7 March 2003 | New York, USA
Statement to the United Nations Security Council
My report to the Council today is an update
on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification
activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441
(2002) and other relevant resolutions.
Inspection Activities
When I reported last to the Council, on 14
February, I explained that the Agency's inspection activities had moved
well beyond the "reconnaissance phase" - that is, re-establishing our
knowledge base regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities - into the
"investigative phase", which focuses on the central question before
the IAEA relevant to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived or attempted to
revive its defunct nuclear weapons programme over the last four years.
At the outset, let me state one general
observation: namely, that during the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi
sites, industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially, due to the departure
of the foreign support that was often present in the late 1980s, the departure
of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade, and the lack of
consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. At only a few
inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing
have the facilities been improved and new personnel been taken on. This overall
deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance to Iraq's
capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme.
Inspections
The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites,
including 21 that had not been inspected before. In addition, IAEA experts have
taken part in many joint UNMOVIC-IAEA inspections.
Technical Methods
Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three
operational air samplers have collected, from key locations in Iraq, weekly air
particulate samples that are being sent to laboratories for analysis.
Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analyses
have been received from the relevant laboratories.
Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has
covered some 2000 kilometres over the past three weeks. Survey access has been
gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons
factories, truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential areas.
Interviews
Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel - at times with
individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced
inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key
scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past
nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews even when the
conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA's preferred modalities, with a
view to gaining as much information as possible - information that could be
cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our
assessment of areas under investigation.
As you may recall, when we first began to
request private, unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on
taping the interviews and keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our
insistence, individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without
escort and without a taped record. The IAEA has conducted two such private
interviews in the last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct private
interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside
Iraq.
I should add that we are looking into
further refining the modalities for conducting interviews, to ensure that they
are conducted freely, and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being
listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be
the best way to ensure that interviews are free. We intend therefore, to
request such interviews shortly. We are also asking other States to enable us
to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those
States.
Specific Issues
In the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a
considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier
as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium
tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities,
and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch briefly on the
progress made on each of these issues.
Uranium Enrichment
Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field
activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to
the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of
centrifuges. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of
international centrifuge manufacturing experts.
Aluminium tubes: The IAEA has
conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempts to purchase large
quantities of high-strength aluminium tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has
maintained that these aluminium tubes were sought for rocket production.
Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any
evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project other than
the reverse engineering of rockets. [Emphasis Added]
The Iraqi decision-making process with
regard to the design of these rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided
copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings
and supporting data and samples. A thorough analysis of this information,
together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has
allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchases and
intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well as the rationale behind the
changes in the tolerances.
Drawing on this information, the IAEA has
learned that the original tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987,
and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported
rockets in Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse engineer the rockets
met with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following years as
part of ongoing efforts to revitalize the project and improve operational
efficiency. The project languished for long periods during this time and became
the subject of several committees, which resulted in specification and
tolerance changes on each occasion.
Based on available evidence, the IAEA team
has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not
likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover,
that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable
re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. However, this
issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated. [Emphasis Added]
Magnets: With respect to reports about Iraq's
efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets - or to achieve the
capability for producing such magnets - for use in a centrifuge enrichment
programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength
magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of twelve
different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets
have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity
meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites,
reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts
familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified
that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a
centrifuge magnetic bearing. [Emphasis Added]
In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a
new magnet production line, for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery
has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel
indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, the contract has
been evaluated by the IAEA centrifuge enrichment experts. They have concluded
the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems
reasonable from an economic point of view. In addition, the training and
experience acquired by Iraq in the pre-1991 period makes it likely that Iraq
possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable
for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will continue therefore to monitor
and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for
enrichment centrifuges.
Flow forming capabilities: Iraq has used its
relatively low-accuracy flow forming capability for the production of rocket
parts in steel. Investigations in the field indicate that Iraq has recently
started to flow form its own tubes in aluminium as well.
Based upon Iraqi documentation, experts'
observations of Iraq's industrial capabilities and the IAEA's knowledge of
Iraq's industrial assets - including the availability of raw materials - our
assessment to date is that Iraq still possesses an abundance of high-strength
aluminium materials procured during the 1980s, and has the expertise needed to
produce pre-forms of high quality, but that it currently has low-quality flow
forming equipment. In addition, Iraq's lack of experience and expertise in this
field makes it highly unlikely that it is currently able to produce aluminium
cylinders consistently to the tolerances required for centrifuge enrichment.
[Emphasis Added] Nevertheless, the IAEA will monitor all potentially capable
machines and facilities using 24-hour camera surveillance, supported by a
regime of unannounced inspections. The IAEA will also continue to assess the
level of centrifuge-related expertise remaining in Iraq.
Uranium Acquisition
The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought
to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents
provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between Niger and
Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.
The IAEA has discussed these reports with
the Governments of Iraq and Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity
took place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive
explanation of its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi
official to a number of African countries, including Niger, in February 1999,
which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was also able
to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of Niger,
and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence
with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has
concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents -
which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between
Iraq and Niger - are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that
these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow
up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq to
illicitly import nuclear materials. [Emphasis Added]
Procurement Patterns
Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear
programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported by a number of
States. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and
products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have been conducted in
contravention of sanction controls specified under Security Council resolution
661 and other relevant resolutions.
The issue of procurement efforts remains
under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. An
IAEA team of technical experts, customs investigators and computer forensic
specialists is currently conducting a series of investigations, through
inspections at trading companies and commercial organizations, aimed at
understanding Iraq's patterns of procurement.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I am able to report today
that, in the area of nuclear weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass
destruction - inspections in Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of
inspections a little over three months ago - and particularly during the three
weeks since my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important
progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and
in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past
nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were
brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated:
As I stated above, the IAEA will continue
further to scrutinize and investigate all of the above issues.
After three months of intrusive inspections,
we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a
nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection
activities, making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution
1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including
reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to
continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our mandate.
I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of
ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been
forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with regard to the conduct of
private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to
the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope that Iraq will continue to
expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its co-operation.
The detailed knowledge of Iraq's
capabilities that IAEA experts have accumulated since 1991 - combined with the
extended rights provided by resolution 1441, the active commitment by all
States to help us fulfil our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi
co-operation - should enable us in the near future to provide the Security
Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related
capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will endeavour - in
view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification process,
and, particularly in light of Iraq's past record of co-operation - to evaluate
Iraq's capabilities on a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring
and verification programme, in order to provide the international community
with ongoing and real time assurances.
Link to Original: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml