a special case and
    special consideration must be given to Zionist colonial settlers as a
    historically vulnerable group;

    ii) Since this "historically vulnerable group" also has massive military
    power, nuclear weapons, and U.S. military and economic support, calling
    for an end to the colonial regime is unrealistic; it only hurts the
    colonized, and should be redirected to more useful activities.

    The first is a tortured attempt to meet arguments about justice; the
    second is an attempt to make them moot by arguments about realism.

    These essentially are the two arguments that Chomsky advances against
    calls for democracy and equal rights for all the people of historic
    Palestine. In this case, their particular form runs as follows: a
    democratic Palestine, in all of historic Palesine, with equal rights for
    everyone would only end up making Jews an oppressed minority (moral
    argument); such calls are unrealistic in any case, and will only be used
    by Zionist extremists to further justify their program of ethnic
    cleansing against Palestinians (pragmatic argument). Palestine is thus
    not like South Africa morally, where in the discourse against Apartheid
    the fact that whites were a minority was not supposed to give them the
    right to maintain special privileges by military force--they were a
    colonial-settler regime, and special privileges were exactly what the
    anti-Apartheid movement was opposing. Somehow in the case of the "Jewish
    state" a colonial-settler minority is supposed to be able to maintain a
    privileged status by force on land seized through military aggression.
    Palestine is not like South Africa pragmatically, since calls for an end
    to the colonial-settler regime are doomed to failure because they will
    never get sufficient international support to be effective.

    As in the famous case of Freud's "leaky-pot logic" of dreams, one should
    ask oneself whether these two arguments don't rather cancel each other
    out--the first providing the unspoken assumptions and motivations of the
    second.

    2. Here is how the discussion works in Chomsky's hands. Asked by
    interviewers Stephen S. Shalom and Justin Podur how he views the
    possibility of a "single-state solution, in the form of a democratic,
    secular state," he responds as follows:

    "There has never been a legitimate proposal for a democratic secular
    state from any significant Palestinian (or of course Israeli) group. One
    can debate, abstractly, whether it is 'desirable.' But it is completely
    unrealistic. There is no meaningful international support for it, and
    within Israel, opposition to it is close to universal. It is understood
    that this would soon become a Palestinian state with a Jewish minority,
    and with no guarantee for either democracy or secularism (even if the
    minority status would be accepted, which it would not). Those who are
    now calling for a democratic secular state are, in my opinion, in effect
    providing weapons to the most extreme and violent elements in Israel and
    the US."

    Reading these comments, one wonders how Chomsky understands the words
    "legitimate" and "significant." Do Palestinians ever qualify? Both the
    DFLP and the PFLP explicitly proposed a "democratic secular state" in
    all of historic Palestine as early as 1969, and the foremost official
    representatives of the larger PLO umbrella organization expressed this
    goal within the same year. This continued to be the vision of the core
    left within the PLO for years to come. More importantly, the Palestinian
    idea of liberation expressed in the PLO charter of 1968 rejected the
    colonial construction of ethnic and religious division: all the historic
    people of Palestine, regardless of religion, were considered
    Palestinians; all were entitled to freedom of worship. The PLO rejected
    not Jewish people, but colonial settlers and the state created for their
    exclusive interests. The "democratic, secular state" espoused by a
    significant portion of the Palestinian movement throughout the 1970s was
    an implicit concession to the settler community--a generous attempt to
    include settlers and their descendants in a liberated Palestine,
    provided that they were willing to renounce special privileges. This
    generosity was never answered by any significant movement within Israel.
    Does this Israeli rejection condition then the limits of justice for
    which Palestinians and their supporters should struggle?

    What's clear is that Israelis will necessarily determine the limits of
    the discourse for Chomsky; anything that they do not accept is
    "unrealistic." Pressed again on the subject, Chomsky becomes even more
    emphatic:

    "The call for a 'democratic secular state,' which is not taken seriously
    by the Israeli public or internationally, is an explicit demand for the
    destruction of Israel, offering nothing to Israelis beyond the hope of a
    degree of freedom in an eventual Palestinian state. The propaganda
    systems in Israel and the US will joyously welcome the proposal if it
    gains more than even marginal attention, and will labor to give it great
    publicity, interpreting it as just another demonstration that there is
    'no partner for peace,' so that the US-Israel have no choice but to
    establish 'security' by caging barbaric Palestinians into a West Bank
    dungeon while taking over the valuable lands and resources. The most
    extreme and violent elements in Israel and the US could hope for no
    greater gift than this proposal."

    This last threat is rather curious. When I visited Palestine in the
    summer of 2003, the Israelis were in the process of caging Palestinians
    into a system of open-air prisons in the name of "security," and were
    busily annexing their land to settlements, even as representatives of
    the Palestinian Authority were meeting with Sharon and Bush to discuss
    the "Road Map to Peace." None of this required anyone proposing a
    "democratic, secular state"--since that, according to Chomsky, wasn't
    even on the table.

    3. It's especially disturbing to see Chomsky so consistently placing the
    limits of activism at the limits of the prevailing discourse--what is
    "taken seriously" by "the Israeli public" or "the US public" or
    "internationally"

    In his article "The Bounds of Thinkable Thought" (The Progressive,
    1986), Chomsky argued that a genuine criticism of U.S. imperial policies
    in Vietnam had been kept out of the mainstream political debate largely
    through a process of self-censorship oriented toward the boundaries of
    acceptable discourse. According to Chomsky, anyone not wishing to be
    considered "beyond the pale" knew that it was necessary to funnel all
    opposition to U.S. policy through the discourse of "winability"-not to
    challenge U.S. goals in Vietnam, but rather to challenge tactics and
    strategy. The prevailing discourse allowed for two positions: 1) the
    U.S. was successfully defending democracy in Vietnam, and could win the
    war by intensifying its military operations; 2) the U.S. was attempting
    to defend democracy in Vietnam, but its possibilities for success were
    increasingly poor, and casualties both to U.S. soldiers and to the
    Vietnamese made the war unsupportable from the perspective of a
    cost-benefit analysis. According to this model, even those within the
    mainstream debate who may not have supported the basic assumptions of
    the discourse-e.g. those who recognized that the U.S. was in Vietnam in
    order to pursue U.S. regional hegemony, against the interests of the
    people who lived there-learned to couch their opposition within the
    acceptable terms. This was done to preserve "credibility" and to serve
    the pragmatic goal of ending the war.

    As Chomsky observed, this means that the basic assumptions at work in
    U.S. propaganda for its various wars of expansion and domination are
    never significantly challenged within mainstream debate. This makes it
    difficult to build a movement that opposes basic policies. Even a
    limited "pragmatic" victory for the opposition-e.g. success in shifting
    U.S. policy away from troop deployment in Vietnam-can be effectively
    absorbed within the overall system of empire. The subsequent writing of
    history created what was called the "Vietnam syndrome"-narrowly
    understood as a tactical problem in winning ground wars against guerilla
    resistance in foreign lands-and George Bush the First was thus able to
    declare the "syndrome" broken after the intensive aerial bombardment of
    Iraq and the deliberate massacre of tens of thousands of retreating
    troops and fleeing civilians on the Basra highway in 1991. By then the
    "Vietnam syndrome" did not include the deliberate massacre of civilians
    and other war-crimes, but only significant losses to U.S. forces.

    >From someone with this analysis regarding Vietnam, it's all the more
    distressing to see Chomsky's repeated insistence on what the discourse
    will allow in the case of Palestine. To say that one should not speak on
    behalf of a democratic Palestine with equal rights for everyone because
    there is no broad support for that position and it will only play into
    the hands of Israel's right wing supporters is rather like the
    equivalent argument continually advanced within certain sectors of the
    anti-war movement in the case of Vietnam (and still continually advanced
    today): Talking about U.S. goals in Vietnam as "imperialism"--or worse,
    speaking of "the right of the Vietnamese people to defend themselves
    against U.S. invasion"-will only make us all look like a bunch of
    left-wing fanatics out of touch with the rest of America; that's exactly
    what the pro-war crowd wants us to do; we had better confine ourselves
    to criticizing the "winability" of the war and decrying U.S. casualties.

    Now listen to Chomsky on the right of return:

    "there is no detectable international support for it, and under the
    (virtually unimaginable) circumstances that such support would develop,
    Israel would very likely resort to its ultimate weapon, defying even the
    boss-man, to prevent it. © In my opinion, it is improper to dangle hopes
    that will not be realized before the eyes of people suffering in misery
    and oppression. Rather, constructive efforts should be pursued to
    mitigate their suffering and deal with their problems in the real
    world."

    The right of return--a fundamental human right that Palestinian refugees
    posses both collectively and individually, and that cannot be bargained
    away on their behalf by anyone--is thus dispensed with in a few
    sentences referring to prevailing "international support." Notice the
    kindly paternalism with which Chomsky refuses to "dangle hopes that will
    not be realized before the eyes" of the Palestinian people--as if the
    right of return were something that he, or "we," could offer or withdraw
    to an oppressed community that is entirely passive and dependent on his
    benevolence, and not a right for which the Palestinian refugee community
    has organized itself in an international struggle. The right of return
    is not a "hope" which Chomsky can "dangle before the eyes" of
    Palestinians; it is a right which they possess and which they are
    actively fighting to realize. He can either support their struggle or
    fail to support it.

    It is a striking fact about the entire interview that Palestinians
    nowhere occur as a people with historical agency. When Chomsky tells us
    that a majority of Israelis and US citizens now support a two-state
    solution, he fails to mention that the very recognition of the existence
    of the Palestinian people--in the face of half a century of genocidal
    Israeli attempts to negate their society, their history and their
    culture--is a direct product of Palestinian resistance against
    overwhelming military, economic and political odds. It also seems that
    Chomsky's assessments of "international support" are very much out of
    touch with the global opinion on the streets. Wherever one finds masses
    of people showing serious opposition to U.S. and European systems of
    empire--whether against imperial wars, or against the instruments of
    economic conquest--the Palestinian resistance has captured the
    imagination and sympathy of the global community. "Globalize the
    Intifada!" is now a rallying cry from Europe to South America.

    4. Against the call for justice and equal rights for everyone--a call
    that we are being told is at once unjust and too idealistic--Chomsky
    offers his realistic compromise of justice: a two-state solution based
    on the Geneva Accords. (That is to say, if only the US would back
    it--which it just might do if we deluded pro-Palestine activists would
    devote our energies to that realistic solution.) Here is Chomsky's
    calculus of compromise:

    "Which compromises should be accepted and which not? There is, and can
    be, no general formula. Every treaty and other agreement I can think of
    has been a 'compromise' and is unjust. Some are worth accepting, some
    not. Take Apartheid South Africa. We were all in favor of the end of
    Apartheid, though it was radically unjust, leaving highly concentrated
    economic power virtually unchanged, though with some black faces among
    the dominant white minority. On the other hand, we were all strenuously
    opposed to the 'homelands' ('Bantustan') policies of 40 years ago, a
    different compromise. The closest we can come to a formula -- and it is
    pretty meaningless -- is that compromises should be accepted if they are
    the best possible and can lead the way to something better. That is the
    criterion we should all try to follow. Sharon's two-state settlement,
    leaving Palestinians caged in the Gaza Strip and about half of the West
    Bank, should not be accepted, because it radically fails the criterion.
    The Geneva Accords approximates the criterion, and therefore should be
    accepted, in my opinion."

    It's notable that Chomsky recognizes, in the case of South Africa, that
    the compromise ultimately reached falls short of justice: even the
    official end of Apartheid does not undo the immense inequality in the
    concentration of wealth and power among white South Africans. In the
    case of Palestine, "realism" demands that Palestinians strive not even
    for this much, since Chomsky's solution is to impose some version of
    what the anti-Apartheid movement rejected in South Africa 40 years ago:
    a militarized state "for Jews only" next to a system of demilitarized
    Bantustans. Make no mistake--in spite of all of Chomsky's claims, this
    really is the solution offered by the Geneva Accords.

    5. It's good that, at least in this case, we know what the "realistic"
    demand for a two-state solution looks like. In the usual variants of
    this argument from pragmatism, there is the added wrinkle that the
    spokesman only believes in a highly idealized, utopian two-state
    solution, which he can't quantify exactly with details. It's usually a
    two-state solution that isn't like any of the proposals advanced so far;
    one that "really gives both sides equal rights" and has them living
    happily ever after "along side one another" and "in peace." Here Chomsky
    at least does give us something specific and historical--a solution
    based on the Geneva Accords.

    What the Geneva Accords are in reality--what they actually are meant to
    accomplish for Israel--is best expressed by one of their foremost
    negotiators and spokesmen, Amram Mitzna (the Israeli Labor candidate
    famous in the US as a candidate for "peace," and infamous among
    Palestinians as the man who instituted the bone-crushing policy against
    Palestinian children during the first Intifada). The following passages
    are culled from Mitzna's article on the Geneva Accords published in
    Haarezt ("They are Afraid of Peace," October 16, 2003). I quote them
    here at some length because they demonstrate, better than any discussion
    I might give, that "negotiation" is here merely a continuation of
    colonial war by other means:

    "If the prime minister decided to implement the Geneva initiative, he
    would go down in history for confirming the state of Israel as a Jewish
    and democratic state, by agreement. That would be even more important
    than the declaration of the state in 1948, since that was unilateral and
    recognized by only a few other countries at the time." ©

    "For three years the prime minister brainwashed the public on the
    grounds that only force will bring victory.

    He and his colleagues made the public believe that there truly is
    "nobody to talk to," that "the IDF can win" and that if we use more
    force, the Palestinians will break.

    They told the citizens that if we are strong, the terror will end. But
    the situation only worsened. The assassinations became the government's
    only policy and instead of eradicating terror threaten to wipe out all
    that remains of the country.

    The terror is intensifying, the economy continues to collapse, and
    society to break down, and the demographic reality threatens the
    existence of Israel as a Jewish state. But none of that has made the
    government change course and try a different tack." ©

    "©We conducted battles for Jerusalem, the Temple Mount and Gush Etzion.
    We fought for the permanent borders of the state of Israel, for the very
    existence of the state and its character, and we reached many
    achievements.

    For the first time in history, the Palestinians explicitly and
    officially recognized the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish
    people forever. They gave up the right of return to the state of Israel
    and a solid, stable Jewish majority was guaranteed. The Western Wall,
    the Jewish Quarter and David's Tower will all remain in our hands.

    The suffocating ring was lifted from over Jerusalem and the entire ring
    of settlements around it-Givat Ze'ev, old and new Givon, Ma'ale Adumim,
    Gush Etzion, Neve Yaacov, Pisgat Ze'ev, French Hill, Ramot, Gilo and
    Armon Hanatziv will be part of the expanded city, forever. None of the
    settlers in those areas will have to leave their homes."

    Two things are clear from Mitzna's discussion: 1) the second Intifada
    has been far more successful than anyone would imagine from the press
    here in the US, or from Chomsky's discussion, in threatening the
    continued existence of Israel as a Jewish state; 2) the Geneva Accords
    were meant to accomplish by means of negotiation what the Sharon regime
    has failed to accomplish by means of force--to break the Palestinian
    resistance, to give full and permanent international legitimacy to '48
    occupied land, and to increase by one huge bound the amount of '67
    occupied territory that would belong to this now fully legitimate
    "Israel." As Mitzna puts it, it is a matter of trying "a different
    tack."

    At the same time, the Geneva Accords would be an international treaty
    giving legal legitimacy to a set of conditions on the ground that set
    the stage for Israel's then inevitable ongoing colonial expansion. The
    agreement would ensure that the "Palestinian state" has no means of
    defending itself against Israeli aggression and that Israel would
    maintain the de facto power to invade at any time. The dense settlements
    around Jerusalem, which contain the highest concentration of settlers in
    the West Bank, and which effectively cut the West Bank in half, would be
    conceded as part of "Israel" forever. The only guarantee that Israel
    would not continue to expand these settlements, build more of them, and
    re-invade militarily whenever Palestinians attempt to defend themselves
    from these encroachments is a vague promise that the majority of
    Israelis "really want to live in peace." Once again, neither the history
    of Israel nor the general history of colonial projects is supposed to
    guide us in assessing the realism of this "realistic" scenario.

    A far more realistic assessment of all such treaty negotiations was
    written during the Oslo process by Norman Finkelstein. Entitled
    "History's Verdict: the Cherokee Case," the article is a sustained
    comparison between the Zionist project in Palestine and the US
    colonial-settler project of dispossessing the Cherokee people of all of
    their native land through a combination of settler encroachment,
    military assault and treaty negotiations. Within this process, settlers
    steal land; natives defend themselves; self-defense is widely published
    as "savagery" or "terrorism"; this propaganda is then used to justify
    military attacks as acts of "self-defense;" and finally treaty
    negotiations are employed to enlist a certain number of the indigenous
    people--either those who are simply exhausted by the sustained military
    assault, or those who can be bribed into collaborating--to cede more of
    their land to the settlers with the guarantee that the remaining land
    will be theirs "in perpetuity." Perpetuity lasts for about 10 to 20
    years, and then the cycle begins again (if it doesn't simply continue
    unabated). The treaty negotiations are particularly useful in dividing
    the colonized within themselves over their possible hopes; stopping
    resistance struggles under the guise of a negotiated peace; and finally
    giving a spurious appearance of legitimacy to the entire process.

    6. There is unmistakable racism in the way in which Chomsky evaluates
    the realism of different scenarios: he tells us that it's entirely
    unrealistic to imagine that Jewish people could live safely as a
    minority in a Palestinian state based on principles of democracy and
    equal rights. More disturbingly, this concern over the possible fate of
    Jews as a minority in a Palestinian state is so significant in his mind
    as to justify opposition to ending an actual situation in which Jewish
    people live as privileged colonizers on Palestinian land. Here we are
    supposed to apply the author's concept of realism. On the other hand,
    it's supposed to be realistic, in spite of all proven history to the
    contrary, for Palestinians to expect that a neighboring Israel, under a
    two-state solution, will respect their territory even though they have
    no arms to defend themselves. Or, even more amazing, that the US, under
    pressure from US citizens, could be expected to protect them. His hope
    for this rests apparently on the good will of Israelis and US citizens.
    (Even in the aftermath of decades of genocidal US policies in other
    countries, and protest movements that have never reached a level capable
    of stopping a US invasion.) Here idealism is supposed to apply.

    In deciding what is realistic, we are supposed to ignore the most
    obvious historical facts: that Palestine had centuries of religious
    co-existence before Zionism--a co-existence to which all parties in the
    history of the Palestinian struggle for liberation have officially
    committed themselves; that the US, Europe and now Israel have an
    unbroken history of violating treaties and international agreements
    (including the highest conventions of international law) respecting
    territorial integrity--especially the territorial integrity of native
    peoples--and that this process has generally ended in near total
    genocide wherever such peoples have put down their arms and ceased to
    defend themselves.

    7. The concept of "realism" as Chomsky employs it has a striking
    resemblance to the colonial discourse of "manifest destiny": Good or
    bad, right or wrong--so the argument goes--these are the facts on the
    ground; this is the way of history. In the name of this "realism,"
    activists and intellectuals in the international community have
    simultaneously asserted themselves as pro-Palestinian, and yet taken it
    upon themselves to concede every fundamental right to which the
    Palestinian people lay claim. In pointing to the Geneva Accords as a
    legitimate compromise, Chomsky concedes all of the following rights on
    their behalf:

    --the right to reclaim sovereignty over the land stolen from them in
      1948;

    --the right of refugees even to return to this land;

    --the right to reclaim the most densely settled land in the West Bank;

    --the right to freedom of movement within the new Palestinian "state"
      (since the West Bank settlements--to be declared permanently a part of
      "Israel"--cut that territory into isolated cantons, and these cantons
      are in turn separated from Gaza);

    --the right to full sovereignty over borders and airspace;

    --the right to maintain an independent military capable of self-defense;

    --the right to full control of resources.

    In general, this means that the "best possible compromise," that
    promises to "lead to something better," requires first that Palestinians
    officially concede all of the material conditions on which the right to
    self-determination depends. It's hard to see how these concessions could
    possibly lead to "something better."

    More importantly for our purposes--however one evaluates the realistic
    possibilities available to the Palestinian people in their struggle for
    liberation--it's impossible to see how anyone in the international
    community can help their struggle by conceding ground on matters of
    fundamental principle. Honesty in these matters is our minimum
    responsibility; if we believe that colonialism, racism and Apartheid are
    unjust, we should oppose them systematically on principle and fight them
    with every means at our disposal.

    Faced with the apologetics of pragmatism, a friend long active in the
    struggle against Apartheid in South Africa, and now equally active in
    the struggle for justice in Palestine, put the matter succinctly: Since
    when is it the role of solidarity activists from the society of the
    oppressor to make concessions on behalf of the oppressed?

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CHOMSKY'S RESPONSE:
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [This is a reply to an article by Noah Cohen, which in turn is a
    response to an interview Chomsky gave with Shalom and Podur several
    months ago.]

    Noah Cohen’s charges raise some interesting questions about advocacy,
    principle, and realism, which have much broader applications. Let’s
    focus on his particular case – defense of Palestinian rights -- bringing
    up the broader issues in this context. The core question, then, has to
    do with the stands that can be taken by people with serious concerns for
    the fate of the Palestinians, who have suffered severely and face an
    even more miserable future unless we find ways to reverse the processes
    now underway, for which we bear considerable responsibility and
    accordingly, can influence if we choose.

    Among the options under discussion are one-state and binational
    approaches. These are crucially different. There are many forms of
    multinationalism in the world: Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, etc. The
    concept is a cover term for arrangements that allow forms of autonomy
    for groups within complex societies, not necessarily only those that
    choose to regard themselves as “nations.” Quite different are one-state
    systems, with no form of autonomy for various communities. In the US,
    for example, Latinos do not have autonomy or control over language or
    education in the areas stolen by violence from Mexico (or elsewhere);
    nothing approaching, say, the partial autonomy in Catalonia, to mention
    one of many cases of some form of multinationalism.

    Let’s turn to some of the relevant background. Pre-1948, binationalism
    was a minority position within the Zionist movement. From 1967-73 Israel
    had a real opportunity to institute a binational settlement in
    cis-Jordan in the context of a full peace treaty with Egypt and Jordan,
    hence the relevant part of the Arab world. There was no interest. The
    PLO had no interest. US articulate opinion was bitterly opposed. My own
    writings on the topic were harshly attacked from all sides.

    After the 1973 war, that option was effectively closed. Palestinian
    national rights were, for the first time, clearly and forcefully
    articulated in the international arena. A two-state settlement was
    brought to the UN Security Council in January 1976, vetoed by the US, an
    act condemned by Syria, Jordan, Egypt and the PLO. Since then there has
    been a broad international consensus in favor of a two-state settlement,
    blocked by the US and Israel alone. It should be unnecessary to review
    this history once again.

    In contrast, there has been no support for a one-state solution from any
    significant actor throughout this period. It has never been considered
    an option in the international arena. The PLO spoke about “democratic
    secularism,” but in a form that called for liquidation of all Jewish
    political, social, and cultural institutions within an “Arab nation.”
    For this reason alone – there were many others – the stance had no
    impact, except as a weapon for advocates of US-Israeli rejectionism.
    These matters were discussed in print in the 1970s; there is a brief
    review in my book Toward a New Cold War (1982, 430n). To say that the
    idea has had no support in Israel is an understatement. It is rejected
    with virtual unanimity and considerable fervor, and would be even if
    there some basis for taking seriously the rhetoric about democratic
    secularism. Under the (virtually unimaginable) circumstance that some
    meaningful international support would develop for such a plan, Israel
    would oppose it by any possible means: that includes the ultimate
    weapons, which Israel has available and can use.

    Since the late ‘90s, a "one-state settlement" has become a welcome topic
    of discussion in elite circles, so much so that the New York Times
    Magazine and the New York Review of Books have run major articles
    proposing this approach – I won’t say “advocating” it, for reasons to
    which I will return. Same in similar circles elsewhere. It is worth
    bearing in mind that when the solution was realistic and would have
    saved a lot of blood and agony, it was utter anathema. Why the change?
    The only explanation I have seen is what appears in the interview with
    Shalom-Podur, which I won’t repeat. But let us put that aside, and turn
    to the current situation.

    Right now, there are several possible stands that might be taken by
    those concerned with the people of the region, justice for Palestinians
    in particular. Evidently, such stands are of only academic interest
    unless they are accompanied by programs of action that take into account
    the real world. If not, they are not advocacy in any serious sense of
    the term.

    Perhaps another word of clarification is in order. Attention to feasible
    programs of action is sometimes dismissed as “realism” or “pragmatism,”
    and is placed in opposition to “acting on principle.” That is a serious
    delusion. There is nothing “principled” about refusal to pay attention
    to the real world and the options that exist within it – including, of
    course, the option of making changes, if a feasible course of action can
    be developed, as was clearly and explicitly the case with regard to
    Vietnam, discussed in the comments that Cohen brings up and completely
    misunderstands. Those who ignore or deride such “realism” and
    “pragmatism,” however well-intentioned they may be, are simply choosing
    to ignore the consequences of their actions. The delusion is not only a
    serious intellectual error, but also a harmful one, with severe human
    consequences. That should be clear without further elaboration.

    I will keep here to advocacy in the serious sense: accompanied by some
    kind of feasible program of action, free from delusions about “acting on
    principle” without regard to “realism” -- that is, without regard for
    the fate of suffering people.

    One stand is support for a two-state settlement in terms of the
    overwhelming and long-standing and very broad international consensus
    (including the Palestinian Authority), barred by the US and Israel
    though supported by the majority of the US population and acceptable to
    majorities, possibly large majorities, within Israel (depending on how
    questions are asked in polls). There are various concrete forms. One
    version is the Geneva Accords, which, as noted in the interview, “gives
    a detailed program for a 1-1 land swap and other aspects of a
    settlement, and is about as good as is likely to be achieved.” The terms
    and maps are readily available. Since Cohen does not address these
    matters, apart from citation of an irrelevant source, and does not
    suggest anything that is more “likely to be achieved,” there is no need
    to go beyond the interview. These proposals constitute a basis for
    negotiations that is vastly improved over the Clinton-Barak Camp David
    proposals as well as the (much less unacceptable) Taba proposals that
    followed. For the first time, they open the doors to a 1-1 land swap
    that could be meaningful, and they break from the cantonization programs
    of earlier proposals. They still have objectionable features, but the
    operative question is whether they can be taken as a serious basis for
    negotiations, and whether there is an alternative that is likely to
    offer more to the Palestinians than proceeding on this basis.

    If there is such an alternative, let’s by all means hear it. Those who
    do not want to undertake that responsibility are choosing, in effect, to
    take part in an academic seminar among disengaged intellectuals on Mars.

    Support for the international consensus is true advocacy, not posturing
    or academic debate. The reason is straightforward, as discussed in the
    interview: there are obvious and realistic programs of action associated
    with this stand. The main task is to bring the opinions and attitudes of
    the large majority of the US population into the arena of policy. As
    compared with other tasks facing activists, this is, and has long been,
    a relatively simple one. Relatively; no such tasks are easy. What has
    been lacking is commitment, not opportunities. Those who are unwilling
    to undertake the commitment have only themselves to blame for the likely
    outcome, which is taking shape before our eyes, in directions that are
    all too clear. To the extent that US policy can be shifted towards the
    international consensus and domestic opinion, support will increase in
    Israel, almost automatically, as a result of the dependency relation
    that Israel consciously adopted over 30 years ago. There will
    undoubtedly be settler resistance, but at least in the judgment of the
    most senior Israeli security officials, the problem should not be too
    difficult to deal with, as quoted in the interview.

    A second possible stand is support for a binational settlement, perhaps
    a federal arrangement of the kind that has long been discussed and
    exists successfully elsewhere, or in some other form. This stand moves
    from rhetoric and posturing to true advocacy when it is accompanied by a
    feasible program of action. There is such a program, with two essential
    steps. The first is to implement a two-state settlement in accord with
    the international consensus, and reversing the escalating cycle of
    hostility, hatred, violence, repression, and dispossession. The second
    step is to proceed from there. For reasons that are clear to anyone
    familiar with the region, two states in cis-Jordan make little sense,
    and both communities have good reasons to seek further integration. That
    is a feasible program, but only in steps. Those who think otherwise have
    the responsibility of formulating their program to implement directly
    the alternative they propose; as noted, that was possible before the
    mid-1970s, but not since. Until we see that program, there is nothing to
    discuss, and there is no advocacy in the serious sense of the term.

    A third possible stand is support for a no-state settlement,
    generalizing multinationalism (in the broad sense indicated) beyond the
    borders of a state. That approach would be based on the recognition that
    the nation-state system has been one of the must brutal and destructive
    creations of Europe and its offshoots, imposed by force on much of the
    rest of the world, with horrendous consequences for centuries in Europe,
    and elsewhere until the present. For the region, it would mean
    reinstating some of the more sensible elements of the Ottoman system
    (though, obviously, without its intolerable features), including local
    and regional autonomy, elimination of borders and free transit, sharply
    diminishing or eliminating military forces, etc. Applied elsewhere, say
    to North America, it would entail, to mention just one example,
    reversing Clinton’s post-NAFTA militarization of the (previously quite
    porous) Mexico-US border, with a severe human cost, and dealing in some
    humane way with the fact that the US is sitting on half of Mexico,
    acquired by brutal conquest. Similar issues arise throughout the world.

    For what it’s worth, I’ve also advocated that in public, and in fact
    have been (maybe still am) under investigation for the crime of
    “separatism” by the Turkish security system for remarks on this matter
    in a talk in the semi-official Kurdish capital of Diyarbakir, later
    published, maybe posted on Znet. There’s also an (implicit) advocacy of
    something like that in Charles Glass’s excellent book Tribes with Flags.

    Is there a feasible program for this, so that it reaches the level of
    true advocacy? Yes, along the path of advocacy of the more limited
    binational proposal. The no-state stand is more reasonable and probably
    more feasible in the longer term than the one-state position. At least
    this approach recognizes the realities of the region, and the importance
    of some form of self-determination and autonomy for the complex array of
    intermingled groups and interests.

    How should we rank these objectives in order of preference? My own
    judgment, since childhood and still today, is that among these
    alternatives, the no-state solution is by far the best (not just in this
    region), a binational state second, and a two-state solution worst. Note
    that I have omitted the one-state version. One reason I have already
    indicated: a binational system is much better suited to the needs and
    concerns of the two communities, and I suspect would be preferable to
    them if it can be approached in steps. But we need not speculate about
    that. Until the immediate one-state proposal accepts the discipline of
    “realism,” and is accompanied by some indication of a feasible program
    of action, we are back to the Martian seminar.

    As already mentioned, I presume this is why the proposal has become
    acceptable in elite intellectual circles, as distinct from the years
    when a binational version was feasible and was anathema. Now the ideas
    are welcome, demonstrating our humanity, but without concern that they
    might lead anywhere. There are, however, those who greatly welcome this
    proposal as an immediate demand, rejecting the intermediate stages, and
    hope that it will be widely adopted. To quote the interview:

    “The propaganda systems in Israel and the US will joyously welcome the
    proposal if it gains more than even marginal attention, and will labor
    to give it great publicity, interpreting it as just another
    demonstration that there is "no partner for peace," so that the
    US-Israel have no choice but to establish "security" by caging barbaric
    Palestinians into a West Bank dungeon while taking over the valuable
    lands and resources. The most extreme and violent elements in Israel and
    the US could hope for no greater gift than this proposal.”

    If the only alternative open is a “one-state settlement” without
    preliminary stages, we can have little doubt that Israeli and US hawks
    would rejoice, and would proceed, with overwhelming public support to
    impose their own brutal arrangements on the occupied territories. Since
    Cohen ignores these matters entirely, I’ll leave it at that, simply
    noting that we do not reach the level of advocacy, in a serious sense,
    unless these topics are addressed with care.

    Much the same holds with regard to the “right of return.” As stated
    explicitly in the interview, “Palestinian refugees should certainly not
    be willing to renounce the right of return.” That is not in question
    (Cohen’s misrepresentation omits this crucial sentence). A different
    question is whether the right will be implemented. In this case too,
    under the (virtually unimaginable) circumstances that any meaningful
    support might develop for it, Israel would resort to its ultimate
    weapons to prevent it. Those who have any concern for the fate of the
    refugees will not dangle before their eyes hopes that will not be
    realized. And they can hardly claim that to do so is a moral stance.

    The same is true generally, including the other examples mentioned here.
    The Cherokees have the right of return to the lands from which they were
    driven, and “should certainly not be willing to renounce” that right.
    The 10-15 million Kurds of Turkey have the right to self-government in a
    much broader Kurdistan, and “should certainly not be willing to
    renounce” that right. Suppose that someone were to dangle in front of
    the eyes of Cherokees or Turkish Kurds the hope that those rights will
    be realized if only they reject any arrangements that to some extent
    mitigate their grim circumstances. Such a person might believe
    him/herself to be a “defender of the Cherokees” or of the Kurds, and to
    be acting “on principle,” but would be seriously misled.

    I have been assuming so far that the discussion is among people who care
    about the people involved and their fate, in particular the
    Palestinians, the most miserable victims. There is, of course, another
    possibility. We might shift to the academic seminar among disengaged
    intellectuals on Mars. We can then join them in deriding “realism” and
    feasibility – that is, attention to the real world and consideration of
    the consequences of our actions for the victims. And we can engage in
    abstract discussion of what might be “right” and “just” in some
    non-existent universe. But if partipicants in these exercises decide to
    come down to earth, and to have some concern and compassion for the
    victims, they have the duty of explaining to us how we proceed from here
    to there. If they have a suggestion, let’s hear it so we can evaluate
    it, and if it is reasonable, act on it. Those who are convinced by the
    proposals if they are ever presented should by all means pursue them,
    but for the moment the matters is entirely academic, since there are no
    meaningful proposals for action other than the step-by-step ones already
    outlined; at least none that I have ever seen. For the reasons I
    explained, I think that those who take these stands without reaching the
    level of serious advocacy are serving the cause of the extreme hawks in
    Israel and the US, and bringing even more harm to suffering
    Palestinians. Since the comments have not been addressed, I have to
    leave it at that.

    I don’t see anything substantive in Cohen’s charges that has not already
    been answered. To illustrate the pointlessness of response, I will
    simply take the first charge, skipping the rhetorical flow that
    precedes:

    “In general, the argument rests on two pillars:

    1) Israel's history of colonial occupation and expansion must be
    separated from all other colonial histories as a special case and
    special consideration must be given to Zionist colonial settlers as a
    historically vulnerable group; 2) Since this "historically vulnerable
    group" also has massive military power, nuclear weapons, and U.S.
    military and economic support, calling for an end to the colonial regime
    is unrealistic; it only hurts the colonized, and should be redirected to
    more useful activities.

    The first is a tortured attempt to meet arguments about justice; the
    second is an attempt to make them moot by arguments about realism.”

    Pillar 1) is an invention, unless Cohen means that this is a “special
    case” in the exact sense in which every other case is a “special case,”
    with its own properties that should be taken into consideration by
    anyone who has the slightest concern for the people involved, in
    particular the Palestinians. The rest of 1) we can ignore.

    In pillar 2), Cohen is quoting himself, not me. The reference to “U.S.
    military and economic support” is also his invention: the interview to
    which he refers, and everything I’ve written and said about that topic
    for many decades, make it unmistakeably clear that ending that support
    should precisely be our objective – not reinforcing that support by
    adopting a stand that is extremely welcome to the ultra-hawks, as just
    explained. To the extent that the charge of “realism” is accurate, I
    certainly accept it, and would recommend it to anyone who hopes to do
    something useful in this world, and therefore takes into account real
    world circumstances and the consequences of our actions for suffering
    people.

    The rest continues along the same lines. If any reader thinks there is
    some point that should be addressed, I’ll be glad to consider it.

    continue

    more