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| NYU-A7-SM�������� ������������������������������� ��������������� Soe MYINT������������������ ��������������� November 4, 2000��������������� |
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| International Organization and their Management�������� ��������������� Professor Ambassador Ahmad Kamal |
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| Assignment #7: |
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| Take any single peacekeeping operation of the United Nations, and examine its successes and failures. |
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_________________________________________________________________ |
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Analysis of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda |
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| Introduction |
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| United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was total failures that obliterate the image of the world body to a substantial extent and brought the attention of international community to justify the viability of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation. |
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| UNAMIR (1993-96) having a peace force numbering 5,500, was mandated to stop the massacre of the defenseless population of Rwanda, assist refugees, report atrocities. |
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| In the presence of UNAMIR, about 800,000 people were killed during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.� The systematic slaughter of men, women, children which took place over the course of about 100 days between April and July of 1994 will forever be remembered as one of the most terrifying events of the twentieth century.� Rwandans killed Rwandans, brutally decimating the Tutsi population of the country, but also targeting moderate Hutus.� |
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| Failures |
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| 1.Overriding failure - In response of the UN before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to prevent/stop the genocide. |
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| 2.Inadequacy of UNAMIR's mandate - The scope of the initial mandate was the fundamental failure of the mission to prevent/stop the genocide in Rwanda. Responsibility lies firstly with the UN Secretariat, the Secretary-General (SG) and officials within the DPKO for the mistaken analysis, which underpinned the recommendations to the Council, and for recommending fewer troops than the field mission had requested. The Security Council (SC) is responsible for the hesitance to support new peacekeeping operations in the aftermath of Somalia, and specifically decided to limit the mandate of the mission in respect to the weapons secure area. |
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| 3.Implementation of mandate - The UNAMIR and the Secretariat are responsible of i) not being able to share the very important information such as the existence of a plan to exterminate Tutsi, to the higher level, ii) no follow-up on the substantial information provide by the informant, and iii) no clarification was sought on the role of UNAMIR after the threat against the Belgian contingent. |
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| 4.Confusion over the rules of engagement - The Force Commander submitted a draft set of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNAMIR to Head Quarters (HQ) on 23 November 1993 for approval.� HQ never responded to that request because it did not have a procedure in place for the formal approval of draft ROE.� While UNAMIR considered it as approved and in effect, some senior member of UNAMIR command ignored them. |
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| 5.Failure to respond to the genocide - Weak and limited mandate together with confused ROE and lack of determination, UNAMIR failed to deter in the early stage of genocide.� If UNAMIR force numbering 2,500 could stop the actions of the militia and RGF soldiers in this early stage, it could have prevented the terrible sequence of violence.� UNAMIR, the Secretariat and troop shared the responsible. The decision by Security Council on 21 April to reduce UNAMIR to a minimal force in the face of the killings which were by then known to all, rather than to make every effort to muster the political will to try and stop the killing has led to widespread bitterness in Rwanda.� Security Council was responsible for its lack of political will to do more to stop the killing and delay in identifying the events in Rwanda as genocide. |
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| 6.More causes to the failure - UNAMIR mission was total disaster with the following major failures. |
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Peacekeeping overburdened with inadequate resources and logistics,
Focus on achieving a cease-fire,
Lack of analytical capacity,
Lack of political will of Member States,
Failure to protect political leaders,
Failure to protect civilians,
Failure to protect national staff,
National evacuations: international troops in different roles, and
Rwanda as a member of the Security Council. |
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| Conclusion of Independent Inquiry |
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| "The Independent Inquiry finds that the response of the United Nations before and during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda failed in a number of fundamental respects.� The responsibility for the failings of the United Nations to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda lies with a number of different actors, in particular the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the Security Council, UNAMIR and the broader membership of the United Nations.� The international responsibility is one which warrants a clear apology by the Organization and by Member States concerned to the Rwandese people.� As to the responsibility of those Rwandans who planned, incited and carried out the genocide against their countrymen, continued efforts must be made to bring them to justice -- at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and nationally in Rwanda."5 |
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| Final Remark |
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| As of 17 August 2000, there are 1654 personal (27 in UNAMIR) gave their lives under the UN Blue flag in 39 completed peace missions.� UNAMIR mission had damage the image of United Nation as a whole, peacekeeping operation in particular.� All those costly lessons should be learnt seriously so that it won't repeat again in any future UN missions.� United Nations is aware of those mistakes and convened a high-level panel (chaired by Mr Lakhdar Brahimi) to undertake a through review of the UN peace and security activities.� Degree of viability and accountability of UN peacekeeping operations is mainly depending on how the UN and the member states could consider the past lessons and prepare on their parts. |
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Reference:
1. Completed Peacekeeping Operations http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/p_miss.htm.
2. Fatalities by mission and appointment type http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/fatal1.htm.
3. Lakhdar Brahimi (chairman), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operation, A/55/305 - S/2000/809, 17 August 2000.
4. Lawrence Zirring, Robert Riggs, Jack Plano, The United Nations - International Organization and World Politics, 3rd edition, Harcourt College Publishers, 2000.
5. Ingvar Carlson, Han Sung-Joo, Rufus M Kupolati, Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, New York, 15 December 1999. |
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