As delivered
SECURITY COUNCIL 7
MARCH 2003
Oral introduction of
the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC
Executive Chairman
Dr. Hans Blix
Mr. President,
For nearly three years, I have been
coming to the Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of
UNMOVIC. They have described our many
preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The 12th quarterly report is the
first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalized ten days ago and a
number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today’s statement will supplement the
circulated report on these points to bring the Council up-to-date.
Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27
November 2002. In matters relating to
process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few
difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in
the period 1991 to 1998. This may well
be due to the strong outside pressure.
Some
practical matters, which were not settled by the talks, Dr. ElBaradei and I had
with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441
(2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi
side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly
zones were overcome. This is not to say
that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture
we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to
increase aerial surveillance.
American
U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery,
supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add
night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian
Federation. We also expect to add
low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries,
which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most
recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their
territory.
Iraq, with
a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more
documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to
light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq’s
Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect,
including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant
results. When proscribed items are
deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible accounts that is needed – or
the proscribed items, if they exist.
Where
authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons, who may
have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of obtaining
evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such
persons in its records and they are among the people whom we seek to
interview. In the last month, Iraq has
provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of
information, in particular, persons who took part in various phases of the
unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed
missiles in 1991. The provision of
names prompts two reflections:
The first is that
with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the
unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities
and other data concerning the various items destroyed.
The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses
available it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in
modes and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given
without outside influence. While the
Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of
Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews, conditions
ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside
Iraq. Interviews outside the country
might provide such assurance. It is our
intention to request such interviews shortly.
Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are
useful. Since we started requesting
interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10
accepted under our terms, 7 of these during the last week.
As I
noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of
mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there
are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at
declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile
workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing
equipment. No evidence of proscribed
activities have so far been found. Iraq
is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random
checks of ground transportation. [Emphasis
Added]
Inspectors
are also engaged in examining Iraq’s programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles
(RPVs). A number of sites have been
inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities
of the various models found.
Inspections are continuing in this area.
There
have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are
conducted underground. Iraq should
provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or
storage of WMD. During inspections of
declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building
structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in
several specific locations. No
underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were
found so far. [Emphasis Added]
I should
add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the
inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in
Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling
of the staff. I would rather have twice
the amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the
number of expert inspectors to send.
On 14
February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active
in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed new light on
unresolved disarmament issues. Even a
week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still
relatively little tangible progress to note.
Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you.
As of
today, there is more. While during our
meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2
missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the
Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us
to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since
accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started
the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of
disarmament – indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of
toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being
destroyed. However, I must add that no
destruction has happened today. I hope
it’s a temporary break. [Emphasis Added]
To date,
34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including 4 training missiles, 2 combat warheads, 1
launcher and 5 engines have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory
the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme.
Two
‘reconstituted’ casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant
missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.
The
legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further
investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile.
More
papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq
had already declared, some will require further study and discussion.
There
is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty
as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were
unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part
of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for
full investigation in the past. It is
now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq
has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400
bombs and six other complete bombs.
Bomb fragments were also found.
Samples have been taken. The
investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the
determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and
credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs
were produced. In this, as in other
matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results. [Emphasis Added]
Iraq
proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of
unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify
the amount of anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still
be open to interpretation. Defining the
quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to
establish what quantity was actually produced.
With
respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX
precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of
1991.
Iraq has
also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential
decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work
related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter
from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.
What are
we to make of these activities? One can
hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant
cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side
since the end of January.
This is welcome, but the value of these measures must
be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in
straightening out. This is not yet
clear.
Against
this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated
“immediately, unconditionally and actively” with UNMOVIC, as required under
paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002).
The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have
provided. However, if more direct
answers are desired, I would say the following:
The
Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding
helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has
not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of
any of our inspection rights. If it
did, we would report it.
It
is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the
Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues,
can be seen as “active”, or even “proactive”, these initiatives 3-4 months into
the new resolution cannot be said to constitute “immediate” cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of
relevance. They are nevertheless
welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently
unresolved disarmament issues. [Emphasis Added]
Mr. President,
Members of the Council may relate
most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing
work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted
in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC but
also continues to guide much of our work.
Under the time lines set by the resolution, the results of some of this
work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific.
Resolution
1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to “address unresolved disarmament issues” and to
identify “key remaining disarmament tasks” and the latter are to be submitted
for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work
programme this month as required.
UNSCOM and
the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues, which
were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting
points but analysed the data behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to
the present time to compile its own list of “unresolved disarmament issues” or,
rather, clustered issues. It is the
answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities.
It is from the list of these
clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify the “key remaining disarmament
tasks”. As noted in the report before
you, this list of clustered issues is ready.
UNMOVIC is
only required to submit the work programme with the “key remaining disarmament
tasks” to the Council. As I understand
that several Council members are interested in the working document with the
complete clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified it and are ready
to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document, which may still be
adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date
review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which members
usually refer to. Each cluster in the
working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to
solve the issue. Hence, Iraq’s cooperation
could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.
I should
note that the working document contains much information and discussion about
the issues which existed at the end of 1998 – including information which has
come to light after 1998. It contains
much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily
because of paucity of information.
Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that
proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed
programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and
that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document contains some suggestions on how these
concerns may be tackled.
Mr. President,
Let me
conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme,
which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list
of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of
ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement;
it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the programme,
e.g. for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers,
for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc.
How
much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be
immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be
instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi
attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time
to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and
draw conclusions. It would not take
years, nor weeks, but months. Neither
governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever.
[Emphasis Added] However, it must be remembered that in
accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and
monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give
confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any
proscribed weapons programmes.
Link to Original: http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/SC7asdelivered.htm