In Serle's mind an Artifically Intelligent computer program is only a set of symbolic operations which emulate its show of intelligence. Serle claims the machine has no idea of what are its inputs and outputs since the program only operates symbolically. Searle has produced no philosophical proof of this claim.
Of course I agree with Serle on the point of a Computer program not knowing what its units are and the sequences which foray into the units obtaining gramatically correct positions which can be exhibited to the world as reasonable measurements of intelligence are only grains of sand on the beach positioned by the waves unaware of all else including what it comprises. The pattern the sand makes when it encounters the waves and the wind is not recognisable as an intellectual pursuit by the sand itself. A computer program cannot gauge the intellectual level of its output. [ repeat for intrinsic value : a computer program cannot gauge the intellectual level of its output].
Then again another program may be written which can analyse output for intellectual content. The scope is limited by the sequence of instructions which delineate intellectual content.
Experience seems at this point a necessary factor, which would allow the absorbation of the techniques and elements outside the scope of written programs. What then is necessary to parse experience? It would seem odd if experience was not-1-of-us , since we would be unable to comprehend the information of experience . If we had no eyes to see, no ears to hear, no hands to touch, no nose to smell, no tongue to taste, no feet to move, no organs to reproduce, no brain to act as command central, we would be disadvantaged in this environment where we would wish to obtain experience.
HOW is consciousness related to experience? DOES the experience bring about consciousness or does the experience heighten one's consciousness? OR alternatively, is consciousness necessary in order to experience?
If Serle's machine was able to comprehend experience in its environment would 'it' be conscious of that experience BUT not as yet conscious of itself?
The implication presented is pointing to what constitutes 'conscious of the experience'.
It was stated earlier as experience was introduced with somber notation that one must posess the tools of the environment in order to experience the environment. The information of the environment must be passed on to those who wish to experience the environment.
IT goes without saying that any part of the environment which may or may not transmit information which the subject cannot absorb and parse OR accept the presence of such information, blinds the subject. Another way of saying this is, the subject is blind to such experiences within the environment, or the subject is totally blind to the environment.
FOR all those who are not blind to the environment, what is it that makes them conscious of the environment?
DOES information from the environment help them to be conscious of their environment? IT seems reasonable to add that the case of not being blind to the information of experience within the environment is a necessary step up the ladder of consciousness .
CLIMBING the ladder of consciousness entails not being blind to the information of experience within the environment.
AS we chase Serle's machine environment, it is obvious that the program is not blind to the information which is a product of the machine's experience. The program is conscious of the data, conscious of the data result. In the machine environment the program has climbed the ladder of consciousness by not being blind to its information of experience - HOWEVER LIMITED.
We have reached the point where we can say that if we are blind to elements in our environment then we cannot achieve any adequate level of consciousness within the environment. Sometimes we may not even realise an environment to which we are totally blind - exists. To be conscious of our environment we must be able to accumulate information within the environment of the environment. It may be possible to sometimes collect information of the environment from without the environment by being loosely connected while being remote of the environment.
Notwithstanding all this current information we posess, if we are passing along information withour collecting information about what we are passing then we are only achieving a symbolic process of passing along information. We would be blind to the information we are passing. Who is doing the passing would not know what they were passing. In other words Serle was correct to claim AI programs are only symbolic processors of data and information and therefore they only appear to be intelligent.
AI Machines and their programs portray Intelligence through the processes of emulation & simulation. Their consciousness is therefore a limited one, one limited to symbolic processing.