Ground Zero
by Scott McConnell
Antiwar.com

October 5, 2000
The Bushes and the Palestinians: Act 2

One taboo prevalent in the first weeks after September 11 is already
listing badly: it is becoming less mandatory to pretend that the attack
has "absolutely nothing to do" with the American tie to Israel. Writing
in the Wall Street Journal shortly after the attack, Norman Podhoretz
insisted on the lack of any meaningful connection, and several
subsequent commentators, including, initially, President Bush himself,
asserted the terror was completely unrelated to any American policies in
the Mid East. Generally it was attributed to Islamic dislike of American
freedoms, success, to "who we are." 

No doubt the motives – both of the terrorists, and those who support
them – are mixed, and Islam's sad identity crisis in its encounter with
the West has some weight. But denial that the Israeli-Palestinian
stalemate generates enormous ill will towards the United States in the
Arab world, or that the Israeli occupation, backed by American arms,
gives the bin Ladens of the region effective recruiting points and
propaganda themes, seems more and more difficult. 

Now this linkage has apparently been acknowledged at the highest levels.
Last Tuesday's New York Times frontpage revealed a bombshell: the
administration let it be known that prior to September 11, it had
planned to endorse formally the idea of a Palestinian state. Secretary
of State Powell was going to outline an American conception of a final
Israeli-Palestinian settlement in a speech before the General Assembly,
President Bush planned to meet with Yasser Arafat. Questioned last week,
President in essence affirmed this, saying "The idea of a Palestinian
state has always been part of a vision." 

The leak and Bush's comment are part of the effort to build alliances in
the Arab world prior to taking out bin Laden; they also serve as a
counter to the "go-to-war – against-the-whole – Arab-world" rhetoric
emanating from the neoconservative magazines and editorial pages. But
once the words are out, they can't easily be retracted. 

On the merits of course, the Palestinian state idea is unimpeachable,
required for any resolution of the conflict that purports to conform
with justice. That has been clear from the outset, though many barriers
had to be overcome. The Palestinians needed to accept as fact Israel's
permanent existence in the region and its right to secure and recognized
borders; that acquiescence to half a loaf was not really obtained until
after the Gulf War. The Israelis had to give up the idea of a "Greater
Israel" established on the captured lands of he West Bank and Gaza. The
maximalists on the Israeli side have more than matched the Palestinians
in stubbornness, both in Israel itself, where both political parties
have expanded the illegal settlements, and among the Jewish state's hard
line American supporters. The latter, neoconservative hawks for the most
part, play prominent roles both inside the Bush administration and in
right wing journalism. 

For those reasons, no one should underestimate the risk in the political
leap President Bush took in saying "Yes there should be a Palestinian
state" – or the intensity of the battle that now lies before him. Bush
will soon find himself fighting a two front war, first to rally American
and world opinion to support strikes against the Taliban, and secondly
against a domestic lobby which will fight tooth and nail against
American diplomatic pressure on Israel to make concessions. 

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee – by acclamation Capitol
Hill's most potent lobby – was quick to denounce the White House,
issuing a statement claiming "Those who are urging the President to meet
with PLO Chairman Arafat. . . are undermining America's war against
terrorism." (The "those who are urging" phrasing diplomatically tries to
avoid direct criticism of Bush, but more direct attacks will certainly
come.) The Forward, the well-informed Jewish weekly, described the
reaction of Jewish leaders to the Times report as "furious." Robert
Satloff, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israel
think tank, lambasted the Bush suggestion, saying the successful
American Mid East diplomacy has always stressed that "process" was more
important than "preferred outcomes." 

Interestingly, Satloff put forward as an example for the current
President to follow George Herbert Walker Bush (Bush I) who, he claims,
put together a coalition with Arabs to reverse Saddam Hussein's takeover
of Kuwait without making any promises about the Palestinian question.
"That was the right approach then, and is still the right approach"
Satloff concludes. 

The example is noteworthy because of what Satloff doesn't mention:
George Bush senior's presidency was gravely wounded in its post-Desert
Storm face-off with the Israeli lobby over the Palestinian issue. 

As the dust settled in the summer of 1991 after the victory over Iraq,
Bush I began to press for diplomatic progress on the Israel-Palestinian
front. But Israel wanted American loan guarantees to settle a large new
influx of Soviet Jews on the West Bank, and Congress was inclined to
give it, no strings attached. The White House did not want new Israeli
settlements built on the Palestinian territory – believing, as had every
American administration before and since, that Israeli settlements were
a barrier to a durable peace. The settlements deprived the future
Palestinian state of contiguous territory while expanding the Israeli
domestic constituency with a passionate vested interest (their homes)
against any "land for peace" arrangement. Seeking a compromise with
Congress, the White House pushed for a four-month moratorium on the loan
guarantees, but the Israeli lobby asked for the funds to be released
right away. 

In a press conference that would become notorious, President Bush
complained about the size and intensity of the lobby's activities. "I
heard today there were something like a thousand lobbyists on the Hill
working the other side of the question. We've got one lonely guy
[himself] down here doing it." The remark draw a clear line between the
President and AIPAC, generating a firestorm of anger within organized
American Jewry. High ranking figures in major Jewish organizations
accused the president of a "disgusting display of, if not anti-Semitism,
at least something close to it." Thousands of letters to the editor
poured into American newspapers, attacking Bush in similar terms. 

On the day of his press conference, (September 12, 1991) Bush, the
organizer of the Desert Storm victory, held a 70 percent approval rating
in the opinion polls. Within two months, his political stock had
nose-dived. His close friend Richard Thornburgh, a former attorney
general, soon lost a comfortable lead in an off year race for an open
Pennsylvania Senate seat, after money suddenly began pouring in to his
Democratic opponents' campaign. Thornburgh's defeat that November was
taken as a harbinger President Bush's own re-election vulnerability. 

This account of Bush I's fall (drawn largely from J.J. Goldberg's Jewish
Power: Inside the Jewish Establishment) does not attribute Bush's
political collapse entirely to fallout from taking on "the lobby". The
economy was weak, and did not begin to emerge from recession until late
1992. But it does illustrate the potential dangers – even for a
Republican not greatly dependent on Jewish financial or voter support –
of a political showdown with Israel's backers over the
Israel-Palestinian peace process. 

It is virtually inconceivable that Bush fils has failed to speak
extensively with his father about those fateful days of a mere decade
ago, well before uttering his own simple words about Palestinian
statehood. Assuming that the President hasn't stepped into this hornets
nest without reflection, he has demonstrated, impressively, that he at
least is ready to "take risks for peace."