INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS : ITS RELEVANCE
TO THE NORTH EASTERN ECONOMY OF INDIA
Dr.
S K Mishra
Professor,
Dept.
of Economics
NEHU,
Shillong.
I. A Framework of Institutional Economics: Institutionalism is gaining popularity in the
recent years. But the idea is not new. Thorstein B Veblen (1857–1929) is the
founder of this school of thought. The economic characterization of human
behaviour as the rational calculation of benefits and costs seemed ludicrous to
Veblen. He was a bitter critic of the hedonistic principle of Jeremy Bentham
and J S Mill and the Anglo-American
economics that grew on this principle. Instead, Veblen argued that human
behaviour is best analysed as interaction of instincts and habits and that many
social processes may be interpreted as results of cultural lags. In his
doctrine of ‘conspicuous consumption’ (which is meant for status
competition) he explained how imitation of the leisure class motivates the
labour class to buy goods in a way that is culturally determined, not price
determined as conventional economists would attempt to argue. In a more general
sense, Veblen insisted on studying the origin and nature of economic
institutions. Veblen argued that conventional economics fails to consider
social and economic institutions, artificially reducing human nature to a
matter of rational ( = pecuniary) calculations. Veblen’s criticism of
(conventional) economic theory was largely based on anti-rationalist premises.
Let us first characterize the (modern) economy as
seen by the institutionalists. This economy consists of two classes – the
Leisure class - smaller in population size - and the Labour or worker class,
much more populous. The Leisure class has a command over the dominant portion
of material resources available in the economy. The labour class mainly lives
by selling labour in the market, though it may own some material resources as
well. The value system of the entire society is determined by the value system
buttressed by the Leisure class. Wasteful consumption, unproductive labour,
idle curiosity and pecuniary canons of taste are the major attributes of the
value system supported by the Leisure class.
Why is the Leisure class smaller in size and why, at
the first instance, they command over the dominant portion of the material
resources of the society? The members of this class have a predator’s instinct
and prowess, of which only a minority is the natural recipient. So, to begin
with, this class cannot be large. Once they own material resources, the
ownership of such resources bestows upon them the power to command further
resources. This snowballing effect keeps them in an advantageous position over
the Labour class. On the other hand, the labour class has to live by labour
power which cannot be accumulated. Furthermore, the members of this class have
the dominant and widespread instinct to emulate or imitate. Emulators are at
the disadvantage simply due to lesser degree of freedom and therefore, they can
receive only the left over. This keeps the labour class poorer forever.
Emulative instincts of the labour class reinforces the social structure so
described.
Culture, therefore, is the name of the collectivity
of the settled habits of considering the ways of living of the leisure class
superior, emulating them and feeling elevated. For the leisure class it is just
a way of life, but for the labour class it is venerable. In such a society,
rationality is a far cry.
Veblen held that the instinct of workmanship is a
fundamental instinct. When a man completes his work with the best of his
ability, the work gives him immense pleasure. He is little concerned with what
he gets for his work – the work itself is the source of joy for him. That is
why many artists have stuck to their jobs, though living miserably as paupers.
That explains why technocrats put their life in completing their projects, even
though the reward of their labour evidently goes to the masters. On the other
hand, the captains of the industry are the rogues who value the pecuniary
benefits only. To them it matters only little what is a great creative work –
what matters to them is the pecuniary benefit it would fetch. Due to this view,
they often retard and arrest the progress of the industry and the economy as a
whole.
Some of the terms coined by the institutionalists
have permanent place in our concept structure. These are, such opposites as pecuniary
employment and industrial employment, business enterprise and
the machine process, vendibility and serviceability, making
money and making goods, acquisition and physical
production, etc. There are other terms such as: conspicuous consumption, pecuniary emulation, ostentatious
display, absentee ownership, discretionary control and so on. These are very
important categories and may help in analysis.
Some of the points highlighted by the
institutionalism are very important.
(i)
First, that economics
ought to be an evolutionary science – meaning an enquiry into the genesis and
growth of economic institutions. We define economic institution as a complex of
well-settled habits of thought and conventional behaviour. The economic system
should be viewed, not as a self-balancing mechanism but as a ‘cumulatively
unfolding process’.
(ii)
Secondly, since
different societies have different histories of their development, their
institutional structures are different. To understand the economies of these
societies, there cannot be a single ‘economics’ – each such society will have
its own economics – there cannot be a universal economics.
(iii)
Thirdly, economics
ought not be a narrow discipline – it should be wider, integrated with other
aspects of social life. Gunnar Myrdal, a leading institutional economist said:
there are no economic, social, or political problems. There are problems,
however, and there are economic, political and social aspects of these
problems. Modern “New Institutional Economists” are trying to explain the
pattern, development and evolution of economies (and institutions) by
indigenous (inside economic theories and methods) concepts. Modern
institutional economists believe that marginal analysis of the
‘neo-classicists’ is applicable to institutional economics too, though Veblen
never thought so.
(iv)
Fourthly, economics is
much wider than what is conceived by the conventional economists. Market
economy is only one of its types in which market as the leading institution
regulates the social life. The conventional economics studies the social
organization around this central institution. Yet, it is surprising that how markets emerge,
function, and remain in existence (or are reproduced) are problems that the
conventional economists have hardly addressed. One of the exceptions is Friedrich Hayek. Between the second half of the 1930s
and the early 1960s he formulated a number of ideas about these topics.
Historically, these were inspired by his very early work on cognitive
psychology, which in the 1950’s was one of the sources of neural network
models. Among the features that found their way from his cognitive psychology
into his market models are the distributed nature of knowledge in a system and
its coordination by means of a self organizing process.
(v) Population, its composition and structure, its quality and interrelationship among its constituent individuals and communities are perhaps the most important determinants of development of a region. The composition and structure of population has several dimensions – distribution of the total between male and female, among different age groups, among different religious and ethnic groups, among different classes, occupations, skill categories, abilities and so on. Similarly, quality of population, illiterate, literate and educated, unskilled and skilled, pre-modernized and modernized in their attitudes, behaviour and action, is very important. Interrelationship among different individuals at family, class, ethnicity and region levels also are equally important. And this importance is not mainly for sake of classification and presentation in tabular form, but for the fact that it impinges on the contribution of population towards making themselves, the region and the nation progressively better.
Population is
perhaps the only socio-economic category that has dual importance, both as an
end and as a means to all endeavours. The society and economy is in fact of the
people, for the people and by the people. Other things, whether material or
mental, real or ideological, tangible or intangible, are meant for the people,
and not for themselves. Material resources – the air with its birds, the waters
with their vast wealth and fish, the territory with its fields and forests, the
various substrata underground with all their mineral wealth, are meant for and
worked upon by the people. Similarly, the soft resources, institutions (meaning
the collection of settled habits of thought and action at the community level),
mores, traditions, customs, beliefs, and all moral sentiments are continuously
shaped and used by the people for making their lives better (or worse, for that
matter). In this framework, the interest of the mankind is the sole parameter –
the rest others are variables - to plan, change, modify and shape up, by the
human efforts. Of late, people have become conscious of over-using, misusing
and disusing the material resources leading to the so-called environmental
problems. However, this concern does not change the parameter, only the
denotation of ‘people’ has changed. Now ‘people’ means the present and the
future generations; earlier it meant only the ‘contemporary’ generation. That
does not imply, however, that the stress on ‘resources for the people’ has
increased. To care for the resources to bequeath to our grand children needs
much to be done by the people of the present generation. Similarly, a concern
for keeping the social (and ideological) environment clean is growing. People
have started thinking on the deteriorating social capital – the soft resources.
Disbelief in oneself and in others is on a rise. Hatred seated somewhere deep
inside finds the one or the other excuse to erupt out. Trust has given way to
betrayal. And this is more of a concern to the people of affairs, the people
busy in the ordinary business of life, since it interferes with and speaks on
the individual and social interest closely connected to the attainment of
material requisites of their well being.
Yet, this
holistic importance of people is asserted, reasserted and soon set aside, nay,
forgotten. Especially, qualitative aspects of population are singularly
neglected, more so when they relate to soft resources or social capital –
attitudes and institutions (the settled habit of thought and action at the
community level) – that grossly determine how people live, earn their
livelihood, use or misuse resources to meet their ends and generate, preserve,
and economize the resources and innovate or imitate and so on.
The gross
negligence of qualitative aspects of population is determined by the habits of
thought of that section of the society, which directly or indirectly determines
the means, objectives, methodology and content of social action, planning in
particular. The organizations that collect information about population (or any
other aspect of the economy and the society for that matter) seek directives
from those who are recognized for thinking and acting on behalf of the society
and matter when they are right as well as when they are wrong. Evidently, such
representatives of the society, even whey are genuinely interested in
development, are guided by the one of the two philosophies of planning for
development, Standard (meaning largely anglo-american economics popularly
taught in the universities, sometimes referred to as the establishment
economics) or the Marxist, or an illegitimate patchwork of the two. In any
case, planning for a reform of attitudes and institutions, even collecting
information regarding them, is completely out of consideration. The
conservative (Standard) judgment that a reform of attitudes and institutions is
largely irrelevant or undesirable, and the Marxist judgment that it is either
impossible or inevitable, lead to the one and the same conclusion - undermining
the need for a conscious policy directed at a radical reform of the so-called non-economic
factors in economic development. Textbooks, articles and plans do pay lip
service to the need to reform the social framework before economic planning
begins. However, these declarations are no sooner forgotten than when the
discussion on the conventional concepts of income, employment, savings,
investment, etc. begins. The reasons are obvious though unsaid. Reforms of
institutions and human attitudes, more painful to implement than financial
expenditure programmes, violate vested interests of the power class (and the
so-called public representatives are often led to think and act in the interest
of this class, whether knowingly or unknowingly, by volition or by compulsion).
A rather long excerpt from Streeten
(1966) will be illuminating. “… attitudes and valuation and social institutions
are normally assumed to be given and adapted. We assume that there is a legal
framework, that contracts are enforced, that an efficient civil service carries
out government orders and an honest judiciary adjudicates; that people are able
and willing to work if opportunities arise; that they are literate, skilled and
able to cooperate with discipline, appearing on time and carrying out orders;
that money spent is efficiently spent and not diverted into the pockets of
corrupt officials; that alternatives are considered largely on their pecuniary
merits, etc. It follows that none of these matters is considered a suitable
area for planning.” Alternatively, in the Marxist scheme “what are parameters
become dependent variables. Cultural, political and social institutions are the
superstructure, which is determined by the methods of production. It reflects
these conditions and gives rise to tensions and contradictions in due course.
These tensions between the degree of development of the forces of production
and the prevailing relations of production (the institutions and attitudes) in
turn give rise to revolution. After the revolution the attitudes and
institutions reflect the new conditions of production. Hence social, cultural
and political attitudes and institutions, the so-called relations of
production, though dependent variables, are, after a time-lag, adjusted to
the extent required by the dynamic productive forces. Once again, though for
fundamentally different reasons, planning the superstructure is not in
question. It would be futile before the revolution and unnecessary after it. It
was indeed for their attempts to speculate on how social attitudes and
institutions could and should be reformed that Marx and Engels ridiculed the Utopian
thinkers.” Streeten (1966)
In the ‘Standard’ economics’ , the idea of labour as a factor of production is based on the assumption that the workers are literate and mobile, mostly in employment. The are highly organized. Racial, religious and linguistic differences are not sufficiently important to break up the labour supply. Furthermore, it is assumed that skilled and professional workers are in substantial quantities.
Similarly, employment
presupposes a fairly homogenous, mobile labour force, willing and able to work
and responsive to incentives. In a society of isolated communities, some of
them apathetic or with religious prejudices against certain kinds of work,
illiterate and unused to cooperation, the notion “labour force” does not make
sense. Further, underemployment or disguised unemployment
presupposes that if only demand and machines were available, men and women
would be able and willing to work. In fact, much more would be required : a
breakdown of caste prejudices, of apathy, of lack of interest in money rewards,
of resistance to cooperation, discipline and punctuality, etc.
The distinction between consumption and investment can have various justifications. In the context of development, it is based upon the assumption that investment enables us to produce more later than we would otherwise have done, while consumption is current enjoyment. But if more food and better health now reduce apathy and raise ability to work, they share in the characteristics of investment : consumption, too, is productive of more output. Thus the distinction between consumption and investment – If investment is defined as “abstaining for the sake of higher consumption later”, we commit a mistake of applying a category to a field of experience to which it is inappropriate. However, if investment is defined as any input which yields higher output later, irrespective of whether it involves “abstaining” or not, we fail to group certain activities under investment which should be classified as consumption.
The standard
theory describes the economic process of a society in which the atomistic
(uniform and unidentifiable) individuals behave strictly hedonistically, where
the entrepreneur seeks to maximize his cash profit, and where any commodity can
be exchanged on the market at uniform prices and none exchanged otherwise. On
the other hand Marxist theory refers to an economy characterized by class
monopoly of the means of production, money-making entrepreneurs, markets with
uniform prices and complete independence of economic from demographic factors.
In any case, population characteristics are redundant.
We find a very good
description of new findings of experimental economics in the paper by F Guala
& L Mittone (Experiments in Economics: Testing Theories vs. the
Robustness of Phenomena). For example, how the experiments on tax evasion led to
finding of Bomb Crater Effect and Echo Effect. It is said that troops under heavy enemy fire hide in
the craters of recent explosions, because they believe it highly unlikely for
two bombs to fall exactly in the same spot at short time-distance. Something
similar happened in the tax experiments: immediately after each audit,
tax payments fall sharply (i.e. evasion increases). Due to Echo Effect, repeated auditing an individual
or group of people may cause a robust reduction of evasion for quite a long
time after the event. These experimental findings are corroborated by the real
world experience. And there are many other new findings of the experimental
economics. This is in line with what W C Mitchell dreamt of some 70 years back.
These aspects make up
the subject matter of Experimental Economics. Experiments may show how economic
agents feel the landscape of choices for optimization. It does not necessitate
explicitly defined objective functions and/or constraints. It does away with
the strict assumption of rationality. It assimilates the views of discordant economists like Veblen and Mitchell
– the founders of Institutionalist School. Moreover, it gives us a new
methodology to investigate economics – away from armchair thinking or
econometric search for economic relations. It gives us a scope for discovering
new laws, new rules of behaviour and overall it integrates biology and
psychology with economics.
III. Institutional Economics, Experimental
Methods and their Suitability to the North Eastern Region of India: How can we benefit by applying the methodology of
institutional economics to our economy – especially the North Eastern
economies? What are the steps that we have to follow if we part with the
methodology of conventional economics and adopt the methodology of
institutional economics to analyzing the economies of the North Eastern region
in particular ? The following are the steps to undergo:
(1). Listing of instincts and propensities closely
related to socio-economic and political aspects of human behaviour: It may
have two lines of approach – one staring with the assumption of homogeneity of
the stock with no innate difference and another starting with that of
heterogeneity of stock which assumes that different races have different
propensities. One must be careful in not being dogmatic – the approach should
be amenable to changes based on real world findings. Are gender differences in
propensities, instincts and therefore attitudes innate? Will a matrilineal
society have different institutional structure than a patrilineal society ? If yes, what are its implications
to development of different institutions ? A society that has a matrilineal
history, will it have a different path of economic development even if it
becomes patriarchal and patrilineal in due course of development? Are the
matrilineal societies matriarchal too? To what extent the institution of
matrilineal inheritance will give rise to other institutions different from the
patriarchal inheritance? What kind of propensities will they buttress or
suppress? The studies of this type will call for a help from anthropologists.
Institutional economics welcomes interdisciplinary studies, as has been noted
earlier.
(2). Listing
of relevant economic institutions, tracing the history of their development and
the study of inter-relations among them: It is in the line of institutional
economics to hold that different societies will have different institutional
matrix and there too, the stage of evolution of different institutions will be
different. It is needed, therefore that one must make an inventory of
information on the institutional structure. Again, there are some institutions
that are concordant with each others, while there are others that are
discordant. Mutually concordant institutions reinforce each other and
accelerate their evolution while discordant institution, antithetical in
nature, clash with each other and create a deadlock. An institutional economist
will observe soon that discordant dualism or pluralism of institutions create
very strong and robust bottlenecks and deadlocks. This type of study cannot be
done unless institutions of a society/economy are listed exhaustively and their
inter-relations are examined. Any economic policy cannot succeed unless these
deadlocks are removed.
(3) A study
of the geographical and environmental
determinants of institutions: As D C North
(won Nobel Prize in 1993) rightly pointed out, geographical and
environmental attributes, including the resource endowment of the ecosphere
that house an economy shape the structure of the economy. The same is true with
institutions as well. The institutional structure in plains cannot be the same
as in the hills as much as the institutions would be different in the
landlocked regions, frontier regions, central regions and coastal regions. An
institutional economist has to assess all these.
(4). A study of
the attitudinal structure of the society and its implications to the economy:
Different societies differ in their attitudinal structure. Modernization ideals
that are needed for a successful and efficient functioning of the modern
economic organization may not always be buttressed by the attitudinal structure
of a particular economy. As a result, severely discordant dualism or pluralism
emerges. Gunnar Myrdal in his Asian Drama
has elaborated on the modernization ideals. A study of the attitudinal
structure of a particular economy and its relationship with the modernization
ideals will provide us hints on concordance and discordance. It is to be noted
that the attitudinal structure of a society is a result of the historical
process – common experiences undergone by a series of generations. It requires
a deep sense of planning to change this structure in a short time. Traumatic
experiences at the community level also determine the attitudinal structure of
a society. That would require a study of the social psychology.
(5). Accounting of Soft Resources: Every
economist recognizes the worth of material resources such as land, labour
power, material capital – machines, tools, etc. Of late, failing to explain
growth by simply attributing it to material capital, economists had to recognize
the role of human capital. However, human capital signifies skill formation –
the skill that is compatible to working with the material capital. We also find
‘entrepreneurship’ – the faculty of innovation and taking risk – in the
literature on traditional economics. However, attempts to understanding
entrepreneurship became intensified after the works of Herbert Simon. D C
McClelland highlighted need for achievement as an important factor in promoting
growth. Beyond all these, institutional economist has to understand ‘soft
resources’ much more closely. These soft resources include the
non-materialistic entities that are shaped by the material environment and in turn shape the material
environment – entities such as trust. These resources may be nurtured and
generated. They degenerate by wrong human actions. These resources have great economic value. The relevance of ‘soft
resources’ has recently been highlighted by Robert Putnam by referring to the
soft resources as ‘social capital’, very elaborately discussed by Adam Smith in
his “The theory of the moral Sentiments”. Some economists name these resources
as the social capital. An institutional economist must study them.
Findings of some prominent experiments in economics
suggest the importance of institutions in decision making. Therefore, it
appears that experimental methodology of research in institutional economics
will be suitable. It is interesting to read the history of development of the
experimental economics laboratory at the California Institute of Technology,
USA.
“Laboratory experimental methods began at Caltech in
the early 1970's when Professor Charles R. Plott, Edward S. Harkness of
Professor of Economics and Political Science, discovered a methodology for
applying laboratory methods to the study of public economics. The
methodology, which was related to the experimental methods used earlier by
Vernon Smith to study market behavior, opened the way for an experimental
examination of public goods and the impact
of different institutions that might be implemented for the provision of
public goods. The initial research, with Morris Firoina, led,
immediately, to the discovery that collective decision processes, such as
majority rule, when applied to the provision of economic public goods, exhibit
an equilibration process. Furthermore, the equilibration process can be
modeled by principles of equilibrium (majority rule equilibrium) and game
theory (the core of a cooperative game without side payments). Additional
research with agendas established that the principles governing public actions
are more fundamental than are captured by the straight forward application of
game theory and voting equilibrium models because the decisions could be almost
completely determined by institutional controls (the agenda). This prominence of institutional influences
on decision processes together with the close relationship between
institutional influences and associated theory, continue as a dominating theme
of research even today.
Research in public economics began to merge with
research in classical economics when Plott invited Vernon Smith to visit
Caltech as a Sherman Fairchild Fellow. During this period Plott and Smith
initiated the first systematic study of competitive market experiments since
Smith had studied markets in the early 1960s. From the early 1960's until the
new research at Caltech in the 1970s no more than a paper or two dealing with
competitive markets and an additional two or three papers on oligopoly were
published. Plott and Smith joined in teaching the first course in
experimental economics at Caltech and from their efforts came three discoveries
that set the stage for a revolution in experimental methodology. The
first was the posted price effect, which elevated
the importance of institutions as a key focus of research in market economics.
Early research on the importance of institutions in markets (different auction
processes) and the importance of institutions found public economics were now
supplemented with a third area. However, the posted price effect was
especially important. It had a potential for applications much beyond the
other experimental findings because of its connection to industrial
organization and policy. The second was the discovery and development of an
efficiency measure that could be applied to assess the efficiency of institutions implemented in experimental markets in
exactly the same way that cost benefit analysis is used to assess the
efficiency of naturally occurring markets. The posted price effect and the
efficiency measure established a laboratory scientific window for the first
attempts to use laboratory economics in an active policy context. The
third discovery of the very early 1970's, with Ross Miller, was that
speculation could be studied in experimental markets and that speculative
activity could be observed equilibrating markets along the lines of classical
theory.
With this background, the modern experimental
methods in economics began to grow. The research expanded to include many
different types of institutions, uncertainty and information. The
attempts to apply laboratory experimental methods to policy problems became
systematic. Two major policy studies, which were published only several
years after the actual research, were an application to posted prices found in
the inland water transportation industry (Plott and Hong) and an examination of
the method for allocating the rights to land at the major airlines (M. Issac,
D. Grether and C. Plott). To these were added the first studies of the role
of asymmetric information in markets. The convergence properties of multiple
markets were discovered. Conspiracy, price controls and other types of market
interventions were examined experimentally for the first time. New forms
of markets were studied, such as methods for deciding on programs for public
broadcasting. The theory of agendas and public decision making was
applied to the analysis of defense problems where committees were thought to
make decisions. Classic papers on individual choice, such as the preference
reversal phenomena were also produced. During this time many now famous names,
J. Ferejohn, R. Forsythe, Dave Grether, E. Hoffman, M. Isaac, G. Miller, R.
Noll, and T. Palfrey all became interested in laboratory experimental methods. In
the late 1970s Dick McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook, both of whom had active
interests in experiments with many contributions, joined the faculty. Caltech
had become famous for its contributions to laboratory methods in economics and
political science.
In the mid 1980s the Division Chairman, David
Grether provided space in Baxter Hall for a new laboratory. Plott, the
director, and raised funds for the creation of a laboratory from General Motors
Corporation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, Pacific Bell, Inc. and the
National Science Foundation. Basic research began immediately and, in
addition, a grant to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to study the allocation of
resources on Space Station Freedom focused efforts on the creation of
computerized experiments. The first local area computerized markets
(MUDA) were created by Hsing-Yang Lee according to the specifications defined
by Plott and Caltech's Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political
Science was born in its current form.
From the origin of the Caltech Laboratory the
economics profession has experienced an explosion of the applications of
laboratory experimental methods. Volumes of experimental papers are being
published each year and the number of laboratories is rapidly growing around
the world. The Caltech Laboratory is a major facility that is serving as
a model for laboratory development throughout the world. Knowledge about
the potential uses and limitations of experimental methods has been an
important tool for Caltech graduate students in launching their careers.”
Experimental methods to
study the attitudinal, institutional, and habit structure and their
relationship with the economic variables may prove very helpful: The methodology of studying Economics has three
components – metaphysical
(reflection, meditation, and such processes applied to visualize the
functioning of an economy), observational
(based on collection, processing and interpretation of real world data, without
controlling or influencing them by design) and experimental (creating or simulating a controlled environment and
observing the response of the economic agent – then processing the
experimentally obtained information and concluding on that basis). Formerly,
economists used the metaphysical method in the main, with some observational
content. But after the first World War, observational content dominated over
the metaphysical content. Now, experimental content is increasing.
Institutional economists should apply this experimental method to understand
the economy in a better way. A particular stimulus in a given attitudinal and
institutional structure will give a response of economic importance. This will
help to understand the economics in the given milieu.
§
Papers in Experimental
Economics by Vernon L. Smith.
§
Bargaining
and Market Behavior : Essays in Experimental Economics by
Vernon L. Smith.
§
The Handbook
of Experimental Economics (edited by John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth)
§
Paving Wall
Street : Experimental Economics and the Quest for the Perfect Market by
Ross M. Miller, Vernon L. Smith (Foreword) (Hardcover - January 2002)
§
Essays on
Genetic Evolution and Economics by Terence C. Burnham, Edward
O. Wilson (Editor), Adam M. Brandenburger (Editor), Vernon L. Smith.
§
Choices,
Values, and Frames by Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
(Editors).
§
Heuristics
and Biases : The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment by Thomas
Gilovich et al. (Editors).
§
Well-Being :
The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology by Daniel Kahneman et al
(Editors).
§
Judgment
under Uncertainty : Heuristics and Biases by Daniel Kahneman et
al. (Editors).
§
“Biases
in human behavior” by Massimo Egidi [email protected], CEEL,
Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, University of Trento.
§
“Experiments in
Economics:Testing Theories vs. the Robustness of Phenomena” by Francesco
Guala and Luigi Mittone.
§
“Conditional
Cooperation: New Evidence from Public Goods Experiment” by Roberto M.
Burlando and Francesco Guala.
§
“Rethinking Bounded
Rationality” by Massimo Egidi, CEEL, University of Trento.
§
“Division of Labour
and Social CoordinationModes: A simple simulation model” by Massimo Egidi and Luigi Marengo, Department of Economics,
University of Trento.
§
“Virtuous
and Adverse Selection within Economic Organisations” by Massimo Egidi, Department
of Economics, University of Trento.
§
“Mind, Market and
Society:Network Structures in the Work of F. A. Hayek” by Jack Birner, Department of Economics, University of Trento
§
“Learning by the experience of others: An experiment on information
contagion” by Alessandro Narduzzo (Dipartimento di Economia e Studi
Aziendali, Università di Bologna, and Experimental Economics Lab, Università di
Trento) & and Massimo Warglien ( Dipartimento di Economia e Direzione
Aziendale, Università di Venezia, and Experimental Economics Lab, Università di
Trento). For correspondence: [email protected]
§
“Learning
in Evolutionary Environments” by Giovanni
Dosi, Luigi Marengo and Giorgio Fagiolo. of Dept. of Economics, University of
Rome “La Sapienza”, Italy and Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University
of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Dept. of
Economics, University of Trento, Italy and
Faculty of Statistics, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Italy,
respectively.
§
“Interdependencies, Nearly-decomposability and Adaptation”
by Koen Frenken1, Luigi Marengo and Marco Valente.
§
Analytical
Economics by N Georgescu-Roegen. Harvard Univ. Press.
§
The
Entropy Law and the Economic Process by N Georgescu-Roegen.Harvard
Univ. Press.
§
The Use
and Abuse of Models in Development Planning by
Paul Streeten, in Kurt Martin and John Knapp(eds), The Teaching of Development
Economics, Frank Cass & Co. 1966.
§
Are Men
Rational or Economists Wrong by Tibor Scitovsky, in Paul David and Melvin Reder (eds) Nation and Households in Economic
Growth, Academic Press, NY.
§
Models of Bounded Rationality, by
Herbert Simon, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982.
§
Foundations of Swarm Intelligence: From Principles to
Practice, by L. Fleischer, Swarming Network Enabled C4ISR,
arXiv:nlin.AO/0502003 v1 2 Feb 2005.
§ A New Optimizer using Particle Swarm Theory, by RC Eberhart and J Kennedy, in Proceedings Sixth Symposium on Micro Machine and Human Science, pp. 39–43. IEEE Service Center, Piscataway, NJ, 1995.
§
A New
Kind of Science, by Stephen Wolfram, Wolfram Media, 2002. (for online
version http://www.wolframscience.com/nksonline/toc.html
).