{p. 75} EXHIBIT A
DIALOGUES IN HELL*
BETWEEN
MACHIAVELLI AND MONTESQUIEU
Or the Policies of Machiavelli in the Nineteenth Century
BY A CONTEMPORARY
(MAURICE JOLY)
"Soon will be seen a frightful calm, during which all will reunite
against the infringing power of the laws:
"When Sylla desired to restore liberty to Rome, she was no longer
able to harbor it."
(Montesquleu, Esprit des Lois.)
BRUSSELS
PRESS OF A. MERTENS AND SON
22, RUE DE L'ESCALIER
1864
*See Exhibit I for facsimile of original title page.
{p. 77} PREFACE
THIS book has characteristics that can be applied to all governments,
but its goal is more exact; it personifies one particular political system
which has not varied once in its methods since the fatal and alas! already too
distant date of its enthronement.
There is no question here of a defamatory lampoon, nor of a pamphlet:
opinion in modern nations is too regimented to accept violent truths about
contemporary affairs. The supernatural duration of certain successes is,
moreover, making for the corruption of honesty itself; but the public
conscience is still alive and providence will one fine day interfere in the
game being played against it.
One judges better certain facts and certain principles when one sees
them outside of the framework in which they usually exist in our sight; the
change in point of view sometimes terrifies the eyes!
Here, all is presented in
the form of fiction: it would be superfluous to give away the key in anticipation. If this book has a message, if it bears a lesson, the reader must
discover it for himself and not be informed. This reading, moreover, will
lack certain lively distractions; nevertheless, one must proceed slowly, as is
necessary with writings that are not
frivolous.
No one will ask whose hand has
written these words: a work such as this is in a way impersonal. It responds to the call of the conscience;
the whole world conceived it, it is done. The
author stands back, for he is only
the editor of a thought which is in the general mind, he is but the more or less obscure tool of the coalition for good.
Geneva, October 15, 1864.
{p. 79} FIRST DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. On the bank of this
deserted coast, they told me, I would encounter the shade of the great Montesquieu. Is it he who stands before me?
MONTESQUIEU. The name "great" belongs to no one here, O Machiavelli. But I am the one
you seek.
MACHIAVELLI. Of all the illustrious personages whose shades people the resting place of darkness, there
is none I would rather meet than Montesquieu. Carried into this unknown
territory by the migration of souls,
I give thanks to the chance that at last places me in the presence of the author of the Esprit des Lois.
MONTESQUIEU. The former secretary
of State of the Florentine Republic has not yet forgotten his courtly
language. But what can those who have traversed these dark shores exchange,
save anguish and regrets?
MACHIAVELLI. Is it the philosopher, or is it the statesman who speaks
thus? What does death matter to those who have lived by thought, since thought
never dies? For myself, I know of no condition more tolerable than that in which we shall remain until the day of
last judgment. To be free of the cares and worries of material life, to live in the domain of pure reason,
to be able to converse with the great men who have filled the universe with the
sound of their names; to follow from
afar the revolutions among the states, the fall and the transformation of
empires, to meditate on their new constitutions, on the changes applied to
the customs and ideas of the peoples of Europe, on the progress of their
civilization, in politics, in art, in industry, as well as in the sphere of
philosophical ideas, what a theatre for the mind! What subjects for
astonishment! How many new points
{p. 80} of view! How many unexpected revelations! How many marvels, if we are to believe the shades that come
among us. Death for us is like a
profound retreat in which we manage to gather the lessons of history and
the rights of humanity! Oblivion itself could not break all the bonds which
attach us to the earth, for posterity still speaks of those who, like you, have
imprinted the great movements upon the human soul. Your political principles reign at the present time over almost half
Europe; and if someone couid be freed of fear in effecting the dark passage which leads from hell to heaven, who
better than he who bears with him such pure titles to glory before the eternal justice?
MONTESQUIEU. You do not speak for yourself, Machiavelli: you show too
much modesty for one who leaves behind
him the tremerldous renown of the author of The
Prince.
MACHIAVELLI. I believe I understand the irony which is hidden beneath your words. The great French
publicist would judge then like the mob who only knows my name and a blind
prejudice? That book gave me a fatal renown, I know: it made me responsible for all tyrannies; it drew down upon me the
maledictions of those peoples who personified in me their hatred for despotism;
it poisoned my last days, and the reprobation of posterity seems to have
followed me here. But what have I done? For fifteen years I served my fatherland,
a republic; I conspired for her independence and I defended her unceasingly
against Louis XII, against the Spaniards, against Julius II, against Borgia
himself, who, but for me, would have strangled her. I protected her against the
bloody intrigues which were woven in all directions around her, combating by
diplomacy as another would have combated by the sword; treating, negotiating,
weaving or snapping threads according to the interests of the republic, which
was then crushed between the great powers and tossed by war like a small boat.
And it was not an oppressive or autocratic government which we upheld in
Florence; they were popular institutions. Was I one of those whom you see
changing with a change in fortune? The executioners of the Medicis knew where
{p. 81} to find me after the fall of Soderini. Fostered by liberty, I
succumbed with her; I lived as one
proscribed, without the regard of a single prince deigning to be turned on
me. I died poor and forgotten. That was my life, and those were the crimes
which have cost me the ingratitude of my fatherland, the hate of posterity.
Providence will perhaps be more just to me.
MONTESQUIEU. I knew all that, Machiavelli, and it is for that reason
that I have never been able to understand how the Florentine patriot, how the
servant of a republic, had made himself
the founder of this sombre school that has made all the crowned heads your disciples, but which is qualified
to justify the most heinous crimes of
tyrants.
MACHIAVELLT. And what if I told you that this book was but the fantasy
of a diplomat; that it was not written
to be printed; that it received a fame that its author did not wish for it;
that it was conceived under the influence of ideas which were at that time common to all the Italian principalities
avid for territory at the expense of others, and directed by cunning policies
in which the most perfidious were reputed to be the most able. ...
MONTESQUIEU. Is that really your thought? Since you speak to me with
this frankness, I can admit to you that it was mine also, and that I shared in
that respect the opinion of many others who knew your life and had carefully
read your books. Yes, yes, Machiavelli, and this avowal honors you, you did not
then say what you thought or you only said it under the influence of personal
sentiments which muddied for a moment your powers for clear reasoning.
MACHIAVELLI. That is what deceives you, Montesquieu, as well as those
who thought as you do. My single crime
was to say the truth to the people as to the kings; not the moral truth,
but the political truth; not truth such as it should have been, but such as it is,
such as it will always be. It is not I who am the founder of the doctrine the
paternity of which is attributed to me; it is the human heart. Machiavellism
preceded Machiavelli.
Moses, Sesostris, Solomon, Lysander, Philip and Alexander of
{p. 82} Macedon, Agathocles, Romulus, Tarquin, Julius Caesar, Augustus
and even Nero, Charlemagne, Theodoric, Clovis, Hugh Capet, Louis XI, Gonzalo of
Cordova, Caesar Borgia, those were the ancestors of my doctrines. I speak
without mentioning, of course, those who came after me, and better ones, the
list of whom would be long, and to whom The Prince taught nothing but what they
already knew, by the practice of power. Who in your time rendered me more
brilliant homage than Frederic II? He refuted me, his pen in his hand, in the
interest of his popularity, and in politics he rigorously applied my doctrines.
By what inexplicable whim of the human soul was what I wrote in that
work made sinful? As much reproach the savant for seeking the physical causes
which bring about the fall of bodies that wound us in descending, the doctor
for describing maladies, the chemist for making a history of poisons, the
moralist for painting the vices, the historian for describing history.
MONTESQUIEU. Oh! Machiavelli,
that Socrates were here to contest the sophistries that are hidden in your
words! No matter how awkward in argument nature has made me, it is scarcely
difficult for me to answer you: you
compare to poison and sickness the evils engendered by the spirit of domination,
of cunning and of violence; and these are the maladies that your writings teach
the means to communicate to the states, these
are the poisons that you instruct how to distil. When the savant, the
doctor, the moralist, seek evil, it is not to teach how to propagate it; it is to heal it. Now, that is what your book
does not do; but it matters little, and I am not less disarmed because of
it. From the moment you do not erect despotism in principle, from the moment
you yourself consider it an evil, it seems to me that by that you condemn it,
and on this point at least we can be in accord.
MACHIAVELLI. That we are not, Montesquieu, for you have not understood
my whole thought; I threw you off by a comparison which was too easy to refute.
The irony of Socrates himself would disturb me, for only a sophist would use
more ably than others, that false
instrument, logomachy. That is not your school
{p. 83} and it is not mine: let us leave alone words and comparisons
and hold ourselves to ideas. Here is how I formulate my system, and I doubt
whether you will shake it, for it is only composed of deductions from the moral
and political facts of an eternal truth: The evil instinct in man is more
powerful than the good. Man leans more
toward the evil than the good; fear and power have more control over him
than reason. I do not stop to demonstrate such truths; there was among you only the hare-brained coterie of Baron d'Holbach, of which J. J. Rousseau
was the grand priest and Diderot the apostle, who could have contradicted them. All men seek power, and there is none who would not be an oppressor if
he could; all, or nearly all, are ready to sacrifice the rights of others to
their own interests.
What restrains these ravenous
animals that we call men? In the beginnings of society, it is brute force,
without control; later, it is law, that is, force again, ruled by certain forms.
You have consulted all the sources of history; everywhere force appears before
justice.
Political liberty is only a
relative idea; the necessity to live is what dominates States as well as
individuals.
In certain latitudes of Europe, there are people incapable of
moderation in the exercise of liberty. If
liberty prolongs itself, it is transformed to license; civil or social war
arrives, and the State is lost, either by division or dismemberment because
of its own convulsions, or by its divisions rendering it the prey of other
lands. In such conditions, the people
prefer despotism to anarchy; are they wrong?
States, once constituted, have two
kinds of enemies; the enemies within and the enemies without. What arms
shall they employ in war against the foreigners? Will the two enemy generals
communicate to one another their campaign plans in order that each shall be
able to defend himself? Will they forbid themselves night attacks, snares,
ambuscades, battles in which the number of troops are unequal? Without doubt,
they will not. And such fighters would make one laugh. And these snares, these
{p. 84} artifices, all this strategy indispensable to warfare, you
don't want them to be employed against
the enemies within, against the disturbers of peace? No doubt, they will be
used with less rigor; but, fundamentally, the rules will be the same. Is it possible to conduct by pure reason
violent masses which are moved only by sentiment, passion and prejudice?
No matter whether the direction of affairs is placed in the hands of an autocrat, of an
oligarchy or of the people itself, no war, no negotiation, no internal
reform, could succeed without the help of these
combinations which you seem to reprove, but which you would have been
obliged to employ yourself if the king of France had given you charge of the
smallest affair of state.
What a puerile reproach is that which attacked The Prince! Has politics
anything to do with morals? Have you
ever seen a single state conduct its affairs according to the principles that
govern private morals? Then every war would be a sin, even when it would
have just cause; every conquest having no other motive than glory, would be a
heinous crime; every treaty in which one power would tip the balance to its
side, would be an unworthy deception; every usurpation of sovereign power would
be an act meriting death. Nothing would
be legitimate but what is based on justice! but I told you just now, and I
maintain even in the face of modern history: all sovereign powers have had
force for an origin, or, what is the same thing, the negation of justice. Does that mean that I should outlaw it?
No; but I regard it as an extremely limited application, as much in the
relations of nations among themselves as in the relations of the governors with
the governed.
This word
"justice" itself, by the way, do you not see that it is infinitely vague? Where does it begin,
where does it end? When will justice exist, when will it not exist? I take
examples. Here is a State: bad organization of public powers, turbulence of
democracy, impotence of laws to control discontented, disorder which reigns everywhere, will all precipitate it into
ruin. A strong man
{p. 85} thrusts himself from the
ranks of the aristocracy or from the heart of the people; he breaks through
all constituted power; he puts his hand on the laws, he alters all the institutions, and he gives twenty years of peace
to his country. Did he have the right to do what he has done?
Pisistratus captures the citadel by a sudden attack and lays the ground
for the age of Pericles. Brutus violates
the monarchical constitution of Rome, expels the Tarquins, and with a stab founds a republic whose
grandeur is the most imposing spectacle that has ever been presented to the
universe. But the struggle between the patricians and the plebes, which, as
long as it was carried on, made for the vitality of the republic, brought
dissolution with it, and everything was
about to perish. Caesar and Augustus appear; they too are violators; but the
Roman empire which succeeded the republic, thanks to them, lasts as long as did the republic, and
failed only after covering the whole world with its debris. Well, was justice with these audacious men?
No, according to you. And yet posterity has covered them with glory; in reality, they served and saved their
country; they prolonged its existence through the centuries. You can easily
see that among States the principle of justice is dominated by the principle of
interest, and the thing that is made clear from these considerations is that good
can come from evil, that one
arrives at good through evil, as one heals through poison, as one saves
life by cutting it with iron. I am less
preoccupied by what is good and moral than by what is useful and necessary;
I have taken societies as they are, and I have laid down rules in consequence.
Speaking abstractly, are
violence and cunning an evil? Yes; but it is necessary to use them in governing
men, so long as men are not angels.
Everything is good or evil,
according to the use one makes of it and the fruit one harvests from it;
the end justifies the means: and now, if you ask me why I, a republican, give preference everywhere to absolutist
government, I will tell you that, as a witness in my homeland of the fickleness and the cowardice of the
{p. 86} populace, of its innate
taste for slavery, of its incapacity to conceive and to respect the
conditions of free life; it is to my eyes
a blind force which dissolves itself sooner or later, if it is not in the
hands of a single man; I answer that
the people, left to itself, would only
be able to destroy itself; that it would never be able to administer, nor
to judge, nor to make war. I will tell you that Greece never shone except in the eclipses of liberty; that without
the despotism of the Roman aristocracy, and that, later, without the despotism
of the emperors, the brilliant civilization of Europe would never have
developed.
Shall I seek examples among modern States? They are so striking and so
numerous that I take the nearest ones.
Under what institutions and under what men did the Italian republics
shine? With what sovereigns did Spain, France and Germany constitute their
power? Under Leo X, Julius II, Philip II, Barbarossa, Louis XIV, Napoleon, all
men with heavy hands, placed more often on their swords than on the charters of
their countries.
But I am surprised that I must talk so long to convince the illustrious
writer who listens to me. Are not a part of these ideas, if I am not mistaken,
in the Esprit des Lois? Has this discourse wounded the grave and calm man who
meditated without passion on political problems? The encyclopedists were not
Catos; the author of the Persian Letters was not a saint, nor even a fervent
believer. Our school, which men call
immoral, was perhaps more closely attached to the real God than the
philosophers of the eighteenth century.
MONTESQUIEU. Your last words find me without anger, Machiavelli, and I
have listened to you attentively. Will you listen to me, and will you let me
speak to you with the same liberty?
MACHIAVELLI. I will be silent, and listen respectfully to the man who is called the legislator of
nations.
{p. 87} SECOND DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. Your doctrines are not new to me, Machiavelli; and if I
find some difficulty in refuting them,
it is, whether wrong or right, rather because they have no philosophical basis than because they disturb my
thoughts. I readily understand that you are above all a man of politics, and
that facts impress you more than ideas.
But you will admit nevertheless that when it is a question of government, one
must end up at certain principles. You
give no place in your political system to morals, to religion, or to justice;
you have in your mouth but two words:
force and cunning. If your system reduces itself to the declaration that
force plays a great role in human affairs, that cleverness is a necessary
qualification for a statesman, you understand well that this is a truth that
needs not be proved; but, if you elevate
violence to a principle, cunning to a maxim of government, if you do not
take into consideration in your calculations any of the laws of humanity, the
code of tyranny is naught but the code
of the brute, for animals, too, are adroit and strong, and, indeed, there is no justice among them but that of
brute force. But I do not believe that even your fatalism will go so far,
for you admit the existence of good and
evil.
Your principle is that good
can come from evil, and that it
is permissible to do evil when it will result in good. Thus, you do not
say: It is good in itself to go back on one's word; it is good to use
corruption, violence and murder. But you do say: One can deceive when it is
useful to do so, kill when that is necessary, take the property of others when
that is advantageous. I hasten to add that, in your system, these maxims are
applied only to principles, and when it is a question of their interests or of
those of the State. Consequently, the
prince has a right to violate his oaths; he can shed streams of blood to
usurp power and to maintain himself; he
can pillage those whom he proscribes, upset all the laws, make new ones, and
violate these, too; he can squander
{p. 88} his finances, corrupt, compromise, punish and strike
unceasingly.
MACHIAVELLI. But was it not you who said that in autocratic states fear was necessary, virtue useless, honor
dangerous; that blind obedience was necessary, and that the prince would be lost if for one instant he failed to lift his arm?
(Esprit des Lois, pp. 24 and 25, Chap. IX, Book III.)
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, I said that; but when I discovered, as you did, the
frightful conditions upon which tyrannical power maintains itself, it was to disgrace it and not to build altars to
it; it was to inspire horror in my fatherland which never, luckily for her,
bowed her head beneath such a yoke. How is it you do not see that force is only
an accident in the progress of regular society, and that the most arbitrary powers are obliged to seek their sanction in
considerations foreign to the theories of force? It is not only in the name
of interest, it is in the name of duty
that all oppressors act. They
violate it, but they invoke it; the docrine of interest is thus just as impotent
by itself as are the means which it employs.
MACHIAVELLI. I interrupt you here; you take interest into account, that
is enough to justify all the necessary policies which are not in accord with
justice.
MONTESQUIEU. It is a reason of state that you invoke. Notice, then,
that I cannot give as a basis of society just the thing that destroys it. In
the name of selfishness, princes and peoples, like citizens, can only commit
crimes. The selfishness of the State, you say! But how am I to know if it is
really profitable to commit such-and-such an iniquity? Do we not know that the
interests of the state are more often the interests of the prince in
particular, or those of the corrupt favorites around him? I do not expose
myself to such consequences when I give justice as a basis for the existence of
society, because the idea of justice traces limits which state interests cannot
exceed. And if you ask me what is the
foundation of justice, I will tell you that it is morality whose precepts
have in them nothing doubtful or obscure, because they are written into all religions, and
{p. 89} they are imprinted in luminous characters on the conscience of man. It is this pure
source from which should spring all laws,
civil, political, economic, international.
Ex eodem jure, siue ex eodem fronte, siue ex eodem principio.
But here is where your inconsistency is conspicuous; you are Catholic,
you are Christian; we worship the same
God, you admit His commandments, you admit the existence of morality, you
admit justice in the relations among human beings, and you throw to the ground
all these rules when the question of the State or the prince arises. In a word,
politics, according to you, has nothing to do with morality. You permit the monarch to do what you
forbid the subject. According to whether the same actions are done by the
weak or by the strong, you glorify them or you blame them; they are either
crimes or virtues, according to the rank of the man who accomplishes them. You
praise the prince for having done them, and you send the subject to the
galleys. You do not dream that with such maxims, no society can last; you believe that the subject will keep his
promises when he sees his sovereign break his; that he will respect the law
when he knows that the man who handed it down to him has violated it and
continually violates it; you believe he will hesitate to follow the road to
violence, corruption and fraud when he sees those who are supposed to lead him
following it at all times? Learn the truth; know that each usurpation of the prince in public affairs authorizes an equal
infraction on the part of the subject; that every political perfidy
engenders a social perfidy; that every violence on high legitimizes a violence
lower down. That much for what concerns the citizens among themselves.
As for what concerns their relations with the governing powers, I need
not tell you that it means civil war introduced in a state of ferment into the
breast of society. The silence of the
people is but the truce of the vanquished for whom complaint is a crime. Wait for him to awaken; you have invented
the theory of force; rest assured that he has remembered it. At the first
opportunity,
{p. 90} he will break his chains; he will break them perhaps under the
most futile pretext, and he will retake by force what force had taken from him.
The maxim of despotism is the perinde ac cadaver of the Jesuits; to
kill or to be killed: that is its law: it is brutality today, civil war tomorrow. It is thus, at least, that things come about in European climes; in
the Orient, the peoples sleep in peace amid the degradation of servitude.
Princes cannot, therefore,
permit themselves what private morality does not permit; that is my conclusion; it is positive.
You thought you could embarrass me by giving examples of many great men who, by
bold acts accomplished in violation of the laws, had given peace and sometimes
glory to their country; and from them you took your great argument: good comes
from evil. I am little moved; it has not
been proven to me that these daring men have done more good than evil; it
is in no way established for me that their societies would not have been saved
and upheld without them. The methods of
salvation which they bring do not compensate for the germs of dissolution which they introduce into the States. Several
years of anarchy are often less fatal for a kingdom than many years of quiet
despotism.
You admire the great men; I
admire only the great institutions. I believe that, to be happy, people have
less need of men of genius than of men of integrity; but I grant you, if you
wish, that several of the violent enterprises for which you are the apologist
have been capable of being turned to the advantage of certain States. These
acts could justify themselves in the
ancient nations where slavery and the dogma of fatality reigned. One finds them again in the Middle Ages and even
in modern times; but in proportion as the customs are modified, as light is
propagated among the divers peoples of Europe, in proportion, especially, as the principles of political science
have become better known, justice has found itself substituted for force in
principle as well as in fact. No doubt, the tempests of liberty will always
exist, and a good number of crimes will yet be committed in her name: but
political fatalism
{p. 91} no longer exists. If you were able to say, in your times, that
despotism was a necessary evil, you could not say it today, for, in the actual
state of customs and political institutions
among the principal peoples of Europe, despotism has become impossible.
MACHIAVELLI. Impossible ...? If you can manage to prove that to me, I
agree to make a step in the direction of your ideas.
MONTESQUIEU. I will prove it to you very easily, if you still wish to
listen.
MACHIAVELLI. Very willingly, but take care; I believe you are
attempting a great deal.
THIRD DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. A thick mass of shadows is coming toward this shore; the
region we are in now will soon be invaded. Come to this side; otherwise we will
soon be separated.
MACHIAVELLI. I did not find in your words just now the precision that
characterized your language at the beginning of our conversation. I find that
you have exaggerated the consequences of the principles which are comprised in
the Esprit des Lois.
MONTESQUIEU. I expressly avoided, in that work, the making of long
theories. If you knew it otherwise than by what has been reported to you, you
would see that the particular developments that you give here spring without
effort from the principles that I have laid down. Besides, I find no difficulty
in admitting that the knowledge that I have acquired lately has modified or
completed several of my ideas.
MACHIAVELLI. Do you really expect to maintain that despotism is
incompatible with the political conditions of the peoples of Europe?
MONTESQUIEU. I have not said all the peoples; but I will cite, if you
wish, those among whom the development of political science has brought great
results.
MACHIAVELLI. What are those nations?
{p. 92} MONTESQUIEU. England,
France, Belgium, a part of Italy, Prussia, Switzerland, the German
Confederation, Holland, even Austria; that is, as you see, almost all that
part of Europe over which once spread
the Roman world.
MACHIAVELLI. I know a little about what has happened in Europe from
1527 to these times, and I assure you that I am very curious to hear you
justify your position.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, listen to me, and I will succeed in convincing you,
perhaps. It is not men but institutions that assure the reign of liberty and of
good customs in the nations. On the perfection or the imperfection of the
institutions depend all the benefits, as well necessarily as all the evils
which could result for men in their union in a community; and, when I demand
the best institutions, you understand that, according to the beautiful saying
of Solon, I mean the most perfect institutions that the people can support.
That is to say that I do not conceive of impossible conditions of existence for
them, and that by that I separate myself
from those deplorable reformers who pretend to construct governments on pure,
rational hypotheses without taking into consideration climate, habits,
customs and even prejudices.
At the beginning of a nation's history, institutions are what they can
be. Antiquity has shown us marvelous
civilizations, states in which the conditions of the free government were
admirably understood. The peoples of the Christian era have had more
difficulty in putting their constitutions in harmony with the movement of
political life; but they have profited from the lessons of antiquity, and with
civilizations infinitely more complicated, they have nevertheless arrived at
more perfect results.
One of the primary causes of anarchy, as of despotism, has been the
theoretical and practical ignorance in which the nations of Europe have been
for so long of the principles which govern the organization of power. How, when
the principle of sovereignty rested solely on the person of the prince, could
the rights of the nation be affirmed? How, when the one charged with executing the laws was at the same time the
legislator, could his power not
{p. 93} be tyrannical? How could the citizens be guaranteed against
arbitrary rule when the legislative and
the executive power were already combined, and the judicial power also about to
be united to it? (Esprit des Lois, p. 129, Book XI, Chap. VI.)
I know well that certain liberties, that certain public rights which
are introduced sooner or later into the least advanced political customs, do
not but permit the bringing of obstacles
to the unlimited exercise of absolute royalty; that, on the other side, the
fear of angering the people, the spirit of moderation among certain kings, have made them use with moderation the
excessive powers with which they are invested; but it is not less true that
such precarious guarantees were at the mercy of the monarch who possessed in
principle the goods, the rights and the person of his subjects. The division of powers has realized in
Europe the problem of free societies, and if something can sweeten for me
the anxiety of the hours which precede the last judgment, it is the thought
that my passage on earth was not foreign to this great emancipation.
You were born, Machiavelli, on the borders of the Middle Ages, and you
saw, with the renaissance of art, the first dawning of modern times; but the
society in the center of which you lived was, permit me to declare it, still imprinted with the manners of
barbarity; Europe was a tournament. The ideas of war, domination and conquest filled the heads of the statesmen and the
princes. Force was everything then, justice very little, I admit; kingdoms
were as prey for the conquerors; within the states, the sovereigns fought with the great vassals; the great vassals
wiped out the cities. Amid the feudal anarchy which placed all Europe in arms,
the people, crushed to the ground, were in the habit of considering the great
men and the princes as fatal divinities,
to whom the human race had been delivered. You came into those tumultuous
times, times full of grandeur, too. You saw intrepid captains, men of iron,
audacious geniuses; and this world, filled with sombre beauties in its
disorder, appeared to you as it would appear to an artist whose imagination is
more struck than his moral sense; it
{p. 94} is that which, to my eyes, explains The Prince, and you were
not so far from the truth which you are willing to admit, when, a moment ago,
by an Italian feint, it pleased you, in order to sound me, to attribute it to
the caprice of a diplomat. But, since your time, the world has progressed; the peoples look upon themselves today as
the arbiters of their destinies; they have, in fact as well as in law, destroyed privilege, destroyed aristocracy;
they have established a principle which may be very new to you, a descendant of
Marquis Hugo; they have established the
principle of equality; they see in those who govern them only mandatories;
they have realized the principle of equality by civil laws that nothing could
take away from them. They hold to these laws as to their own blood, because
they have in fact cost enough in the blood of their ancestors.
I spoke to you of wars just
now: they rage always, I know; but, the first progress is that today they no longer give the conquerors the property of the vanquished states.
A law that you hardly knew, international
law, today guides the relations between the nations, just as civil law
guides the relations of the subjects of every country.
After having assured their private rights by civil laws, their public
rights by treaties, the peoples wanted to put themselves in order with their
princes, and they assured their
political rights by constitutions. Long in the hands of arbitrary rule by
the confusion of powers, which permitted the princes to make tyrannical laws
and to exercise them tyrannicaUy, they separated
the three powers, legislative, executive and judicial, by constitutional
lines which cannot be crossed without
an alarm being given to the political body.
By this single reform, which is an immense point, interior public
justice was created, and the superior principles which constitute it are found
to be redeemed. The person of the prince ceases to be confounded with that of
the state; the sovereignty appears to have in part its source in the very heart
of the nation, which makes for the
distribution of powers between the prince and the
{p. 95} political bodies,
independent of one another. I do not wish to theorize before the
illustrious statesman who listens to me, upon the regime which is called in England and France the constitutional
regime; it has today passed into the customs of the principal states of
Europe, not only because it is the expression of the highest political science
but mostly because it is the only
practical method of government in the presence of the ideas of modern
civilization.
In all times, under the rule of liberty as under that of tyranny, one cannot but govern by laws. It is,
therefore, on the manner in which the laws are made that are founded all the
guarantees of the citizens. If it is the
prince who is the sole legislator, he will only make tyrannical laws, and
it would be fortunate if he did not overthrow the state constitution in a few
years; but, in any case, it is full absolutism; if it is a senate, an oligarchy has been constituted, a regime
odious to the people, because it gives them as many tyrants as masters; if it is the people, one runs to anarchy,
which is another way to end up in despotism; if it is an assembly elected by the people, the first part of the
problem is already resolved; for therein is the very basis of representative government, today in
power in the whole southern part of Europe.
But an assembly of representatives of the people which would possess in
itself the whole legislative sovereignty would not lose time in abusing its power and in making the
state run the greatest perils. The regime definitely established is a happy compromise between aristocracy,
democracy and the monarchical establishment, having something of the nature
of the three forms of government at once, by means of a balance of powers which
seem to be the masterpiece of the human intellect. The person of the sovereign remains sacred, inviolate; but, while
conserving a mass of capital privileges which, for the good of the state, must
remain in his power, his essential role is not more than that of procurator of
the execution of the laws. No longer
having in his hand the abundance of power, his responsibility lessens and
passes to the ministers whom he associates
with his government. The law, which he has either the exclusive power to
propose or, together
{p. 96} with another state body, is prepared by a council composed of
men experienced in government affairs, submitted
to a high chamber, hereditary or elected for life, which examines whether
these dispositions are not contrary to the constitution, voted by a legislative body emanating from national suffrage,
applied by an independent magistracy. If the law is defective, it is rejected
or amended by the legislative body; the upper chamber opposes its adoption if
it is contrary to the principles upon which the constitution reposes.
The triumph of this system so profoundly conceived, and the mechanism
of which, you understand, can be put together in a thousand ways, according to
the temperament of the people to whom it is applied, has been to conciliate order with liberty,
stabl1ity with movement, to make the
entire citizenry participate in political life and to suppress the agitations in the public square. It is the country governing itself, by the
alternative displacement of majorities, which influences in the chambers the
naming of the directing ministers.
The relations between the prince and the subjects rest, as you see, on
a vast system of guarantees, the unshakable basis of which is civil order. No
one can be reached, body or goods, by an act of the administrative authority;
individual liberty is under the protection of the magistrates; in criminal trials, the accused are judged
by their peers; above all the jurisdictions, there is a supreme
jurisdiction charged with revoking the decrees which are handed down in
violation of the laws. The citizens
themselves are armed, for the defense of their rights, by the institution
of bourgeois militia which cooperates with the police in the cities; the
humblest individual can, by means of petition, bring his complaint to the feet
of the assembled sovereigns which represent the nation. The townships are
administered by public officials named at the election. Each year, great provincial assemblies, also elected by suffrage, unite to express
the needs and the wishes of the populations which surround them.
Such is the faint image, O Machiavelli, of some of the insti-
{p. 97} tutions which flourish today in modern countries, and especially in my beautiful fatherland;
but as publicity is the essence of free
nations, all these institutions could not live long if they did not
function in broad daylight. A power still unknown in your century, and which
was but born in my times, has come to give them the last breath of life. It is the press, long forbidden, still
discredited by ignorance, but to which
could be applied the beautiful words
uttered by Adam Smith in speaking of credit: lt is a public voice. It is by
this voice, in fact, that is
manifested the whole progress of ideas among modern nations. The press
exercises the functions of the police on the state; it expresses needs, brings forth complaints, denounces abuses,
arbitrary acts; it forces morality on
all guardians of power; to bring this about, it is but necessary to draw
public attention to them.
In societies ruled thus, O Machiavelli, what argument could you make
for the ambition of princes and the enterprises of tyranny? I do not forget by
what sorrowful convulsions this progress triumphed. In France, liberty, drowned in blood during the revolutionary period,
only revived during the period of the restoration. There, new disturbances
prepared themselves again; but already all the principles, all the institutions
of which I have spoken, had passed into
the tradition of France and of the people who gravitate about the sphere of
her civilization. I have finished, Machiavelli. States, like sovereigns, are
governed today only by the rules of justice. The modern minister who is
inspired by your teachings would not stay in power one year; the monarch who
put into practice the maxims of The Prince would rouse against him the
reprobation of his subjects; he would be exiled from Europe.
MACHIAVELLI. You think so?
MONTESQUIEU. Will you pardon my frankness?
MACHIAVELLI. Why not?
MONTESQUIEU. Am I to believe that your ideas have been modified a
little?
MACHIAVELLI. I propose to demolish, bit by bit, all the beautiful
{p. 98} things you have just said, and to prove to you that it is my doctrines alone that hold good
even today, in spite of the new ideas, in
spite of the new customs, in spite
of your pretended principles of
public rights, in spite of all the institutions of which you have just
spoken; but permit me, first, to ask you one question: How much do you know of
contemporary history?
MONTESQUIEU. The facts that I
have learned about the various states of Europe go up to the last days of the
year 1847. The hazards of my wandering
travels through infinite space and the confused multitude of souls which fill
it, have not led me to encounter anyone who would have been able to inform
me beyond the period I have just mentioned. Since I have descended into the resting place of the shades, I
have passed about a half-century among the peoples of the ancient world, and it
is only since the last quarter of a century that I have met the modern legions;
besides, it must be said that most have arrived from the most distant corners
of the universe. I do not even know exactly what year it is on earth.
MACHIAVELLI. Here, the last are the first, O Montesquieu! The statesman
of the Middle Ages, the politician of barbarian times, finds that he knows more
about the history of modern times than the philosopher of the eighteenth
century. Human beings are in the year of
our lord 1864.
MONTESQUIEU. Be kind enough, Machiavelli, to tell me now what has gone
on in Europe since the year 1847.
MACHIAVELLI. Not, if you permit, before I have given myself the
pleasure of throwing confusion into the heart of your theories.
MONTESQUIEU. As you please; but believe me, I do not feel any fear in
that direction. Centuries are needed to change the principles and the form of
governments under which people are in the habit of living. No new political teaching could have resulted in the fifteen years
which have just passed; and, in any case, if that did happen, it would not
be the doctrines of Machiavelli which could ever triumph.
MACHIAVELLI. You think not; then listen to me in my turn.
{p. 99} FOURTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. In listening to your theories on the division of powers
and on the benefits that the peoples of Europe owe it, I could not help
admiring, Montesquieu, to what extent
the illusion of the system can take hold of the greatest intellects.
Seduced by the institutions of England, you thought to be able to make
of the constitutional regime the universal panacea for all states; but you have
counted without the irresistible movement which today tears the nations from
their old traditions. Two centuries will not pass before this form of
government, which you admire, will be no more in Europe than a historic memory,
something superannuated and decayed like Aristotle's rule of three unities.
First permit me to examine in itself your political mechanism: you
balance the three powers, and you confine each one to its department; this one will make laws, this other will
apply them, and this third will execute them: the prince will reign, the ministers
will govern. What a marvelous thing is this constitutional seesaw! You have
foreseen all, regulated all, save progress: the triumph of such a system would
not be action; it would be immobility if the mechanism functioned with
precision; but, in reality, things do not happen in this way. On the first occasion,
movement will be produced by the rupture
of one of the springs which you have so carefully forged. Do you believe
that the powers will remain for a long time within the constitutional limits
that you have assigned them, and that they will not attempt to go beyond them? Where is the independent legislative
assembly that does not aspire to sovereignty? Where is the magistracy that will
not bow to the weight of opinion? Where is the prince, above all, sovereign of
a kingdom or chief of a republic, who will accept without reserve the passive role to which you would
have him condemned; who, in his secret thoughts, will not meditate on the
overthrow of the rival powers which disturb his action? In reality,
{p. 100} you would have begun a
struggle between all the opposing forces, roused all enterprises, given arms to all parties. You would
have given strength to the assault of all ambitions, and made of the state an arena in which all factions
would be unchained. In little time,
there would be disorder everywhere; inexhaustible rhetoricians would transform the deliberating assemblies into oratorical jousts; audacious journalists, unbridled pamphleteers, would each day attack the person of the sovereign, would discredit the government, the
ministers, the men of position. ...
MONTESQUIEU. I have for a long time known these reproaches against
liberal governments. They have no value in my eyes; the abuses do not condemn
the institutions. I know of many states that live in peace, and have done so
for a long time, under such laws; I pity those that cannot live thus.
MACHIAVELLI. Wait: In your calculations, you have not counted the social minorities. There are tremendous
populations riveted to labor by poverty,
as they were in other times by slavery. What difference, I ask you, do your parliamentary fictions make to their
happiness? Your great political movement has after all only ended in the triumph of a minority privileged by chance
as the ancient nobility was by birth. What difference does it make to the proletariat bent over its labor,
weighted down by the heaviness of its destiny, that some orators have the right
to speak, that some journalists have the right to write? You have created rights which w111 be purely academic for
the mass of people, since it cannot make use of them. These rights, of
which the law permits him the ideal enjoyment and necessity refuses him the
actual exercise, are for the people only a bitter irony of destiny. I answer
for it that one day they will capture
them out of hatred, and that they will destroy them by their own hand to
intrust themselves to despotism.
MONTESQUIEU. But what dislike has Machiavelli for humanity, and what
idea has he of the baseness of modern nations? All-powerful God, I shall not
believe that Thou hast created them so base. Machiavelli, no matter what he
says, does not recognize
{p. 101} the principles and the conditions of existence of modern
civilization. Work is today the
common law, as it is the divine law; and far
from being a sign of servitude among men, it is the bond of their society,
the instrument of their equality.
Political rights are in no way illusory to people in the lands where
the law recognizes no privileges and where all careers are open to individual
activity. No doubt, and in no society would it be otherwise, the inequality of
intelligence and fortune brings about inevitable inequalities for individuals
in the exercise of their rights; but does it not suffice that these rights
exist so that the will of an enlightened philosophy shall be fulfilled, so that the emancipation of man shall be
assured in such measure as it can be? Even for those whom chance has caused to
be born into the most humble conditions, is it nothing to live in the
realization of their independence and in their dignity as citizens? But that is
only one facet of the question; for if the moral greatness of the races is
attached to liberty, they are not less attached by their material interests.
MACHIAVELLI. I was expecting you to come to that. The school to which
you belong has laid down principles of
which it does not seem to realize the final consequences: you think that they lead to the reign of reason; I shall show you that
they bring about the reign of force. Your political system, taken in its
original purity, consists in giving a practically equal part of the action to
different groups of forces of which nations are composed, to permit the social
activities a justly proportionate competition; you do not wish the aristocratic
element to surpass the democratic element. However, the temper of your institutions is to give more force to the aristocracy than to
the people, more force to the prince
than to the aristocracy, thus adjusting the powers to the political
capacity of those who must exercise them.
MONTESQUIEU. You are right.
MACHIAVELLI. You make the different classes of society participate in
the public functions according to their degree of aptitude and their
enlightenment; you emancipate the
bourgeoisie by the
{p. 102} vote, you restrain
the people by the amount of taxes conferring electoral rights; popular
liberties create the power of opinion, aristocracy gives the prestige of grand
manners, the throne throws over the nation the brilliance of the supreme rank;
you keep all traditions, all the great memories, the culture of all great
things. On the surface one sees a monarchical society, but all is fundamentally
democratic; for, in reality, there is no barrier between the classes, and labor
is the instrument of all fortunes. Is it not that, approximately?
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, Machiavelli; and you can at least understand the
opinions which you do not share.
MACHIAVELLI. Well, all these fine things have passed or will pass like
a dream; for you have a new principle with which all institutions undergo a
change with a startling rapidity.
MONTESQUIEU. What is that principle?
MACHIAVELLI. It is that of popular sovereignty. Rest assured that the
method of squaring a circle will be found long before the conciliation of
balance of power with the existence of such a principle among nations in which
it is admitted. The people, by an
absolutely inevitable consequence, will
one day or another take possession of
all the powers which have been recognized as resting in it. Will it be to
keep them? No. After several days of madness, it will throw them, out of weariness, to the first soldier of fortune who
finds himself in its road. In your country, you saw, in 1793, how the French
headsmen treated representative monarchy; the
sovereign people asserted itself by the execution of its king, then made a
litter of all its rights; it gave itself to Robespierre, Barras and Bonaparte.
You are a great thinker, but you do not know the unfathomable cowardice
of humanity; I do not speak of those of my time, but of those of yours; servile in the face of force, pitiless in
the face of weakness, implacable before blunders, indulgent before crimes,
incapable of supporting the contrarieties of a liberal regime, and patient to
the point of martyrdom before all the violences of bold despotism, upsetting
thrones in its moments of anger, and giving
{p. 103} itself rulers, whom it
pardons for actions the least of which would have caused it to decapitate
twenty constitutional kings.
Look then for justice; look for law, stability, order, respect of the
so-complicated forms of your parliamentary mechanism with the violent, undisciplined, uncultivated masses
to whom you have said: You are the law, you are the masters, you are the
arbiters of the State! Oh, I know very well that the prudent Montesquieu,
the circumspect politician, who laid down principles and reserved the
consequences, did not write the dogma of popular sovereignty in the Esprit des
Lois; but, as you said a moment ago, the consequences flow of themselves from
the principles you have laid down. The
affinity of your doctrines with those of the Contrat Social also makes itself
felt. Thus, from the day the French
revolutionaries wrote, swearing in verba magistri: "A government can
only be the free work of a convention of associates," monarchical and
parliamentary government was condemned to death in your homeland. Vainly was it
attempted to restore the old principles, vainly did your king, Louis XVIII, on
returning to France, attempt to make the powers return to their source by
promulgating the declarations of '89 as a precedent for the royal grant; that
pious fiction of aristocratic monarchy was in too flagrant contradiction with
the past: it had to vanish at the sound of the
revolution of 1830, like the government of 1830 in its turn. ...
MONTESQUIEU. Finish.
MACHIAVELLI. Let us not anticipate. What you as well as I know of the
past authorizes me until now to say that the
principle of popular sovereignty is destructive of all stability, that it
indefinitely perpetuates the right to
revolution. It puts nations into open war against all human powers and even
against God; it is the very incarnation of violence. It makes of the people a ferocious brute which sleeps when it is
satiated with blood, and which is enchained; and this is the invariable
progress which then follows the communities whose movement is ruled by this
principle: popular sovereignty engenders demagogy, demagogy engenders
{p. 104} anarchy, anarchy brings back despotism. Despotism, to you, is
barbarity. Well, you see that the people
returns to barbarity by way of civilization.
But that is not all, I assert that from still other points of view
despotism is the sole form of government that is really appropriate to the
social state of modern peoples. You have told me that their material interests
bound them to liberty; here, you play too fine a game. What are, in general,
the states which are in need of liberty? They are those which live by great
sentiments by great passions, by heroism, by faith, even by honor, as you would
say in your times in speaking of the French monarchy. Stoicism can make a free people; Christianity, under certain
conditions, could have the same privilege. I understand the necessities of
liberty in Athens, in Rome, among the
nations which breathed only by the glory of arms, all of whose expansions
were satisfied by war, who, moreover, had need of all the energies of
patriotism, of all civic enthusiasms to triumph over their enemies.
Public liberties were the natural patrimony of the states in which the servile and industrial functions were
left to the slaves, in which man was useless if he was not a citizen. I
include also liberty at certain epochs of the Christian era, and especially in
the little states united to one another by systems of confederation analogous
to those of the Hellenic repub]ics, as in Italy and Germany. I find there a
part of the natural causes which made liberty
necessary. It would almost have been
inoffensive in times when the principle of authority was not placed in
question, in which religion had absolute authority over the spirit, in which
the people, placed under the tutelar regime of the corporations, walked docilely under the hands of its
pastors. If its political emancipation had been undertaken then, it would
have been without danger; for it would have been accomplished in conformity
with the principles on which rests the existence of all societies. But, with
your great states, which exist only by means of industry; with your populations, Godless and faithless, in times when people
are no longer satisfied by war, and when their violent activity is, of
{p. 105} necessity, restricted to the homeland, liberty, with the
principles which serve as its foundation, cannot but be a cause of dissolution
and ruin. I add that it is no more necessary for the moral needs of the
individual than it is for the states.
From the weariness of
ideas and the shock of revolutions have
come cold and disillusioned societies, which have achieved indifference in
politics as in religion, which have no
other stimulant than material satisfactions, which live only in their own
interest, which have no other cult than
that of gold, whose mercantile
customs compete with those of the Jews whom they have taken for models. Do
you believe that it is for love of liberty in itself that the inferior classes
are trying to rise to the assault on power? It is by hatred of those who possess; in reality, it is to take away their
riches, an instrument of enjoyment which they envy.
Those who possess invoke from all sides a strong arm, a forceful power;
they demand only one thing, the protection
of the state against the agitations which its weak constitution cannot resist,
to give to themselves the necessary security so that they may enjoy and do
business. What forms of government would you apply to societies in which corruption has stolen everywhere, in
which morality has no guarantee save in repressive laws,
in which the sentiment of patriotism
itself is extinguished by I know not
what universal cosmopolitanism?
I see no salvation in these
societies, veritable giants with feet of clay, except in the institution of an extreme
centralization, which puts all public force at the disposition of those who
govern; in a hierarchic
administration resembling that of the Roman empire, which rules
mechanically all the movements of individuals; in a vast system of legislation
which takes up in detail all the
liberties that have been imprudently bestowed; in a tremendous despotism, in short, which could immediately and at
all times strike at all who resist, all who complain. The Caesarism of the
Lower-Empire seems to me to realize quite well what I desire for the well-being
of modern society. Thanks to these
vast aparati which, I have been told, already function in more than one country
of
{p. 106} Europe, they can live
in peace, as in China, as in Japan, as in India. A common prejudice should not make us condemn these oriental
civilizations, whose institutions we learn to appreciate more each day. The Chinese people, for example, is very
commercial and very well administered.
FIFTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. I hesitate in answering you, Machiavelli, for there is in
your words I know not what satanic mockery, which gives me the inward suspicion
that your discourse is not in complete accord with your secret thoughts. Yes,
you have the fatal eloquence that loses the trace of truth, and you are the
same sombre genius whose name is
still the bogie of modern generations.
Nevertheless, I readily recognize the fact that with such a powerful intellect
one would lose too much in remaining quiet; I wish to hear you to the end, and
I even wish to answer you, although, even now, I have little hope to convince
you. You have just drawn a really sinister picture of modern society; I cannot
know whether it is faithful, but it is at least incomplete, for in all things,
besides the evil, there is the good, and you have only shown me the evil;
moreover, you have not given me the means to verify how far you are right, for
I know neither of what peoples nor of what states you wished to speak when you
painted this dark picture of contemporary custom.
MACHIAVELLI. Well, let us admit that I have taken as an example that
one of all the nations in Europe which is the most advanced in its civilization, and to which, I hasten to say,
the picture that I have drawn could be least applied.
MONTESQUIEU. It is then of
France that you wish to speak?
MACHIAVELLI. Well, yes.
MONTESQUIEU. You are right, for there
the dark doctrines of materialism have penetrated least. It is France who
has remained the home of the great ideas and the great passions whose source
{p. 107} you believe exhausted, and it is from there that have come those great principles of public right
to which you give no place in the government of nations.
MACHIAVELLI. You may add that it is the field of experiment consecrated to political theories.
MONTESQUIEU. I know of no experiment that has yet, by the establishment
of despotism, proved of lasting benefit to contemporary nations and least of
all to France, and it is this that in the very first place makes me find that
your theories on the necessity of absolute power conform little to the reality
of matters. I know at the present time of but
two states in Europe completely deprived of the liberal institutions that have modified in all parts the purely
monarchical element: they are Turkey and
Russia, and still if you regard closely the interior movements which are operating in the heart of this
latter power, perhaps you will find there the symptoms of an approaching transformation. You tell me, it is true, that in
the more or less near future, the peoples, menaced by an inevitable
dissolution, will return to despotism as
to an ark of safety; that they will constitute themselves under the form of
great absolute monarchies, similar to
those of Asia; that is only a prediction: in how much time will that be
accomplished?
MACHIAVELLI. Within a century.
MONTESQUIEU. You are a soothsayer; one century is always just so much
gained; but let me tell you now why your prediction will not be fulfilled.
Modern societies today must no longer be considered with the eyes of the past.
Their customs, their habits, their needs, all have changed. One must not,
therefore, put confidence without reserve in the inferences of historical
analogy, when it comes to judging their destinies. One must beware above all of
taking for universal laws facts which are but accidents, and of transforming
into general rules the necessities of such a situation or the necessities of
such a time. As for despotism occurring many times m history as a consequence
of social disturbances, does it follow that it must be taken as a rule of
government? As for its having served as a transition in the past, shall I
conclude that
{p. 108} it is calculated to settle the crises of modern times? Is it
not more rational to say that other evils bring forth other remedies, other
problems other solutions, other social customs other political customs? An invariable law of society is that it
always tends toward perfection, toward progress; eternal wisdom has, if I
may say so, condemned it; it has refused it movement in the opposite direction.
It must achieve this progress.
MACHIAVELLI. Or it must die.
MONTESQUIEU. Let us not place ourselves at extremes; societies never
die when they are about to give birth. When they are constituted in the manner
which pleases them, their institutions can change, fall into decadence and
perish; but they will have lasted for many centuries. It is thus that the
different peoples of Europe have passed, by successive transformations, from
the feudal system to the monarchical system, and from the monarchical system to
the constitutional regime. This progressive development, the unity of which is
so imposing, has nothing of fortuitousness about it; it has arrived as the necessary consequence of the movement
which operated in ideas before being
translated into fact.
Society cannot have forms of government other than those which are in
agreement with its principles, and it is against this absolute law that you
place yourself when you believe despotism compatible with modern civilization. As long as the peoples regarded sovereignty
as a pure emanation of the divine will, they submitted without a murmur to
absolute power; as long as their institutions were insufficient to assure their
progress, they accepted arbitrariness. But, from the day their rights are recognized and solemnly declared,
from the day more fertile institutions have been able to resolve through
liberty all the functions of the social body, politics as an instrument of
princes fell from its pedestal; power has become a dependency of the public
domain; the art of government has changed into an affair of administration.
Today things are ordained in such a way, in the various countries, that the
directing power only appears as the motor of the organized forces.
{p. 109} Certainly, if you imagine these societies infected by all the
corruptions, by all the vices of which you spoke to me only a moment
ago, they will progress rapidly in the direction of decomposition:
but how is it you do not see that the argument you draw from
this is a veritable petition of principle? Since when does liberty
abase the soul and degrade the character? Those are not the
teachings of history; for it attests everywhere in characters of fire
that the greatest peoples have
been the most free. If customs were
degraded, as you say, in some part of Europe that I do not know of, it
is because despotism had passed through it; it is because liberty was
extinguished there; it is, therefore, necessary to maintain it wherever it is,
and to reestablish it where it no longer exists.
Do not forget that we are at this moment on the plane of principles;
and if yours differ from mine, I expect them to be invariable; now, I no longer
know where I am when I hear you praise
liberty in antiquity and prohibit it in modern times, refusing or admitting
it according to periods and places. These distinctions, supposing them
justified, still do not leave the principle less intact, and it is to the
principle alone that I hold.
MACHIAVELLI. I see that you avoid the reefs like an able pilot, keeping
yourself to the high seas. Generalities are a great help in argument; but I
confess that I am very impatient to know how the grave Montesquieu will
extricate himself with the principle of
popular sovereignty. I could not tell, until now, whether or not it was a
part of your system. Do you or do you not admit it?
MONTESQUIEU. I cannot answer a question couched in those terms.
MACHIAVELLI. I knew that even your mind would be disturbed before this
phantom.
MONTESQUIEU. You are wrong, Machiavelli; but, before answering you, I
had to remind you what my writings were and what was the character of the
mission which they were able to carry out. You
have made my name jointly and severaUy responsible for the iniquities of the
French revolution: it is a severe enough
{p. 110} judgment for the philosopher who walked with such a prudent
step in search of truth. Born in a century of intellectual effervescence, on
the eve of a revolution which was to carry off the ancient forms of monarchic
government in my native land, I can say that none of the subsequent
consequences of progress of ideas then going on escaped my eyes from that time
on. I could not fail to realize that the system of the division of power would
one day necessarily displace the seat of sovereignty.
This principle, little known, poorly defined, above all, badly applied,
could engender terrible equivocations, and overthrow French society from top to
bottom. The perception of these perils became the rule for my words. Thus,
while imprudent innovators,
immediately attacking the source of power, unwittingly
prepared a great catastrophe, I applied myself solely to the study of the
forms of free government, to the extraction of clearly defined principles which
preside over their establishment. Statesman rather than philosopher, lawyer
rather than theologian, practical legislator, if the boldness of such a word is
permitted me, I thought to do more for my country by teaching it to govern itself than by questioning the very
principle of authority. God forbid, however, that I attempt to give myself
purer merit at the expense of those who, like myself, sought truth in good
faith! We have all made mistakes, but to each the responsibility for his deeds.
Yes, Machiavelli, and it is a concession that I do not hesitate to make
to you, you were right just now when you said that it was necessary that the
emancipation of the French people should be made in conformity with the
superior principles which preside over the existence of human communities, and
this reserve permits you to foresee the judgment that I will bring upon the
principle of popular sovereignty.
First of all, I do not admit a
designation which seems to exclude from sovereignty the most enlightened
classes of society. This distinction is fundamental, because it makes of a
state a pure democracy or a representative state. If sovereignty rests
anywhere, it rests upon the entire
nation; I will therefore in the first place
{p. 111} call it national
sovereignty. But the idea of this sovereignty is not an absolute truth, it is only relative. The sovereignty of
human power corresponds to an idea profoundly subversive, the sovereignty of human rights; it is this materialist and atheistic doctrine
that precipitated the French revolution into blood, and inflicted on it the disgrace of despotism after the
delirium of independence. It is not correct to say that the nations are the
absolute masters of their destinies, for
their sovereign master is God Himself, and they will never be beyond His
power. If they possessed absolute sovereignty, they could do everything, even
contrary to eternal justice, even contrary to God; who would dare to go that
far? But the principle of divine right,
with the significance that is generally attached to it, is a no less fatal principle, for it links the people to
obscurantism, to despotism, to the void; it reconstitutes logically the regime
of castes, it makes of the people a herd of slaves, conducted, as in India, by the hand of the priests, and trembling
beneath the whip of the master. How could it be otherwise? If the sovereign is
the messenger of God, if he is the very representative of the Divinity on
earth, he has every power over the human creatures subject to his empire, and
this power will have a brake only in the general rules of equity, which it will
always be easy to transgress.
It is in the field that separates these two extreme opinions that have
been waged the furious battles of party spirit; some shout: No divine
authority!; others: No human authority! O supreme Providence, my mind refuses
to accept one or the other of these alternatives; they both appear to me equal blasphemies against Thy wisdom! Between divine
right which excludes man and human right which excludes God, there lies the
truth, Machiavelli; nations, like individuals, are free in the hands of
God. They have all rights, all powers, charged with using them according to the
rules of eternal justice. Sovereignty is human in the sense that it is given by
men, and it is men who exercise it; it is divine in the sense that it is
instituted by God, and that it can only be exercised in accordance with the
precepts that He has established.
{p. 112} SIXTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. I would like to come to definite conclusions. How far does
the hand of God extend over humanity? Who
makes the sovereigns?
MONTESQUIEU. The people.
MACHIAVELLI. It is written: Per
me reges regnant. Which means literally: God makes kings. (Through me kings reign.)
MONTESQUIEU. That is a translation in the manner of The Prince, O
Machiavelli, and it was given you in that century by one of your most
illustrious partisans (Note: Machiavelli here evidently alludes to Joseph de Maistre, whose name,
moreover, is again mentioned later on), but it is not from the Holy Scripture.
God instituted sovereignty, he did not institute sovereigns. His all-powerful
hand stopped there, because there begins the free human arbiter. "Kings reign according to My
commandments, they must reign according to My law": such is the
meaning of the divine Book. If it were otherwise, it would have to be said that
the good as well as the evil princes are established by Providence: one would
have to bow down before Nero as before Titus, before Caligula as before
Vespasian. No, God did not wish that the most sacrilegious dominations should
invoke His protection, that the vilest tyrannies should claim His investiture.
To peoples as to kings, He left the responsibility for their acts.
MACHIAVELLI. I doubt very much whether that is orthodox. Whatever it
is, according to you, it is the people who dispose of sovereign authority?
MONTESQUIEU. Be careful, in contesting it, of setting yourself up
against a truth of pure common sense. That is not a novelty in history. In
ancient times, in the middle ages, everywhere that power was established
without invasion or conquest, sovereign power was born through the free will of
the people, in the original form of election. To cite but one example, it was
thus that in France the head of the Carlovingian race succeeded the de
{p. 113} scendants of Clovis, and the dynasty of Hugh Capet that of
Charlemagne. (Esprit des Lois, p. 513, Book XXXI, ch. IV.) No doubt heredity
became the substitute for election. The brilliance of services rendered, public
gratitude, traditions, fixed the sovereignty on the principal families of
Europe, and nothing was more legitimate. But the principle of entire national
power is constantly rediscovered at the bottom of revolutions; it has always
been invoked for the consecration of new powers. It is a prior and pre-existent
principle, which has made itself only more strictly realized in the various
constitutions of modern countries.
MACHIAVELLI. But if it is the
people who choose their masters, cannot they, therefore, also overthrow them?
If they have the right to establish the form of government which satisfies
them, what will stop them from changing at the behest of their caprice? It will
not be a regime of order and liberty that will come forth from your doctrines,
it will be the indefinite era of revolutions.
MONTESQUIEU. You confound justice with the abuse that can result from
its exercise, the principles with their application; those are fundamental distinctions,
without which we cannot agree.
MACHIAVELLI. Do not hope to escape me, I demand of you logical
deductions; refuse me them if you wish. I wish to know if, according to your
principles, the people have the right to overthrow their sovereign?
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, in extreme cases and for just causes.
MACHIAVELLI. Who will be the
judge of these extreme cases and of the justice of these extremes?
MONTESQUIEU. And who would you wish it to be, if not the people
themselves? Have things happened otherwise since the beginning of world? That
is a formidable sanction, no doubt, but beneficial and inevitable. How is it
you do not see that the contrary doctrine, which commands of man respect for
the most odious governments, would make them fall once more under the yoke of
monarchical fatalism?
MACHIAVELLI. Your system has but one inconvenience, that it supposes the infallibility of reason among
the people; but have they
{p. 114} not, like individuals, their passions, their mistakes, their
injustices?
MONTESQUIEU. When the people will make mistakes, they will be punished
as are individuals who have sinned against the moral law.
MACHIAVELLI. In what way?
MONTESQUIEU. They will be punished by the scourges of dissension,
anarchy, even despotism. There is no other justice on earth, when awaiting that
of God.
MACHIAVELLI. You have just uttered the word despotism, you see that one
returns to it.
MONTESQUIEU. That objection is not worthy of your great mind,
Machiavelli; I imagined the most extreme consequences of the principles which
you oppose; that was sufficient for the real idea to be perverted. God did not
give the people either the power or the will to change thus the forms of
government which are the essential means of their existence. Among political
societies as among organized beings, the nature of things limits of itself the
expansion of free forces. The import of your argument must restrict itself to
what is acceptable to reason.
You believe that, under the influence of modern ideas, revolutions
would be more frequent. They will not be more, it is possible they will be
less. Nations, indeed, as you said a moment ago, exist at the present time
through industry, and what seems to you a cause for servitude is at the same
time a principle of order and liberty. Industrial civilizations have sores that
I do not forget, but one must not deny their benefits, nor distort their
tendencies. Societies which live by
labor, by exchange, by credit, are societies essentially Christian, no
matter what one may say, for all these forms of industry, so powerful and so
varied, are fundamentally but the application of several great moral ideas
borrowed from Christianity, source of all strength as of all truth.
Industry plays such a considerable role in the progress of modern
society that one cannot, from the point of view which you assume, make an exact
calculation without taking into consideration its influence; and this influence
is not all that you thought to charge it with. The science that seeks the
relationships
{p. 115} of industrial life and the maxims that are drawn therefrom are
quite the most contrary to the principle of the concentration of powers. The
tendency of political economy is to see in the political organism only a
necessary but very costly mechanism, whose energy must be simplified, and it
reduces the role of the government to functions so elementary that its greatest
inconvenience is perhaps to destroy prestige. Industry is the born enemy of revolutions, for without social order it
perishes and with it is arrested the vital progress of modern nations. It
cannot do without liberty; and, note well, liberties
in the question of industry necessarily engender political liberty, so much so
that one could say that the people most advanced in industry are also the
people most advanced in liberty. Leave
India and China which exist under the blind destiny of absolute monarchy; look
at Europe, and you will see.
You have just mentioned the word despotism again; well, Machiavelli,
you whose sombre genius so profoundly assimilated all the subterranean
passages, all the occult combinations, all the artifices of law and of
government with the aid of which one can enchain the physical activity and the
mental activity of the people; you who distrust man, you who dream of the terrible dominations of the Orient for them,
you whose political doctrines are
borrowed from frightful theories of Indian mythology, tell me, I beg of
you, how you would go about organizing despotism amongst peoples whose public
rights rest essentially on liberty, whose morals and religion develop all
progress in the same direction, among Christian nations who live by commerce
and industry, in states whose political bodies are in the presence of the
publicity of the press which throws
floods of light into the most obscure corners of power; call upon all the
resources of your powerful imagination, seek, invent, and if you resolve the
problem, I will say with you that the modern spirit is conquered.
MACHIAVELLI. Take care, you give me a fine chance, I may take you at
your word.
MONTESQUIEU. Do so, I beseech you.
{p. 116} MACHIAVELLI. I do not expect to fail.
MONTESQUIEU. In a few hours we will perhaps be separated. These parts
are not known to you, follow me in the twisting path that I shall take with you
along this dark passage, we can yet escape for several hours the wave of
shadows that you perceive over there.
SEVENTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. We can stop here.
MONTESQUIEU. I am listening to you.
MACHIAVELLI. First I must tell you that you are wrong from beginning to
end in the application of my principles.
Despotism always presents itself before your eyes in the decayed forms of
oriental monarchy, but it is not thus that I think of it; with new
societies, new procedures must be employed. Today there is no question, in
order to govern, of committing violent iniquities, decapitating one's enemies,
stripping one's subjects of their possessions, spreading punishment; no, death,
spoliation and physical torture cannot play a role secondary enough in the
interior policies of modern states.
MONTESQUIEU. That is fortunate.
MACHIAVELLI. No doubt I have little admiration, I confess, for your
civilizations of cylinders and shafts; but I advance with the centuries; the
power of the doctrines to which my name is attached is that they accommodate
themselves to all times and all situations. Machiavelli today has grandchildren
who know the price of his lessons. I am believed very old, and every day I grow
younger on earth.
MONTESQUIEU. You are jesting?
MACHIAVELLI. Listen to me and you shall judge. Today it is less a question of doing men violence than
of disarming them, less of
suppressing their political passions than of wiping them out, less of combating their instincts than of
deceiving them, less of prohibit
{p. 117} ing their ideas than of
changing them by appropriating them to oneself.
MONTESQUIEU. And how is that done? For I do not understand this
language.
MACHIAVELLI. Permit me; that is the moral side of politics, we shall
soon arrive at the applications. The
principal secret of government consists in enfeebling the public spirit to the
point of disinteresting it entirely in the ideas and the principles with
which revolutions are made nowadays. In all times, peoples, like individuals, have been paid in words. Appearances nearly
always are sufficient for them; they demand no more. One can, then, establish artificial institutions which correspond to a
language and to ideas equally artificial; it is necessary to have the
talent to strip the parties of that
liberal phraseology with which they arm themselves against the government.
It is necessary to satiate the people
with it until they are weary, until they are disgusted. One speaks often
today of the power of public opinion.
I shall show you that it is made to
express whatever one wants when one knows well the hidden resources of
power. But before thinking of directing
it, one must benumb it, strike it with uncertainty by astounding contradictions,
work on it with incessant diversions, dazzle it with all sorts of different
actions, mislead it imperceptibly in its pathways. One of the great secrets of
the day is to know how to take possession of popular prejudices and passions,
in such a way as to introduce a confusion of principles which makes impossible
all understanding between those who speak the same language and have the same
interests.
MONTESQUIEU. Where are you going with these words whose obscurity has
in it something sinister?
MACHIAVELLI. If the wise Montesquieu means to put sentiment in the
place of politics, I should perhaps stop here; I have not pretended to place
myself on the terrain of morals. You have defied me to stop the progress in
your societies unendingly tormented by
the spirit of anarchy and revolt. Do you wish to let me say
{p. 118} how I would solve the problem? You can put aside your scruples
in accepting this thesis as a question of pure curiosity.
MONTESQUIEU. So be it.
MACHIAVELLI. I understand moreover that you would demand more precise
information of me; I will arrive at that. But permit me to tell you first under
what essential conditions the Prince can hope today to consolidate his power.
He will have to endeavor above all to destroy the parties, to dissolve the
collective forces wherever they exist, to paralyze
in all its manifestations individual initiative; then the level of
character would descend to himself, and all knees will soon bend in servitude.
Absolute power will no longer be an accident, it will become a need. These
political precepts are not entirely new, but, as I said to you, it is the
processes that must be new. A large number of these results can be obtained by
simple regulations of the police and the administration. In your societies, so
fine and so well organized, in the place
of absolute monarchies you have put a monster which is called the State, a
new Briareus whose arms extend everywhere, a colossal organism of tyranny in
whose shadow despotism is always reborn. Well, under the invocation of the
state, nothing will be easier then to consummate the occult work of which I
spoke to you just now, and the most powerful methods of action will perhaps be
precisely those that one will have the talent to borrow from this very
industrial regime which calls forth your admiration.
With the aid of the sole regulating power, I would institute, for example,
huge financial monopolies, reservoirs of the public wealth, on which depends so
closely the fate of all the private fortunes that they would be swallowed up
with the credit of the state the day after any political catastrophe. You are an economist, Montesquieu, weigh
the value of this combination.
Head of the government, all my edicts, all my ordinances would
constantly tend toward the same goal: to annihilate collective and individual
forces; to develop excessively the preponderance of the state, to
make of it the sovereign protector, promoter and remunerator.
{p. 119} Here is another scheme borrowed from the industrial order: In
modern times, the aristocracy, as a political force, has disappeared; but the landed bourgeoisie is still an element
of dangerous resistance to governments, because it is independent in
itself; it may be necessary to
impoverish it or even to ruin it completely. It is enough, for this, to
increase the charges which weigh on landed property, to maintain agriculture in a state of relative inferiority, to favor
commerce and industry excessively, but speculation
principally; for too great
prosperity in industry can itself become a danger, in creating too large a number of independent fortunes.
The great industrialists and manufacturers will be reacted against
advantageously by stimulation to a
disproportionate luxury, by the elevation of taxes on salaries, by deep blows ably struck at the sources of
production. I need not develop these
ideas, you can readily understand in what circumstances and under what pretexts all this can be
done. The interests of the people, and even a sort of zeal for liberty, for the
great economic principles, will easily cover
the true goal, if it is desired. It is useless to add that the perpetual
upkeep of a large army continually
exercised by foreign wars must be the indispensable complement of this
system; it is necessary to arrive at the existence in the state only of proletarians, several millionaires, and
soldiers.
MONTESQUIEU. Continue.
MACHIAVELLI. So much for the interior policies of the state. Outside, it is necessary to incite, from
one end of Europe to the other, the revolutionary fermentation that is curbed
at home. Two considerable advantages would result from that; the liberal
agitation outside makes passable the repression within. Moreover, in this way one controls all the powers, among which
one can create order or disorder at will. The important point is to
entangle by cabinet intrigues all the threads of European politics in such a
way as to play one against the other
the Powers with whom one treats. Do not think that this duplicity, if it is
well carried on, could become detrimental to a sovereign. Alex-
{p. 120} ander VI practised only deception in his diplomatic
negotiations and yet he always succeeded, so well did he know the science of
cunning. (The Prince, p. 114, ch. XVII.) But for what you call today the
official language, a striking contrast is necessary, and there one cannot
affect too much the spirit of loyalty and conciliation; the people, who see only the outward appearance of things, will
manufacture a reputation of wisdom for the ruler who can conduct his
affairs in this way.
To all internal agitation,
he must be able to respond with a foreign war; to any imminent revolution, with a general war; but since in
politics words must never be in accord
with deeds, it is necessary that, in these various crises, the prince be
able enough to disguise his real designs
under contrary design; he must always give the impression of acceding to public opinion while he does what his hands
have secretly prepared.
To sum up the whole system in a word, revolution in the state is restrained on the one hand by the terror of anarchy, on the other,
by bankruptcy, and, all things
considered, by general war.
You have already been able to see, by means of the rapid outline I have
just given you, what an important role the
art of language is called upon to play in modern politics. I am far from
disdaining the press, as you see, and I would be able in time of need to use
the rostrum; what is essential is the
use against one's enemies of all the arms they could employ against you.
Not content with relying on the violent force of democracy, I would borrow of
the subtleties of justice their most learned resources. When one makes
decisions that could seem unjust or rash, it is essential to know how to
express them in fine terms, to give them the highest reasons of morality and
justice.
The power of which I
dream, far, as you see, from having barbarian customs, must draw to itself all
the forces and all the talents of the civilization in the heart of which it
lives. It must surround itself with
publicists, lawyers, jurisconsults, practical men and administrators, men
who know thoroughly all the secrets, all the strength of social life, who speak
all languages,
{p. 121} who have studied man in all circles. They must be taken from
anywhere and everywhere, for these men give surprising service through the
ingenious procedures they apply to politics. With that, a whole world of
economists is necessary, of bankers, of industrialists, of capitalists, of men
of vision, of men with millions, for all fundamentally resolves itself into a
question of figures.
As for the principal dignities, the principal dismemberment of power,
one must so arrange as to give them to men whose antecedents and character
place a gulf between them and other men, every one of whom has only to expect
death or exile in case of a change in government and is in need of defending
until his last breath all that exists.
Imagine for a moment that I have at my disposal the different moral and
material resources which I have just sketched for you, and now give me any nation, do you hear! You
regard it as a capital point, in the Esprit des Lois, not to change the
character of a nation (Esprit des Lois, p. 252 et seq., book XIX, Chap. V) when
one wishes it to conserve its original vigor. Well, I do not ask you twenty years to transform in the most complete way the
most untamable European character and to make it as docile under tyranny as the
smallest nation in Asia.
MONTESQUIEU. You have just added, in your jesting, another chapter to
your treatise on The Prince. Whatever are your doctrines, I do not debate them;
I make but one observation to you. It is evident that you have in no way held
to the promise you had made; the use of
these methods presupposes the existence of absolute power, and I have asked you precisely how you could establish it in political societies which rest upon
liberal institutions.
MACHIAVELLI. Your observation is perfectly fair and I do not mean to
escape it. This beginning was only a preface.
MONTESQUIEU. I put you in the presence of a state founded on
representative institutions, monarchic or republic; I speak to you of a nation
long familiar with liberty, and I ask you how, from there, you could return to
absolute power.
{p. 122} EIGHTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. I take the hypothesis which is most contrary to me; I take
a state constituted as a republic. With a monarchy, the role that I propose to
play would be too easy. I take a republic, because with such a form of
government, I will encounter resistance almost insurmountable in appearance, in
ideas, in custom, in laws. This hypothesis is not acceptable to you? I accept
from your hands a state of no matter what form, great or small; I imagine it
endowed with all the institutions that guarantee liberty, and I ask you this
single question: Do you believe power is protected from a blow or from what is
today called a coup d'etat?
MONTESQUIEU. No, that is true; but you will at least admit that such an
enterprise would be singularly difficult in the political society of our times,
as it is organized.
MACHIAVELLI. And why? Are not these societies, as in all times, prey to
factions? Are there not everywhere the elements of civil war, between parties,
between pretenders?
MONTESQUIEU. That is possible; but I think I can make you understand in
one word where your error lies. These usurpations, necessarily very rare
because they are full of peril and they repudiate modern customs, supposing
that they succeed, would in no way have the importance that you seem to
attribute to them. A change of power would not bring about a change of
institutions. A pretender will trouble the state; his party will triumph, I
admit it; the power is in other hands, that is all; but the public rights and
very foundation of the institutions remain upright. That is what concerns me.
MACHIAVELLI. Is it true that you have such an illusion?
MONTESQUIEU. Prove the contrary.
{p. 123} MACHIAVELLI. You grant me, for the moment, the success of an
armed enterprise against the established power?
MONTESQUIEU. Yes.
MACHIAVELLI. Then note in what situation I find myself placed. I have
for the moment suppressed all power other than my own. If the institutions
still standing can erect some obstacle before me, it is pure form; in fact, the
acts of my will can encounter no real resistance; at last I am in that
extra-legal condition that the Romans called by a word so beautiful and so
powerfully energetic: dictatorship. That is to say I can do all I wish at the
present time; I am legislator, executive, judge, and, on horseback, chief of
the army.
Remember this. Now I have
triumphed through the support of one faction, that is, this occurrence
could only be accomplished in an atmosphere of deep internal dissension. One can tell at random, without being
wrong, what were the causes. It will be an
antagonism between the aristocracy and the people or between the people and the
bourgeoisie. At the basis of things, it could not be otherwise; on the
surface, there is a mixture of contrary
ideas, opinions, influences and currents, as in all states where liberty has been unchained for a moment. There
will be political elements of all kinds, fragments
of parties once victorious, today defeated, unbridled ambitions, wild
cupidity, implacable hatreds, terror
everywhere, men of all opinions and all doctrines, would-be restorers of former regimes, demagogues,
anarchists, utopians, all at work, all laboring equally from their side for the overthrow of the established order.
What may be concluded from such a situation? Two things: first, that the country has great need of peace and
that it will refuse nothing to him who can give it her; second, that in the
middle of this division of parties, there is no real force or rather, there is
only one, the people.
I myself am a victorious pretender; I bear, let us suppose, a great
name in history, qualified to work on the imagination of the masses. Like
Pisistratus, like Caesar, like Nero
even, I rely on the people; that is the a b c of all usurpers. There lies the
{p. 124} blind power that
gives the means to do everything with impunity, there lies authority, there the
name that will cover all. The people indeed care much for your legal fictions
and your constitutional guarantees!
I have brought quiet amid all the factions, and now you will see how I
am going to proceed.
Perhaps you remember the rules I established in The Prince for the conservation of conquered provinces.
The usurper in a state is in a situation similar to that of the conqueror. He
is condemned to the renovation of
everything, the dissolution of the state, the destruction of the city, the
changing of the face of customs.
That is the goal, but in modern times one must aim at it only through
roundabout ways, indirect means, cunning schemes and, as far as possible,
without violence. Therefore, I will not
destroy institutions directly, but I will reach them one by one by an unseen
blow which will throw the mechanism into confusion. Thus I will reach, each
in its turn, the judicial organization,
the electorate, the press, individual liberty, education.
Above the primitive laws I
will have passed a whole new legislation which, without exactly abrogating the
old, will mask it first, and soon make it disappear completely. Such are my
general conceptions, now you will see the details of execution.
MONTESQUIEU. Would that you were still in the gardens of Rucellai, O
Machiavelli, to teach these fine lessons, and how sad it is that posterity
could not hear you!
MACHIAVELLI. Rest assured; for those who can read, all this is in The Prince.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, you have arrived at the day after your coup d'etat;
what are you going to do?
MACHIAVELLI. One great thing, then a very little one.
MONTESQUIEU. Let us see the great one first.
MACHIAVELLI. After the success of a coup against the established power,
all is not finished, and the parties do not generally consider themselves
beaten. It is not yet exactly known how much
{p. 125} the usurper's energy is worth, he will be tried, and they will
rise against him with weapons in their hands. The moment has come to impress terror which will strike the entire
city and will make the most intrepid souls shrink back.
MONTESQUIEU. What are you going to do? You told me that you repudiated
bloodshed.
MACHIAVELLI. It is not a question of false humanity here. Society is
menaced, it is in a state of lawful
defense; the excess of strictness, even cruelty, will prevent more flowing of blood in the future. Do not ask me what
will be done; it is necessary that the
people be terrified once and for all and that fear soften them.
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, I remember; that is what you teach in The Prince in
recounting the sinister execution of Borgia in Cesene (The Prince, p. 47, chap.
VII). You are still the same.
MACHIAVELLI. No, no, you will see later; I only do this by necessity,
and I suffer from it.
MONTESQUIEU. But who will start this blood flowing?
MACHIAVELLI. The army! that great justiciary of the state whose hand
never dishonors its victims. Two results of the greatest importance will be
obtained in the repression by the intervention of the army. From this time, on
the one hand, it will find itself
forever hostile to the civil population which it had punished without
consideration, and on the other, it will attach itself in an indissoluble
manner to the fate of its leader.
MONTESQUIEU. And you think that this blood will not fall back on you?
MACHIAVELLI. No, for in the eyes
of the people, the sovereign, definitely, is a stranger to the excesses of a
soldiery which is not always easy to hold back. Those who could be held responsible are the generals, the ministers
who had executed my orders. These men, I assure you, will be devoted to me
until their last breath, for they know very well what awaits them after me.
MONTESQUIEU. That is, therefore, your first act as sovereign? Now let
us hear the second.
MACHIAVELLI. I do not know whether you have noticed what is,
{p. 126} in politics, the power of little things. After what I have
just told you, I will have all new coins
struck with my effigy, and I will issue a considerable quantity.
MONTESQUIEU. But amid the first cares of the state, that would be a
puerile measure.
MACHIAVELLI. You think s? You have not been in power. The human effigy on coins is the supreme
sign of power. At the beginning there will be proud spirits who will shake
with anger, but they will become accustomed to it; even the enemies of my power
will be obliged to have my portrait in their purses. It is quite certain that
the people will accustom themselves to seeing with a softer regard the features
that are printed everywhere on the material token of our possessions. From the
day my effigy is on the coins, I am king.
MONTESQUIEU. I confess that this notion is new to me; but let us
continue. You have not forgotten that new peoples have the weakness of giving
themselves constitutions that are guaranties of their rights? With your power
emanating from force, with the projects that you explain to me, you will
perhaps find yourself embarrassed in the presence of a fundamental charter whose every principle, every regulation,
every plan, is contrary to your maxims of government.
MACHIAVELLI. I will make another
constitution, that is all.
MONTESQUIEU. And you think that that will not be difficult?
MACHIAVELLI. Wherein will lie the difficulty? For the moment, there is
no other will, no other force than mine and I have the popular element as a
basis of action.
MONTESQUIEU. That is true. Still, I have one doubt: according to what
you have been telling me, I imagine that your
constitution will not be a monument of liberty. Do you think that a single
crisis of strength, a single lucky violence will be sufficient to ravish all
the rights of a nation, all her conquests, all her institutions, all the
principles with which she has been in the habit of living?
MACHIAVELLI. Permit me! I don t go as fast as that. I said to
{p. 127} you, a few moments ago, that nations were like individuals, that they attached more to appearances than to the reality of things; in
politics that is a rule the details of which I will follow scrupulously; if you
will call to mind the principles to which you hold the most, you will see that
I am not as embarrassed by them as you seem to think.
MONTESQUIEU. What are you going to do, O Machiavelli?
MACHIAVELLI. Don't be afraid, name them to me.
MONTESQUIEU. I don t trust myself, I confess it.
MACHIAVELLI. Then I will remind you myself. You would not fail, no
doubt, to speak to me of the principles of the separation of powers, of liberty of speech and of the press,
religious liberty, individual liberty, the right to congregate, equality before the law, the inviolability of property and of the
home, the right of petition, free consent to taxation, adequacy of punishment,
the non-retroactivity of the laws; is that enough and do you wish more?
MONTESQUIEU. I think that is much more than is necessary, Machiavelli,
to make your government uneasy.
MACHIAVELLI. There you are wrong, and this is so true that I see no reason why I should not proclaim
these principles; if you wish, I will even make them the preamble to my
constitution.
MONTESQUIEU. You have already proved to me that you are a great magician.
MACHIAVELLI. There is no magic here, only political sauoir faire.
MONTESQUIEU. But how, having inscribed these principles at the head of
your constitution, are you going to go
about without applying them?
MACHIAVELLI. Ah! take care, I have told you that I would proclaim these
principles, but I have not said I would inscribe them or even that I would
expressly designate them.
MONTESQUIEU. What do you mean?
MACHIAVELLI. I will in no way
sum up; I will take care to declare to the people that I recognize and
confirm the great principles of modern justice.
MONTESQUIEU. The import of this reticence escapes me.
{p. 128} MACHLAVELLI. You will see how important it is. If I expressly enumerated these rights, my
freedom of action will be chained to those I have mentioned; that is what I
do not want. In not naming them, I
seem to accord all and I do not
specially accord any; this permits me to set aside later, by means of
exception, those that I may judge dangerous.
MONTESQUIEU. I understand.
MACHIAVELLI. Of these principles, moreover, some belong to political
and constitutional law, others to civil law. That is a distinction that
must always serve as a rule in the exercise of absolute power. It is to the civil rights that people hold most; I
will not touch them, if I can, and, in this way, one part of my program at
least will be fulfilled.
MONTESQUIEU. And as for the political rights ...?
MACHIAVELLI. I have written in my treatise on The Prince the following
maxim, which has never ceased to be true: "The governed will always be
content with the prince, so long as he
touches neither their possessions nor their honor, and from that time on he
has only to combat the pretensions of a
small number of malcontents, whom he can finish off easily." That is
my answer to your question.
MONTESQUIEU. Strictly, one could find it insufficient; one could answer
you that political rights are also possessions; that it also is of importance
to the honor of the people to maintain it, and that in disturbing it you are in
reality striking at their possessions as well as their honor. One could add
still further that the maintenance of civil rights is linked with the maintenance
of political rights by a close solidarity. Who is to guarantee to the citizens
that if you strip them of political liberty today, you will not strip them of
individual liberty tomorrow; that if you attack their liberty today, you will
not attack their fortunes tomorrow?
MACHIAVELLI. It is certain that the argument has been presented with
much vivacity, but I believe that you also perfectly understand the
exaggeration. You seem always to believe that people
{p. 129} of today are starved for liberty. Have you foreseen the case
when they wish no more of it, and can you demand of the princes more passion
for it than the people? Now, in your societies
so deeply liberated, in which the individual only lives in the sphere of his
egoism and his material interests, question the greatest number, and you
will see whether, from every side, you will not be answered: What has politics
to do with me? What has liberty to do with me? Are not all governments the
same? Must not a government protect itself?
Note this well, moreover, it is not even the people who will speak
thus; it will be the bourgeois, the industrialists, the educated men, the rich,
the literati, all those who are in a position to appreciate your fine doctrines
of public rights. They will bless me, they will cry out that I have saved them,
that they are in a minority position, that they cannot help themselves. Look,
the nations have I know not what secret love for the vigorous genius of force.
Of all violent actions marked by the talent of artifice, you will hear said
with an admiration that overcomes all blame: This is not good, so be it, but it is clever, it is well done, it
is strong!
MONTESQUIEU. You are, then, going to penetrate the professional party
with your doctrines?
MACHIAVELLI. No, we have arrived at the execution. I would certainly
have made several more steps if you had not obliged me to digress. Let us
continue.
NINTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. You were at the day following a constitution drawn up by yourself without the consent of the nation.
MACHIAVELLI. Here I stop you; I have not intended to offend to this
point the acknowledged ideas whose influence I am aware of.
MONTESQUIEU. Really!
{p. 130} MACHIAVELLI. I speak very seriously.
MONTESQUIEU. You expect, then, to associate the nation with the new
fundamental work that you are preparing?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, no doubt. That surprises you? I will do much better; I will first have ratified by a popular
vote the coup that I have carried against the state; I will say to the
people, in suitable terms: All was going wrong; I have smashed everything, I have saved you, do you want me? You
are free to condemn me or to absolve me by your vote.
MONTESQUIEU. Free, under the weight of terror and armed force.
MACHIAVELLI. I will be acclaimed.
MONTESQUIEU. I believe that.
MACHIAVELLI. And the popular
vote, which I have as an instrument of my power, will become the very base of my government. I will establish a
suffrage without distinction of class or tax, with which absolutism will be
organized in a single blow.
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, for by one blow you crush at the same time the unity
of the family, you lessen suffrage, you annul the preponderance of the
enlightened, and you make numbers a blind power which operates at your will.
MACHIAVELLI. I bring about a progress ardently hoped for today by all
peoples of Europe: I organize universal
suffrage as did Washington in the United States, and the first use I make of it
is to submit to it my constitution.
MONTESQUIEU. What! you are going
to have it discussed in primary or secondary assemblies?
MACHIAVELLI. Oh! let us forget, I beg of you, your eighteenth century
ideas; they are no longer of modern times.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, then in what manner will you have the acceptance of
your constitution deliberated? How will the articles embodied in it be
discussed?
MACHIAVELLI. But I do not intend
that they shall be discussed at all, I thought I told you that.
MONTESQUIEU. I have only followed you on the terrain of the
{p. 131} principles it has pleased you to choose. You spoke to me of
the United States; I do not know whether you are a new Washington, but what is
certain is that the present constitution of the United States was discussed,
deliberated and voted by representatives of the people.
MACHIAVELLI. I beg you, let us not confound the time, the place and the
people; we are in Europe; my
constitution is presented en bloc, it is accepted en bloc.
MONTESQUIEU. But in acting thus you are disguising nothing to anyone.
How, in voting under these conditions, can the people know what they are doing
and to what point it engages them?
MACHIAVELLI. And where have you ever seen that a constitution, really
worthy of the name, really durable, has ever been the result of popular
deliberation? A constitution must come
forth fully armed from the head of one man alone, or it is nothing but a
work condemned to oblivion. Without homogeneity, without linking of parties,
without practical strength, it will necessarily bear the imprint of all the
weakness of sight that have presided at its composition. A constitution, once
more, cannot but be the work of a single man; never have things been done
otherwise; I prove it by the history of all the founders of empires, the
example of Sesostris, of Solon, Lycurgus, Charlemagne, Frederick II, Peter I.
MONTESQUIEU. That is a chapter of one of your disciples that you are
developing there.
MACHIAVELLI. Of whose?
MONTESQUIEU. Of Joseph de
Maistre. There are therein certain general reflections that are not without
truth but that I find without application. One would say, to hear you, that you
are going to draw a people out of chaos or out of the deep night of their first
origins. You do not seem to remember that, in the hypothetical nation in which
we place ourselves, the country has attained the summit of its civilization,
that its public rights are soundly entrenched, and that it is in possession of
regular institutions.
{p. 132} MACHIAVELLI. I do not say no; therefore you will see that I
need not destroy your institutions from top to bottom to arrive at my goal. It
will suffice me to modify the arrangements and to change the methods.
MONTESQUIEU. Explain yourself.
MACHIAVELLI. Just now you gave me a discourse on constitutional
politics, I intend to profit from it. I do not, by the way, know as little as
is generally believed in Europe about all these ideas of seesaw politics; you
can see that by my discourses on Titus-Livy. But let us return to the present
problem. You noticed rightly, a moment ago, that in the parliamentary states of
Europe the public powers were distributed almost everywhere in the same manner
between a certain number of political bodies whose regular working constituted
the government.
Thus one finds everywhere, under
various names, but with practically uniform attributes, a ministerial organization, a senate, a legislative body, a council of
state, a court of cassation; I must not exact from you any useless
development of the respective mechanism of these powers, whose secret you know
better than I; it is evident that each
one of them corresponds to an essential function of the government. You
will note well that it is the function
that I call essential, not the institution. Thus it is necessary that there
be a directing power, a moderating power, a legislative power, a regulating
power; there can be no doubt of that.
MONTESQUIEU. But, if I understand you well, the various powers are but
one in your estimation and you are ready to give it all to a single man by
suppressing the institutions.
MACHIAVELLI. Once more it is that which deceives you. One could not act
thus without danger ... especially in France with the fanaticism which reigns
there for what you call the principles
of '89; but please listen to me carefully: in statics the displacement of a point of support changes the direction
of the force, in mechanics the displacement of a spring changes the movement.
{p. 133} And yet in appearance it is the same apparatus, it is the same
mechanism. It is equally true in physiology that the temperament depends on the
state of the organs. If the organs are modified, the temperament changes. Well,
the various institutions of which we have just spoken function, in governmental
economics, like real organs of the human body. If I touch the organs, they remain, but the political complexion of the
State will be changed. Do you understand that?
MONTESQUIEU. That is not difficult, and no periphrase was necessary for
it. You keep names, you put aside things. That
is what Augustus did at Rome when he destroyed the Republic. There was always a
consulate, a praetorship, a censorship, a tribunal; but there were no longer
consuls, prcetors, censors, nor tribunes.
MACHIAVELLI. You must admit that one could choose worse models.
Anything may be done in politics as long as one flatters public prejudices and respects appearances.
MONTESQUIEU. Don't go back into generalities; get to work, I am
following you.
MACHIAVELLI. Don't forget from what personal convictions each one of my
acts will spring. In my eyes your parliamentary governments are nothing but
schools for dispute, nothing but centers of sterile agitations in the midst of
which is exhausted the fertile activity of nations which the court and the
press condemn to impotence. Consequently I have no remorse; I start from an
elevated point of view and my aim justifies my acts.
For abstract theories I
substitute practical reason, the experience of centuries, the example of men of
genius who have done great things by the same means, I begin by returning to
power its vital conditions.
My first reform at once dwells upon your claim of ministerial
responsibility. In centralized countries, like yours, for instance, where
opinion instinctively leaves everything to the head of the State, the good as
well as the bad, to write at the top of a chart
{p. 134} that the sovereign is irresponsible is to lie to public
sentiment, is to establish a fiction which will always vanish at the sound of
revolutions. I begin, then, by striking
out of my constitution the principle of ministerial responsibility; the
sovereign that I institute will alone be responsible to the people.
MONTESQUIEU. Fortunately, there is no circumlocution there.
MACHIAVELLI. In your parliamentary system the representatives of the
nation have, as you explained it to me,
the initiative in projects of laws either alone or concurrently with
executive power; well, that is the source of the most serious abuses, for in
such an order of things each deputy could, at any time, substitute himself for
the government in presenting laws
insufficiently studied, insufticiently examined from all angles; why, with
parliamentary initiative, the Chamber could, if it wished, overthrow the
government. I strike out parliamentary
initiative. The sovereign alone may propose laws.
MONTESQUIEU. I see that you are taking the best method of entering the
course of absolute power; for in a State where the initiative of law belongs
only to the sovereign, it is practically the sovereign who is the sole
legislator; but before you go further, I should like to make an objection. You
wish to establish yourself on a rock, and I find you seated on sand.
MACHIAVELLI. How?
MONTESQUIEU. Did you not take
popular suffrage as the basis of your power?
MACHIAVELLI. Certainly.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, you are
nothing but a representative to be recalled at the will of the people in
whom alone resides the true sovereignty. You thought you could make use of this
principle to support your authority; don't you see that you could easily be
overthrown? On the other hand, you declared yourself solely responsible; do
you, then, consider yourself an angel? But be so, if you wish; you will still be blamed for any evil which
may arise, and you will perish at
the first crisis.
{p. 135} MACHIAVELLI. You anticipate: the objection comes too soon, but
I shall answer it at once since you force me to it. You are strangely mistaken
if you believe that I have not foreseen your argument. If my power were threatened, it could be only because of factions. I am
guarded against them by two basic rights which I have placed in my
constitution.
MONTESQUIEU. And what are those rights?
MACHIAVELLI. The appeal to the
people, the right to put the country in a state of siege. I am head of the
army, I have the entire public force in
my hands; at the first insurrection against my power, the bayonets would be an
answer to resistance and I would again find in the ballot-box a new
sanction of my authority.
MONTESQUIEU. You have unanswerable arguments; but let us get back to
the legislative body which you have established. On this point I see
complications; you have deprived this assembly of the parliamentary initiative,
but it still has the right to vote the laws which you will present for its
adoption. Undoubtedly you do not expect to permit it to exercise this right?
MACHIAVELLI. You are more suspicious than I, for I confess that I see
nothing wrong with it. Since no one but myself may present the law, I have
nothing to fear that anything may be done against my power. I have the key of
the tabernacle. Besides, as I have already told you, it is a part of my plan to allow the institutions to exist - in
appearance. Only I must state that I
do not mean to allow to the Chamber what you call the right of amendment. It is evident that with the exercise of
such a faculty, there is no law which could not be diverted from its original
goal and the disposition of which is not capable of being changed. The law is accepted or rejected - no other
alternative.
MONTESQUIEU. But no more is necessary to overthrow you: it would
suffice merely that the legislative assembly systematically reject all your proposed laws or simply that it
refuse to vote the taxes.
MACHIAVELLI. You know perfectly well that things cannot hap-
{p. 136} pen like that. Any chamber which would obstruct by such an act
of temerity the movement of public affairs would commit suicide. Besides, I
would have a thousand means of neutralising the power of such an assembly. I would reduce by half the number of
representatives and I would, consequently, have half the amount of
political passions to combat. I would
reserve for myself the nominations of the presidents and vice-presidents who
direct the deliberations. In place
of permanent sessions, I would reduce them to several months. Above all I
would do one thing which is of very great importance and the practice of which
has already begun, I hear: I would abolish the free services of the legislative
mandate; the deputies would receive a
fee so that their duties would, to some extent, be salaried. I consider this innovation the most certain method of
putting the representatives of the nation in power; I need not go into details
about that for you; the efficacy of the method is self-evident. I may add that,
as chief of the executive power, I have
the right to call together or to dissolve the legislative body, and that in
the event of dissolution, I would take advantage of the longest delay before
calling together a new representation. I understand perfectly that the
legislative assembly could not, without danger, remain independent of my power,
but be reassured: we shall soon come across other practical means of linking it
up. Do these constitutional details satisfy you? Or do you want more?
MONTESQUIEU. No, that is not at all necessary and you may go on now to
the organisation of the Senate.
MACHIAVELLI. I see that you have very well understood that there lies
the principal part of my work, the keystone of my constitution.
MONTESQUIEU. I really do not know what else you can do for, up to now,
I consider you completely master of the Senate.
MACHIAVELLI. It pleases you to say that; but, in reality, sovereignty
could not be established on such superficial bases. At the side of the ruler there must be bodies which impress by the
brilliance of their titles and their dignities and by the personal ex-
{p. 137} ample of those who compose them. It is not wise that the
sovereign be seen to have a hand in everything; he must be able, if necessary,
to cover his actions under the authority
of the great judges who surround the throne.
MONTESQUIEU. It is easy to see that it is for this role that you
destine the Senate and the Council of
State.
MACHIAVELLI. It is impossible to conceal anything from you.
MONTESQUIEU. You speak of the throne: I see that you are king and we are just now in a republic. The
transition has not been effected.
MACHIAVELLI. The illustrious French publicist cannot require me to stop
for such details of execution: from the
moment that I have full power, the hour when I shall have myself proclaimed
king is no more than a question of opportunity. I shall be king before or
after having promulgated my constitution - that is of little consequence.
MONTESQUIEU. That is true. Let us get back to the organisation of the
Senate.
TENTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. In the profound studies which you must have made for the
composition of your memorable work on The Causes of the Grandeur and of the
Decadence of the Romans, you must certainly have noticed the role played by the Senate in connection with the Emperors,
starting from the reign of Augustus.
MONTESQUIEU. That, if you will permit me to say so, is a point which
historical researches seem to me not yet to have completely clarified. This
much is certain, that up until the last
days of the Republic, the Roman Senate was an autonomous institution,
vested with great privileges, having its own powers; that was the secret of its
power, of the depth of its political traditions and of the grandeur which it
impressed on the Republic. From the time of Augustus, the Senate is no more
than an instrument in the
{p. 138} hands of the Emperors,
but it is not clear by what succession of acts they succeeded in stripping it
of its power.
MACHIAVELLI. It is not precisely to elucidate this point of history
that I beg you to return to this period of the Empire. This question for the
moment does not interest me; all that I wished to teli you is that the Senate
which I picture must fill, at the side of the prince, a political rale
analogous to that of the Roman Senate in the times which followed the fall of
the Republic.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, but at this period the law was no longer voted in the popular comitia, but by senatorial
decree; is that what you were thinking of?
MACHIAVELLI. Not at all: that would not conform at all to modern
principles of constitutional law.
MONTESQUIEU. What thanks are due you for such a scruple!
MACHIAVELLI. Oh, I have no need of that to decree what I think
necessary. No legislative order, you know, could go forth except at my
suggestion, and besides I make decrees
which have the force of laws.
MONTESQUIEU. That is true, you have forgotten that point which is by no
means trivial; but I do not quite see for what purposes you are keeping the
Senate.
MACHIAVELLI. Placed in the highest constitutional spheres, its direct
intervention need appear only under solemn circumstances; if it were necessary,
for instance, to alter the fundamental pact or if the sovereignty were placed
in danger.
MONTESQUIEU. This language is prophetic. You like to prepare your
effects.
MACHIAVELLI. The fixed idea of your modern constituents has been, up to the present, to wish to foresee
all, to provide for all in the charters which they give to the people. I
would not fall into such an error; I
would not wish to enclose myself within an impassable circle; I would
settle only that which it is impossible to leave uncertain; I would allow sufficient room for change
so that, in great crises, there would be other means of safety than the
disastrous expedient of revolution.
{p. 138} MONTESQUIEU. You speak wisely.
MACHIAVELLI. As for that which concerns the Senate, I would write into
my constitution: "The Senate has
the power to decide, by a senatus-consultum, everything which has not been
foreseen by the constitution and which is necessary to its progress; it has
the power to define the meaning of the articles of the constitution which may
give rise to different interpretations; it has the power to maintain or to
annul all the acts which are reported to it as unconstitutional by the
government or denounced by the petition of the citizens; it has the power to
lay the foundations of projects of law of a great national interest; it has the
power to propose amendments to the constitution which will be enacted by a
senatus-consultum."
MONTESQUIEU. That is all very fine and it is truly a Roman Senate. But
I should like to make several remarks about your constitution: it will, I
gather, be drawn up in very vague and
ambiguous terms since you judge in advance that the articles which it
contains will be capable of various interpretations.
MACHIAVELLI. No, but one must foresee everything.
MONTESQUIEU. I thought, on the contrary, that your principle in such a
matter was to avoid foreseeing and providing for everything.
MACHIAVELLI. The illustrious president has not haunted the palace of
Themis without profit, nor has he worn in vain the cap of president of a court
of justice. My words had no other meaning than this: One must foresee what is essential.
MONTESQUIEU. Be good enough to tell me this: Has your Senate, which is
the interpreter and guardian of the fundamental pact, a power of its own?
MACHIAVELLI. Decidedly not.
MONTESQUIEU. Then all that the Senate does will really be done by you?
MACHIAVELLI. I do not contradict that.
MONTESQUIEU. And all that it will interpret will really be interpreted
by you; all that it will modify will really be modified
{p. 140} by you; all that it will annul will really be annulled by you?
MACHIAVELLI. I admit it.
MONTESQUIEU. That is as much as to say that you reserve the right to
destroy what you have done, to take away what you have given, to change your
constitution, either for the worse or for the better, or even to make it
disappear completely if you judge it necessary. I do not conjecture at your
intentions or at the motives which might make you act in certain given
circumstances; I only ask you where the citizens would find even the weakest
guarantee in the midst of such despotism, and especially how they would ever
agree to submit to it?
MACHIAVELLI. I see that your philosophic sensitiveness is returning.
Rest assured, I would not bring any modification to the fundamental basis of my
constitution without submitting these
modifications to the acceptance of the people by means of universal suffrage.
MONTESQUIEU. But it would still be you who would be judge of the
question as to whether the modification which you propose bears within it the
fundamental character which would cause it to be submitted for the approval of
the people. I still suppose that you would not pass by a decree or by a
senatus-consultum what should be passed by a plebiscite. Would you surrender
your constitutional amendments to general discussion? Would you allow them to
be deliberated upon in the popular assembly?
MACHIAVELLI. By no means. If a debate over constitutional articles were
ever engaged in before the popular assemblies, nothing could prevent the people
from examining everything in virtue of its right of removal, and the next day
there would be a revolution in the streets.
MONTESQUIEU. You are logical at least: then the constitutional amendments are to be presented in bulk and accepted
in bulk?
MACHIAVELLI. Just so.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, then, I believe that we may pass on to the
organization of the Council of State.
{p. 141} MACHIAVELLI. Really, you direct debates with the consummate
precision of a President of a supreme court. I forgot to tell you that I would appoint the Senate as I appointed
the legislative body.
MONTESQUIEU. That is understood.
MACHIAVELLI. And it is needless to add that I should also reserve to myself the right to nominate the Presidents
and the Vice-Presidents of this assembly. Concerning the Council of State,
I shall be more brief. Your modern institutions are instruments of
centralisation so powerful that it is almost impossible to make use of them
without exercising sovereign authority.
According to your own principles, what, in fact, is the Council of State? It is a sham political body destined to put
a considerable power into the hands of the Prince, the customary power which is
a sort of discretionary one which can serve at will to make real laws.
The Council of State is, I am told, invested in France with a special
privilege perhaps even more excessive. In litigious matters, it may, I am
assured, claim by right of evocation, and recover in its own authority, before
the ordinary courts of justice, the knowledge of all litigations that seem to have
an administrative character. Thus, to characterise briefly the exceptional in
this latter privilege, the courts of justice must refuse to judge when it is a
question of an act of the administrative authority, and the administrative
authority may, in like case, take it out of the hands of the courts in order to
leave the decision to the Council of State.
Now, once more, what is the Council of State? Has it any power of its
own? Is it independent of the sovereign? Not at all. It is nothing but a
Draughting Committee. When the Council
of State makes a law, it is really the sovereign who makes it; when it
renders a judgment, it is the sovereign who renders it, or, as you say nowadays, it is the administration, the
administration which is judge and interested party in its own cause. Do
{p. 142} you know anything stronger than that and do you believe that
it would take much to place absolute power in those States where such
institutions are already organized?
MONTESQUIEU. Your criticism is very just, I admit; but, since the
Council of State is, in itself, an excellent institution, nothing is easier
than to give it the necessary independence by isolating it, to a certain
extent, from power. That, undoubtedly, is not what you will do.
MACHIAVELLI. Indeed, I shall maintain the type of unity in the
institution where I find it and I shall bring it where it does not exist, by
tightening the bonds of a solidarity which I regard as indispensable. We have
not wasted any time, you see, for here is my constitution finished.
MONTESQUIEU. Already?
MACHIAVELLI. A few contrivances wisely arranged are sufficient to
change completely the progress of power. This part of my program is complete.
MONTESQUIEU. I thought you still had something to say about the highest
court of appeal.
MACHIAVELLI. What I have to say to you can better be said at another
time.
MONTESQUIEU. It is true that if we evaluate the sum of the powers which
lie in your hands, you ought to begin to be satisfied.
To sum up:
You make laws:
1. In the form of propositions to the legislative body;
2. In the form of decrees;
3. In the form of senatorial decrees;
4. In the form of general regulations;
5. In the form of resolutions at the Council of State;
6. In the form of ministerial regulations;
7. And, finally, in the form of coups d'etat.
MACHIAVELLI. You seem to have the idea that what still re-
{p. 143} mains for me to do is not exactly the most difficult to
accomplish.
MONTESQUIEU. That is, indeed, my idea.
MACHIAVELLI. Then you have not sufficiently noticed that my
constitution was silent about a mass
of acquired rights which would be incompatible with the new order of things
that I have just established. There is, for instance, the freedom of the press; the right of association; the independence of the
magistracy; the right of suffrage, of the election, by communes, of
municipal officers; the institution of civic guards and many more things which
will have to disappear or else be
greatly modified.
MONTESQUIEU. But did you not recognize all these rights implicitly,
since you solemnly recognized the principles of which they are but the
application?
MACHIAVELLI. As I have told you,
I recognized no principle and no right in particular; moreover, the
measures which I shall take will only be the exceptions to the rule.
MONTESQUIEU. The exceptions which prove it - that is true.
MACHIAVELLI. But, to do that, I must be careful to choose the right
moment, for an error there might ruin everything. I wrote in the treatise of
The Prince a maxim which should serve as a rule of conduct in such cases:
"The usurper of a state must commit, all at one time, the acts of severity
which his safety necessitates, for later he will not be able to change either
for the better or the worse; if it is for the worse that you have to act, you
are too late once luck is against you; if it is for the better, your subjects
will not be grateful for a change which they will consider forced on
them."
The very next day after the promulgation of my constitution, I shall issue a succession of decrees,
having the force of laws, which will
suppress at a single stroke all the liberties and rights the exercise of
which might be dangerous.
MONTESQUIEU. The moment would indeed be well chosen. The country would
still be terror-stricken at your coup d'etat. As for your constitution, nothing
would be refused you, since you would be in a position to take everything; and
as for your decrees, there
{p. 144} would be nothing to grant you, since you ask for nothing and
take all.
MACHIAVELLI. You have a quick tongue.
MONTESQUIEU. Not so quick as your action. In spite of your strength and
penetration, I must admit that I have difficulty in believing that the country
would not rise up in a second coup d'etat prepared behind your back.
MACHIAVELLI. The country would
voluntarily close its eyes; for, according to my hypothesis, it would be tired of strife, it would
yearn for rest like the sand in the desert after the shower which follows the
storm.
MONTESQUIEU. You are merely making beautiful figures of speech; it is
too much.
MACHIAVELLI. I hasten to add that the
liberties which I suppress I would promise solemnly to restore after the
agitation dies down.
MONTESQUIEU. I believe they would have to wait forever.
MACHIAVELLI. That is possible.
MONTESQUIEU. It is certain, for your maxims permit the prince not to
keep his word if he finds it to his interest.
MACHIAVELLI. Don't be in a hurry to speak; you shall see the use I
expect to make of this promise; I should soon take it upon myself to pass for
the most liberal man in my kingdom.
MONTESQUIEU. That would be a startling thing for which I am not in the
least prepared; in the meanwhile, you would directly suppress all the
liberties.
MACHIAVELLI. Directly is no word for a statesman; I would suppress nothing directly; it is just at this point that the fox's skin must be sewed on to the
lion's skin. Of what use is politics if one could not reach by oblique means the goal which cannot be attained by a straight
line? The foundations of my establishments are laid, the forces are ready,
all that is necessary is to get them going. I shall do that with all the
discretion which the new cnnstitutional customs permit. It is here that one
naturally places the stratagems of government and of legislation which prudence
recommends to the prince.
{p. 145} MONTESQUIEU. I see that we are entering a new phase: I am
prepared to listen.
ELEVENTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. You wisely mention, in your Esprit des Lois that the word liberty is a word to which
one attaches greatly varied meanings.
I am told that the following proposition may be found in your book: "Liberty is the right to do that which
the laws permit." (Esprit des Lois, p. 123, book XI, chap. III.) I am
well pleased with that definition which I consider a good one, and I assure you
that my laws will permit only what is necessary. Where would you like me to
begin?
MONTESQUIEU. I should not mind seeing first of all how you will defend yourself against the press.
MACHIAVELLI. You have put your finger on the most delicate part of my
task. The system which I conceive is, in this respect, as vast in its
applications as it is diversified. Here, fortunately, I have full scope; I may
decide and command with absolute security and almost without raising any
discussion.
MONTESQUIEU. How so, if I may ask?
MACHIAVELLI. Because, in the majority of the parhamentary nations, the
press has the faculty of making itself hated, since it is at the service only
of violent, selfish, and exclusive passions, since it disparages through
prejudice, since it is mercenary, since it is unjust, since it is without
generosity and without patriotism; and, last but not least, since you will
never be able to make the masses of the people understand of what value it may
be.
MONTESQUIEU. Oh, if you are looking for grievances against the press,
it is easy enough to amass a great many. If you ask of what value it may be,
that is another thing. Briefly, it
hinders the arbitrary use of power; it compels the government to act
constitutionally; it forces the guardians of public authority to be honest,
to be moderate, and to respect themselves and others. Finally, in
{p. 146} a word, it gives to the
oppressed the means of complaining and of being heard. One pardons much to
an institution which, despite so many abuses, necessarily renders such
services.
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, I am familiar with these pleadings, but make them
understood, if you can, by the greatest number; count those who will be
interested in the fate of the press, and you will see.
MONTESQUIEU. That is why it should be just as well for you to go on at
once to the practical methods of muzzling
the press; I believe that is the word for it.
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, it is just the word for it; besides, it isn t only journalism that I intend to
repress.
MONTESQUIEU. It is printing
itself.
MACHIAVELL}. You are beginning to use irony.
MONTESQUIEU. In just another moment you are going to take that away
from me since you expect to shackle the press in all forms.
MACHIAVELLI. One is completely disarmed by such playfulness when it is
so clever; but you will understand perfectly that it would hardly be worth while escaping from the attacks of journalism
if one had to remain exposed to those of books.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, let us begin with journalism.
MACHIAVELLI. If I decided to suppress newspapers purely and simply, I
would very imprudently shock public sensibility which it is always dangerous to
oppose openly; I should proceed by a series of provisions which would seem to
be simple measures of precaution and policy. I would decree that in the future no newspaper could be founded except by
authorization of the government; right there you have the danger arrested
in its development; for, as you can easily understand, the newspapers which
would be authorized would be only those organs devoted to the government.
ONTESQUIEU. But, since you are going into all details, allow me this
question: the spirit of a newspaper changes with the per-
{p. 147} sonnel of its editorial staff; how would you get rid of a staff hostile to your power?
MACHIAVELLI. The objection is very weak, for, in the last analysis, if
I so wished, I would not authorize the publication of any new sheet; but I have
other plans, as you will see. You ask how I should counteract a hostile
editorial staff? In the simplest manner; I would add that the authorization of the government is necessary for any changes made
in the personnel of the chief or sub-editors of a newspaper.
MONTESQUIEU. But the old papers, which have remained enemies of your
government, and whose staff has not changed, will speak aloud.
MACHIAVELLI. Wait! I would reach all newspapers, present or future, by
fiscal measures which would check when needed all publicity enterprises; I would subject political journals to what
you call nowadays the stamp and security. The business of the press would
soon become so unremunerative, thanks to the raising of these taxes, that no
one would go into it unknowingly.
MONTESQUIEU. The remedy is insufficient, because political parties
spare no expenses.
MACHIAVELLI. Calm yourself - I have something with which to close their
mouths: here come the repressive
measures. There are some states in Europe where the knowledge of the
misdemeanors of the press has been given over to the jury to decide upon. I
know of no measure more deplorable than that, since it only stirs up opinion in
connection with the most insignificant nonsense of journalists. The
misdemeanors of the press have such an elastic character, the writer may
disguise his attacks under such varied and subtle forms that it is not even
possible to convey to the courts the knowledge of these offenses. The courts
will always remain armed, that goes without saying, but the usual restraining
force must be in the hands of the administration.
MONTESQUIEU. Then there are offenses which will not come under the
jurisdiction of the courts, or, rather, which you will
{p. 148} strike from both sides: from the courts of justice and from
the administration?
MACHIAVELLI. Such a misfortune! What solicitude for a few wicked little
journalists who insist on attacking and disparaging everything, who act with
the government like the bandits that travelers meet on the road. They are
always putting themselves beyond the law; what if one did outlaw them a little!
MONTESQUIEU. So it is upon them alone that your restrictions will fall?
MACHIAVELLI. I cannot undertake to do that, because these people are like the heads of the hydra of Lerna; when
you cut ten, fifty more grow. I should put the blame principally on the
newspapers as publicity undertakings. I would speak to them as follows: "I
could have suppressed you all. I did not. I can still do it. I am going to let you exist, but naturally
there is one condition, and that is that you do not obstruct my progress or
diminish my power. I do not want to have to bring action against you every
day, nor expound the law to restrain your infractions; neither can I have an army of censors whose duty it is to examine
the night before what you print the next day. You have pens, write; but
remember this: I claim, for myself
and my representatives, the right to
judge when I shall be attacked. No subtleties. When you attack me, I shall
be aware of it and you yourselves will be well aware of it; in such a case, I
will do justice myself, not at once, for I want to proceed circumspectly; I
shall warn you once, twice; the third
time your papers will be suppressed."
MONTESQUIEU. I see with astonishment that it is not exactly the
journalist who is hit in this system; it
is the newspaper, the ruin of which includes the interests that are grouped
about it.
MACHIAVELLI. Let them group themselves elsewhere! We do not bother
about such trifles. As I have just told you, my administration will not
interfere with the sentences passed by the court. Two convictions in one year will automatically bring about the
suppression of the paper. I would not rely on that alone, I would
{p. 149} say to the newspapers, in a decree or a law: "Reduced to
the greatest caution in matters that concern you, do not expect to arouse
opinion by commentaries on the debates in my chambers; I forbid you to give an accurate account of legislative proceedings,
I forbid you to give even an accurate account of the judiciary debates in
connection with the press. Nor must you count on making an impression on the
public by imaginary news from abroad; I shall punish false news by corporal
punishment whether they are published in good or in bad faith."
MONTESQUIEU. That seems to me a little hard, since newspapers, being no
longer able, without the greatest of dangers, to give themselves up to
political valuations, will not be able to exist except by news. Now, when a
paper publishes some news, it seems to me very difficult to insist on its
veracity, since very often the paper can answer for it only to a certain
extent, and when it is morally sure of its truth, material proof may be
lacking.
MACHIAVELLI. Then they will look
twice before stirring up the public - that is as it should be.
MONTESQUIEU. But I see something else. If you cannot be fought by
newspapers in the country, they can
fight you by papers abroad. All the dissatisfactions, all the hatred will
be written at the gates of your kingdom;
they will throw across the frontier fiery newspapers and pamphlets.
MACHIAVELLI. Ah, here you touch upon a point which I expect to take
care of in the most rigorous manner, because the foreign press is indeed very dangerous. First of all, the introduction or circulation in the
kingdom of unauthorized papers or pamphlets will be punished by imprisonment,
and the sentence will be sufficiently severe to do away with any desire for it.
Then, those of my subjects convicted of
having written abroad anything against the government will be sought out,
upon their return to the kingdom, and
severely punished. It is really an infamy to write against the government
when one is out of the country.
MONTESQUIEU. That depends. But the foreign press of the bordering
states will have something to say.
{p. 150} MACHIAVELLI. You think so? We are supposing that I am reigning
over a great kingdom. The little states which border my frontier will tremble
before me, I assure you. In case of attack against my government, by the press
or otherwise, I shall make them surrender the laws which cover their own
nationals.
MONTESQUIEU. I see that I was right in saying, in the Esprit des Lois,
that the frontiers of a despot ought to be laid waste. Civilization ought not
penetrate. Your subjects, I am sure,
will not know their history. According to Benjamin Constant, you will make of the kingdom an island where
one will be ignorant of what goes on in Europe, and you will make of the
capital another island where one will be ignorant of what goes on in the
provinces.
MACHIAVELLI. I do not want my kingdom to be disturbed by noises from abroad. How could foreign news arrive? By a few
agencies which centralize the news which is transmitted to them from the
four quarters of the globe. Well, I suppose
these agencies could be paid, and then they would give out no news except
by order of the government.
MONTESQUIEU. That is a good idea; now you may go on to the regulation
of books.
MACHIAVELLI. That bothers me very little, for in a period where
journalism has assumed such tremendous proportions, hardly anyone reads books
any more. But I don't by any means intend to give them a free hand. In the
first place, I shall oblige those who wish to exercise the profession of printer, editor or librarian to secure a seal, that is, an authorization which the government
may always withdraw, either directly or by decisions of thc court.
MONTESQUIEU. But, in that case,
these business people will be public officials. The instruments of thought
will become the instruments of power!
MACHIAVELLI. You will not complain, I imagine, for things were like
that in your time, too, under parliamentary rule; one must keep old customs
when they are good. I will return to fiscal
{p. 151} measures; I will extend
to books the stamp which affects the newspapers, or rather I shall impose the burden of a stamp on
those books which have not a certain number of pages. A book, for instance,
which has not two or three hundred pages
will not be a book, it will be only a brochure. I believe that you readily
grasp the advantage of this scheme: on one hand I reduce, by this tax, the swarm of little writings which are
like the appendages of journalism; on the other hand, I force those who wish to escape the tax to write long and costly
compositions which will scarcely sell or which will barely be read in this
form. Nowadays there are hardly any but a few poor devils who have the
conscience to write books; they will give it up. The economic question will
discourage literary vanity and penal law will disarm printing itself, for I shall make the publisher and the printer
criminally responsible for the contents of the books. If there are writers
daring enough to write books against the government, they must not be able to find anyone to publish them.
The effects of this wholesome intimidation will indirectly re-establish a censor that the government itself could
not exercise because of the disrepute into which this preventive measure has
fallen. Before publishing new works, the printers and the publishers will
consult one another, they will be informed; they will produce books which are
in demand, and in this manner the government will always be usefully informed
of the publications which are being prepared against it; it will bring about a
preliminary attachment when it deems necessary and will report the authors to
the courts.
MONTESQUIEU. You told me you would not touch civil rights. You do not
seem to doubt that it is the freedom of industry that you have just hit by this
legislation; the right of property, too, is involved - that will come in its
turn.
MACHIAVELLI. These are but words.
MONTESQUIEU. Then you are through with the press, I gather.
MACHIAVELLI. Oh, not at all!
MONTESQUIEU. Why, what is there left?
MACHIAVELLI. The other half of the task.
{p. 152} TWELFTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. Up to now I have
showed you only the defensive part, so to speak, of the organic regime
which I would impose on the press; now I must make you understand that I would
know how to employ this institution to the advantage of my power. I dare say
that no government, up to the present,
has had a bolder conception than the one of which I am going to speak to you.
In parliamentary countries, it is almost always because of the press that the
governments fail; well, I foresee the possibility of counteracting the press by
the press itself. Since journalism is
such a great force, do you know what
my government would do? It would
turn journalist, it would become journalism incarnate.
MONTESQUIEU. Truly, you treat me to strange surprises! It is a panorama
of infinite variety that you spread out before me; I am very curious, I must
admit, to see how you will go about putting into effect this new program.
MACHIAVELLI. Much less effort of imagination is necessary than you
think. I shall count the number of
newspapers which represent what you call the opposition. If there are ten for
the opposition, I shall have twenty for the government; if there are
twenty, I shall have forty; if there are forty, I shall have eighty. You can
readily understand now to what use I will put the faculty which I reserved for
myself to authorize the creation of new political papers.
MONTESQUIEU. Really, that is very simple.
MACHIAVELLI. Not quite as simple as you think, though, because the masses must have no suspicion of these
tactics; the scheme would lose its point, public opinion would shy at
newspapers which openly defended my policies. I shall divide in three or four categories the papers devoted to my
power. In first rank I shall put
a certain number of newspapers whose tone will be frankly official and which, at any en-
{p. 153} counter, will defend my
deeds to the death. I tell you right from the start, these will not be the
ones which will have the greatest influence on public opinion. In the second rank I shall place
another series of newspapers the character of which will be no more than
officious and the purposes of which will be to rally to my power that mass of luke-warm and indifferent persons who accept without scruple what
is established but who do not go beyond that in their political faith.
It is in the newspaper categories
which follow that will be found the most powerful supporters of my power.
Here, the official or officious tone is
completely dropped, in appearance, that is, for the newspapers of which I
am going to speak will all be attached
by the same chain to my government, a chain visible for some, invisible for
others. I shall not attempt to tell you how many of them there will be, for
I shall count on a devoted organ in each opinion, in each party; I shall have an aristocratic organ in the
aristocratic party, a republican organ in the republican party, a revolutionary
organ in the revolutionary party, an anarchist organ, if necessary, in the
anarchist party. Like the god Vishnu
my press will have a hundred arms,
and these arms will stretch out their hands to all the possible shades of
opinion over the whole surface of the country. Everyone will be of my party
whether he knows it or not. Those who
think they are speaking their own language will be speaking mine, those who
think they are agitating their own party will be agitating mine, those who
think they are marching under their own flag will be marching under mine.
MONTESQUIEU. Are these conceptions realizable or merely phantasmagoria?
It is enough to make one dizzy.
MACHIAVELLI. Spare your strength, for you have not yet come to the end.
MONTESQUIEU. I am only wondering how you will be able to direct and
rally all these military forces of publicity secretly hired by your government.
MACHIAVELLI. That is only a question of organization, you must
{p. 154} understand; I shall
institute, for instance, under the title of division of printing and the press,
a center of operation to which one will come for orders. So, for those who
will be only half in on the secret of this scheme, it will be a strange
spectacle: they will see sheets, devoted
to my government, which will attack me, which will shout, which will stir
up a turmoil of confusion.
MONTESQUIEU. This is beyond me; I no longer follow.
MACHIAVELLI. And yet it is not too difficult to understand; you will notice
that the foundation and the principles
of my government will never be attacked by the newspapers of which I am
speaking; they will never go in for anything more than a polemic skirmish, a dynastic opposition within the narrowest
limits.
MONTESQUIEU. And what advantage do you find in that?
MACHIAVELLI. Your question is rather ingenuous. The result,
considerable enough, will be to make the
greatest number say: "But you see, one is free, one may speak under this
regime, it is unjustly attacked; instead
of repressing, as it might do, it
tolerates these things!" Another result, not less important, will be
to provoke, for instance, such observations as these: "You see to what
point the foundations and principles of this government commands the respect of
all; here are newspapers which allow
themselves the greatest freedom of speech; well, they never attack the
established institutions. They must be above the injustices of human
passions, since the very enemies of the
government cannot help rendering homage to them."
MONTESQUIEU. That, I confess, is truly machiavellian.
MACHIAVELLI. You do me a great honor, but something better is yet to
come: With the aid of the secret loyalty
of these public papers, I may say that I
can direct at will the general opinion in all questions of internal or
external politics. I arouse or lull the minds, I reassure or disturb them, I
plead for and against, true and false. I have a fact announced and I have it
refuted, according to the circumstances; in this way I plumb public thought, I gather the impression produced. I try
combinations, projects, sudden decisions; in other words, I send out what you
call in
{p. 155} France feelers. I fight my enemies as I please without ever
compromising my power, since, after having the papers make certain statements,
I may, when necessary, deny them most energetically; I solicit opinion on
certain resolutions, I urge it on or I hold it back, I always have my finger on
its pulse; it reflects, without knowing it, my personal impressions, and it
occasionally is astonished at being so constantly in accord with its sovereign.
Then they say that I have the feeling for the people, that there is a secret
and mysterious sympathy which unites me to the movements of my people.
MONTESQUIEU. These various projects seem to be ideally perfect.
Nevertheless I should like to comment on something, but very timidly this time: If you depart from the silence of China,
if you permit, for the furthering of your designs, the provisional opposition
which you have just spoken of on the part of your army of newspapers, I really
do not understand how you can prevent
the non-affiliated newspapers from answering, by overwhelming thrusts, the
provocations the source of which they will guess. Do you not think that they will finally succeed in raising some of the
veils which cover so many mysterious forces? When they will learn the
secret of this comedy, will you be able to stop them from laughing at it? The
game seems to me a little dangerous.
MACHIAVELLI. Not at all; I must tell you that I have spent a good part
of my time at this point to examine the strength and the weakness of these
schemes; I am well informed on all that has to do with the conditions of
existence of the press in parliamentary countries. You must know that journalism is a sort of free-masonry;
those who live by it are all more or less attached
to one another by the bonds of professional discretion; like the ancient
soothsayers, they do not readily divulge the secret of their oracles. They
would gain nothing by betraying one another, for the majority of them have some
more or less shameful secrets. It is quite probable, I agree, that at the heart
of the capital, within a certain radius of people, these things will be no
mystery; but,
{p. 156} everywhere else, no one will suspect, and the great majority
of the nation will follow, with the utmost confidence, the trail of the leaders
which I will have given them.
What does it matter to me that, in the capital, a certain set will be
aware of the tricks of my journalism? It
is in the provinces that the greatest part of its influence will be felt.
There I shall always have the barometer of opinion which is necessary for me,
and there every one of my strokes will have the desired effect. The provincial press will belong to me
entirely, there can be no contradiction nor discussion as to that; from the center of the administration where
I shall hold court, they will transmit
regularly to the governor of each province the order to have the newspapers
speak in such and such a way, so that
at the same moment, all over the country, such and such an influence will
be produced, such and such an impulse will be given, often even before the
capital becomes cognizant of it. You see by this that the opinion of the capital is not enough to preoccupy me. When
necessary, it will learn too late about the external movement which would
surround it without its knowledge.
MONTESQUIEU. The chain of your ideas carries everything away with such
force that you make me lose the consciousness of a last objection which I
wanted to refer to you. The fact still remains, in spite of all you have just
said, that there still is in the capital
a certain number of independent newspapers. It will be practically
impossible for them to talk politics, that is certain, but they may still wage
a war of details. Your administration will not be perfect; the development of
absolute power brings with it a quantity of grievances of which even the
sovereign is not the cause; for all the acts of your representatives which will
touch private interests, you will be held guilty; they will complain, they will
attack your representatives, you will necessarily be considered responsible for
them, and esteem for you will decrease gradually.
MACHIAVELLI. I am not afraid of that.
MONTESQUIEU. It is true that you have increased to such an ex-
{p. 157} tent the means of repression that you have but to choose your
method.
MACHIAVELLI. That is not what I was going to say; I do not even wish to
be obliged to have ceaseless recourse to repression: I wish, through a simple injunction, to make it possible to put an end to any discussion on a subject
concerning the administration.
MONTESQUIEU. And how do you expect to go about that?
MACHIAVELLI. I shall oblige the
newspapers to put at the head of their columns the corrections which the
government will impart to them; the representatives of the administration
will give them notes in which they will be told categorically: "You have
asserted such and such a fact, it is not exact; you made such and such a
criticism, you were unjust, you were improper, you were wrong, do not forget
it." That will be, as you see, a loyal and open censure.
MONTESQUIEU. To which, of course, there will be no reply.
MACHIAVELLI. Obviously not; discussion will be closed.
MONTESQUIEU. In this way you will always have the last word, and you
will have it without the use of violence - it is very ingenious. You put it
very well a short time ago when you said your government is journalism
incarnate.
MACHIAVELLI. Just as I do not
wish the country to be disturbed by rumors from abroad, so I do not wish it
to be so by rumors from within, even
the simplest private news. When there will be some extraordinary suicide, some
big money question a little too suspicious, some misdeed by a public official, I shall forbid the papers to write of it.
Silence about these things shows more respect for public honesty than does
scandal.
MONTESQUIEU. And during this time you yourself will be a journalist
with a vengeance?
MACHIAVELLI. I must. To make use of the press, to make use of it in all
its forms: such is, today, the law of the powers which wish to exist. It is
very singular, but it is so. And I shall engage in it to a much greater extent
than you can imagine. In order to understand the breadth of my system, it is
neces-
{p. 158} sary to see how the language of my press is called to
co-operate with the official acts of my politics: I wish, suppose, to bring to
light the solution to a certain external or internal complication; this
solution, recommended by my newspapers which for several months have been
guiding public opinion each in its own way, is brought forth one fine day as an
official event. You know with what discretion and what ingenious consideration
authoritative documents must be drawn up on important matters: the problem to
be solved in such a case is to give a certain amount of satisfaction to each
party. Well, then, every one of my newspapers, according to its tendency, will
strive to persuade its party that the resolution that has been made is the one
which favors itself most. That which will not be written in an official
document, will be brought to light by means of interpretation; that which is
only indicated, the officious newspapers will construe more openly, and the
democratic and revolutionary papers will shout from the housetops; and while
they are disputing and giving the most varied interpretations to my acts, my
government will always be able to answer to one and all: "You are mistaken
about my intentions, you have misconstrued my declarations; I only meant this
or that." The main thing is never
to be found in contradiction with oneself.
MONTESQUIEU. What! After what you have just told me, you make such a
claim?
MACHIAVELLI. Certainly, and your astonishment proves that you did not
understand me. It is necessary to make
words, rather than deeds, harmonize. How do you expect the masses of the
people to judge if it is reason which rules its government? It is sufficient to
tell it to them. I wish, then, that the
various phases of my policies be presented as the development of a single
thought clinging to an unchanging goal. Every event, foreseen or
unforeseen, will be a result wisely brought about, the deviations of direction
will only be the different facets of the same question, the various roads which lead to the same goal, the diversified means
to an identical solution pursued unceasingly in the face of
{p. 159} obstacles. The most recent event will be given as the logical
conclusion to the previous ones.
MONTESQUIEU. In truth, you are admirable! What strength of mind! What
activity!
MACHIAVELLI. Every day my newspapers will be filled with official
speeches, with accountings, with references to the ministers and references to
the sovereign. I shall not forget that I am living in a period where it is
believed that all social problems may be settled by industry, and where the
amelioration of the fate of the working classes is constantly being sought. I
shall interest myself all the more in these questions inasmuch as they are a
very fortunate counter-irritant to absorption in internal politics. When it
comes to the peoples of the south, the governments must appear to be
unceasingly occupied; the masses are
satisfied to be inactive on condition that those who govern them give them the
spectacle of a continual activity, a sort of fever; that they constantly
attract their attention by novelties, surprises, theatrical strokes. That is
strange, perhaps, but, once more, it is so.
I would comply with these indications, point by point; conse-
quently, I would, in matters of commerce, industry, arts, and
even adminstration, look into
all sorts of projects, plans, com-
binations, changes, alterations, and improvements the fame of
which in the press would cover the voices of the most numerous
and most prolific publicists. Political economy has, it is said, made
a fortune in France; well, I should leave to your theorists, to
your utopians, to the most impassioned declaimers of your schools
nothing to invent, nothing to publish, nothing even to say. The
good of the people would be the sole and unchanging object of
my public confidences. Whether I speak myself, or whether I
have my ministers or my writers speak, one would never exhaust
the subject of the grandeur of the country, of its prosperity, of
the majesty of its purpose and of its destiny; one would never
cease to support it for its great principles of modern law, for the
great problems which arouse humanity. The most enthusiastic,
{p. 160} the most universal liberalism would breathe through my
writings. The people of the occident love the oriental style, and so the style
of all official speeches, of all official manifestoes should always be adorned
with images, always pompous, full of loftiness and reflections. The people do not like atheistic
governments; in my communications with the public I should not fail to put my acts under the invocation of the
Divinity, while tactfully associating my own star with that of the nation.
I should like the acts of my reign to be compared at every moment with
those of past governments.
It would be the best way to bring out my good deeds and to arouse the
gratitude which they deserve. It would be very important to place in relief the mistakes of those who
preceded me, to show that I have always known how to avoid those mistakes.
In this way, people would entertain
toward the regimes which preceded my power a sort of antipathy, aversion
even, which would end by becoming irreparable as an atonement.
Not only would I give to a certain number of newspapers the mission of
continually exalting the glory of my reign, of throwing back upon governments
other than mine the responsibility of the errors of European politics, but I
should like most of these eulogies to appear to be echoes of foreign papers
from which articles would be reproduced, true or false, which would render
striking homage to my own policies. Besides, I would have, abroad, some paid newspapers whose support would be
all the more efficacious since I would give them an appearance of opposition on several points of detail.
My principles, my ideas, my acts would be represented with the halo of
youth, with the prestige of the new law in contrast to the decrepitude and
decay of ancient institutions.
I realize that safety valves are necessary for public spirit, that
intellectual activity, driven back at one point, is necessarily carried over to
another. That is why I would not be afraid to throw the
{p. 161} nation into all sorts of theoretical and practical
speculations about the industrial regime.
Outside of politics, moreover, I assure you that I would be a very good
prince, that I would peacefully allow
the people to stir up philosophical or religious questions. Concerning religion, the doctrine of free
examination has become a sort of monomania. One must not oppose this
tendency, in fact, it could not be done without danger. In those countries of
Europe which are furthest advanced in civilization, the invention of printing ended by giving birth to a literature that
is insane, furious, unrestrained, almost unclean - it is a great
misfortune. Well, it is sad to say, but, to satisfy this rage of writing which
possesses your parliamentary countries, it is almost enough merely not to
thwart it.
This pestiferous literature, the course of
which cannot be obstructed, and the platitude of writers and political men who
would be at the head of journalism, would not fail to form a shocking contrast to the
dignity of the language which would fall from the steps of the throne, with
the vivacious and colorful dialectic upon which care would be taken to rest all
the manifestations of power. You understand, now, why I wished to surround the prince with this host of publicists,
administrators, lawyers, business men and attorneys who are essential to
the drawing up of this quantity of official communications of which I have
spoken to you, and the impression of which on public opinion would always be
very strong.
Such, in brief, is the general disposition of my regime concerning the
press.
MONTESQUIEU. Then you are through with it?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, and to my regret, for I was much more brief than I
should have been. But our moments are counted and we must move rapidly.
{p. 162} THIRTEENTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. I need to recover a little from the emotions which you
have caused me to undergo. What fertility of resource, what strange
conceptions! There is poetry in all that and a certain fatal beauty which the
modern Byrons would not deny; one finds there the scenic talent of the author
of Mandragore.
MACHIAVELLI. You think so, Monsieur de Decondat? Yet something tells me
that you are not so certain in your irony; you are not sure that these things
are impossible.
MONTESQUIEU. If it is my opinion which interests you, you shall have
it; I await the conclusion.
MACHIAVELLI. I have not yet reached it.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, then, continue.
MACHIAVELLI. I am at your service.
MONTESQUIEU. At the outset, you outlined a formidable legislation
concerning the press. You extinguished all voices, with the exception of your
own. Here are the mute parties before you -
do you fear no conspiracies?
MACHIAVELLI. No, for I should not be very foresighted if, with one
twist of the hand, I did not disarm them all at once.
MONTESQUIEU. In that case, what are your methods?
MACHIAVELLI. I would begin by
deporting by the hundreds those who, with gun in hand, greeted the accession of
my power. I have been told that in Italy, in Germany and in France, it was through secret societies that the
agitators who conspired against the government were recruited. I would tear
to pieces the obscure threads which are woven like spider webs in dens.
MONTESQUIEU. And then?
MACHIAVELLI. The organization of a secret society, or affiliation with
one, will be severely punished.
MONTESQUIEU. Good enough for the future; but the existing societies?
MACHIAVELLI. I shall expel, for public safety, all those who have
{p. 163} been definitely known to have been members. Those whom I do
not reach will remain under a continual threat, for I shall put through a law
which will permit the government to
deport, by administrative means, all
who may have been affiliated with such societies.
MONTESQUIEU. That is, without judgment.
MACHIAVELLI. Why do you say: without judgment? Is not the decision of a
government a judgment? You may rest assured that there will be little pity for
sedition-mongers. In countries continually troubled by civil discord, peace
must be brought about by implacable acts of vigor; if there is a reckoning of
victims to be made in order to insure tranquillity, it will be made. After
that, the appearance of the one who commands becomes so imposing that no one
dares to make an attempt on his life. After
having covered Italy with blood, Sylla may reappear in Rome as a private
individual; no one would touch a hair of his head.
MONTESQUIEU. I see that you are in a period of terrible execution; I
hardly dare to make an observation. However, it seems to me that, even in
following your plans, you could be less severe.
MACHIAVELLI. If my clemency were called upon, I should see. I can even
confide to you that a portion of the severe provisions which I shall write into
the law will become purely comminatory, on condition, however, that I am not
forced to use them otherwise.
MONTESQUIEU. And that is what you call comminatory! Nevertheless your
clemency reassures me a little; there are moments when, if some mortal were to
hear you, you would freeze his blood.
MACHIAVELLI. Why? I lived very close to the Duke of Valentinois who
left behind him a terrible reputation, which he well deserved, for he had his
pitiless moments; yet I assure you that once the necessity for execution was
passed, he was good-tempered enough. The same could be said of almost all the
absolute monarchs; at bottom they are good, especially so when it comes to
children.
{p. 164} MONTESQUIEU. I am not sure that I do not prefer you at the
height of your wrath: your gentleness is more frightening. But to return. You
have destroyed the secret societies.
MACHIAVELLI. Don’t go so fast: I did not do that: you will cause some
confusion.
MONTESQUIEU. What and how?
MACHIAVELLI. I prohibited secret
societies the character and actions of which would escape the supervision of my
government, but I did not mean to deprive myself of a means of information,
a secret influence which can be considerable if one knows how to make use of
it.
MONTESQUIEU. What can you be thinking of in that connection?
MACHIAVELLI. I foresee the possibility of giving to a certain number of these societies a sort of legal existence
or, rather, to centralise them all under
a single one the supreme head of which will be appointed by myself. In this
way I shall hold in my hand the various
revolutionary elements in the country. The people who make up these
societies belong to all nations, to all
classes, to all ranks; I shall be kept informed of the most obscure
political intrigues. It will be like a branch of my police force about which I
shall soon tell you. This subterranean world of secret societies is filled with
empty heads to which I shall not pay much attention, but there are directions
to be given there, forces to move. If something is stirring, it is my hand
which moves it; if a plot is being
prepared, I am the head of it: I am the chief of the league.
MONTESQUIEU. And you believe that these hordes of democrats, these
republicans, these anarchists, these terrorists will allow you to approach and
break bread with them; you can believe that those who wish no human domination
at all will accept a guide who will really be a master!
MACHIAVELLI. That is because you do not understand, Montesquieu! How
much impotence and even simplicity is to be found among the majority of the men
of European demagogism. These tigers
have the souls of sheep, heads full of wind; one need
{p. 165} only speak their language to be admitted to their ranks.
Besides, almost all their ideas have an
incredible affinity with the doctrines of absolute power. Their dream is the
absorption of the individual into a symbolic unity. They demand the complete realization of equality
by virtue of a power which can,
after all, be in the hands of only a
single man. You see that even here I am the head of their school! And then
it must be said that they have no choice. Secret societies will exist under the
conditions that I have just described to you or they will not exist at all.
MONTESQUIEU. The finale of sic volo sic jubeo is never long in coming,
with you. I see definitely that you are well guarded against conspiracies.
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, for it is just as well to tell you that the legislation will not permit reunions or
secret meetings which exceed a certain number of persons.
MONTESQUIEU. How many?
MACHIAVELLI. You insist upon details? No group of more than fifteen or twenty people, if that satisfies
you.
MONTESQUIEU. What! Friends numbering more than fifteen or twenty will
not be able to dine together?
MACHIAVELLI. You are already becoming alarmed, I see, in the name of
gallic gayety. Well, yes, they may
gather, for my rule will not be as savage as you think, but with one condition - that politics is not
discussed.
MONTESQUIEU. They may discuss literature?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, but on
condition that under cover of literature they do not gather for a political
purpose, for it is possible not to talk politics at all and still give to a
banquet a character which will be understood by the public. That must not
happen.
MONTESQUIEU. Alas! in such a system it is difficult for the citizens to
live without being suspected by the government!
MACHIAVELLI. You are mistaken then; none but rebels will suffer from these restrictions; no one else will
be aware of them. It goes without saying that here I have nothing to do
with acts of rebellion against my power, or of attempts to overthrow
{p. 166} it, or of attacks either against the person of the prince or
against his authority or his institutions. These are veritable crimes which are
restrained by the common law of all legislations. They would be foreseen and
punished in my kingdom according to classification and according to definitions
which would not permit of the slightest direct or indirect attempt against the
order of established things.
MONTESQUIEU. Permit me to have full confidence in you in this matter
and not to inquire about your methods. Still it is not enough to establish a
Draconian legislation; one must have a magistracy which is willing to apply it;
that point is not without its difficulties.
MACHIAVELLI. There are no difficulties there.
MONTESQUIEU. Then you are going to destroy the judicial organization?
MACHIAVELLI. I destroy nothing: I modify and I initiate.
MONTESQUIEU. Then you are going to establish martial or provost's
courts, exceptional tribunals?
MACHIAVELLI. No.
MONTESQUIEU. What then?
MACHIAVELLI. It is well for you to know first of all that I shall not
need to decree a great many severe laws whose application I shall follow up.
Many of them will already exist and will still be in force; for all governments, liberal or absolute,
republican or royalist, come up against the same difficulties; they are
obliged, in critical moments, to have recourse to rigorous laws some of
which remain, others of which are weakened, depending on the needs which cause
them. One must make use of both; concerning the latter, one must remember that
they have not been explicitly abrogated, that they were perfectly good laws,
and that the return of the abuses which
they anticipated makes their application necessary. In this way the government
seems to be performing nothing but an act of good administration, which is
often the case. You see that it is only a question of giving a little
elasticity to the action of the courts, which is always easy in centralized
{p. 167} countries where the magistracy is in direct contact with the
administration, by means of the ministry upon which it depends. As for the new
laws which will be enacted under my reign and which, for the most part, wlll
have been given out in the form of simple decrees, the application will perhaps
not be quite so easy, because in those countries where the magistrate has a
life-appointment, he may oppose by himself, in the interpretation of the law,
the too direct action of power. But I believe I have found a plan very ingenious,
very simple, apparently perfectly lawful, which, without affecting the
permanence of the magistracy, will modify what is too absolute in the
consequences of the principle. I shall
issue a decree that the magistrates must retire when they reach a certain age.
I do not doubt that here, too, I shall have opinion on my side, for it is a
painful spectacle to see, as is frequently the case, that the judge, who is
called upon to decide the loftiest and most difficult questions, falls into a
decrepitude of mind which renders him incapable.
MONTESQUIEU. But, if you will permit, I have some ideas about the
things of which you speak. The fact which you bring out does not at all conform
to experience. With those men who live by the continual exercise of the mind,
the intelligence does not weaken as you mention; that, if I may say so, is the
privilege of thought in those people where it becomes the principal element.
If, in the case of some magistrates, the faculties become unsettled with age,
in the case of the greater number, they are preserved and their light
continually increases; there is no need to replace them, for death causes in
their ranks the natural voids which are necessary; but even if there were,
indeed, among them as many examples of decadence as you claim, it would still
be a thousand times more worthwhile, in the interests of justice, to tolerate
that evil than to accept your remedy.
MACHIAVELLI. I have reasons superior to yours.
MONTESQUIEU. Reasons of state?
MACHIAVELLI. Perhaps. You may be sure of one thing: in this
{p. 166} new organization the magistrates will not deviate more than
formerly in purely civil questions.
MONTESQUIEU. How do I know? For, according to your words, I already see
that they will deviate in political questions.
MACHIAVELLI. They will not deviate; they will do their duty as they
must do it, for, in political matters, it is necessary, in the interest of
order, that the judges be always on the side of power. It would be the worst
thing in the world if a sovereign could be affected by seditious decrees
against the government which the whole country would seize upon at once. Of
what value would it be to have forced the press to be silent if the judgments
of the courts were free?
MONTESQUIEU. Under a modest appearance, your method is quite powerful,
is it not? Since you attach such importance to it.
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, for it causes this spirit of resistance to disappear,
this esprif de corps which is always so dangerous in judiciary companies which
have conserved the memory, perhaps the cult, of past governments. It introduces
in their midst a mass of new elements the influence of which are wholly
favorable to the spirit which animates my reign. Every year twenty, thirty, or
forty posts of magistrates which become vacant by retirement bring about a change in the whole personnel of the
courts which may in this way be renewed from top to bottom every six
months. One single vacancy, you know, may entail fifty appointments by the
successive effect of the heads of different ranks who are being moved up. You
can imagine what will take place when there are thirty or forty vacancies at
once. It is not only that the collective spirit disappears in what politics
there may be, but one becomes more closely united to the government, with
disposes of a greater number of places. There are young men who are desirous to
start their careers, who are no longer stopped by the perpetuity of those who
precede them. They know that the government likes order, that the country likes
it also, and it becomes a question merely of serving the two, in doing justice,
when order plays its part.
{p. 169} MONTESQUIEU. But, except for incredible blindness, you will be
accused of arousing in the magistracy a spirit of competition fatal to the
judiciary bodies. I shall not show you what are the consequences of this, since
I know that that would not stop you.
MACHIAVELLI. I make no claim to escape criticism; it is of little
importance to me, provided that I do not hear it. In all things I shall have
for a principle the irrevocability of my
decisions, in spite of murmurings. A prince who acts thus is always sure of
gaining respect for his will-power.
FOURTEENTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. I have already told you many times, and I repeat it once
more, that I have no need to create and to organize everything; that I find in
the institutions already existing a great many of the instruments of my power.
Do you know what is the constitutional guarantee?
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, and I am sorry for your sake, because, without
meaning to, I deprive you of a surprise which you would perhaps not have been
angry to prepare for me, with the cleverness of setting which is your strong
point.
MACHIAVELLI. Of what are you thinking?
MONTESQUIEU. I am thinking of what is true, at least, for France, of
which you seem to be speaking; and that is, that it is a law of circumstance
which must be modified, if not made to disappear completely, under a regime of
constitutional liberty.
MACHIAVELLI. I consider you very moderate on this point. According to
your ideas, it is simply one of the most tyrannical restrictions in the world.
What! When private persons will be injured by representatives of the government
in the exercise of their duties, and they will bring them before the courts,
the judges will have to answer them: "We cannot decide for you, the door
of the praetorium is closed; go to the administration to ask for the
authorization to bring suit against its officials." But
{p. 170} that would be a veritable denial of justice. How often will it
happen that the government will authorize such suits?
MONTESQUIEU. What are you complaining of? It seems to me that that
would satisfy you very well.
MACHIAVELLI. I only told you that in order to show you that, in states
where justice comes across such obstacles, a government has not much to fear
from the tribunals. It is always as provisional agreements that such exceptions
are inserted into the law, but once the period of transition is passed, the
exceptions remain, and that is as it should be, for as long as order reigns,
they disturb no one, and when times are troubled, they are necessary.
There is another modern institution which serves the operation of
central power with no less efficacy: that is the creation, in connection with
the tribunals, of a great magistracy
which you call the public ministry and which used to be called, with much
more reason, the ministry of the King, because this office is essentially
removable and revocable at the will of the Prince. I have no need to describe
to you the influence of this magistrate over the courts close to which he has
his bench; suffice it to say that it is considerable. Remember all this
carefully. Now I am going to speak to you of the highest court of appeal which
plays a considerable ro1e in the administration of justice.
The court of appeal is more than a
judiciary body; it is, to a certain extent,
a fourth power in the state, because it has the last word in the interpretation
of the law. So I shall repeat what I believe I told you concerning the
Senate and the legislative assembly: such a court of justice which would be
completely independent of the government would, in view of its sovereign and
almost discretionary power of interpretation, be able to overthrow it if it so wished. It would suffice merely to
restrain or to extend systematically, in the direction of liberty, the
provisions of laws which regulate the exercise of political rights.
MONTESQUIEU. And apparently it is just the contrary that you are going
to ask of it?
MACHIAVELLI. I shall ask nothing of it; it will itself do what is
{p. 171} suitable for it to do. For it is here that the different
causes of influence which I mentioned above will cooperate the most strongly.
The nearer the judge is to power, the more it belongs to him. The conservative
spirit of the reign will develop here to a greater degree than anywhere else,
and the laws of strict police politics will receive, at the hands of this great
assembly, an interpretation so favorable to my power, that I shall be relieved
of a multitude of restrictive measures which, without that, would become
necessary.
MONTESQUIEU. One would really say, to hear you, that laws are capable of the most fantastic
interpretations. Are the legislative texts not clear and precise, that they
lend themselves to extensions or restrictions such as you intimate?
MACHIAVELLI. Surely it is not to the author of the Esprit des Lois, to
the experienced magistrate who must have rendered so many excellent decisions,
that I can hope to teach the meaning of jurisprudence. There is no text, no matter how clear, which is not capable of
receiving the most contrary interpretations, even in pure civil law; but I
beg you to remember that we are talking of political matters. Now, it is a habit common to legislators of all
times to draw up certain of their provisions in a manner elastic enough to
regulate cases or, according to circumstances, to introduce exceptions which it
would not have been prudent to explain more precisely.
I am well aware that I must give you examples, for without that my
proposition would seem too vague to you. The difficulty for me is to find one
of so general a character as to dispense with entering into long details. Here
is one which I take by preference, since a short time ago we touched upon it.
In speaking of the constitutional guarantee, you were saying that this
exceptional law should be modified in a free country.
Well, I am supposing that this law exists in the state which I govern,
I am supposing that it was modified; therefore I imagine that before me a law
was promulgated which, in electoral
{p. 172} matters, permitted the prosecution of representatives of the
government without the authorization of the Council of State.
The question comes up under my rule which, as you know, has introduced
great changes in public equity. Someone wishes to bring suit against an
official on the occasion of an electoral act; the magistrate of the public
ministry rises and says: "The protection you wish to take advantage of
can't be applied; it is no longer compatible with present institutions. The old
law which dispenses with the authorization of the Council of State in such a
case has been tacitly abrogated."
The courts answer yes or no, in the end the discussion is brought before the court
of appeals and this high tribunal thus defines public equity on this point:
"The old law is tacitly abrogated;
the authorization of the Council of State is necessary to prosecute public
officials, even in electoral matters."
Here is another example, somewhat more special, it is borrowed by the
police from the press: I have been told that in France there was a law which
required, under penal sanction, that all those who made a living distributing
and peddling pamphlets must be provided with an authorization given out by the
public official who is, in each province, entrusted with the general
administration. The law wished to regulate peddling and to subject it to strict
supervision; that is the essential aim of this law; but the text of the
provision reads, I suppose: "All distributors or peddlers must be provided
with an authorization, etc."
Well, the court of appeals, if the question arises, will be able to
say: "It is not only the professional act that the respective law had in
view. It is any act whatsoever of distribution or peddling. Consequently, even the author of a pamphlet or of a work,
several copies of which are distributed, even as gifts, without preliminary
authorization, is party to distribution and peddling; therefore he comes under
the threat of the penal provision."
You see at once what results from such an interpretation; instead of a
simple police law, you have a law which
restricts the right to publish one's thoughts by means of the press.
{p. 173} MONTESQUIEU. All you needed was to be a jurist.
MACHIAVELLI. That is absolutely necessary. How are governments overthrown these days? By legal distinctions,
by the subtleties of constitutional law, by opposing to the ruling power all
the means, all the weapons, all the contrivances which are not directly
prohibited by law. And you expect that the ruling power would not make use of
these stratagems of law which the parties employ with such obstinacy against
the power? But then the struggle would not be equal, resistance would not even
be possible; it would be necessary to abdicate.
MONTESQUIEU. You have so many stumbling-blocks to avoid that it would
be a miracle if you anticipated all of them. The courts are not bound by their
judgments. With a jurisprudence such as that which would be applied under your
rule, you will have many lawsuits on your hands. The persons amenable to a
tribunal will not weary of knocking at the door of the courts to demand other
interpretations from them.
MACHIAVELLI. In the beginning that is possible; but when a certain number of arrests will have
definitely put jurisprudence in its proper place, no one will continue to
do what it forbids, and the source of the lawsuits will be exhausted. Public
opinion would, in fact, be so much satisfied that when it came to a question of
the meaning of laws, it would be referred to the official counsel of the
administration.
MONTESQUIEU. And how, may I ask?
MACHIAVELLI. At certain critical times when there is fear that some
difficulty may arise over such and such a point of legislation, the
administration will declare, in the form of a notice, that such and such an act
comes under the application of the law, that the law covers such and such a
case.
MONTESQUIEU. But those are merely declarations which in no way bind the
courts.
MACHIAVELLI. Undoubtedly, but these declarations have, none the less, a
very great influence on the decisions of the courts of justice, coming as they
do from an administration as powerful as
{p. 174} the one I have organized. They will particularly have great
control over individual resolutions and, in many cases (not to say always),
they will forestall annoying lawsuits; people will refrain from them.
MONTESQUIEU. The farther we advance, the more I see that your government is becoming more and more
paternal. What you are speaking of are judiciary customs almost
patriarchal. It does indeed seem impossible that you should not be credited
with a solicitude which displays itself under so many ingenious forms.
MACHIAVELLI. You must, nevertheless, realize that I am very far from the barbarous processes of government which you
seemed to attribute to me at the beginning of this conversation. You see that violence plays no role; I take my
point of support where everyone takes it nowadays-from the law.
MONTESQUIEU. From the law of the strongest.
MACHIAVELLI. The law which is obeyed is always the law of the
strongest: I know of no exception to this rule.
FIFTEENTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. Although we have surveyed a great sphere and you have
organized almost everything, I need not conceal from you that there still
remains much for you to do in order to reassure me completely as to the
continuance of your power. That which
astonishes me the most in the world is that you have based it on universal
suffrage, that is, the most inconsistent element of its nature of which I
am aware. Let us understand one another perfectly; you told me that you were
king?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, king.
MONTESQUIEU. For life, or hereditary?
MACHIAVELLI. I am king as one is king in all the kingdoms of the world,
hereditary king with a succession from
male to male, in order of issue, with the perpetual exclusion of women.
MONTESQUIEU. You are not gallant.
{175} MACHIAVELLI. Pardon me, but I am prompted by the traditions of
the Salian and Frankish monarchy.
MONTESQUIEU. You will, no doubt, explain to me how you expect to
reconcile heredity with, for instance, the democratic suffrage of the United
States?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes.
MONTESQUIEU. What! With this principle you hope to bind the will of future generations?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes.
MONTESQUIEU. For the present what I should like to see is the way you
would manage with this suffrage when it is a question of applying it to the
nomination of public officers.
MACHIAVELLI. What public officers? You know very well that, in
monarchical states, it is the government which appoints the officials of all
ranks.
MONTESQUIEU. That depends on which officials. Those which have to do
with the administration of the townships are, in general, elected by the
inhabitants, even under monarchical governments.
MACHIAVELLI. That will be changed by a law; in the future they will be
appointed by the government.
MONTESQUIEU. And you will also appoint the representatives of the
nation?
MACHIAVELLI. You know that that is not possible.
MONTESQUIEU. Then I pity you, for if you leave the voting to itself, if
you do not arrange for some new plan, the assembly of the representatives of
the people will not be long, under the influence of the parties, in filling up
with deputies hostile to your power.
MACHIAVELLI. Just for that reason I had not the slightest intention of
leaving the voting to itself.
MONTESQUIEU. I expected that. But what plan will you adopt?
MACHIAVELLI. The first point is to link to the government those who
wish to represent the country. I shall impose upon the candidates the solemnity
of the oath. Here it is not a question of an
{176} oath to the nation, as your revolutionaries of '89 understood it;
I want an oath of loyalty to the prince
himself and to his constitution.
MONTESQUIEU. But since in politics you do not fear to violate your own,
how can you expect that they should be more scrupulous than yourself on this
point?
MACHIAVELLI. I count little on the political conscience of men; I count
on the power of opinion: no one will dare to debase himself before it by openly
proving false to his sworn oath. They will dare still less since the oath which I shall place upon them will
precede the election instead of following it, and they will be without any
excuse for seeking votes, under these conditions, if they are not decided in
advance to serve me. Now it is necessary to give to the government the means of
resisting the influence of the opposition, of preventing them from making
deserters of those who wish to defend it. At election time, the parties are in
the habit of announcing their candidates and placing them before the
government; I shall do as they do, I shall have candidates announced and I
shall place them before the parties.
MONTESQUIEU. If you were not all-powerful, the method would be odious,
for, while openly offering combat, you provoke blows.
MACHIAVELLI. I expect the agents of my government, from first to last,
to see to it that my candidates are successful.
MONTESQUIEU. That goes without saying.
MACHIAVELLI. Everything is of the greatest importance in this matter.
"The laws which establish suffrage are fundamental; the manner in which
suffrage is granted is fundamental; the law which determines the manner of granting
permits to vote is fundamental." (Esprit des Lois, page 12 et seq., Book
II, et seq., Chapter II, et seq.) Was it not you who said that?
MONTESQUIEU. I do not always recognize my language when it passes
through your lips; it seems to me that the words which you cite were applied to
democratic government.
MACHIAVELLI. Undoubtedly, and you have already been able to sec that my
essential policy was to trust myself to the people, and
{p. 177} that although I wear a crown, my real and declared purpose is
to represent it. Trustee of all the powers which it has delegated to me, I
alone, after all, am its true representative. What I wish, it wishes; what I
do, it does. Accordingly, it is indispensable that at the time of the elections
the factions should not be able to substitute their influence for that of which
I am the armed personification. Therefore I have found still other means to
paralyze their efforts. You must know, for instance, that the law which forbids gatherings will naturally apply to those which
might be formed in view of the elections. In this way, the parties will
neither be able to plan together nor to make secret arrangements.
MONTESQUIEU. Why do you always put the parties first? Under pretext of
putting shackles on them, do you not really put them on the voters themselves?
The parties, in short, are only masses of voters; if the voters are not
permitted to become enlightened through gatherings, through conferences, how
will they be able to vote with a thorough knowledge of the matter?
MACHIAVELLI. I see that you do not know with what infinite art, with
what guile, political passions frustrate prohibitive measures. Do not concern
yourself with the voters - those who are animated by good intentions will
always know for whom to vote. Besides, I shall use tolerance; not only shall I
not forbid the gatherings which are formed in the interest of my candidates,
but I shall go so far as to close my
eyes to the actions of some popular candidates who will agitate noisily in the
name of liberty; only I may as well tell you that those who shout the loudest will be my own men.
MONTESQUIEU. And how are you going to regulate the voting?
MACHIAVELLI. First of all, concerning the country people, I do not want
the voters to go to vote in the great centers where they might come in contact
with the spirit of opposition of the cities or towns and, from there, receive
the pass-word which would come from the capital; I want them to vote by
communes. The result of this plan, which seems so simple, will nonetheless be
considerable.
MONTESQUIEU. That is easy to understand; you force the country vote to
be divided among insignificant notorieties or, for lack of familiar names, to
fall back on the candidates designated by your government. I should be very
much surprised if, under this system, many capable or talented men were
produced.
MACHIAVELLI. Public order has less need of talented men than of men
devoted to the government. Great ability holds sway from the throne and among
those who surround it - elsewhere it is useless; it is almost harmful even, for
it can only act against the power.
MONTESQUIEU. Your aphorisms cut like a sword; I have no arguments to
oppose you. Please let us go on with the rest of your electoral regulations.
MACHIAVELLI. For the reasons which I have just deduced for you I also
do no want the vote by ticket which falsifies the election and which permits
the coalition of men and of principles. Besides I shall divide the electoral
colleges into a certain number of administrative districts in which there will
be room for the election of but a single
deputy and where, consequently, each voter will be able to place only one
name on his voting paper. In addition, there must be the possibility of
neutralizing the opposition in the districts where it makes itself too strongly
felt. Thus, let us suppose that in the previous elections a district has been
noted for the majority of its hostile votes, or that one may reasonably suppos
that it will declare itself against the government candidates, nothing is
easier than to remedy that: if this district has only a small population, it
may be attached to a district nearby or far away, but of greater expanse, in
which its votes will be drowned and its political spirit lost. If the hostile
district, on the contrary, has a large population, it may be divided up into
several parts and annexed to neighboring districts in which it will be
completely destroyed. You understand that I am passing over a mass of details
which are only accessories to the whole. Thus, when necessary, I divide the
colleges into sections of colleges in order to give more oppor-
{p. 179} tunity for administrative action, and I have the colleges and
the divisions of colleges presided over by municipal officers whose nominations
depend upon the government.
MONTESQUIEU. I notice, with a certain surprise, that you are not making
use of a measure which you recommended during the time of Leo X, and which
consists of the substitution of votes by investigators after the elections.
MACHIAVELLI. That would perhaps be too difficult in these days, and I
believe that this method should not be used except with the greatest caution.
Besides, a clever government has so many other resources! Without directly
buying the vote, with out-and-out money, nothing is easier than to influence
the vote of the masses through administrative concessions, by promising here a
port, there a market, further on a road, a canal; and inversely, by doing
nothing for the cities and towns where the vote is unfavorable.
MONTESQUIEU. I have no objection to make to the profundity of these
plans; but are you not afraid that people will say that sometimes you corrupt
and sometimes you oppress popular suffrage? Are you not afraid of compromising
your power in the struggles in which it will be so directly engaged? The
slightest success obtained over your candidates will be a brilliant victory
which will be a severe blow to your government. What keeps me constantly
worried for you is that I see you always obliged to succeed in all things if
you wish to avert a disaster.
MACHIAVELLI. You speak the language of fear, calm yourself. At the
point to which I have arrived, I have succeeded in so many things that I cannot
perish because of extremely small things. Bossuet's grain of sand is not made
for true statesmen. I am so advanced in my career that I could, without danger,
brave even storms; what, then, signify the minute difficulties of
administration of which you speak? Do you believe that I claim to be perfect?
Do I not know very well that more than one blunder will be committed around me?
No, there is no doubt that I shall not be able to prevent a certain amount of
pillage and scandal here
{p. 180} and there. Is that sufficient to hinder the whole thing from
progressing? The main thing is not so much to make no errors as to accept the
responsibility with an attitude of energy which commands respect from the
slanderers. And, what is more, if the opposition should succeed in introducing
some orators into my chamber, what difference does it make to me? I am not one
of those who wish to reckon without the necessity of their times. One of my
great principles is to oppose like to like. Just as I make use of the press by
the press, I would make use of the courts by the courts; so I would have as
many men as necessary ready and capable of speaking several hours without a
stop. The chief thing is to have a compact majority and a reliable president.
There is a particular art in conducting debates and carrying off the vote. And,
besides, would I need to make use of the cunning of parliamentary strategy? Nineteen-twentieths of the Chamber would be
my own men who would vote on orders, while I would pull the strings of an
artificial and clandestinely recruited opposition; after that, let them make
beautiful speeches: they will go into the ears of my deputies as the wind
enters the keyhole of a lock. Now do you want me to speak to you of my Senate?
MONTESQUIEU. No, I know from Caligula what that will be like.
SIXTEENTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. One of the salient points of your politics is the
annihilation of parties and the destruction of collective forces. You have
certainly not failed in this program; yet I see all around you some things
which you have not even touched upon.
You have not dealt with the clergy nor the University nor the bar nor the
national militia nor the commercial corporations; and yet it seems to me
that there is more than one dangerous element in all that.
MACHIAVELLI. I cannot tell everything at once. Let us turn at once to
the national militia so that I need be bothered about it no
{p. 181} further. Their dissolution was, of necessity, one of the first
acts of my power. The organization of a civilian guard cannot be reconciled
with the existence of a regular army, since citizens in arms may, at a given
time, be transformed into rebels. Nevertheless, this point is not without its
difficulty. The national guard is a useless institution, but it bears a popular
name. In military states it flatters the puerile instincts of certain bourgeois
classes which, by a rather ridiculous eccentricity, unites to commercial habits
the taste for warlike demonstration. It is a harmless prejudice which it would
be all the more ill-advised to go counter to, since thc prince must never have
the semblance of separating his interests from those of the city which thinks
it has found a guarantee in the arming of its inhabitants.
MONTESQUIEU. But you mentioned that you would break up this militia.
MACHIAVELLI. I would break it up in order to reorganize it upon other
lines. The main thing is to put it under the immediate orders of the agents of
civil authority and to relieve it of the prerogative of recruiting its chiefs
by means of elections; that is what I am going to do. Besides, I shall organize
it only in the proper places, and I reserve the right to dissolve it again and
to re-establish it upon still other lines, if circumstances require. I have
nothing more to say to you on this point. As for the University, the present order of things is practically
satisfactory. You are aware, of course, that these great bodies of instruction
are no longer organized as they formerly were. I am assured that almost
everywhere they have lost their autonomy
and are no longer anything more than public services in care of the State.
Now, as I have told you more than once, where the State is, the prince is; the
moral direction of the public establishments is in his hands; it is his agents
who inspire the spirit of youth. The heads as well as the members of the teaching
body of all degrees are appointed by the government; they are attached to it,
they depend upon it, that suffices; if here and there some traces of
independent organization remain in any public school or academy whatsoever, it
is easy to bring it
{p. 182} back to the common center of unity and direction. It is only a
question of a regulation or even of a simple ministerial order. At full speed I
pass over the details which need no closer attention. Yet I must not leave this
subject without telling you that I consider it very important to proscribe the studies of constitutional
politics in the teaching of law.
MONTESQUIEU. Indeed you have good reasons for that.
MACHIAVELLI. My reasons are simple enough; I do not wish the young
people, on leaving school, to busy themselves with politics at random; at the
age of eighteen, one goes about making constitutions as one makes tragedies.
Such teaching can only give false ideas to the youth and initiate it
prematurely into matters which are beyond the limits of its reasoning. It is
with these notions poorly digested and poorly understood that unsound statesmen
are prepared, utopians the temerity of whose spirit is later translated into
temerity of action. The generations which are born under my reign must be
brought up in the respect of established institutions, in the love of the
prince; for this purpose I should make an ingenious use of the power of
management of instruction: I believe that in general a great mistake is made in
the school - contemporary history is neglected. It is at least just as
essential to know one's own time as the time of Pericles; I should like to have
the history of my reign, of myself while living, taught in the schools. That is
how a new prince enters into the heart of a generation.
MONTESQUIEU. That would, of course, be a continual apology for all your
deeds?
MACHIAVELLI. It is obvious that I would not have myself disparaged. The
other method which I would use would have for a goal the reaction against free
instruction, which cannot be directly proscribed. The universities contain
armies of professors whose leisure time may be used for the propagation of good
doctrines. I would have them give free courses in all the important towns, and
in this way I would mobilize the education and the influence of the government.
{p. 183} MONTESQUIEU. In other words, you absorb, you confiscate for your profit even the last gleams of
independent thought.
MACHIAVELLI. I confiscate nothing at all.
MONTESQUIEU. Are you going to permit professors other than your own to
popularize science by the same methods, without license or authorization?
MACHIAVELLI. What! Do you expect me to sanction clubs?
MONTESQUIEU. No. Let us go on to something else.
MACHIAVELLI. Among the multitude of customary measures which the safety
of my government requires, you have called my attention to the bar; that means going further than is necessary for the moment;
besides, here I touch upon civil interests and you know that, in this matter,
my rule of conduct is to abstain as much as possible. In the states where the
bar is composed of a corporation, those amenable to a tribunal consider the
independence of this institution as a guarantee inseparable from the right of
the defense before the courts, and that it is a question of their honor, their
interest, or their life. It is a serious thing to intervene here, for public
opinion could be aroused at a cry which would not fail to cast aside the whole
corporation. Nonetheless, I am aware that this order will be a center of
influences constantly hostile to my power. This
profession - and you know it better than I, Montesquieu -develops characters which are cold and
stubborn in their principles, it develops spirits whose tendency is to seek in the acts of power the element of
pure legality. The lawyer has not the lofty sense of social necessities to
the same degree as has the magistrate; he sees the law from too near and from
angles too petty to allow of just sentiment, whereas the magistrate. ...
MONTESQUIEU. Spare me the apology.
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, for I am not forgetting that I am face to face with a
descendant of the great magistrates who upheld the throne of the monarchy in
France with such brilliance.
MONTESQUIEU. And who rarely lent themselves to the registration of
decrees when they violated the law of the state.
{p. 184} MACHIAVELLI. That is how they ended by overthrowing the state
itself. I do not want my courts of justice to be parliaments and the lawyers,
under immunity of their gowns, to play politics there. The greatest man of the
century to whom your country had the honor of giving birth, said: "I
should like to cut the tongue of a lawyer who has anything to say against the
government." Modern customs are milder; I should not go so far. On the first
day, and in fitting circumstances, I shall limit myself to doing a very simple
thing: I shall issue a decree which, while respecting the independence of the
corporation, will nevertheless arrange
for the lawyers to receive the investiture of their profession from the
sovereign. In the expose of the motives of my decree, it will not, I
believe, be very diflicult to show the people that they will find in this
method of appointment a more weighty guarantee than when the corporation draws
upon itself, that is, with the elements necessarily a little confused.
MONTESQUIEU. It is only too true that one may lend to the most
detestable measures the language of reason! But look here, what are you going
to do now in connection with the clergy?
Here is an institution which depends on the state only on one side and which is
set off by a spiritual power the
seat of which is not with you. I know of nothing more dangerous to your power,
I declare, than this power which speaks
in the name of heaven and the roots of which are all over the earth: do not
forget that the Christian word is a word of liberty. Undoubtedly the laws of
the state have established a profound demarcation between religious and
political authority; undoubtedly the word of the ministers of the cult cannot
be heard except in the name of the Gospel; but the divine spiritualism which is
evolved from it is the stumbling-block of political materialism. It is this book, so humble and so gentle, which
has destroyed by itself the Roman empire and Caesarism and its power. Those
nations which are frankly Christian will always escape despotism, for Christianity raises the dignity of man too
high for despotism to reach, since it develops moral forces upon which
human power has no hold.
{p. 185} (Esprit des Lois, page 371, Book XXIV, Chapter I et seq.) Beware of the priest: he depends only upon
God, and his influence is everywhere, in the sanctuary, in the famlly, in
the school. You can do nothing to him: his hierarchy is not yours, he obeys a
constitution which is decided neither by the law nor by the sword. If you reign
over a Catholic nation and you have the clergy for enemy, you will perish
sooner or later, even if all the people were for you.
MACHIAVELLI. I am not quite sure why you are pleased to make of the
priest an aposde of liberty. I have never seen that, neither in ancient nor in
modern times; I have always found in the
priesthood a natural support of absolute power. Note this: if, in the
interests of my establishment, I had to make concessions to the democratic
spirit of my epoch, if I took universal suffrage as the foundation of my power,
it is only a stratagem required by the times. I claim the benefit of divine right nonetheless, I am king by the
grace of God nonetheless. In view of this, the clergy must support me, for
my principles of authority conform to their own. If, however, they show
themselves rebellious, if they take advantage of their influence to carry on an
underhand war against my government ...
MONTESQUIEU. Well, what then?
MACHIAVELLI. You who speak of the influence
of the clergy, do you not know to what point it was able to make itself
unpopular in certain Catholic states? In
France, for instance, journalism and the press defamed it to such an extent
before the masses, they ruined its mission so greatly, that if I reigned in its
kingdom, do you know what I could do?
MONTESQUIEU. What?
MACHIAVELLI. I could provoke a
schism in the Church which would break all the bonds which attach the clergy to the court of Rome, for that is the
Gordian knot. Through my press, through my publicists, through my statesmen I
would have the following words circulated: "Christianity is independent of
Catholicism; what Catholicism forbids, Christianity permits; the inde-
{p. 186} pendence of the clergy, its submission to the court of Rome,
are purely Catholic dogmas; such an order of things is a continual menace to
the safety of the state. The loyal
subjects of the kingdom should not have a foreign prince as their spiritual
leader; that is to leave internal order to the discretion of a power which
might become hostile at any moment; this hierarchy of the Middle Ages, this
protectorate of the people as children can no longer be reconciled with the
virile genius of modern civilization, with its wisdom and its independence. Why
go to Rome to seek a director of conscience? Why should the head of the
political authority not be at the same time the head of the religious
authority? Why should the sovereign not be pontiff?" Those are the words I
would have circulated by the press, especially by the liberal press, and, what
is very probable, the masses of the people would hear them with joy.
MONTESQUIEU. If you can believe that and if you dared to attempt such
an undertaking, you would learn promptly and terribly the power of Catholicism,
even among the nations where it seems to be weakened. (Esprit des Lois, Page
393, Book XXV, Chapter XII.)
MACHIAVELLI. Attempt it, great God! But I ask pardon, on my knees, of
our divine master for having as much as described this sacrilegious doctrine,
inspired by the hatred of Catholicism; but God, who has instituted human power,
does not forbid it to protect itself against the enterprises of the clergy, who
violate the precepts of the Gospel when they show insubordination to the
prince. I know that they will not conspire except because of an imperceptible
influence, but I would find the way to arrest the intention which directs the
influence, even at the heart of the court of Rome.
MONTESQUIEU. How?
MACHIAVELLI. It would suffice for me to point out at the Holy See the
moral condition of my people, trembling under the yoke of the Church, aspiring
to cast it off, capable of detaching itself
{p. 187} from the Catholic unity and of throwing itself into the schism
of the Greek or Protestant Church.
MONTESQUIEU. Threat instead of action!
MACHIAVELLI. How mistaken you are, Montesquieu, and how you disregard
my respect for the pontifical throne! The only role that I wish to play, the
sole mission which belongs to me as Catholic sovereign would be just that of
defending the Church. In the present day, you know, temporal power is gravely
threatened, both by irreligious hate and by the ambition of the countries north
of Italy. Well, I would say to the Holy
Father: "I shall support you against all of them, I shall save you -
it is my duty, it is my mission. But at least do not attack me - support me with your moral influence."
Would that be too much to ask when I would endanger my popularity by
holding myself up to those who are called the European democracy as defender of
temporal power which is, alas! completely discredited at present. This danger
would not stop me. Not only would I check any enterprise against the
sovereignty of the Holy See on the part of the neighboring states, but if, by
misfortune, it were attacked, if the
Pope were to be driven out of the Papal States, as has already happened, my bayonets alone would bring him back
and would keep him there always as long as I live.
MONTESQUIEU. That would indeed be a master stroke, for if you kept a
perpetual garrison at Rome, you would practically have the Holy See at your
command, as if it were in some province of your kingdom.
MACHIAVELLI. Do you think that after such a service rendered to the
papacy, it would refuse to uphold my power; that the Pope himself, at need,
would refuse to come to consecrate me in my capital? Are such events unexampled
in history?
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, examples of everything can be found in history. But
if, instead of finding a Borgia or a Dubois on Saint Peter's throne, as you
seem to expect, you should find a pope
who resisted your intrigues and braved your anger, what would you do?
{p. 188} MACHIAVELLI. In that case, under pretext of defending the temporal power, I would bring about his
fall.
MONTESQUIEU. You have what is called genius!
SEVENTEENTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. I said that you had genius; in truth, a certain type of it
is necessary to conceive and to execute so many things. Now I understand the apologue of the god Vishnu; you have a hundred
arms like the Hindu idol and each one of your fingers touches a spring. In the same way that you touch everything, are
you also able to see everything?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, for I shall make
of the police an institution so vast that in the heart of my kingdom half of the people shall see the other
half. May I give you some details on the organization of my police?
MONTESQUIEU. Go ahead.
MACHIAVELLI. I shall begin by creating a ministry of police which will
be the most important of my ministries and which will centralize, as much for
the exterior as for the interior, the numerous functions which I give over to
that part of my administration.
MONTESQUIEU. But if you do that, your subjects will see immediately
that they are caught in a prodigious net.
MACHIAVELLI. If this ministry incurs displeasure, I shall abolish it
and I shall call it, if that pleases you better, the ministry of state.
Besides, I shall organize in other ministries corresponding functions the
greater part of which will be quietly blended in with what you call nowadays
the ministry of the interior and the ministry of foreign affairs. You
understand perfectly that here I am not interested in diplomacy but only in the
proper means to assure my security against the factions, foreign as well as domestic.
Well then, you may believe me that, in this connection, I shall find the
majority of monarchs about in the same situation as myself, that is, very much
disposed to second my views, which would
{p. 189} consist in creating international police services in the
interest of mutual safety. If, as I scarcely doubt, I succeed in attaining this
result, here are some of the forms by which my police would manifest themselves
abroad: Men of pleasure and good company
in the foreign courts, to keep an eye on the intrigues of the princes and of
the exiled pretenders; proscribed revolutionaries, some of whom I would not
despair of being able to persuade, with money, to be of service to me as agents
of transmission in regard to the secret practices of underhand demagogy; the
establishment of political newspapers in the great capitals, printers and book stores placed in the
same conditions and secretly subsidized in order to follow more closely, by
means of the press, the direction of public thought.
MONTESQUIEU. It is no longer the factions of your kingdom but the very
soul of humanity that you will end up by conspiring against.
MACHIAVELLI. You know that I do not take fright at big words. I want to
arrange that every politician who goes
abroad to plot can be observed, noted from one point to another, until his return to my kingdom, where he
will be imprisoned for good and all so that he will no longer be in a
position to plot again. In order to have well in hand the thread of
revolutionary intrigues, I am dreaming of a plan which would, I think, be
rather clever.
MONTESQUIEU. Good God, what may that be!
MACHIAVELLI. I should like to have a prince of my house, seated on the
steps of my throne, who would play at
being a malcontent. His mission would be to hold himself up as a liberal, a slanderer of my government and thus to
rally (in order to observe them more closely) those who, in the highest
ranks of my kingdom, might go in a little for demagogy. Riding above domestic
and foreign intrigues, the prince to whom I would confide this mission would
thus play the game of dupe to those who would not be in the secret of the
comedy.
MONTESQUIEU. What! You would entrust to a prince of your house powers
which you yourself class as befitting thc police?
MACHIAVELLI. And why not? I know of reigning princes who,
{p. 190} while in exile, were attached to the secret police of certain
cabinets.
MONTESQUIEU. If I continue to listen to you, Machiavelli, it is only to
have the last word of this shocking wager.
MACHIAVELLI. Do not be so indignant, M. de Montesquieu; in the Esprit
des Lois you called me a great man. (Esprit des Lois, Page 68, Book VI, Chapter
V.)
MONTESQUIEU. You are making me atone dearly for that; it is to punish
myself that I listen to you. Pass as quickly as you can over so many sinister
details.
MACHIAVELLI. At home I am obliged to re-establish the black cabinet.
MONTESQUIEU. Re-establish ...
MACHIAVELLI. Your best kings made use of it. The secrecy of letters
must not be permitted to serve as a covering for plots.
MONTESQUIEU. It is that which makes you tremble; I understand it
MACHIAVELLI. You are mistaken, for there will be plots under my reign;
there must be.
MONTESQUIEU. What now?
MACHIAVELLI. There will perhaps be real plots, I cannot answer for
that; but certainly there will be
simulated plots. At certain times it may be an excellent method to arouse the sympathy of the people in favor
of the prince, when his popularity is waning. In intimidating public
spirit, certain severe measures may be obtained when necessary, or those which
already exist may be maintained. False conspiracies which, of course, must be
made use of only with the greatest caution, have still another advantage: they
permit the discovery of real plots by giving rise to investigations which lead
to a thorough search for traces of whatever one suspects. Nothing is more
precious than the life of the sovereign: it must be surrounded by innumerable
guarantees, that is, innumerable agents, but at the same time it is necessary
that this secret militia be concealed so cleverly that the sovereign seems to show
{p. 191} no fear when he shows
himself in public. I have been told tnat in Europe the precautions in this
connection were so perfected that a prince who goes out into the streets might
seem to be a simple citizen who is taking a walk, unguarded, among the crowd,
whereas he is really surrounded by two
or three thousand protectors. In addition, I expect that my police will be interspersed in all ranks
of society. There will be no secret meeting, no committee, no salon, no
intimate hearth where there will not be an
ear to hear what is said in every place, at every hour. Alas, for those who
have wielded power it is an astonishing phenomenon with what facility men
denounce one another. What is still more astonishing is the faculty of
observation and of analysis which is developed in those who make up the political police; you have no idea
of their ruses, their disguises, their instincts, the passion which they bring
to their researches, their patience, their impenetrability; there are men of
all ranks who go in for this profession through - how shall I say it? - a sort
of love of the art.
MONTESQUIEU. Ah! Draw the curtain!
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, for at the very bottom of power there are secrets
which terrify the eye. I spare you the description of more somber things which
you have not heard. With the system that I shall organize, I shall be so completely informed that I shall be able to tolerate
even guilty actions because at any moment of the day I will have the power to
stop them.
MONTESQUIEU. Tolerate them? And why?
MACHIAVELLI. Because in European states the absolute monarch must not use force indiscreetly; because, in
the depths of society, there are always secret activities about which nothing
can be done when they are not formulated; because it is necessary to take the greatest care to avoid alarming
public opinion concerning the security of power; because the parties are
satisfied with murmurs, with harmless teasing, when they are reduced to
impotence, and to claim to disarm them even of their temper would be folly.
They will, then, be heard complaining here and there, in news-
{p. 192} papers and books; they will attempt allusions against the
government in speeches and addresses; under various pretexts, they will make
some small manifestations of their existence; all that will be very timid, I
swear to you, and the public, if informed, will be tempted only to laughter. I
will be considered very good to support it, I shall pass for too good-natured; that is why I shall tolerate
what seems to me to be without any danger: I do not even wish my government to
be considered suspicious.
MONTESQUIEU. This language reminds me that you have left a gap, and a
very serious one, in your decrees.
MACHIAVELLI. Which one?
MONTESQUIEU. You have not
touched individual liberty.
MACHIAVELLI. I shall not touch
it.
MONTESQUIEU. You think not? If you have reserved the faculty of
toleration, you have also reserved the right to prevent all that appears
dangerous to you. If the interest of the state, or even something slightly
important, requires that a man be arrested in your kingdom at a particular
moment, how can it be done if the law of
habeas corpus exists in the legislation; if individual arrest is preceded
by certain formalities, by certain guarantees? While the procedure is going on,
time will be passing.
MACHIAVELLI. Allow me to state that even if I respect individual
liberty, I did not forbid the judiciary organization to make some useful
modifications in this regard.
MONTESQUIEU. I was well aware of that.
MACHIAVELLI. Oh! Do not be so superior, it will be the easiest thing in
the world. Who is it who generally makes the laws on individual liberty in your
parliamentary states?
MONTESQUIEU. It is a council of magistrates, the number and
independence of whom are the guarantee of those brought before the courts.
MACHIAVELLI. It is certainly a vicious organization, for how do you
expect that, with the slowness of the deliberations of a council, justice can
have the necessary rapidity of apprehension of evil-doers?
{p. 193} MONTESQUIEU. Which evil-doers?
MACHIAVELLI. I am speaking of those who commit murder, robbery, crimes
and misdemeanors which come under the common law. This tribunal must be given
the unity of action which is necessary to it; I replace your council by a single magistrate, charged with making
laws concerning the arrest of criminals.
MONTESQUIEU. But it is not a question now of criminals; with the aid of
this regulation, you threaten the liberty of all the citizens. At least make a
distinction in the cause of accusation.
MACHIAVELLI. That is just what I do not wish to do. Is the one who
undertakes something against the government not as guilty as, if not more so
than, the one who commits an ordinary crime or misdemeanor? Passion or misery
mitigates many faults, but who forces people to busy themselves with politics?
So I wish no distinction between the misdemeanors of common law and the
political misdemeanors. Where, then, is the mentality of modern governments, to
set up a sort of criminal court of justice for their slanderers? In my kingdom,
the insolent journalist will mingle in
the prisons with the plain thief and will appear at his side before the
correctional jurisdiction. The
conspirator will be seated before the criminal jury, side by side with the
counterfeiter and the murderer. That is an excellent legislative
modification, you must notice, for public opinion, seeing the conspirator
treated as the equal of the ordinary criminal, will end up by confusing the two types in the same scorn.
MONTESQUIEU. You are ruining the very foundation of moral sense; but
what does that matter to you? What surprises me is that you are keeping a
criminal jury.
MACHIAVELLI. In those states which are centralized like mine, the
public officials are the ones who appoint the members of the jury. In a
question of a simple political misdemeanor, my minister of justice can always,
when necessary, compose the chamber of judges who are well versed in such
things.
MONTESQUIEU. Your internal legislation is irreproachable; it is time to
pass to other matters.
{p. 194} EIGHTEENTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. Up to now you have occupied yourself only with the forms
of your government and the rigorous laws necessary to maintain it. That is a
great deal, and yet it is nothing. There still remains the most difficult of
all problems for a sovereign who wishes to exert absolute power in a European
state accustomed to representative customs.
MACHIAVELLI. And what is this problem?
MONTESQUIEU. The problem of your
finances.
MACHIAVELLI. That question has not been foreign to my calculations, for
I remember having told you that everything
resolved itself into a question of figures.
MONTESQUIEU. All very well, but here it is the very nature of the thing
which will resist you.
MACHIAVELLI. You disturb me, I confess, for I date from a century of
barbarism concerning political economy and I understand very little of those
things.
MONTESQUIEU. I am setting my mind at rest for you. In any case allow me
to ask you a question. I remember having written, in the Esprit dles Lois, that
the absolute monarch was forced, by
the principle of his government, to
impose only minor taxes on his subjects. (Esprit des Lois, Page 80,
(Chapter X, Book XIII.) Will you give your subjects at least this satisfaction?
MACHIAVELLI. I do not promise that and I know nothing, in truth, more
debatable than the proposition which you put forth there. How do you expect the
machinery of monarchical power, the brilliance and the representation of a
great court to exist without imposing heavy sacrifices on the nation? Your
theory might be true in Turkey, in Persia, heaven knows where! in small
countries without industry, where the people have no means to pay the tax; but in European societies, where wealth
overflows the sources of labor and may be taxed in so many varied forms,
where luxury is a means of government, where the upkeep and
{p. 195} the expense of all the public services are centralized in the
hands of the state, where all the great posts, all the powers, are very highly
salaried, how do you expect one to limit himself to moderate taxes, especial]y
when one is sovereign master?
MONTESQUIEU. That is very true and I abandon my theory, the real
meaning of which seems to have escaped you. Your government, then, will be
expensive; it is evident that it will cost more than a representative
government.
MACHIAVELLI. It is possible.
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, but it is just here that the difficulty begins. I
know how the representative governments provide for their financial needs, but
I have no idea of the means of existence of absolute power in modern societies.
If I question the past, I see very clearly that it can exist only under the
following conditions: in the first place, the absolute monarch must be a
military chief. You undoubtedly understand that?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes.
MONTESQUIEU. In addition he must be a victor, for it is from war that
he must demand the principal resources which are necessary to maintain his pomp
and his armies. If he demanded them by taxation, he would crush his subjects.
You see by this that it is not because the absolute monarch spends less that he
must husband his resources, but because the law of his subsistence is
elsewhere. Now, today, war no longer brings in profits to those who wage it: it
ruins the victors as well as the vanquished. That is a source of revenue which
is out of your reach.
Taxes are left, but, of course, the absolute prince must be able to do
without the consent of his subjects in this regard. In the despotic states, there is a legal fiction which permits them
to tax at will: in law, the sovereign is
supposed to possess all the goods of his subjects. When he takes something
from them, he is only taking back what belongs to him. Thus, no resistance.
And finally the prince must be able to dispose of the resources
procured for him by taxes without discussion as well as without control. Such
are the inevitable steps of absolutism; you must
{p. 196} agree that there would be much to do in order to achieve that.
If the people of the present day are as indifferent as you say to the loss of
their liberties, that does not mean that they will be so when it comes to their
interests; their interests are bound to an economic regime exclusive of
despotism: if you are not arbitrary in finances, you cannot be so in politics.
Your whole reign will be overthrown because of the budget.
MACHIAVELLI. I am very calm on that point, as I am on all the rest.
MONTESQUIEU. That is what we shall have to see; let us come to the
point. The vote on taxes, by the representatives of the nation, is the
fundamental rule of modern states: will
you accept the vote on taxation?
MACHIAVELLI. Why not?
MONTESQUIEU. Take care! This principle is the most express consecration
of the sovereignty of the nation: for to
grant it the right to vote taxes means also granting it the right to refuse
them, to limit them, to reduce to nothing the prince's possibilities of
action and consequently to destroy the prince himself, if need be.
MACHIAVELLI. You are categoric. Continue.
MONTESQUIEU. Those who vote the
taxes are themselves taxpayers. Here their interests are strictly united to
those of the nation, at a point where it will necessarily keep its eyes wide
open. Thus you are going to find its representatives as little accommodating in
connection with legislative credit as you found them yielding in connection
with liberties.
MACHIAVELLI. It is here that the weakness of the argument is revealed;
will you be good enough to note two considerations which you have forgotten. In
the first place the representatives of
the nation receive salaries; taxpayers or no, they are personally
disinterested in the vote of taxes.
MONTESQUIEU. I agree that the idea is practical and the observation
wise.
MACHIAVELLI. You see the disadvantage of considering the
{p. 197} things too systematically; the smallest, clever modification
suffices to change everything. You would
perhaps be right if I based my power on the aristocracy or on the bourgeois
classes which might, at a given moment,
refuse me their cooperation; but, in the second place, as a basis of action I have the proletariat of whom the mass possesses
nothing. The burdens of the state scarcely weigh upon them and I would even
arrange that these expenses should not touch them at all. Fiscal measures will trouble the working classes very little.
MONTESQUIEU. If I understand correctly, that is all very clear: the possessors will be forced to pay by the
sovereign will of those who possess nothing. That is the ransom exacted of
wealth by numbers and poverty.
MACHIAVELLI. Is that not just?
MONTESQUIEU. It is not even true, for in present-day society, from the
economic point of view, there are neither rich nor poor. The artisan of
yesterday is the bourgeois of tomorrow, by virtue of the labor law. If you
strike at the territorial or industrial bourgeoisie, do you know what you are
doing? In reality you are making emancipation through labor more difficult, you are retaining a greater number of
workers in the bonds of the proletariat. It is an aberration to believe
that the proletariat can profit by blows struck at production. By
impoverishing, through fiscal laws, those who have possessions, unnatural
situations are created and, in time, even those who possess nothing become
still poorer.
MACHIAVELLI. Those are pretty theories, but I have just as pretty ones
to offer in contradiction, if you wish.
MONTESQUIEU. No, for you have not yet solved the problem which I placed
before you. First you must obtain what you need to meet the expense of absolute
sovereignty. It will not be as easy as you think, even with a legislative
chamber in which you will have an assured majority, even with the omnipotence
of popular mandate with which you are invested. Tell me, for instance, how you
can bend the financial mechanism of the modern states to the
{p. 198} demands of absolute power. I repeat, it is the very nature of
things which is in opposition. The
civilized peoples of Europe have surrounded the administration of their
finances with guarantees so binding, so jealous, so multiple, that they
leave no more room for collection than for the arbitrary use of public funds.
MACHIAVELLI. And what is this marvelous system?
MONTESQUIEU. That can be shown in few words. The perfection of the
financial system in modern times rests on two fundamental bases - control and
publicity. In these essentials lies the guarantee of the taxpayers. A sovereign
cannot meddle with it without saying indirectly to his subjects: "You have
order, I wish disorder, I wish obscurity in the management of public funds; I
need that because there is a mass of expenditures which I desire to be able to
make without your approval, deficits
which I desire to be able to conceal, receipts which I desire to have the
means of disguising or of increasing according to circumstances."
MACHIAVELLI. Your beginning is good.
MONTESQUIEU. In free, industrial countries, everybody is familiar with
the finances, by necessity, by interest and by trade, and your government can
deceive no one in this regard.
MACHIAVELLI. Who told you that I wish to deceive anyone?
MONTESQUIEU. The entire work of the financial administration, no matter
how vast and how complicated it may be in its details, in the last analysis
comes down to two very simple operations - receiving
and spending. It is around these two kinds of financial acta that gravitate
the multitude of laws and special regulations which, in themselves, have a very
simple end in view: to act so that the taxpayer pays only the necessary and
regularly established taxes, and to act so that the government cannot apply public funds to expenditures other than
those approved by the nation. I leave aside all that relates to the
assessment and to the method of collecting the taxes, to the practical means of
assuring the completeness of the collection, the order and the precision in the
{p. 199} fluctuations of public funds; these are but accounting details
which I have no intention of discussing with you. I only wish to show you how publicity moves along with control in
the best organized systems of political finance in Europe.
One of the most important problems to be solved was to bring forth from
obscurity, to make visible to all eyes, the elements of collection and expenses
upon which is based the use of the public fortune in the hands of the
government. This result has been attained by the creation of what is called in
modern language the state budget,
which is the estimate of the receipts and the expenses, anticipated not for a
period of remote time, but each year for use the following year. The annual
budget is, then, the main point and, in a way, the generator of the financial
situation which improves or becomes worse in proportion to the established
results. The items of which it is composed are prepared by the various
administrators in the department, who are appointed for that purpose. As the
foundation of their work they take the allocations of previous budgets introducing
the necessary modifications, additions and retrenchments. The whole is given to
the minister of finance who centralizes the documents which are transmitted to
him, and who presents to the legislative assembly what is called the plan of
the budget. This great public work, printed, reproduced in a thousand
newspapers, reveals to all eyes the
internal and external politics of the state, the civil, judicial and
military administration. It is examined, discussed and voted upon by the
representatives of the country, after which it is executed in the same manner
as the other laws of the state.
MACHIAVELLI. Allow me to admire with what clarity of deduction and what
propriety of terms, completely modern, the illustrious author of the Esprit des
Lois has been able, in financial matters, to get away from the somewhat vague
theories and the occasionally rather ambiguous terms in the great work which
has made him immortal.
MONTESQUIEU. The Esprit des Lois is not a financial treatise.
MACHIAVELLI. Your sobriety on this point deserves to be praised
{p. 200} all the more, since you could have discussed it very
competently. Be good enough to continue; I am listening with the greatest
interest.
NINETEENTH DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. The creation of the budgetary system has brought with it,
one may say, all the other financial guarantees which are today the share of
well-regulated political societies.
Thus, the first law which the economy of the budget necessitates is
that the funds required correspond with
the existing resources. That is a balance which must always be openly
expressed by real and authentic figures, and recourse has heen made to a very
wise measure in order better to assure this important result and in order that
the legislator who votes on the propositions submitted to him should not be
carried away by his ardor. The general budget of the state is divided into two
distinct budgets: the budget of
expenditures and the budget of revenue, which must be voted upon separately,
each by a special law.
In this way, the attention of the legislator is forced to concentrate,
in turn, separately, on the active and passive situation, and his decisions are
not influenced in advance by the general balance of revenue and expenses.
He scrupulously controls these two elements and it is, in the last
analysis, by their comparison, by their strict harmony, that the general vote
on the budget is produced.
MACHIAVELLI. That is all very well, but are the expenditures by any
chance impassably limited by the legislative vote? Is that possible? Can a
chamber, without paralyzing the exercise of the executive power, forbid its
sovereign to provide for unforeseen expenses through emergency measures?
MONTESQUIEU. I see that that disturbs you, but I cannot regret it.
MACHIAVELLI. Even in constitutional states is it not expressly reserved
for the sovereign to set up, through
decrees, supple-
{p. 201} mentary or unusual
credits in the interval between legislative sessions?
MONTESQUIEU. That is true, but on one condition, which is that these
decrees are converted into laws at the meeting of the chambers. Their approval
must intervene.
MACHIAVELLI. If it intervenes after the expenditure is pledged, in
order to ratify what is done, I should not be averse to it.
MONTESQUIEU. I believe you; but, unfortunately, they do not stop there.
The most advanced modern financial legislation forbids acting contrary to the
normal anticipations of the budget, other than by laws leading to the opinion
of supplementary and extraordinary credits. Expenses cannot be pledged without
the intervention of the legislative power.
MACHIAVELLI. But in that case one can no longer even govern.
MONTESQUIEU. It seems that one can. The modern states have reflected
that the legislative vote of the budget would end by becoming illusory, with
the abuses of supplementary and extraordinary credits; that, in short, the
expenses must be capable of being limited when the resources were so; that
political events were not able to vary financial facts from one moment to
another, and that the intervals between the sessions were not long enough to
make it impossible to provide advantageously for them by an extra-budgetary
vote.
They went still farther - they wished to arrange that once the
resources were voted for such and such purposes, they might revert to the
treasury if they were not used; they thought that the government, while
remaining within the limits of allotted credits, must not be able to use the funds of one purpose to appropriate them for
another, to cover this, to uncover that, by means of switching funds from
one ministry to another through decrees; for that would be to evade their
legislative destination and to return, by an ingenious detour, to arbitrary
finance.
For this purpose they conceived what is called the specifying of funds by subjects, that is, that the vote of
expenditures takes place through special subjects containing only correlative
purposes
{p. 202} and of the same nature for all the ministries. Thus, for
instance, topic A will include, for all the ministries, expenditure A; topic B
expenditure B; and so on. The result of this plan is that the funds which are
not used must be annulled in the accounts of the various ministries and carried
over as revenue in the budget of the following year. I need not tell you that
the ministerial responsibility is the sanction of all these measures. The crown
of the financial guarantees is the establishment of an accounting chamber, a
sort of supreme court in its way, permanently charged with the exercise of the
functions of jurisdiction and control over the accounts, the manipulation and
the use of public funds, even having as its mission to point out those parts of
financial administration which could be improved from the double point of view
of expenditures and of revenue. These explanations are sufficient. Do you not
find that with such an organization, absolute power would be in an embarrassing
position?
MACHIAVELLI. I am still overwhelmed, I admit, by this financial inroad.
You have taken me at my weak point: I told you that I understood very little of
these matters but, you may believe me, I would have ministers who could refute
all that and point out the danger of the majority of these measures.
MONTESQUIEU. Could not you yourself do that a little?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, I could. I leave to my ministers the trouble of
making pretty theories; that will be their principal occupation. As for myself,
I shall talk finance to you rather as a
statesman than an economist. There is one thing which you are too inclined
to forget, and that is that the question of finances is, of all the divisions
of politics, the one which most easily lends itself to the maxims of the
treatise of The Prince. Those states which have budgets so methodically ordered
and official writings so well regulated, impress me as do the business men who
have their books perfectly kept and who
are, after all, wholly ruined.
Why, who has greater budgets than your parliamentary governments? What is it
that costs more than the democratic republic of the United States, or than the
royal republic of England? It is true
{p. 203} that the immense resources of this last-named power are used
in the service of the most profound and the most widespread politics.
MONTESQUIEU. You have gotten away from the question. What are you
trying to bring out?
MACHIAVELLI. This: the rules of
the financial administration of the states have no relation to those of
domestic economy, which seems to be the type of your conceptions.
MONTESQUIEU. Ah! the same distinction as between politics and morals?
MACHIAVELLI. Well, yes; is it not universally recognized and practiced?
Were things not the same even in your time, although much less advanced in this
respect, and was it not you yourself who said that the states permitted
themselves certain financial digressions which would put to shame even the most
intemperate gentleman's son?
MONTESQUIEU. It is true I said that, but if you draw from it an
argument favorable to your thesis, that is a real surprise for me.
MACHIAVELLI. You mean, no doubt, that one must not glory in what is
done but in what should be done.
MONTESQUIEU. Precisely.
MACHIAVELLI. I reply that one must desire the possible and that what is
done universally cannot but be done.
MONTESQUIEU. That is pure practice, I agree.
MACHIAVELLI. And I have an idea that if we were to balance the
accounts, as you say, my government, absolute as it is, would cost less than
yours; but let us drop this discussion which would be without interest. You are
really mistaken if you believe that I am troubled by the perfection of the
financial systems which you have just explained to me. I rejoice with you over
the regularity of the collection of the taxes, of the completeness of the
revenue; I rejoice over the exactitude of the accounts, I rejoice very
sincerely. Do you really believe that I think it necessary that the absolute
sovereign must dip his hands into the state coffers, that he must handle the
public funds.... This luxury of precautions is truly puerile. Is the danger
there? Once more, all the better if
{p. 204} the funds are gathered, set in motion and circulated with the
miraculous precision which you described. I am counting precisely on all these
marvels of accounting, all these organic beauties of financial matter, to aid
in the splendor of my reign.
MONTESQUIEU. You have the vis comica. The most astonishing thing to me
about your financial theories is that they are directly opposed to what you say
about them in the treatise of The Prince, where you strictly recommend not only
economy in finance but even avarice. (The Prince, Page 106, Chapter XVI.)
MACHIAVELLI. If you are astonished, you have no reason to be, for times
are no longer the same from this point of view, and one of the most important
of my principles is to adjust myself to the times. Let us get back and for a
while set a little aside what you told me of your department of accounts: does
this institution belong to the judiciary order?
MONTESQUIEU. No.
MACHIAVELLI. Then it is a purely administrative body. I suppose it to
be irreproachable. But when all the
accounts are verified, it can make advances! Does that prevent funds from
being voted, expenditures from being made? Its decisions of verification are no
more informative of the situation than the budgets. It is a department of
registry without remonstrance, it is an ingenious institution. I shall keep it
up just as it is, without anxiety.
MONTESQUIEU. You will keep it up, you say! So you expect to touch upon
the other parts of the financial organization?
MACHIAVELLI. You guessed as much, I suppose. After a political coup d'etat, is not a financial coup d'etat
inevitable? Shall not take advantage of power for that as well as for the
rest? What is the magic virtue which would preserve your financial regulations?
I am like that giant of some fairy tale or other whom the pigmies had bound
with fetters during his sleep; on arising, he broke them without even noticing
their existence. On the day following my accession, there will be no question
of voting upon the budget; I shall issue a special decree, I shall
dictatorially
{p. 205} open the necessary accounts and I shall have them approved by
my council of state.
MONTESQUIEU. And you expect to continue in this manner?
MACHIAVELLI. Not at all. Beginning with the following year I shall
return to legality, for I do not intend to destroy anything directly, as I have
already told you several times. Rules have been made before me, I shall make
rules in my turn. You spoke to me of the vote of the budget by two distinct
laws: I consider that a bad measure. One understands a financial situation much
better when he votes the budget of revenue and the budget of expenditures at
the same time. My government is a diligent government; the precious time of
public deliberations must not be lost in useless discussions. Henceforth the
budget of revenue and of expenditures will be included in a single law.
MONTESQUIEU. Good. And the law which forbids the appropriation of
supplementary funds other than by a preliminary vote of the Chamber?
MACHIAVELLI. I abrogate it; you understand the reason for that.
MONTESQUIEU. Yes.
MACHIAVELLI. It is a law which would be inapplicable under any regime.
MONTESQUIEU. And the specifying of funds, the vote by topics?
MACHIAVELLI. It is impossible to maintain that: the budget of
expenditures will no longer be voted by topics but by ministries.
MONTESQUIEU. That seems to me a mountainous undertaking, for the vote
by ministry only gives each one of them a total to examine. It is like using a
bottomless cask instead of a strainer to sift public expenditures.
MACHIAVELLI. That is not exact, for each account, as a whole, presents
distinct elements, topics as you call them; if desired they will be examined,
but they will be voted upon by ministries, with the right to change from one
topic to another.
MONTESQUIEU. And from one ministry to another?
MACHIAVELLI. No, I do not go that far; I wish to remain within the
limits of necessity.
{p. 206} MONTESQUIEU, Your moderation is faultless, and you believe
that these financial innovations will not throw the country into a state of
alarm?
MACHIAVELLI, Why should that alarm them more than my other political
measures?
MONTESQUIEU. Why, because this touches the material interests of
everyone.
MACHIAVELLI. Oh! those are very subtle distinctions.
MONTESQUIEU. Subtle! The word is well chosen. But do not put any
subtlety into it yourself, and say frankly that a country which cannot defend
its liberties cannot defend its money.
MACHIAVELLI. What can they complain of, since I have kept the essential
principles of public law in financial matters? Are taxes not regularly
established, regularly collected, funds regularly voted? Is it not true that here, as elsewhere, everything is based
upon popular suffrage? No, without a doubt, my government is not reduced to
indigence. The people who have acclaimed me not only easily tolerate the pomp
of the throne, but they desire it, they seek it in a prince who is the
expression of its power. The people really hate only one thing, and that is the
wealth of their equals.
MONTESQUIEU. Do not escape once more; you have not yet come to the end;
I lead you back inflexibly to the budget. No matter what you say, its very
organization checks the development of your power. It is a frame the boundaries
of which may be broken through, but not without risk and peril. It is
published, its component parts are known, it remains as barometer of the
situation.
MACHIAVELLI. Let us finish up this point, since you wish it.
TWENTIETH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. The budget is a frame, you say; yes, but it is an elastic
frame which stretches as far as desired. I shall always be within it, never
outside it.
MONTESQUIEU. What do you mean?
{p. 207} MACHIAVELLI. Is it for me to teach you how things come about,
even in the states where the budgetary orgallization is pushed to its highest
point of perfection? Perfection consists precisely in knowing how, by ingenious
stratagems, to get out of a system of limitation which in reality is purely
fictitious.
Just what is your annually
voted budget? Nothing but a provisional regulation, an estimate of the principal financial occurrences. The situation
is never definite until after the completion of expenditures made necessary
during the course of the year. In your budgets there are I know not how many types of accounts which correspond to all
the possible eventualities; complementary,
supplementary, extraordinary, temporary, exceptional. And each one of these
accounts by itself forms as many distinct budgets. Now, this is how things work
out: the general budget, the one which is voted at the beginning of the year,
comes to a total amount of, let us say, 800 millions. When half of the year is gone, the financial facts already no longer
correspond to the first estimates; so what is called a rectifying budget is presented to the Chambers, and this budget
adds 100 millions, 150 millions to the original figure. Then comes the
supplementary budget: it adds 50 or 60 millions; finally comes the liquidation which adds 15, 20 or 30 millions. In
short, in the general reckoning, the
total of the unforeseen expenses forms one-third of the estimated expenditures.
It is upon this last figure that the legislative vote of the Chambers falls as
a form of confirmation. In this way, at
the end of ten years the budget can be doubled and even tripled.
MONTESQUIEU. That this accumulation of expenditures could be the result
of your financial improvements, I do not doubt, but no such thing will happen
in the states where your proceedings are avoided. Moreover, you have not yet
finished: after all, the expenditures
must be in proportion to the revenues. How will you handle that?
MACHIAVELLI. Everything, it may be said, consists in the art of
grouping figures and in certain distinctions of expenditures, by
{p. 208} aid of which the necessary latitude is obtained. Thus, for
instance, the distinction between the ordinary budget and the extraordinary
budget may be of great help. Under cover
of this word extraordinary one may easily pass off certain debatable
expenditures and certain more or less problematic revenues. I have here,
for instance, 20 millions in expensesj it must be met by 20 millions in
revenue: I produce as revenue a war indemnity of 20 millions, not yet
collected, but which will be later, or else
I bring forth as revenue an increase of 20 millions in the proceeds of taxation
which will be realized next year. So much for your revenues; I need not
multiply the examples. As for the expenditures, one may have recourse to the
opposite procedure: instead of adding, you subtract. Thus, for instance, you
remove the cost of tax collection from the budget of expenses.
MONTESQUIEU. And under what pretext, may I ask?
MACHIAVELLI. One may say, and with reason, I believe, that it is not a
state expense. And for the same reason it may also be arranged to omit from the
budget of expenditures the cost of provincial and communal service.
MONTESQUIEU. As you see, I dispute nothing of all that; but what will you do with the revenues which
are deficits, and the expenditures which you eliminate?
MACHIAVELLI. The big thing in this question is the distinction between
the ordinary budget and the extraordinary budget. The expenditures which are
absorbing you at present must be included in the extraordinary budget.
MONTESQUIEU. But after all these two budgets are finally totaled and
the definite figure of expenditures is made known.
MACHIAVELLI, No total must be
made; on the contrary. The ordinary budget appears alone; the extraordinary
budget is an appendant which is provided for by other means.
MONTESQUIEU. And what are they?
MACHIAVELLI. Do not make me anticipate. You see first of all that there
is a particular manner of presenting the budget, of concealing, if necessary,
the growing increase. There is no gov-
{p. 209} ernment which is not forced to act thus; there are
inexhaustible resources in industrial countries but, as you noticed, these
countries are miserly and suspicious; they argue over the most necessary
outlays. Financial politics cannot, any more than other politics, play with
open cards: at every step one would be hindered; but after all and, I admit,
thanks to the perfecting of the budgetary system, everything is found again, everything
is classified, and if the budget has its mysteries, it also has its lights.
MONTESQUIEU. But only for the initiated, I have no doubt. I see that
you will surround financial legislation with a formalism as impenetrable as the
judiciary procedure among the Romans, at the time of the twelve tables. But let
us go on. Since your expenditures
increase, your resources must increase in the same proportion. Will you,
like Julius Caesar, find a value of two thousand million francs in the state
coffers, or will you discover the Potosi mines?
MACHIAVELLI. Your darts are very ingenious; I shall do what all possible governments do, I shall borrow.
MONTESQUIEU. It is to this very point that I wished to lead you. It is
certain that there are few governments who are not obliged to have recourse to
borrowing; but it is also certain that they are obliged to make use of them
sparingly; they could not, without immorality and without danger, encumber future generations with exorbitant
burdens, out of all proportion to probable resources. How are loans made? By the issue of bonds containing an obligation on
the part of the government to pay a yearly interest proportionate to the
capital which has been deposited. If the
loan is at 5 percent, for instance, the state, at the end of twenty years, has
paid a sum equal to the capital borrowed; at the end of 40 years, a double
amount; at the end of 60 years, a triple amount, and yet it always remains
debtor for the total of the same capital. It may be added that if the state
increased its debt indefinitely, doing nothing to diminish it, it would be
driven either to the impossibility of further borrowing or to bankruptcy. These results are easy to
comprehend; there is no country where they are not under-
{p. 210} stood. The modern
states wished to put a necessary limitation to the increase of taxes. So
they conceived what is called the system of amortization, a scheme truly admirable for its simplicity and for
its very practical method of execution. A
special fund was created, the capitalized resources of which are meant to be a
permanent redemption of the public debt by successive fractions; so that every time that the state borrows, it must
endow the sinking fund with a certain capital for the purpose of liquidating
the new debt at a given time. You see that this method of limitation is
indirect and it is that which makes it so powerful. By means of amortization,
the nation says to its government: "Borrow if you must, but you will have
to find a way to meet the new obligation that you are contracting in my
name." When one is continually obliged to amortize, one thinks twice
before borrowing. If you amortize regularly, your loans will be passed.
MACHIAVELLI, And what makes you think that I expect to amortize? In
which states is amortization a regular thing? Even in England it is suspended.
Your example falls flat: what is done nowhere, cannot be done.
MONTESQUIEU, Then you would abolish amortization?
MACHIAVELLI, I did not say that, far from it; I shall allow this
mechanism to function, and my government will make use of the funds which it
produces; this plan presents a great advantage. At the presentation of the
budget, from time to time the proceeds of the amortization of the following
year may be made to figure as revenue.
MONTESQUIEU. And the following year it will figure as expenditures.
MACHIAVELLI. I do not know, that will depend on circumstances, for I
will very much regret that this financial institution should not be able to
continue regularly. My ministers will explain themselves in this connection in
an extremely sorrowful manner. Great heavens, I do not claim that my
administration will have nothing to be criticized from the financial point of
view, but when the facts are properly presented, one gets by with many things.
The
{p. 211} administration of finances is also largely a matter of the
press, it must not be forgotten.
MONTESQUIEU. How is that?
MACHIAVELLI. Did you not yourself say that the very essence of the
budget was publicity?
MONTESQUIEU. Yes.
MACHIAVELLI, Well, are budgets not accompanied by detailed accounts, by
reports, by all sorts of official documents? What resources do these public
communications not give to the sovereign if he is surrounded by clever men! I
expect my minister of finance to talk the language of numbers with an admirable
clarity and to have a literary style of impeccable purity.
It is well to repeat continually this truth, that "the management
of public funds at the present time is handled in the open."
This incontestable statement must be presented in a thousand forms; I
intend to have written such phrases as the following:
"Our system of accounting, fruit of long experience, is
distinguished by the clarity and the certitude of its procedures. It obstructs
abuses and gives to no one, from the smallest official to the chief of the
state himself) the means of diverting the least sum from its original purpose,
or of making irregular use of it."
Your language will be kept: could one do better? and I shall have it
said:
"The excellence of the financial system rests on two bases;
control and publicity. Control which prevents a single farthing from leaving
the hands of the taxpayers to enter the public treasury, to pass from one
counting-house to another, and to be given into the hands of a creditor of the
state, without the legitimacy of its collection, the regularity of its
movements, the rightfulness of its use, being controlled by responsible agents,
judicially verified by permanent magistrates, and finally sanctioned in the legislative
accounts of the Chamber."
MONTESQUIEU, O Machiavelli! You are always jeering, but your mockery
has something infernal in it.
MACHIAVELLI, You forget where we are.
{p. 212} MONTESQUIEU. You defy heaven.
MACHIAVELLI. God fathoms the heart.
MONTESQUIEU. Continue.
MACHIAVELLI. At the beginning of the budgetary year, the comptroller of
finances will declare: "Up to now, nothing alters the provisions of the
present budget. Without being the victim of illusions, there are serious
reasons to hope that, for the first time in years, the budget, in spite of
loans, will present a real balance. This desirable result, obtained in
exceptionally difficult times, is the best proof that the upward movement of
the public fortunes has never slowed down." Is that properly done?
MONTESQUIEU. Go on.
MACHIAVELLI. In this connection there will be talk of this amortization
which absorbed you a short time ago, and they will say: "Soon amortization
will function. If the project which has been conceived in this connection will
be realised, if the state revenues continue to progress, it is not impossible
that, in the budget which will be presented in five years, the public accounts
will be liquidated by a surplus of revenue."
MONTESQUIEU. Your hopes are long-dated; but a propos of the
amortization, if, after having promised to start it functioning, nothing is
done, what will you say?
MACHIAVELLI. If necessary, it will be boldly acknowledged. Such
frankness does honor to the government and touches the people when it comes
from a strong power. But, in return, my finance minister will use all his
efforts to remove all significance from the heightened figure of expenses. He
will say, and it will be true: "Actual practice in matters of finance
shows that deficits are never entirely confirmed, that a certain quantity of
new resources arise unexpectedly during the course of the year, notably through
the increase of the proceeds of taxes; that, moreover, a considerable portion
of funds which have been voted are put to no use and are annulled."
{p. 213} MONTESQUIEU. Will that happen?
MACHIAVELLI. Sometimes, you know, in finance there are words ready
made, stereotyped phrases, which have a great effect on the public, calming and
reassuring the people. Thus, in artfully presenting such and such a debt, one
says: this figure is not at all
exorbitant - it is normal, it conforms to previous budgets - the figure of the
floating debt is very reassuring. There is a host of similar locutions
which I shall not mention because there are other more important practical
stratagems to which I wish to call your attention. First, in all official
documents it is necessary to insist upon the development of prosperity, of
commercial activity and of the ever increasing progress of consumption.
The taxpayer is less aroused by the disproportion of the budget when
these things are repeated to him, and they may be repeated to satiety without
his ever becoming suspicious, to such an extent do authentic accounts produce a
magic effect upon the mind of bourgeois fools. When the budget can no longer be balanced and one wishes to prepare
public spirit for some disappointment for the following year, one says in advance, in a report, next
year the deficit will only be so and so much.
If the deficit is less than the estimate, it is a veritable triumph; if
it is greater, one says: "the deficit was greater than was estimated, but
it was still higher last year; altogether the situation is better, because less
has been spent and yet we have gone through exceptionally difficult
circumstances: war, poverty, epidemics, unforeseen subsistence crises, etc.
"But, next year, the increase of revenues will, in all
probability, permit the attainment of a balance which has been so long sought:
the debt will be reduced, the budget suitably balanced. This progress will
continue, it may be hoped, and, save for extraordinary events, balance will
become the custom of our finances, as it is the rule."
MONTESQUIEU. That is high comedy; the custom will be like the
{p. 214} rule, it will never work, for I imagine that, under your
reign, there will always be some extraordinary circumstance, a war, a crisis.
MACHIAVELLI. I do not know whether there will be subsistence crises;
one thing is certain and that is that I shall hold the banner of national
dignity very high.
MONTESQUIEU. That is the very least you could do. If you gather glory,
one need not be grateful to you, for in your hands it is only a means of
government; it is not that which will liquidate the debts of your state.
TWENTY-FIRST DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. I am afraid that you
are somewhat prejudiced against loans; they are valuable for more than one
reason: they attach families to the government; they are excellent investments
for private people, and modern economists today expressly recognize that, far from impoverishing the state, public
debts enrich it. Will you allow me to explain how?
MONTESQUIEU. No, for I believe I know those theories. Since you are
always talking of borrowing and never of repaying, I should first of all like
to know from whom you will ask so much capital, and for what reason you will
ask it.
MACHIAVELLI. For that, foreign wars are a great help. In the great
states, they permit the borrowing of five or six hundred millions; one manages
so as to spend only the half or two-thirds, and the rest finds its place in the
treasury for domestic expenditures.
MONTESQUIEU. Five or six hundred millions, you say! And who are the
bankers of modern times who can negotiate loans the amount of which would
constitute the whole fortune of certain states?
MACHIAVELLI. Ah! You are still concerned with these rudimentary
procedures of the loan? If you will permit me to say
{p. 215} so, that is almost barbarian, in a matter of financial
economy. Nowadays one no longer borrows
of bankers.
MONTESQUIEU. Of whom, then?
MACHIAVELLI. Instead of striking bargains with capitalists who come to
an agreement amongst themselves to frustrate any bidding and whose limited
number destroys all competition, one
appeals to all his subjects: to the rich, to the poor, to the artisans, to the
business men, to whomever has a cent to dispose of; one opens what is
called a public subscription, and so
that each one can buy shares, it is divided into coupons of very small
sums. They sell for from five to ten francs a share to 100,000, a million
francs' worth of shares. The day after their issue the value of these shares is
rising, is at a premium, as they say: everyone knows it, and they rush from all
sides to buy; one would think them delirious. In several days the chests of the treasury are crammed; so much
money is received that one hardly knows where to put it; however, arrangements
are made to accept it, because if the subscription exceeds the capital of the
stock issued, a great effect can be made upon public opinion.
MONTESQUIEU. Ah!
MACHIAVELLI. Defaulters are returned their money. That is done with
much talk, with the help of the press. It is a striking event, carefully
handled. Sometimes the surplus comes to two or three hundred millions: you may
judge for yourself to what point public spirit is affected by this public
confidence in the government.
MONTESQUIEU. Confidence which is mingled with a spirit of unrestrained
stock-jobbing, as far as I can see. I have, indeed, already heard of this scheme,
but everything, on your lips, is truly phantasmagoric. All right, then, let us
say you have your hands full of money, but ...
MACHIAVELLI. I would have even more than you think, because among the
modern nations, there are great banking
institutions which are able to lend directly to the state one or two hundred
millions at the usual rate of interest; the large cities may also
{p. 216} lend. Among these same nations there are other institutions
which are called savings institutions: these are savings banks, sick funds,
pensions. The state is accustomed to demand that their capital, which is
immense, sometimes as much as five or six hundred millions, must be deposited
in the public treasury where it operates with the common stock, allowing a
small interest for those who deposit it. Besides, governments may procure funds
just as bankers do. They make out sight drafts on their treasury for the sum of
two or three hundred millions, a sort of letter of exchange upon which they
draw before they have entered into circulation.
MONTESQUIEU. Permit me to stop you: you speak of nothing but borrowing
or of drawing on letters of exchange; are you never interested in paying
something?
MACHIAVELLI. It is well to let you know that, in case of need, the domains of the state may be sold.
MONTESQUIEU. Ah, now you are selling! But will you never concern
yourself with paying?
MACHIAVELLI. Without a doubt; now is a good time to tell you how to
meet debts.
MONTESQUIEU. You say, to meet debts; I should like a more exact
expression.
MACHIAVELLI. I use this expression because I consider it absolutely
exact. It is not always possible to
liquidate a debt, but it is always possible to meet it; the word is, in
fact, very energetic, for a debt is a formidable enemy.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, how shall you meet it?
MACHIAVELLI. There are various methods: first of all is taxes.
MONTESQUIEU. That is, debt is used to pay the debt.
MACHIAVELLI. You speak to me as an economist and not as a financier. Do
not confuse the two. One may really pay with the proceeds of a tax. I know that
taxes cause talk; if the one that has been established is inconvenient, another
may be found, or the same one re-established under another name. There is a
great art, you know, in finding the weak points of taxable material.
{p. 217} MONTESQUIEU. You will soon have wiped them out, I imagine.
MACHIAVELLI. There are other ways: there is what is called conversion.
MONTESQUIEU. Ah!
MACHIAVELLI. This has to do with the debt which is called consolidated, that is, the one which
accrues from the issue of loans. One says to the stockholders of the state, for
instance: up till now I have paid you
five percent on your money; that was the rate of interest on your shares. From
now on I expect to pay no more than four or four and one-half percent.
Agree to this reduction or be reimbursed for the capital which you loaned me.
MONTESQUIEU. But if the money is really returned, I consider the
procedure quite honest so far.
MACHIAVELLI. Without a doubt it will be returned if requested; but very
few will bother about that; stockholders have their habits; their funds are
placed, they have confidence in the state; they
prefer a smaller income and a certain investment. If everyone demanded his
money it is evident that the treasury would be in a fix. That never happens and in this way one gets rid of a debt of
several hundred millions.
MONTESQUIEU. That is an immoral measure, no matter what you say; a forced loan which lowers public
confidence.
MACHIAVELLI. You do not know stockholders. Here is another plan which
has to do with another type of debt. I was just saying to you that the state had at its disposition the funds
of the savings institutions and that it made use of them by paying their
interest, subject to returning them at the first request. If, after having
handled them a long time, it is no longer prepared to return them, it
consolidates the debt which fluctuates in its hands.
MONTESQUIEU. I know what that means; the state says to the depositors: "You want your money, I no
longer have it; here is an annual income."
MACHIAVELLI. Exactly, and it consolidates in the same way all the debts
to which it no longer feels equal. It consolidates treasury bonds, debts to the
cities, to the banks, in short all those which
{p. 218} compose what is so picturesquely called the floating debt,
because it is made up of debts which have no definite assessment and which
arrive at maturity at about the same time.
MONTESQUIEU. You have singular methods of freeing the state.
MACHIAVELLI. With what can you reproach me if I do only what the others
are doing?
MONTESQUIEU. Oh! if everyone does it, one would, indeed, have to be
very severe to reproach Machiavellifor it.
MACHIAVELLI. I am suggesting to you not even the thousandth part of the
plans which may be used. Far from fearing the increase of perpetual stocks, I should like the entire public wealth to
be in stocks; I would arrange that the towns, the communes, the public
establishments convert into stocks their real estate or their personal capital.
It is the very interest of my dynasty which would force me to these financial
measures. There would not be in my kingdom a single farthing which would not be attached by a thread to my existence.
MONTESQUIEU. But even from this point of view, from this fatal point of
view, will you reach your goal? Are you not marching in the most direct manner
to your ruin across the ruin of the state? Do you not know that among all the
nations of Europe there are huge markets
of public funds where the prudence, the wisdom,the probity of the governments
are auctioned off? According to the way in which you direct your finances,
your funds would have the worst of it in foreign markets and would fall to the
lowest market price, even on the Exchange of your own kingdom.
MACHIAVELLI. That is a flagrant error. A glorious government such as
mine would be, cannot but enjoy great credit abroad. At home, its vigor would
dominate all apprehensions. Besides, I do not intend that the credit of my
state should depend upon the fears of a few candle-grease merchants; I would
dominate the Exchange by the Exchange.
MONTESQUIEU. What now?
MACHIAVELLI. I would have
gigantic establishments of credit
{p. 219} instituted apparently
for the purpose of lending money to
industry, but whose real function would be to uphold the stock. Capable of
placing 400 or 500 millions of shares on the market, or of rarefying the
market in the same proportions, these financial monopolies would always be
masters of the Exchange. What do you think of this scheme?
MONTESQUIEU. A fine business your ministers, your favorites, your
mistresses are going to do in these firms! So your government is going to play
on the Exchange with the secrets of state?
MACHIAVELLI. What are you saying!
MONTESQUIEU. Then explain in some other way the existence of these
firms. So long as you were only in the domain of doctrines, one might be
mistaken about the true name of your politics; since you have arrived at the
application, one can no longer be mistaken. Your government will be unique in
history; one will never be able to slander it.
MACHIAVELLI. If someone in my kingdom presumed to say what you hint at,
he would disappear as if by a thunderbolt.
MONTESQUIEU. A thunderbolt is fine evidence; you are fortunate to have
it at your disposal. Have you finished with the financial aspects?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes.
MONTESQUIEU. Time is passing rapidly.
TWENTY-SECOND DIALOGUE
MONTESQUIEU. Before having heard you, I was not very familiar with
either the spirit of laws, or the spirit of finances. I am indebted to you for
having taught me both. You hold in your
hands the greatest power of modern times, money. You are able to procure
practically as much of it as you wish. With such prodigious resources you will
undoubtedly do great things; here is finally an opportunity of showing that
good may come from evil.
MACHIAVELLI. That is, indeed, what I expect to show you.
{p. 220} MONTESQUIEU. Well, let us see.
MACHIAVELLI. The greatest of my good deeds will be, first of all, that
of having given domestic peace to my
people. Under my reign the wicked passions are restrained, the good people are
reassured and the bad ones tremble. I render liberty, dignity, strength to
a country torn by factions before my time.
MONTESQUIEU. After having changed so many things, will you not end by
changing the meaning of words?
MACHIAVELLI. Liberty does not
consist in license, no more than dignity and strength consist in
insurrection and disorder. My empire,
peaceful at home, will be glorious abroad.
MONTESQUIEU. How?
MACHIAVELLI. I shall wage war in
the four quarters of the globe. I shall cross the Alps, like Hannibal; I
shall fight in India, like Alexander; in Libya, like Scipio; I shall go from
the Atlas to the Taurus, from the shores of the Ganges to the Mississippi, from
the Mississippi to the river Amur. The great wall of China will fall before my
name; my victorious legions will defend the tomb of the Saviour in Jerusalem
and the Pope in Rome; in Peru their feet will trample the dust of the Incas; in
Egypt the ashes of Rameses; in Mesopotamia, of Nebuchadnezzar. Descending from
Ccesar, from Augustus and from Charlemagne, on the shores of the Danube I shall
avenge the defeat of Varus; on the shores of the Adige, the rout at Cannes; on
the Baltic, the outrages of the Normans.
MONTESQUIEU. Be good enough to stop, I beg of you. If you thus avenge
the defeats of all the great leaders, you will not be equal to it. I shall not
compare you to Louis XIV, to whom Boileau said: "Great king, cease
conquering or I cease writing." This comparison would humiliate you. I
grant that no hero of ancient or of modern times could be compared to you.
But it is not at all a question of that: war in itself is an evil; it
serves in your hands to support a still greater evil, slavery; but where in all
this is the good which you promised me to do?
MACHIAVELLI. This is not the time to equivocate; glory is already
{p. 221} a great good in itself; it is the most powerful of accumulated
capitals; a sovereign who has glory has all the rest. He is the terror of the
neighboring states, the arbiter of Europe. His credit forces itself
insurmountably, for, in spite of what you have said of the sterility of
victories, force never abdicates its rights. One pretends to a war of ideas,
one makes a show of disinterestedness and, one fine day, one concludes by
seizing a coveted province and by imposing a tribute of war upon the conquered.
MONTESQUIEU. In such a system it is the best thing to do, if one can;
otherwise, the military career would be too foolish.
MACHIAVELLI. That’s something like it! You see that our ideas are
beginning to come a little closer together.
MONTESQUIEU. Yes, like the Atlas and the Taurus. Let us see the other
great things of your reign.
MACHIAVELLI. I do not disdain as much as you seem to believe a parallel
with Louis XIV. I would have more than one characteristic in common with this
monarch; like him I would have gigantic
constructions made; however, in this connection, my ambition would much
exceed his and that of the most famous potentates; I should like to show to the
people that the monuments whose construction used to require centuries, could
be rebuilt by me in several years. The palaces of the kings my predecessors
would fall under the hammer of the wreckers to rise again rejuvenated by new
forms; I would overthrow whole towns to reconstruct them upon more regular
plans, to obtain more beautiful perspectives. You cannot imagine to what point buildings attach the people to the monarch.
One may say that people easily pardon the destruction of their laws on
condition that houses are built for them. Besides, you will see in a moment
that buildings serve particularly important objects.
MONTESQUIEU. After the buildings, what will you do?
MACHIAVELLI. You are going very rapidly: the number of great deeds is
not boundless. Will you be good enough to tell me if, between Rameses II and
Louis XIV, or Peter I, the two cardinal points of great reigns have not always
been war and constructions.
{p. 222} MONTESQUIEU. It is true, and yet we have seen absolute
sovereigns who have busied themselves with giving good laws, improving the
customs, introducing simplicity and decency. We have seen some who have
occupied themselves with order in finances, with economy; who have dreamed of
leaving behind them order, peace, lasting institutions, sometimes even liberty.
MACHIAVELLI. Oh! all that will happen. You see that, according to
yourself, absolute sovereigns have some good in them.
MONTESQUIEU. Alas! not too much. However, try to prove the contrary to
me. Have you something good to tell me?
MACHIAVELLI. I would give prodigious scope to the spirit of enterprise;
my reign would be the reign of business.
I would launch speculation into directions new and hitherto unknown. My
administration would even unlock some of its links. I would free a host of industries from regulations; the butchers,
the bakers and the theatrical managers would be free.
MONTESQUIEU. Free to do what?
MACHIAVELLI. Free to make bread, free to sell meat and free to organize
theatrical enterprises, without the permission of the authority.
MONTESQUIEU. I do not know what that signifies. Liberty of industry is a common right among modern peoples. Have
you nothing better to tell me?
MACHIAVELLI. I would be constantly occupied with the condition of the
people. My government would procure work
for them.
MONTESQUIEU. Let the people find it themselves, that is much better.
The political powers have not the right to become popular with the money of
their subjects. Public revenues are nothing but a collective subscription the
proceeds of which should be used only for general services; the working classes
which have been accustomed to depend on the state fall into degradation; they
lose their energy, their vigor, their funds of intellectual industry. Being
paid by the state casts them into a sort of bondage from which they can never
raise themselves except by destroying the state itself. Your constructions
swallow up enormous sums in non-
{p. 223} productive expenditures; they make capital scarce, kill the
small industry, destroy credit in the lower levels of society. Hunger is at the
end of all your schemes. Make economies first, build afterward. Govern with
moderation, with justice, govern the least possible and the people will have
nothing to ask of you because they will have no need of you.
MACHIAVELLI. Ah! you look upon the miseries of the people so
cold-bloodedly! The principles of my government are far different; I bear in my
heart the suffering human beings, the little ones. I am indignant when I see the wealthy ones procure pleasures
inaccessible to the majority. I shall do all that I can to improve the material
condition of the workers, the laborers, those who bow beneath the weight of
social necessity.
MONTESQUIEU. Well, begin by giving them the resources which you are
appropriating for the salaries of your grand dignitaries, your ministers, your
consular personages. Set aside for them the bounties which you lavish
recklessly upon your pages, your courtesans, your mistresses.
Still better, remove the purple, the sight of which is an affront to
the equality of men. Get rid of your titles of Majesty, Highness, Excellency,
which enter proud ears like pointed steel. Call yourself protector as Cromwell
did, but do the deeds of the apostles; go to live in the hut of the poor, as
Alfred the Great did, sleep in hospitals, stretch yourself on sickbeds like
godly Louis. It is too easy to do evangelical charity when one passes his life
in the midst of feasts, when one rests on sumptuous beds, with beautiful women,
when, upon rising and upon going to sleep, one has great personages who rush to
put on one's shirt. Be head of the family and not despot, patriarch and not
prince.
If this role does not suit you, be the chief of a democratic republic,
grant liberty, introduce it into the habits of the people, by force if that is
your temperament. Be Lycurgus, be Agesilaus, be a Gracchus; but I do not know
what it is in this soft civilization where everything bends, where everything
fades near a prince, where every spirit is cast in the same mould, every soul
in the
{p. 224} same uniform; I can understand that one aspires to reign over
men but not over automatons.
MACHIAVELLI, Here is a flood of eloquence I cannot stop. It is with
such phrases that governments are overthrown.
MONTESQUIEU. Alas! You never have any other preoccupation than the one
of maintaining your position. In order to put to the proof your love of the
public welfare, one would have only to ask you to descend from the throne in
the name of the safety of the state. The people, whose choice you are, would
have only to express its will to you in this regard in order to know how you
esteem its sovereignty.
MACHIAVELLI. What a strange question! Is it not for its own good that I
would oppose it?
MONTESQUIEU. What do you know of that? If the people is above you, by
what right do you subordinate its will to yours? If you are freely accepted, if
you are not right but only necessary, why do you expect so much from force and
nothing from reason? You are wise to tremble incessantly for your reign, for
you are of those who last a single day.
MACHIAVELLI. A single day! I
shall last all my life, and my descendants after me perhaps. You are
acquainted with my political, economic and financial system. Do you wish to
know the last means by the aid of which I shall shoot forth the roots of my
dynasty to the deepest layers of the earth?
MONTESQUIEU, No.
MACHIAVELLI. You refuse to listen to me. Then you are vanquished, you,
your principles, your school and your century.
MONTESQUIEU. Speak, since you insist, but let this talk be the last.
TWENTY-THIRD DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI, I am not answering any of your bursts of oratory. The
enthusiasms of eloquence have nothing to do here. To say to a sovereign:
"Will you be kind enough to descend from your
{p. 225} throne for the happiness of your people?" Is that not
madness? To say to him: "Since you are an emanation of popular suffrage,
give yourself up to these fluctuations, let yourself be discussed." Is
that possible? Is not the first law of all constituted power to defend itself
not only in its own interest but also in the interest of the people which it
governs? Have I not made the greatest sacrifice which it is possible to make to
the principles of equality of modern times? After all, is not a government
which has sprung from universal suffrage the expression of the will of the
majority? You will tell me that this principle is destructive of public
liberties; what can I do about it? When this principle has entered into the
customs of the people, do you know how to tear it out? And, if it cannot be
torn out, do you know how to realize it in the great European societies other
than by the arm of a single man? You are severe in your judgment of the methods
of government: point out to me another means of execution and, if there is no
other than absolute power, tell me how this power can separate itself from the
special imperfections to which its principle condemns it.
No, I am not a Saint Vincent de Paul, for my subjects need not an
evangelical soul, but an arm; and I am not an Agesilaus, nor a Lycurgus, nor a
Gracchus, for I am neither among the Spartans nor among the Romans; I am in the heart of voluptuous societies which
ally the fury of pleasures to that of arms, the transports of force to those of
the senses, which no longer desire
divine authority, paternal authority, religious restraint. Is it I who have
created the world in the midst of which I live? I am such because it is such.
Would I have the power to stop its inclination? No, I can only prolong its life
because it would dissolve still more quickly if it were left to itself. I take
this society by its vices because it presents only vices to me; if it had
virtues, I should take it by its virtues.
But if austere principles can affront my power, can they disregard the
real services that I render, my genius and even my grandeur?
I am the arm, I am the sword of the Revolutions which the
{p. 226} harbinger breath of final destruction is leading astray. I contain insane forces which have no
other motive power, at bottom, than
the brutality of the instincts, which hunt plunder under the veil of
principles. If I discipline these forces, if I arrest their expansion in my
country, even for only a century, have I not deserved well of it? Can I not
even claim the gratitude of the European states which turn their eyes toward me as toward Osiris who alone has the power
to captivate these trembling crowds? Raise your eyes higher and bow before
one who bears on his brow the fatal sign of human predestination.
MONTESQUIEU. Exterminating angel, grandson of Tamerlane, reduce the
people to slavery, yet you will not prevent that somewhere there will be free
souls who will brave you, and their disdain will suffice to safeguard the
rights of the human conscience rendered imperceptible by God.
MACHIAVELLI. God protects the strong.
MONTESQUIEU. Please get to the last links of the chain which you have
forged. Lock it well, use the anvil and the hammer, you can do all. God
protects you, it is He Himself who guides your star.
MACHIAVELLI. I have difficulty in understanding the animation which now
rules your words. Am I really so hard, I
who have taken as final policy, not violence, but self-effacement? Calm
yourself, I bring you more than one unexpected consolation. Only allow me to
take a few more precautions which I consider necessary to my safety; you will
see that with those with which I surround myself a prince has nothing to fear
of circumstances.
Our writings have more than one resemblance, in spite of what you say,
and I believe that a despot who wishes to be complete must certainly not
dispense with reading you. For instance, you wisely remark in the Esprit des
Lois that an absolute monarch must have a large praetorian guard (Esprit des
Lois, Book X, Ch. XV, Page 127); the advice is good, I shall follow it. My
guard would be about one-third of the strength of my army. I am a great lover
of conscription which is one of the finest inventions of French genius, but I
believe that this institution must be perfected by
{p. 227} trying to retain in the army the greatest possible number of
those who have completed their period of compulsory service. I would succeed, I
believe, by resolutely taking possession of the kind of traffic which is
carried on in some States, as in France for instance, in connection with
voluntary service for money. I would suppress this shocking transaction and I
myself would carry it on honestly in the form of a monopoly by creating an
endowment fund for the army which would call to arms, by the enticement of
money, those who would like to devote themselves exclusively to the military
state, and would keep them there by the same means.
MONTESQUIEU. Then they would be types of mercenaries that you hope to
form in your own country!
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, party hatred will say that, when I am moved only by
the good of the people and by the interest, certainly very legitimate, of my
preservation which is the common good of my subjects. Let us go on to other
subjects. What is going to astonish you is that I am returning to structures. I
warned you that we would be led back to that. You are going to see the
political idea which springs up from the vast system of construction that I
have undertaken; through that I realize an economic theory which has caused
many disasters in certain States of Europe, the theory of the organization of permanent work for the laboring classes. My reign
promises them an indefinite salary. Myself dead, my system abandoned, no
more work; the people are on strike and rise to assault the wealthy classes.
They are in the midst of a peasant
rising: industrial perturbation, overthrow of credit, insurrection in my State,
revolt around it; Europe is aflame. I pause. Tell me if the privileged
classes, which very naturally tremble for their fortunes, will not make common
cause, very close cause, with the working classes to maintain me, me or my
dynasty, if, on the other hand, the interest of European tranquillity does not
attach to it all the powers of the first rank.
The question of building which seems
slight is in reality, as you see, a
colossal one. When it is a question of an object of this
{p. 228} importance, no sacrifice must be spared. Have you noticed that
almost all my political conceptions are lined with a financial plan? That is
just what happens here, too. I shall
institute a fund of public works which I shall endow with several hundred
millions by the aid of which I shall invite constructions over the entire surface
of my kingdom. You have guessed my aim: I
shall support the rising of the working classes; that is the other army
which I need against the factions. But this mass of proletarians which is in my
hand must not be able to turn against me on the day when it will be without
bread. I take care of that by the buildings themselves, for the unusual part of
my plans is that each one at the same time furnishes its corollaries. The
worker who builds for me at the same time builds the necessary means of defense
against himself. Without knowing it, he drives himself from the great centers
where his presence would disturb me; he makes forever impossible the success of
revolutions which are made in the street. The result of great buildings is,
indeed, to rarefy the space in which the artisan may live, to force him to the
suburbs, and soon to cause him to leave even those; for living expenses
increase with the increase in rent. My capital will hardly be habitable for
those who live by their daily work except at the very outskirts. It certainly
is not in the neighborhood of the seat of authority that insurrections can be
formed. Undoubtedly, there will be an immense laboring population around the
capital, formidable in a day of wrath; but the constructions that I would raise
would all be conceived according to a strategic plan, that is, they would make
way for great passages where, from one end to the other, cannons could
circulate. The extremity of these great passages would be attached to a number
of barracks, fortresses, so to speak, full of arms, soldiers and munitions. My
successor would have to be a simple old man or a child to fall before an
insurrection, for, at the motion of his hand, some bits of powder would sweep
the uprising twenty leagues away from the capital. But the blood which courses
in my veins is ardent and my race has all the signs of strength. Are you
listening to me?
{p. 229} MONTESQUIEU. Yes.
MACHIAVELLI. But you understand that I do not expect to make material
life difficult for the working population of the capital, and there I encounter
an incontestable stumbling-block; but the fertility of resources that my
government must have suggests an idea to me; that would be to build for the people huge cities where the
rent would be very low and where the masses would find themselves reunited
by bands as in great families.
MONTESQUIEU. Mouse-traps!
MACHIAVELLI. Oh! the spirit of disparagement, the unbridled hatred of
the parties will not fail to vilify my institutions. They will say what you
say. That matters little to me; if this method does not succeed another will be
found.
I must not leave the chapter on constructions without mentioning a
detail insignificant in appearance, but what is insignificant in politics? The
innumerable edifices that I shall construct must be marked with my name, they
must contain attributes, bas-reliefs, groups, which recall a theme of my
history. My arms, my monogram, must be woven in everywhere. In one place, there
will be angels who support my crown, in another, statues of justice and wisdom
which bear my initials. These points are of the utmost importance, I consider
them essentials.
It is by these signs, by these emblems that the person of the sovereign
is always present; one lives with him, with his memory, with his thought. The
feeling of his absolute sovereignty enters into the most rebellious spirits as
the drop of water which falls unceasingly from the rock hollows out even
granite. For the same reason I want my statue, my bust, my portraits to be in
every public establishment, especially in the auditorium of the courts; I would
be represented in royal costume or on horseback.
MONTESQUIEU. Beside the image of Christ.
MACHIAVELLI. Not at all, but opposite it; for sovereign power is an
image of divine power. My image is thus allied with that of Providence and of
justice.
{p. 230} MONTESQUIEU. Justice itself should wear your livery. You are
not a Christian, you are a Greek emperor of the Lower Empire.
MACHIAVELLI. I am a Catholic, Apostolic and Roman emperor. For the same
reasons as those which I have just pointed out to you, I wish my name, the name Royal, to be given to every public
establishment. Royal Tribunal, royal Court, royal Academy, royal
Legislative Body, royal Senate, royal Council of State; as often as possible
this same term will be given to the officials, the agents, the official
personnel which surrounds the government. Lieutenant of the king, archbishop of
the king, comedian of the king, judge of the king, attorney of the king. In
short, the name of royal will be imprinted on whatever will represent a sign of
power, whether it be men or things. Only my birthday will be a national holiday
and not a royal one. I must add that, whenever possible, streets, public
places, squares, must bear names which recall historic memories of my reign. If
one carefully follows these indications, whether he be Caligula or Nero, he is
certain to impress himself forever upon the memory of the people and to
transmit his prestige to the most distant posterity. How many things I have yet
to add! I must limit myself.
For who could say everything without a mortal tedium? (This sentence is
found in the preface of the Esprit des Lois, P. 1. - Editor’s note.)
Here I am at petty means; I regret it, for these things are perhaps not
worthy of your attention, but, for me, they are vital.
Bureaucracy is, they say, an evil of monarchic governments; I do not
believe that. They are thousands of servants who are naturally attached to the
order of existing things. I have an army of soldiers, an army of judges, an
army of workers, I desire an army of employes.
MONTESQUIEU. You no longer take the pains to justify anything.
MACHIAVELLI. Have I time for that?
MONTESQUIEU. No, go on.
MACHIAVELLI. In the states which have been monarchic, and they all have
been at least once, I have observed that there is a
{p. 231} veritable frenzy for decorations, for ribbons. These things
cost the prince scarcely anything and he can make happy people, and, even
better, loyal ones, by means of some pieces of stuff, some baubles in silver or
gold. In truth, I would need little persuasion to decorate without exception
those who would ask it of me. A man
decorated is a man bought. I would make of these marks of distinction a
rallying sign for devoted subjects; I really believe I would have, at this
price, nine-tenths of my kingdom. In this way I realize, as far as possible,
the instincts of equality of the nation. Note carefully the more a nation in general sticks to equality, the more the
individual has a passion for distinctions. Here, then, is a means of action
which it would be too stupid to deprive oneself of. Therefore far from giving
up titles, as you advise me, I would multiply them around me as often as I
would the dignities. In my court I want the etiquette of Louis XIV, the
domestic hierarchy of Constantine, a severe diplomatic formalism, an imposing
ceremonial; these are the infallible methods of government upon the spirit of
the masses. Against all that, the sovereign appears like a God.
I am assured that in the states which seem most democratic in ideas,
the ancient monarchic nobility has lost practically nothing of its prestige. I
would have as chamberlains the gentlemen of the oldest school. Many ancient
names would no doubt be extinct; by virtue of my sovereign power, I would bring
them to life again with titles, and the greatest names in history since
Charlemagne would be found at my court.
It is possible that these conceptions seem odd to you, but I insist
that they will do more for the consolidation of my dynasty than the wisest
laws. The cult of the prince is a sort of religion and, like all possible
religions, this cult prescribes contradictions and mysteries beyond reason
(Esprit des Lois, Book XXV, Chap. II, p. 386). Each of my acts, inexplicable as
it may seem, proceeds from a calculation the sole object of which is my safety
and the safety of my dynasty. As I have mentioned in The Prince, what is really difficult is to acquire
power; but it is easy to keep
{p. 232} it, for all that is
necessary is to remove that which is harmful and to establish that which
protects. The essential characteristic of my policy, as you have been able to
notice, was to make myself indispensable (The Prince, Chap. IX, p. 63); I have
destroyed as many organized forces as was necessary so that nothing could
proceed without me, so that even the enemies of my power would tremble at the
thought of overthrowing it.
All that now remains for me to do consists only in the development of
the moral methods which are sprouting in my institutions. My reign is a reign
of pleasures; you will not forbid me to cheer my people by games, by festivals;
that is how I expect to modify the customs. One cannot conceal that this
century is a century of money; needs have doubled, luxury is ruining families; on every hand people aspire to material
pleasures; a sovereign would have to be not of his times not to know how to
turn to his profit this universal passion for money and this sensual ardor
which consumes men nowadays. Misery clamps
them as in a vice, luxury crushes them; ambition devours them, they are
mine. But when I speak thus, at bottom it is the interest of my people which
guides me. Yes, I shall call forth good from evil; I shall exploit materialism
to the profit of concord and civilization; I shall extinguish the political
passions of men by satisfying their ambitions, their desires and their needs. I
claim to have as servants of my reign those who, under previous governments,
will have made the most noise in the name of liberty. The most austere virtues
are like that of the wife of Giocondo; all that is necessary is always to
double the price of defeat. Those who resist money will not resist honors;
those who resist honors will not resist money. In seeing those whom it believes
the purest fall in their turn, public opinion will weaken so much that it will
end up by abdicating completely. How could one complain after all? I shall not
be severe except for that which has reference to politics; I shall persecute
only this passion; I shall even secretly favor the others by the thousand
underground ways which absolute power has at its disposal.
{p. 233} MONTESQUIEU. After having destroyed political conscience, you
ought to undertake to destroy moral conscience; you have killed society, now
you are killing man. May it please God that your words should resound to the
very earth; never could a more striking refutation of your own doctrines strike
human ears.
MACHIAVELLI. Allow me to finish.
TWENTY-FOURTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. I have now only to indicate to you certain particulars
concerning my method of action, certain habits of conduct which will give my
government its final countenance.
In the first place, I wish my
aims to be impenetrable even to those who are closest to me. I would be, in
this manner, like Alexander VI and the Duke of Valentinois, of whom it was said
proverbially in the court of Rome, of the former, "that he never did what he said"; of the latter, "that he never said what he did."
I would only communicate my projects when I gave the command for execution
and I would always give my orders at the
very last moment. Borgia never acted otherwise; his ministers themselves knew nothing and everyone about him was
always reduced to simple conjecture. I have the gift of immobility: there is my
goal; I look to one side, and when it is within my reach, I turn suddenly and
swoop upon my prey before it has time even to cry out.
You cannot believe what prestige such a power of dissimulation gives to
the Prince. When it is combined with vigorous action, a supersbtlous respect
surrounds him, his counsellors ask one another secretly what he will think of
next, the people place their confidence only in him; he personifies in their
eyes the Providence whose ways are inscrutable. When the people see him pass,
they think with involuntary terror what he could do by a nod of his head; the
neighboring States are always fearful and overwhelm
{p. 234} him with marks of deference, for they never know if some
enterprise already prepared will not descend on them from one day to the other.
MONTESQUIEU. You are powerful in the face of your people because you
are holding them under your feet, but if you deceive the States with whom you
have relations the way you deceive your subjects, you will soon be strangled in the arms of a coalition.
MACHIAVELLI. You force me to leave my subject, for I am interested here only in my interior policies; but if you wish
to know one of the principal means by the aid of which I would keep in check
the coalition of foreign hatred, here it is: I reign over a powerful kingdom, I
have told you; well! I would seek among the surrounding States some great
nation now decayed and attempting to recover itself; I would help it recover entirely by means of some general war, as has
been done in Sweden, in Prussia, and as could be done from one day to another
in Germany or in Italy; and this nation, which would only exist through me,
which would be nothing but the work of my existence, would give me, as long as
I am in power, three hundred thousand more men against an armed Europe.
MONTESQUIEU. And the welfare of your State by the side of which you
would thus elevate a powerful rival and
possible enemy after a given time?
MACHIAVELLI. Before all else I protect myself.
MONTESQUIEU. Thus you have nothing, not even a care for the destiny of
your kingdom? (One cannot conceal the fact that here Machiavelli contradicts
himself, for he says formally, Chap. IV, page 26, "that the Prince who
makes another powerful works for his own ruin." Editor's Note.)
MACHIAVELLI, Who says that? If I watch out for my own welfare am I not
at the same time watching out for the welfare of my kingdom!
MONTESQUIEU. Your royal aspect is standing out more and more; I would
like to see it in its entirety.
MACHIAVELLI. Then please do not interrupt me.
{p. 235} It is quite necessary for a Prince, no matter what his force
of intellect, always to find within himself the necessary mental resources. One
of the greatest talents of a statesman is that of appropriating the advice that
he hears around him. Very often one finds enlightening advice in his entourage.
I would therefore assemble my council
very often, I would make it argue, debate before me the most important
questions. When the sovereign is not sure of his desires, or has not enough
resources of language to veil his real thought, he must remain silent or must
not speak except to prolong the discussion. It is very rare that, in a
well-formed council, the real plan of action in a given situation is not
formulated in one way or another. It is snatched up and very often one of these
who had given his advice very obscurely is quite surprised to see it carried
into action the next day.
You have been able to see in my institutions and my acts what attention
I have always given to the creating of
appearances; words are as necessary as actions. The height of cleverness is
to create a belief in franchise, when one has a Punic faith. Not only will my
aims be impenetrable, but my words will
nearly always signify the opposite of what they will seem to indicate. Only
the initiated will be able to penetrate the sense of the characteristic phrases
that I will drop from the heights of my throne: when I will say: My reign means peace, it means there will be war;
when I will say that I call upon moral means, it means I will use methods of
force. Do you hear me?
MONTESQUIEU. Yes.
MACHIAVELLI. You have seen that my
press has a hundred voices and that they speak incessantly of the grandeur
of my reign, of the enthusiasm of my subjects for their sovereign; that at the
same time they put into the mouths of the public the opinions, the ideas and
even the formulas of phrase that must support their conversations; you have
also seen that my ministers continually astonish the public by the
incontestable testimony of their work. As for me, I will speak rarely, only once a year, besides occasional important
{p. 236} situations. Thus each of my manifestations will be hailed, not
only in my kingdom, but in the whole of Europe, as an event.
A Prince whose power is founded upon a democratic base, must speak
carefully, albeit popularly. If necessary he must not fear to speak like a
demagogue, for after all he is the people, and he must have its passions. There
must be for him certain attentions, certain flatteries, certain demonstrations
of tenderness which will have their place on occasion. It matters little that
these methods may seem mean and puerile in the eyes of the world, the people
will not look so closely and the effect will be produced.
In my book I recommend to the Prince to take for an example some great
man of the past, in whose footsteps he must follow as much as possible. (The
Prince, Chap. XIV, page 98.) The historical similarities have a great effect on
the masses; one increases in their imagination, one is given in life the place
that posterity is reserving for you. Besides, one finds in the biography of
these great men certain comparisons, certain useful hints, sometimes identical
situations, from which one can gather precious lessons, for all great political
lessons rest in history. When one has found a great man with whom he has some
likeness, he can do even better. You know that the people love a Prince who has
a cultivated spirit, who has a taste for literature, who even has talent. Well,
the Prince could not use his leisure to better advantage than to write, for
instance, the biography of the great man of the past whom he has taken as a
model. A severe philosophy could tax such things with weakness. When the sovereign
is powerful he is pardoned, and is even endowed with I know not what grace.
Certain weaknesses, and even certain vices, moreover, serve the Prince
as much as virtues do. You could recognize the truth of these observations
according to the use I have had to make
sometimes of duplicity, sometimes of violence. It must not be believed, for
example, that the vindictive character of the sovereign could injure him; quite
the contrary. If it is often opportune to employ clemency or magnanimity, it is necessary that at certain moments his
anger should bear down in a terrible manner. Man is the image
{p. 237} of God, and divinity has no less rigorous blows than mercy.
When I would have resolved upon the loss of my enemies, I would therefore wipe
them out until there remained only their dust. Men revenge themselves only for
light injuries; they can do nothing for the great ones. (The Prince, Chap. III,
page 17.) That is what I expressly say in my book. The Prince has only the
choice of instruments which must serve his wrath; he will always find judges
ready to sacrifice their conscience to
projects of vengeance or hate.
Do not fear that the people will ever be moved by the things I do to
it. First, it loves to feel the vigor of the arm that commands, and then it
hates by nature whoever rises above it, and it instinctively rejoices when one
strikes above it. Perhaps you do not know, moreover, with what facility one
forgets. When the moment of rigorous action is past, hardly even those who have
been struck remember. In Rome, during the time of the Lower Empire, Tacitus
reports that the victims ran with joy to meet their tortures. You understand
perfectly that there is no question of anything like that in modern times;
customs have become far softer; several proscriptions, some imprisonments, the
forfeiture of civic rights, those are rather light punishments. It is true
that, to arrive at sovereign power, it
was necessary to spill blood and to violate many rights; but, I repeat,
everything will be forgotten. The least cajolery on the part of the Prince,
several kind actions on the part of his ministers or his agents, will be
accepted with the marks of the greatest gratitude.
If it is indispensable to
punish with an inflexible ruthlessness, it is necessary to recompense with the
same punctuality; that is what I shall never fail to do. Whoever renders a
service to my government will be recompensed the very next day. Positions,
distinctions, the highest dignities, will form so many certain steps for
whoever will be occupied in serving my government usefully. In the army, in the
magistrature, in all public works, advancement will be calculated upon the
shade of opinion and the degree of zeal for my government. You are silent.
{p. 238} MONTESQUIEU. Continue.
MACHIAVELLI. I return to certain vices and even to certain whims which
I think necessary for a Prince. The management of power is an enormous thing.
However able the sovereign may be, however infallible his glance and however
ruthless his decisions, there is still an immense alea in his existence. It is
necessary to be superstitious. Do not think that this is of little consequence.
There are, in the lives of Princes, situations so difficult, moments so grave,
that human prudence counts for little. In such cases, one must almost cast the
die to make decisions. The method that I refer to, and which I shall follow,
consists, in certain critical moments, in becoming attached to historical
dates, consulting happy anniversaries, making such and such a bold resolution
under the auspices of a day on which one has won a victory, or made a lucky
stroke. I must tell you that superstition has another very great advantage; the
people know this tendency. These augural ideas often succeed; they must also be
used when one is sure of success. The people, who only judge by results,
accustom themselves to believe that each act of the sovereign corresponds to
certain celestial signs, that historic coincidences force the hand of fortune.
MONTESQUIEU. The last word has been said; you are a gambler.
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, but I have unheard-of luck, and I have a hand so
sure, a mind so fertile that fortune cannot turn against me.
MONTESQUIEU. Since you are painting your portrait, you must have still
other vices and other virtues to exhibit.
MACHIAVELLI. I ask you to forgive luxury. The passion for women serves
a sovereign far more than you think. Henri IV owed a part of his popularity to
his incontinence. Men are so made that this propensity among those who govern
them pleases them. Dissolute habits have at all times been a passion, a gallant
career in which the Prince must surpass his equals, as he surpasses his
soldiers before the enemy. These ideas are French, and I do not think that they
are too displeasing to the illustrious author of the Letfres Persanes. I am not
permitted to fall into reflections that are too vulgar, but nevertheless I
cannot refrain from telling
{p. 239} you that the most real result of the Prince's gallantry is to
attract the sympathy of the more beautiful half of his subjects.
MONTESQUIEU. You are composing madrigals.
MACHIAVELLI. One can be serious and yet gallant: you have furnished the
proof. I do not diminish my idea in any way. The influence of women on the
public mind is considerable. In good politics, the Prince is condemned to be
gallant, even when at heart he cares little for it; but that situation will be
rare.
I can assure you that if I carefully follow the rules that I have just
laid down, liberty will be little desired in my kingdom. They will have a
strong sovereign, dissolute, filled with the spirit of chivalry, adroit in all
the physical exercises: he will be loved. The austere will do nothing about it;
they will follow the crowd; and more important, the independent men will be
placed on the index: people will keep away from them. No one will believe
either in their character or in their disinterest. They will pass for
malcontents who wish to be bought. If, here and there, I do not encourage talent,
it will be repulsed on all sides, and consciences will be walked on as would
pavements. But at bottom, I shall be a moral Prince; I shall not permit people
to go beyond certain limits. I will respect public modesty, in all places where
I see that it wishes to be respected. Contaminations will not reach me, for I
will give over to others the unpleasant parts of the administration. The worst
that can be said of me is that I am a good Prince who has bad advisers, that I
desire the good, that I desire it ardently, that I will always do what is right
when it is pointed out to me.
If you knew how easy it is to govern when one has absolute power. There
are no contradictions at all, no resistance; one can carry out one's designs at
leisure, one has the time to correct one's mistakes. One can make the people
happy without opposition, for that is what always preoccupies me. I can assure
you that people will never be bored in my kingdom; minds will be always
occupied with a thousand different things. I will give the people the spectacle
of my equipages and the pomp of my Court; great ceremonies will be prepared; I
will lay out gardens; I will offer my
{p. 240} hospitality to Kings; I will have embassies from the most
distant countries brought here. Sometimes there will be rumors of war,
sometimes diplomatic complications which will be discussed for months; I will
even go so far as to satisfy thc monomania of liberty. The wars which will be
waged during my reign will be undertaken in the name of the liberty of men and
the independence of nations, and, while the people acclaim me on my travels, I
will whisper secretly into the ears of thc absolute monarchs: Fear nothing, I
am with you, I wear a crown like you and I intend to conserve it: I embrace
European liberty, but only to strangle it. One thing alone could perhaps
compromise my fortune at some moment; that will be the day when it is realized
on every side that my policies are not honest, that my every act is marked by
the stamp of cunning.
MONTESQUIEU. Who will be the blind who will not see that?
MACHIAVELLI. My entire people, excepting several groups of which I fear
little. I have moreover formed about me a school of politicians of a very great
relative strength. You cannot believe to what point Machiavellism is
contagious, and how easy its precepts are to follow. In every branch of
government there will be men of no consequence, or of very little consequence,
who will be veritable Machiavellis in miniature who will scheme, who will
dissimulate, who will lie with an imperturbable cold-bloodedness; truth will
not be able to see light anywhere.
MONTESQUIEU. If you have not done anything but jest from one end to the
other of this conversation, as I think you have, Machiavelli, I regard this
irony as your most magnificent work.
MACHIAVELLI. Irony! You are deceiving yourself if you think that. Do
you not understand that I have spoken without veiling my meaning, and that it
is the terrible violence of truth that gives my words the color you think you
see!
MONTESQUIEU, You have finished.
MONTESQUIEU. Not yet.
MONTESQUIEU. Then finish.
{p. 241} TWENTY-FIFTH DIALOGUE
MACHIAVELLI. I will reign for
ten years under these conditions, without changing anything in my
legislation; this is the only price of definite success. Nothing, absolutely
nothing, must make me change during this period; the lid of the boiler must be
of iron and lead; it is during this time that the phenomena of destruction of
the dissatisfied spirit are elaborated. You think perhaps that the people will
be unhappy, that they will complain. Ah! I would be inexcusable if that were
so; but when the springs have been the
most violently tensed, when I will weigh with the most terrible heaviness
upon the chest of my people, this is what they will say: We have only what we deserve, let us suffer.
MONTESQUIEU. You are quite blind if you take that as an apology for
your reign, if you do not understand that expression of these words is a
violent regret of the past. That is a stoic saying that announces to you the
day of chastisement.
MACHIAVELLI. You embarrass me. The hour has come to loosen the bonds, I
will return the liberties.
MONTESQUIEU. A thousand times better the excess of your oppression.
Your people will answer you: "Keep what you have taken."
MACHIAVELLI. Ah! How well I recognize implacable partisan hatred in
that. To admit nothing to one's political adversaries, nothing, not even the
benefits.
MONTESQUIEU. No, Machiavelli, nothing with you, nothing! The sacrificed
victim receives no benefits from his executioner.
MACHIAVELLI. Ah! How easily I could penetrate the secret thought of my
enemies in that matter. They flatter themselves, they hope that the force of
expansion that I compress will sooner or later hurl me into space. The fools!
They will only know me well at the end. In politics what is necessary to
prevent any danger with the greatest possible repression? An imperceptible
opening. And it will be found.
{p. 242} I will most certainly not return considerable liberty; well,
see however to what point absolutism will have already penetrated into custom.
I can wager that at the first noise of these liberties, there will be built
around me rumors of alarm. My ministers, my councillors will cry that I am
abandoning the rudder, that all is lost. I will be begged, in the name of the
good of the State, in the name of the whole country, to do nothing about it;
the people will say: "What is he thinking about? His genius is
diminishing"; the indifferent will say: "He has come to the end of
his tether"; the hateful will say: "He is dead."
MONTESQUIEU. And they will all be right, for a modern journalist
(Benjamin Constant. Editor's Note.) has said with great truth: "Does one
wish to despoil men of their rights? Nothing must be done by halves. Whatever
is left will be of use to them to help regain what has been taken away. The
hand that is still free unties the other from its bonds."
MACHIAVELLI. That is very well thought out; it is very true; I know
that I am exposing myself very much. You see that people are unjust to me, that
I love liberty more than they say. You asked me a moment ago if I knew
self-denial, if I would sacrifice myself for my people, relinquish the throne
if necessary: now you have my answer, I can relinquish it as a martyr.
MONTESQUIEU. You have become very tender-hearted. What liberties would
you return?
MACHIAVELLI. I would permit my legislative chamber to inform me each
year, at the new year, of their wishes in a petition.
MONTESQUIEU. But since the great majority of the chamber is devoted to
you, what can you have if not thanks and messages of admiration and love?
MACHIAVELLI. Well, yes. Will not these messages be natural?
MONTESQUIEU. Are these all the liberties?
MACHIAVELLI. But this first concession is important, no matter what you
say. Nevertheless I will not hold myself to that alone. There exists in Europe
today a certain intellectual movement against centralization, not among the
masses, but among the en-
{p. 243} lightened classes. I will decentralize, that is to say, I will
give my governors of the provinces the right to decide on many of the little
local questions hitherto submitted for the approval of my
mlmsters.
MONTESQUIEU. You only make tyranny more insupportable if the municipal
element counts for nothing in this reform.
MACHIAVELLI. That is the fatal precipitation of those who demand
reforms: it is necessary to progress by prudent steps along the road of
liberty. I do not, however, keep myself there: I will give commercial
liberties.
MONTESQUIEU. You have already spoken of that.
MACHIAVELLI. It is because the industrial question always affects me: I
do not wish it said of me that my legislation goes, by an excess of suspicion
in the direction of the people, so far as to hinder it from providing for its
own subsistence. It is for that reason that I will have presented to the
chambers laws that have for their object to lessen a little the prohibitive
resolutions of association. Besides, the toletance of my government has
rendered this measure quite useless, and since, in the final account, one must
not disarm oneself, nothing will be changed in the law, except perhaps the form
of its phrasing. We have today in the chambers deputies who lend themselves
very well to these innocent strategies.
MONTESQUIEU. Is that all?
MACHIAVELLI. Yes, for it is a great deal, too much perhaps; but I think
I can reassure myself; my army is enthusiastic, my magistrature faithful, and
my penal legislation functions with the regularity and the precision of those
all-powerful and terrible mechanisms that modern science has invented.
MONTESQUIEU. Thus, you will not touch the laws concerning the press?
MACHIAVELLI. You would not wish it.
MONTESQUIEU. Nor concerning municipal legislation?
MACHIAVELLI. Is that possible?
MONTESQUIEU. Nor your system of protectorate of the electorate?
MACHIAVELLI. No.
{p. 244} MONTESQUIEU. Nor the organization of the Senate, nor that of
the legislative body, nor your interior system, nor your foreign policy, nor
your economic regime, nor your financial regime?
MACHIAVELLI. I will not change anything besides what I have told you.
To put it correctly, I have left the
period of terror, and I am entering the way of tolerance; I can do it
without danger; I could even give real liberties to the people, for one must be
quite lacking in political sense not to realize that at this imaginary period
my legislation has borne all its fruits. I have fulfilled the goal that I
announced to you; the character of the nation has changed; the unimportant
powers that I have given back have been for me the plumb with which I have
measured the depth of the result. All is done, all is completed, there is no
longer any possible resistance. There is no danger, there is nothing! And
nevertheless I will return nothing. You have said that there lies practical
truth.
MONTESQUIEU. Hasten to finish, Machiavelli. May my shadow never meet
you again, and may God obliterate from my memory the last trace of all that I
have just heard!
MACHIAVELLI. Take care, Montesquieu; before the moment that begins
falls into eternity you will seek my footsteps with anguish and the memory of
this conversation will desolate your soul through eternity.
MONTESQUIEU. Speak!
MACHIAVELLI. Let us return, then. I have done all that you know; by
these concessions to the liberal spirit of my times, I have disarmed partisan
hatred.
MONTESQUIEU. Ah! you will not drop this mask of hypocrisy with which
you have covered heinous crimes that no human language has words for. You wish,
then, that I leave the eternal night to disgrace you! Ah! Machiavelli! you
yourself had not taught to degrade humanity to such a point! You did not
conspire against conscience, you had not conceived the thought of making the
human soul a mire in which the divine Creator Himself would recognize nothing.
{p. 245} MACHIAVELLI. That is true, I am surpassed.
MONTESQUIEU. Flee! do not prolong this talk one moment longer.
MACHIAVELLI, Before the shadows that advance tumultuously over there
have reached this dark ravine which separates them from us, I will have
finished; before they have arrived you will see me no longer and you will call
me in vain.
MONTESQUIEU. Then finish, this will be the expiation of the sin I have
committed in accepting this sacrilegious wager.
MACHIAVELLI. Ah! Liberty! So this is with what strength you hold some
souls when the people scorn you or console themselves with baubles. Permit me
to give you a very short defense of this subject:
Dion speaks of the Roman people being indignant against Augustus
because of certain very harsh laws that he had promulgated, but, as soon as he
had brought back the comedian Piladus, and the dissatisfied had been expelled
from the city, discontent ceased.
That is my defense. Now here is the conclusion of the author, for it is
an author whom I cite:
"Such a people felt tyranny more deeply when a dancer was exiled
than when all its laws had been taken away." (Esprit des Lois~ Book XIX,
Chap. II, p. 253.)
Do you know who wrote that?
MONTESQUIEU. It makes little difference.
MACHIAVELLI. Recognize yourself, then, it was you. I can see only boors
round about me, what can I do? Dancers will not be lacking in my reign, and
they would have to be very bad before I decided to expel them.
MONTESQUIEU. I do not know whether you have quoted me exactly; but here
is a citation that I can guarantee you: it will revenge through eternity the
people you libel:
"The habits of the Prince contribute as much to liberty as the
laws. He can, like them, make men beasts, and beasts men; if he loves free souls,
he will have subjects, if he loves boors, he will have slaves." (Page 173,
Chap. XXVII, Book XII.)
{p. 246} That is my reply, and if I had to add something to this
quotation today, I would say:
"When public honesty is banished from the heart of the courts,
when corruption spreads there without shame, yet it will never penetrate save
in the hearts of those who have access to a bad Prince; love of virtue still
lives in the hearts of the people, and the power of this principle is so great
that the bad Prince has only to disappear in order that, by the very force of
things, honesty will return in the practice of government at the same time as
liberty."
MACHIAVELLI. That is very well written, in a very simple manner. There
is only one thing wrong in what you have just said, that, in the mind as in the
soul of my people, I personify virtue, and more, I personify liberty, do you
hear, as I personify revolution,
progress, the modern spirit, all that is good at the bottom of modern
civilization. I do not say that I am respected, I do not say that I am
loved, I say that I am venerated, I say that the people adore me; that if I
wished it, I could have altars erected to me, for, explain it as you wish, I
have the fatal gifts that work upon the masses. In your country Louis XVI was guillotined, he who wished
only good for his people, who desired it with all the faith, all the ardor
of a sincerely honest soul, and, several years before, altars had been erected
to Louis XIV who cared less for the people than the least of his mistresses;
who, at the slightest shake of a head, would have the mob cannonaded while he
played dice with Lauzun. But I, I am much more than Louis XIV, with the popular
suffrage that is the base of my government; I am Washington, I am Henri IV, I
am Saint Louis, Charles-le-Sage, I take your best kings, to honor you. I am a
king of Egypt and Asia at the same time,
I am Pharaoh, I am Cyrus, I am Alexander, I am Sardanapalus; the soul of
the people expands when I pass; it runs drunkenly in my footsteps; I am an
object of idolatry; the father points me out to his son, the mother invokes my
name in her prayers, the maiden looks at me with sighs and dreams that if my
glance fell upon her by chancel she could perhaps lie for a
{p. 247} moment on my couch. When the unhappy is oppressed, he says: If
the king but knew; when someone desires revenge, when he hopes for help, he says, The king will know. Besides, I
will never be approached without being found with my hands filled with gold.
Those who surround me, it is true, are hard, violent, they deserve the stick at
times, but it is necessary to have things thus; for their hateful despicable
character, their cheap cupidity, their dissoluteness, their shameful
wastefulness, their crass avarice make a contrast with the sweetness of my
character, my simple bealing, my inexhaustible generosity. They will invoke my
name, I tell you, like that of a god; in storms, in periods of want, in great
fires, I hasten to them, the people throw themselves at my feet, they would
carry me to the heavens in their arms, if God gave them wings.
MONTESQUIEU. All of which would not stop you from crushing it with
cannonshot at the least sign of resistance.
MACHIAVELLI. That is true, but love does not exist without fear.
MONTESQUIEU. Has this frightful vision ended?
MACHIAVELLI. Vision! Ah! Montesquieu! you will shed tears for a long
time: tear up the Esprit des Lois, beg God to give you forgetfulness for your
part in heaven; for here is the terrible truth of which you already have the
foreboding; there was no vision in what I have just told you.
MONTESQUIEU. What are you telling me?
MACHIAVELLI. What I have just described, this gathering of monstrous
things before which the mind recoils in fright, this work that only hell itself
could accomplish, all this is fact, all
this exists, all this prospers in the face of the sun, at this very moment,
in a part of the globe which we have left.
MONTESQUIEU. Where?
MACHIAVELLI. No, that would be to inflict upon you a second death.
MONTESQUIEU. Ah! Speak, in the name of heaven!
MACHIAVELLI. Well! ...
{p. 248} MONTESQUIEU. What?
MACHIAVELLI. The time has passed! Do you not see that the whirlwind is
carrying me away?
MONTESQUIEU . Machiavelli!!
MACHIAVELLI. See those shadows which pass by not far from you, covering
their eyes; do you recognize them? They are the glories that called forth the
envy of the whole world. Now, they beseech the Lord to render them their
fatherland! ...
MONTESQUIEU. Eternal God, what have you permitted! ...
ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF "DIALOGUES IN
HELL"
FIRST DIALOGUE.
Meeting of Machiavelli and Montesquieu in hell. Machiavelli eulogizes
posthumous life. He complains of the reprobation that posterity has attached to
his name, and justifies himself. His only crime has been to tell the truth to
the people as to kings; Machiavellism came before Machiavelli. His
philosophical and moral system; theory of force. Negation of morality and
justice in politics. The great men do good in societies by violating all laws.
Gool comes from evil. Causes for the preference given absolute monarchy.
Incapacity of democracy. Despotism favorable to the development of great
civilizations.
SECOND DIALOGUE.
Montesquieu answers. The doctrines of Machiavelli have no philosophical
base. Force and cunning are not principles. The most arbitrary powers are
obliged to rest upon the law. State justice is but the particular interests of
the Prince and his favorites. Law and morality are the foundations of politics.
Inconsequence of a contrary system. If the Prince goes beyond the rules of
morality, the subjects will do the same. The great men who violate the laws
under the pretext of saving the State do more evil than good. Anarchy is often
much less fatal than despotism. Incompatibility of despotism with the actual
state of the institutions
{p. 249} among the principal peoples of Europe. Machiavelli invites
Montesquieu to prove this statement.
THIRD DIALOGUE.
Development of Montesquieu's ideas. The confusion of powers is the primary
cause of despotism and anarchy. Influence of political customs under the sway
of which The Prince was written. Progress of social science in Europe. The vast
system of guarantees with which nations surround themselves. Treaties,
constitutions, civil laws. Separation of the three powers, legislative,
executive and judicial. That is the generating principle of political liberty,
the principal obstacle of tyranny. The representative regime is the most
appropriate form of government in modern times. Conciliation of order and
liberty. Justice, the essential basis of government. The Monarch who would
practice the maxims of The Prince today would be exiled from Europe.
Machiavelli maintains that his maxims have not ceased to prevail in the
policies of princes. He offers to prove it.
FOURTH DIALOGUE.
Machiavelli criticizes the constitutional regime. The powers remain
immobile or leave their orbit violently.
The mass of people indifferent to public liberties, the real enjoyment
of which they cannot have.
The representative regime irreconcilable with the principle of popular
sovereignty and the balance of power.
Revolutions. Popular sovereignty leads to anarchy, and anarchy to
despotism.
Moral and social state of modern nations incompatible with liberty.
Salvation lies in centralization.
Caesarism in the Lower-Empire. India and China.
FIFTH DIALOGUE.
The fatality of despotism is an idea that Montesquieu continues to
combat.
Machiavelli took as universal laws, facts which are only accidents.
Progressive development of liberal institutions from the feudal system
to representative government.
{p. 250} Institutions are corrupted only when liberty is lost. It is
necessary, therefore, to maintain it with care in the regulation of power.
Montesquieu does not admit without reserve the principle of popular
sovereignty. How he understands this principle. Divine right, human right.
SIXTH DIALOGUE.
Continuation of thc same subject. Antiquity of the electoral principle.
It is the primordial basis of sovereignty. Extreme consequences of the
sovereignty of the people. Revolutions will not be more frequent under the sway
of this principle. Important role of industry in modern civilization. Industry
is as irreconcilable to revolutions as to despotism. Despotism is so distant
from customs of the more advanced nations of Europe that Montesquieu defies
Machiavelli to find the means to bring it back. Machiavelli accepts the
challenge, and the dialogue centers on this question.
SEVENTH DIALOGUE.
Machiavelli first generalizes on the system which he proposes to
employ. His doctrines are for all time; even in this century he has
grandchildren who know the price of his lessons. It is only a question of
putting despotism in harmony with modern customs. The principal rules which he
lays down for arresting the movement in contemporary nations. Internal
policies, foreign policies. New rules borrowed from the industrial regime. How
one can make use of the press, of the courts and of the subtleties of law. To
whom the power must be given. By these various means one changes the character
of the most untamable nation and renders it as docile in the face of tyranny as
a little Asiatic nation. Montesquieu invites Machiavelli to leave generalities;
he places him in the presence of a State based on representative institutions
and asks him how he could return from there to absolute power.
{p. 251} EIGHTH DIALOGUE. (The policies of Machiavelli in practice.)
One has power over the order of constituted things, by a coup d'etat.
One depends on the people and during the dictatorship alters all legislation.
The necessity for impressing terror, the day after a coup d'etat. Blood pact
with the army. The usurper must have all coins struck with his effigy. He will
construct a new constitution and will not fear to give it as a basis the great
principles of modern justice. How he will take care not to apply these
principles and will discard them successively.
NINTH DIALOGUE. (The Constitution.)
Continuation of the same subject. The coup d'etat to be ratified by the
people. Universal suffrage established; absolutism results. The constitution
must be the work of one man; submitted to the electorate without discussion,
presented as a whole, accepted as a whole. To change the political complexion
of the State, it suffices to change the disposition of the organs: the Senate,
the legislative body, the Council of State, etc. of thc legislative body.
Suppression of ministerial responsibility and of parliamentary initiative. Only
the Prince has power to propose laws. He is guaranteed against the sovereignty
of the people by the right of appeal to the people and the right to declare a
state of siege. Suppression of the right of amendment. Restriction of the
number of deputies. Salary of the deputies. Shortening of the sessions. Discretionary
power of convocation, of prorogation and of dissolution.
TENTH DIALOGUE. (The Constitution (Continued)) of the Senate and its
organization. The Senate must be only a sham political body destined to cover
the actions of the Prince and to give him absolute and discretionary power over
all laws of the Council of State. It must play, in another sphere, the same
role as the Senate. It transmits to the Prince the regulating and judiciary
power. The Constitution is completed. Recapitulation of the various ways in
which the Prince makes this system law. He does so in seven ways. Immediately
after the Constitution, the Prince must decree a series
{p. 252} of laws which will discard, by means of exception, the
principles of public rights recognized en bloc in the constitution. ELEVENTH
DIALOGUE. (Of the laws.)
Of the press. The spirit of Machiavelli's laws. His definition of
liberty is borrowed from Montesquieu. Machiavelli first occupies himself with
legislation of the Press in his kingdom. It extends over newspapers as well as
books. Authorization of the Government necessary to foond a newspaper and for
all changes in the editorial personnel. Fiscal measures for restraining the
Press. Abolition of jury in matters concerning the Press. Penalization by administrative
and judiciary means. System of notices. Forbidding of detailed accounts of
legislative procedure and of the trials of the Press. Repression of false news,
prohibition of foreign journals. Prohibition of the importing of unauthorized
writings. Laws of the same type imposed on the small frontier States against
their own nationals. Foreign correspondents must be in the pay of the
government. Means of controlling books. Licenses given by the government to
printers, editors and publishers. Facultative retraction of these licenses.
Penal responsibility of the printers. It obliges these latter to make
themselves the police of the books and to refer them to agents of the
administration.
TWELFTH DIALOGUE. (Of the Press. Continued)
How the government of Machiavelli will annihilate the Press in making
itself the journalist. Sheets devoted to the government will be twice as
numerous as the independent papers. Official journals, semi-official,
favorable, semi-favonble. Liberal journals, democratic, revolutionary, all in
the pay of the government unknown to the public. Method of organization and
direction. Handling of opinion. Tactics, managed, trial balloons. Provincial
journals. Importance of their role. Administrative censorship of newspapers.
Communiques. Forbidding of reproduction of certain private news. Official
speeches, reports and accounts are an annex of the governmental press. Methods
of language, artifices and style necessary for taking possession of public
opinion.
{p. 253} Perpetual eulogy of the government. Reproduction of pretended
articles in foreign papers which pay homage to the policies of the government.
Criticism of the former governments. Tolerance in point of religious
discussions and light literature.
THIRTEENTH DIALOGUE. (Of conspiracies.) Reckoning of victims to be made
in order to assure peace. Of secret societies. Their danger. Deportation and
proscription en masse of those who had taken part. Facultative deportation of
those who remain in the country. Penal laws against those who affiliate
themselves in the future. Legal existence permitted certain secret societies,
the chiefs of which to be named by the government, in order to know all and
direct all. Laws against the right to congregate and hold meetings.
Modification of the judiciary organization. Means of action on the magistracy
without expressly abrogating the permanent tenure of judges.
FOURTEENTH DIALOGUE. (Of institutions already existing.) Resources that
Machiavelli borrows from them. Comtitutional guarantee. That it is an absolute
immensity, but necessary, accorded to agents of the government. Of the public
ministry. What can be taken from this institution. Court of Cassation: danger
that this jurisdiction would present if it is too independent. Of the resources
that the art of jurisprudence presents in the application of laws that touch on
the exercise of political rights. How a text of law is supplemented by a
decree. Examples. Means of preventing as much as possible, in certain delicate
cases, the recourse of citizens to the tribunals. Official declarations of the
administration that the law applies to such and such case or in such and such
way. Result of these declarations.
FIFTEENTH DIALOGUE. (Of suffrage.)
The difficulties to be avoided in the application of universal
suffrage. It is necessary to remove from elections the nomination of the heads
of departments in all the councils of administration that issue from suffrage.
Universal suffrage would not, without the greatest peril, be abandoned to
itself in the election of deputies. The candidates must be bound by a
preliminary oath. The govern-
{p. 254} ment must place its candidates in the face of the electors,
and have all its agents cooperate for their nomination. The electors must not
have the right to meet in order to vote in concert. One must avoid having them
vote in the crowded points. Suppression of the vote by ballot: Dismembermcnt of
electoral districts where the opposition makes itself felt. How one can win
over the electorate without directly buying it. Opposition in the Chambers.
Parliamentary strategy and the art of carrying off the vote.
SIXTEENTH DIALOGUE. (Certain corporations.)
Danger presented by collective forces in general. National guard. Need
for dissolving it. Organization and disorganization at will. The University. It
must depend entirely upon the State, in order that the government may direct
the spirit of the youth. Suppression of the chairs of constitutional law. The
teaching and the justification of modern history would be very useful to
impress love and respect for the Prince in future generations. Mobilization of
governmental influence by means of free courses given by professors at the
university. The Bar. Desirable reforms. The lawyers must exercise their
profession under control of the government and be named by it. The Clergy. The
possibility for a Prince to combine spiritual sovereignty with political
sovereignty. Danger which the independence of the priesthood would cause the
State. The policy carried on with the sovereign pontiff. Perpetual menace of a
schism very useful to hold it. The best means would be to be able to keep a
garrison at Rome, unless it is decided to destroy the tcmporal power.
SEVENTEENTH DIALOGUE. (The Police.)
The great development that must be made in this institution. Ministry
of police. Change of name if the name is displeasing. Interior police, exterior
police. Corresponding services in all the ministries. Services of the
international police. Role that a Prince of the blood can be made to play.
Reestablishment of the black cabinet necessary. False conspiracies. Their
usefulness. Means of cxciting popularity of the Prince and of obtaining special
State laws.
{p. 255} Invisible squads which must surround the Prince when he goes
out Improvements of modern civilization in this respect. Distribution of the
police in all classes of society. It is proposed to make use of a certain
tolerance when one has in one's hands all the power of armed force and the
police. With which the right of making rules for individual liberty must belong
to a single magistrate and not to a council. Assimilation of political
misdemeanors with misdemeanors of common law. Salutary effect. Lists of
criminal jury composed by agents of the government. Jurisdiction in matters of
simple political misdemeanors.
EIGHTEENTH DIALOGUE. (Finances and Financial ideas.)
Montesquieu's objections. Despotism can ally itself only with the
system of conquest and military government. Obstacles in the economic regime.
Arbitrariness in politics implies arbitrariness in finance. The fundamental
principle of vote on taxation. Machiavelli's response. He relies on the
proletariat, which is uninterested in financial combinations, and his deputies
are salaried. Montesquieu answers that the financial mechanism of modern States
resists of itself the exigencies of absolute power. Budgets. The method of
drawing them up. NINETEENTH DIALOGUE. (The budgetary system.)
Guarantees presented by this system, according to Montesquieu.
Necessary balance of receipts and expenditures. Separate vote on the budget for
receipts and the budget for expenditures. Forbidding of opening supplementary
and extraordinary credit. Vote on the budget by topic. Court of accounts.
Machiavelli's reply. Finance is of all phases of politics that which lends
itself most to the doctrines of Machiavellism. He will not touch the Court of
acccounts, which he regards as an ingenious institution. He will enjoy the
regularity of the collecting of public money and the marvels of bookkeeping. He
abrogates the laws guaranteeing the balance of the budget, the control and
limiting of expenditures.
TWENTIETH DIALOGUE. (Continuation of the Same Subject.)
Budgets are only elastic frames which must expand at will. The
legislative vote at bottom is nothing but a confirmation pure and simple. The
art of presenting the budget, of grouping the figures. Impor-
{p. 256} tance of the distinction between the ordinary budget and the
extraordinary budget. Artifices to mask expenditures and deficit. Financial
formalism must be impenetrable. Loans. Montesquieu explains that redemption is
an indirect obstacle to expenditure. Machiavelli will do no redeeming; reasons
that he gives for this. The administration of finance is in large part an
affair of the press. How detailed accounts and official reports can be turned
into account. Phrases, formulas and turns of language, promises, hopes, which
must be used to give confidence to the tax-payers, either to prepare them in
advance for a deficit, or to weaken its effect when it is produced. At times it
must be boldly admitted that one has undertaken too much, and announced
resolutions of severe economy. How these declarations can be turned to
accounts.
TWENTY-FIRST DIALOGUE. (Loans (Continued) )
Machiavelli defends loans. New methods of borrowing by States. Public
subscriptions. Other means of procuring funds. Treasury bonds. Loans from
public banks, by provinces and by cities. Mobilization in public funds of goods
of communes and public establishments. Sale of national domains. Institutions of
credit and savings. They are a means of disposing of all the public wealth and
of uniting the future of the citizens to the upholding of the established
regime. How to pay. Increase in taxes. Conversion. Consolidation. Wars. How to
uphold public credit. Great credit establishments whose ostensible mission is
to lend to industry, whose hidden goal is to uphold the course of public funds.
TWENTY-SECOND DIALOCUE. (The Greatness of the Reign.)
The acts of Machiavelli are in proportion to the extent of the resources
of which he can dispose. He will justify the theory that good comes from cvil.
Wars in the four corners of the world. He will follow the trail of the greatest
conquerors. Within, huge constructions. Free play given to the spirit of
speculation and enterprise. Industrial liberties. Amelioration of the lot of
the working clases.
{p. 257} Reflections of
Montesquieu on all these things.
TWENTY-THIRD DIALOCUE. (Of the various other means that Machiavelli
will employ to consolidate his empire and perpetuate his dynasty.)
Establishment of a praetorian guard ready to pounce on the wavering parts of
the empire. Return from the constructions and their political utility.
Realization of the idea of the organization of work. Insurrection prepared in
case of overthrow of power. Strategic roads, Bastilles, workers' cities in
anticipation of insurrection. The people construct fortresses against
themselves. The little means. Trophies, emblems, images and statues which
everywhere remind of the greatness of the Prince. The name "Royal"
given to all institutions and to all tax offices. Streets, public squares and
places must bear the historic names of the reign. Bureaucracy. It is necessary
to multiply the offices. Decorations and their use. Means of making innumerable
partisans at little cost. Creation of titles and restoration of the greatest
names since Charlemagne. Usefulness of ceremonials and etiquette. Pomp and
celebrations. Excitement to luxury and sensual pleasures as a diversion from
political preoccupations. Moral means. Impoverishment of characters. Moral
misery and its utility. With which moreover none of these means harms the
reputation of the Prince and dignity of his reign. TWENTY-FOURTH DIALOGUE.
(Particulars of the aspect of the Prince as Machiavelli conceives him.)
Impenetrability of his designs. Prestige that this gives to the Prince. A word
on Borgia and Alexander Vl. Means of preventing the coalition of foreign
powers, each deceived in turn. Reconstitution of a fallen State which gives
three hundred thousand more men against an armed Europe. Councils and the use
that the Prince must make of them. Certain vices are a virtue in the Prince.
Duplicity. How it is necessary. Everything consists in creating the appearance
in all things. Words that signify the opposite of what they seem to mean.
{p. 258} Language that the Prince must keep to in a State with a
democratic base. The Prince must take for himself the model of a great man of
times gone by and write his biography. With which it is necessary that the
Prince be vindictive. With what facility victims forget: Saying of Tacitus.
Recompense must immediately follow services rendered. Utility of superstition.
It accustoms people to count on the lucky star of the Prince. Machiavelli is
the luckiest of gamblers and his luck can never change. Necessity of gallantry.
It attracts the more beautiful half of his subjects. How easy it is to govern
with absolute power. Pleasures of all kinds that Machiavelli will give his
people. Wars in the name of European independence. He will embrace the liberty
of Europe, but only to strangle it. School of men of politics formed by the
efforts of the Prince. The State will be fuli of Machiavellis in miniature.
TWENTY-FIFTH AND LAST DIALOGUE, (The Last Word.)
Twelve years of reign under these conditions. The work of Machiavelli
is consummated. Public spirit is destroyed. The character of the nation is
changed. Restitution of certain liberties. Nothing is changed in the system.
The concessions are only in appearance. Only he has left the period of terror.
Stigma inflicted by Montesquieu. He does not wish to hear more. Anecdote of
Dion about Augustus. Revengeful citation of Montesquieu. Vindication of
Machiavelli crowned. He is greater than Louis XIV, Henry IV, Washington. The
people adore him. Montesquieu declares that the system of government that
Machiavelli has outlined are but visions and chimera. Machiavelli replies that
precisely all that he has just said exists on one point of the globe. Montesquieu presses Machiavelli to tell him
the name of the kingdom in which these things go on. Machiavelli is about to
speak; a whirlwind of souls carries him away.