Originally published in Bulgarian Historical Review, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (Sofia, 1989).
 

Having discussed elsewhere the establishment of American diplomatic relations
with Bulgaria,' I should like to pursue here the subject from the Bulgarian side,
that is, the appointment of the first Bulgarian envoy to the United States and the
events in which he played a part. The exchange of diplomats between the two
countries  the one, a small nation trying to emerge from backwardness and
achieve national unification, the other a giant of modernity that staddled a continent
 did not occur simultaneously.
Bulgarian governments had expressed on three occasions in the 1890's their
desire to have formal and direct relations with the United States, but when the last
overture bore fruit and an American diplomat was accredited in 1901, Bulgaria
failed to reciprocate. After more than a decade, it was the disaster of the second
Balkan war and the prospect of a general war that turned King Ferdinand and his
Germanophile prime minister, Vasil Radoslavov, to exploring the political and
economic opportunities in America appointing a consul in New York and a minister
in Washington. Their choice as consul was a prominent New York businessman,
Clayton z as minister they chose Panaretov, the ablest and staunchest
Americanophile Bulgaria had at that time. The choices, especially Panaretov's,
were a clear indication that they wanted major results.
The paper is based, of course, on sources accessible to me. They include
Department of State communications to and from Panaretov and other documents
at the National Archives in Washington, documentary series such as Foreign
Relations of the United States, personal papers of participants, and studies and
material published in the United States and Bulgaria. Among the latter, particularly
valuable has been Panaretov's diary for 1917-1920  the most eventful years he
spent in Washington.
Panaretov's credentials for the assignment in America were unequaled. His
acquaintance with American culture began in 1867 when, a lad of 14, he entered
the recently formed Robert College in Constantinopole. He had been brought to
the Ottoman capital by his father. Archimandrite Panaret, who served at the
Bulgarian church in the Fener district of the sity.  The boy spent the first seven
years at the church school, where his teachers were the future metropolitan bishops
(mitropoliti) Grigorii of Dorostol-Cherven and Simeon of Varna-Preslav, and
others. At Robert College, which his father undoubtedly chose because of its
prestige and non-sectarian Christian orientation, the youngster became one of the
favorites of the college president, Cyrus Hamlin, who retained him, upon graduation
in 1871, as an aide to the instructor in the Bulgarian language, Petko V. Gorbanov.
 
 

On Corbanov's resignation the following year, Panaretov took his place, receiving
the rank of professor in 1875 and involving himself in the preparation of a grammar,
the First and only part of which appeared in 1881, as well as an English-Bulgarian
and Bulgarian-English dictionary, which remained unpublished.' He also taught
Bulgarian literature and subsequently expanded into the languages and literatures
of other Slavic countries. His teaching career, spanning forty-three years when he
took the assignment in Washington, made him an unmatched interpreter of English
and Bulgarian. His marriage to Lydia 0. Gile of North Andover, Massachusetts,
a graduate of Holyoke College and teacher at the American school for girls in
Constantinople, and their visits to the United Stases gave him an intimate
knowledge of American culture that in his time only a handful of Bulgarians
possessed.
Since he lived in the Ottoman capital, Panaretov's ties to Bulgarian public life
were somewhat limited. The strongest link was provided by the large number of
classmates, friends, and students at the college who attained prominence in
Bulgaria. He was particularly close to Konstantin Stoilov, a member of the class
of 1871, who was also retained as an aide at the college, but left to study law at
Heidelberg and pursue one of the most illustrious careers in Bulgarian political life.6
The friendships Panaretov formed at the college included the cousin of Ivan E.
Geshov, Ivan S. Geshov, who became a diplomat; the son of Petko R. Slaveikov,
Ivan P. Slaveikov, later minister of education; Petur Dimitrov, who rose to the
position of secretary-genera] of the ministry offoreigh affairs; Mikhail Madzharov,
the statesman, diplomat, and journalist; Dimitur lvanchev, the first director of
statistics  and minister of education;  Ivan  Peev-Plachkov,  office manager and
secretary of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1901-1939); and many bthers.7
His own achievements won him in 1884 membership in the Bulgarian Literary
Society, which in 1911 became the Academy of Sciences.
Panaretov was also directly involved on several occasions in the defense of the
"national cause." In the momentous events of 1876  the April Uprising and
horrors perpetrated in its suppression  he played a key role in the intense activity,
centered at Robert College, to bring these events to the attention of public opinion
in the West, particularly in England, and to mount a defense of the Bulgarian
people. The American educators who became deeply involved in this effort were
Dr. George Washburn, the college's new president, who was very fond of the
Bulgarian students and sympathetic to the Bulgarians in general,* and Professor
Albert Long, who had served earlier as a missionary in Turnovo and, as a member
of the team which translated the Bible into modern Bulgarian in 1871, had brought
his friend from Turnovo, Petko Slaveikov, into the project
The story of this activity, particularly the fact-finding tours and shocking
revelations  of the  American consul-general in Constantinople,  Dr.  Eugene
Schuyier, and his compatriot and friend, Januarius A. MacGahan, then a special
correspondent of the London Daily News, is well-known and need not be
summarized here. Panaretov's part in it was central. To cite only his own one-
sentence summation of it: "All documents and information which the Exarchate’s
received from Bulgaria concerning these massacres and atrocities and wished to

make public, passed through my hands, and Ivan P. Slaveikov and I translated
them into English, while Dr. Washburn and Dr. Long gave them, so translated, to
the British embassy [and] Mr. [Edwin] Pears, the correspondent of the Daily News,
or sent them to their acquaintances and friends in London."ll Panaretov was also
the only Bulgarian taking part in the fateful discussion "late into the night," when
Washburn and Long prevailed upon Schuyier to undertake, at great professional
and personal risk, the investigation of the atrocities and to lend his authority as an
impartial American diplomat to the defense of the Bulgarians.
Panaretov himself was entrusted by the Exarch, Antim I, with a confidential
mission in August, 1876, to go to England and personally present to leading Liberals
and the press the evidence on the plight of the Bulgarian people.   Washburn
supplied him with letters of introduction to "our friends there" who helped him
place several articles in The Times under the pseudonym "Constantinopolitan" and
reach a number of influential members of Parliament. According to Washburn,
Panaretov sat in the Speaker's Gallery in the House of Commons when Disraeli
spoke for the last time before he moved to the House of Lords as Lord Beaconsfield,
the subject being the Bulgarian massacres.
In 1880, Panaretov was entrusted with another mission to England, this time
by Prince Alexander and Stoilov, then political secretary of the prince. Traveling
in Eastern Rumelia that spring, Washburn and Panaretov met with Stoilov and
discussed the prospects of an eventual unification of the province with the
principality. The Liberal party of William Gladstone had just returned to power in
England, and the time seemed propitious for a move, since in the events of 1876
Gladstone had taken up the cause of the Bulgarians with unmatched commitment
and vigor. IS It was decided to send Panaretov to sound out the views of the British
leaders, but because the prime minister (and minister of foreign affairs), Dragan
Tsankov, was concerned about Russian suspicions, the mission was to be unofficial.
In his private report to Tsankov, Panaretov indicated with regret that he had no
greater success than making the British government aware of the importance
Bulgaria attached to solving the problem of unification. He found in England
concern that Austria might intervene with military force to stop it and occupy
either the principality or Eastern Rumelia or even march on to Salonika. The Liberal
goverment, he emphasized, was very favorably disposed toward Bulgaria but
wished, as apparently did the Russian government, "that we remain quiet at the
present time." In regard to Macedonia he assured Tsankov that both Gladstone
and his foreign secretary, Lord Granville, took a great interest in its future and
"fully recognized" that it was a Bulgarian land. As he left London, Granville
expressed the wish that he return soon. He would always be ready he wrote
Tsankov, to be of service whenever it was "to the good of our country."
The next call did not come until after the disastrous second Balkan war over
Macedonia, and it was to serve as Bulgaria's first envoy to America. As noted
above, Bulgaria was very slow in moving to that decision, even though the
Stambolov. government first expressed interest in 1892 and the United States sent
a diplomatic agent, Charles M. Dickinson, in 1901. In welcoming his successor,
John B. Jackson, in 1903, Ferdinand effusively stressed the "great importance" of

the contact which "will not fail, I am firmly convinced, to advance commercial and
industrial relations between the two countries."   But he sent no representative to
the United States for more than ten years.
It was not for lack of trade opportunities or human reasons. In 1893, a very
modest Bulgarian participation in the Chicago World Exposition revealed the
possibilities of benefiting from advanced American machinery and methods in
agriculture and selling rose oil (attar of roses), tobacco, and other products in
America.  At the next world exposition in the U.S. (St. Louis, 1904), the Bulgarian
exhibit was carefully organized and the trade contacts explored by a special
commissioner. ' In the ensuing decade the bilateral trade rose significantly, being
dominated on the American side by agricultural machinery and implements which
had given the United States the edge in world agricultural production and which
Bulgaria needed for its modernization. Another pressing need for opening a legation
was the rapidly growing immigration from Bulgaria proper as well as from Turkey's
Bulgaria regions, especially after the disastrous 1903 insurrection in Macedonia and
Thrace. Since neither Bulgaria nor the United States, not to mention Turkey, kept
adequate statistics, the estimates of its size before 1914 range from 40,000 to 80,000,
sometimes including the immigrants in Canada.  Their legal affairs, especially
inheritance cases, which required diplomatic channels to settle, grew to a considerable volume.
The First to respond to their needs was the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church, which began to send priests after 1908 when immigrants in Granite City,
Illinois,  organized  the  First  church.    The  Bulgarian  government,  however,
remained unresponsive; in 1913, it finally asked the Russian government to look
after Bulgarian interests in the United States.
One of the most persistent advocates of close ties with America was Dr. Ivan
Dimitrov-Strogov, a high ofFicial of the ministry of internal affairs and a publicist.
In 1906, in a lecture published under the title Bulgarskopredstavitelstvo v A erica.23
he argued that Bulgaria stood to gain economically as well as politically from such
ties since the support of the nation's cause by the American missionaries and
educators indicated that the American government and public opinion would take
the same position. After the Balkan wars he urged, in an article under the same
title in Radoslavov's party newspaper Narodni Praia, that Bulgaria should break
out in "new directions in foreign policy" and seek "brighter horizons," namely, the
friendship and protection of the "North American colossus," as well as its Angio-
Saxon parent, England. The acquisition of the Aegean coast, he argued, had greatly
reduced the distance between them and Bulgaria, and "in fact Bulgaria already has
a larger export trade to America (not to mention England) than to Russia."
Bulgarian commercial relations "with this 'distant' country have been until now
closer and more intense than those with Serbia and Russia"; facing the need for a
loan, Bulgaria should turn to America for it. The two nations, he felt, were drawn
together by a common love of liberty.
Leaders of the Bulgarian Protestants who studied in America and, of course,
the missionaries also pressed the case. At the palace they had the ear of Queen
Eleonora, Ferdinand's second wife, who was a Lutheran and had a true devotion
to humanitarian work,  especially nursing.  She was naturally drawn to the

missionaries and formed a close friendship with the family of James F. Clarke, a
pioneer of this work since 1859. She organized a Good Samaritan society in Sofia
for the training of army(nurses and personally ran field hospitals during the Balkan
wars. It was her belief /that Bulgarians stood to learn much from America in this
field, and she made plans to bring, through the American Red Cross, expert nurses
for the purpose.
The catastrophe in 1913 brought forth again, as in 1876, the American
missionaries and educators to Bulgaria's defense. Old ethnic hatreds fueled some
viciousness and cruelty, particularly on the Greek front in Macedonia, where the
retreating Bulgarian units fought off not only Greek regulars, but also armed civilian
bands. The Greek government quickly launched a campaign to discredit Bulgaria
in Western Europe and the United States, charging that the Bulgarian troops had
committed unspeakable atrocities and had murdered an archbishop and two
bishops.26 From retirement, George Washburn, among others, proposed that an
impartial  international  commission  be  established  to  investigate  atrocities
committed by all belligerents, and in July, 1913, a Commission of Inquiry was
formed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, composed of eminent
personalities from the European Powers (except Italy) and the United States.
As the Commission proceeded to the war areas, the Christian belligerents
assembled in Bucharest to draw up the new boundaries. Prostrate and friendless,
Bulgaria was to be handed new frontiers denying her the bulk of Macedonia. In
the face of the impending injustice, missionaries who had worked for decades in
Macedonia and knew firsthand its ethnic character, placed themselves squarely
behind Bulgaria's case. In a memorandum to Lord Grey and other great power
leaders (August 5, 1913), Clarke, J. W. Baird, and Robert Thomson (a Scot) declared
that the missionary activities had First extended from the Bulgarian lands into the
Razlog district of Macedonia (a Bulgarian Protestant church was organized in
Bansko in 1871), that Monastir (Bitolia) was then chosen as "the most favorable
center," that from this center the work extended all through Macedonia, and
churches or preaching stations were established in Resen, Prilep, Veles, Skopie,
Prishtina, and other localities, and that after the railroads to Salonika were built,
that city became another major center for the regions north and east of it. They
were convinced, "after years of acquaintance with Macedonia, either through
residence or travel, or both mingling with the people and living in their homes,"
that "the great bulk of the population in the region which we have indicated as the
Macedonian field of our work, is Bulgarian in origin, language, and customs, and
forms an integral part of the Bulgarian nation."
The missionaries also requested that measures be taken "to guarantee full
religious liberty for all under the new administration [of Macedonia], and to insure
the same freedom to carry on religious and educational work which has been
enjoyed in the past," since the Serbs and especially the Greeks had a record of
hostility to their activity.  The request,  backed by a note of the  American
government to the Bucharest conference, was practically identical with Bulgaria's
own position that the peace treaty should bind Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and
herself to "recognize in their newly-annexed territory the autonomy of religions
 

communities and the freedom of schools."  The final treaty ignored the request,
but an identity of views of the Bulgarian and American governments on a significant
issue had been established.
In this nexus of events, as Bulgarians looked around for friends and Ferdinand
began to plot his revenge,'2 the Radoslavov government decided to establish a
legation in Washington and a consulate in New York, Ferdinand announced the
decision about the legation on December 26, 1913, at the reception for Charles J.
Vopicka, the new American minister to Rumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria,  indicating
that the National Assembly would be asked for the necessary appropriation, and
spoke grandly of "the noble and generous United States [and] its constant
,,34 As it turned out, he had a number of other ideas in mind, some
already suggested in Ivan Dimitrov-Strogov's article in Narodni Prava.
One was to have the United States open a consulate in Dedeagach, the seaport
of the newly-annexed Western Thrace, which provided the shortest route between
Bulgaria and New York. The United States had a consul in Sofia, Dr. Asen
Kermektchieff, since January, 1912 (subordinated to Vopicka in Buchurest), but
the consular business was limited, and there was no need to open another consulate
in Dedeagach. Ferdinand also expressed a strong desire to visit the United States
semiofficially with the queen, their sons Boris and Kiril, and "Bulgarian notables."
Planning to travel with a large party, he obviously wanted to impress his hosts and
make contacts in political, business, and Financial circles. The queen in particular
wanted to study American "hospitals, schools for nurses, and similar institutions."
Vopicka was delighted, but the Department of State emphatically opposed the visit
as placing unnecessary obligations and costs on the United States, and used the
military involvement in Mexico as the official excuse. Ferdinand also hoped to visit
officially the Panama-Pacific Exposition in San Francisco, which was to mark the
completion of the Panama Canal in 1914, but the war caused its cancellation.
The idea of a loan from the United States intrigued both sides. For Bulgaria it
had the particular attraction of carrying no political conditions or commitments,
whereas loans from European countries came with political strings attached.
Rumours about it to the tune of 250-300 million dollars circulated since the end of
1913, particularly in connection with Ferdinand's plans to visit the United Stases.
Vopicka and Kermektchieff pursued the possibilities in the first part of 1914, but
the Bulgarian government, faced with the urgent need to service the country's
foreign debts and rebuild the army, looked for a loan in Western Europe. Vopicka
finally reported a prospect on July II, 1914, but it was too late; the following day
Bulgaria signed a contract for a loan from the German Disconto-Gesellschaft,
representing an international consortium of banks, for 500 million francs.
It was not only the American side that was slow to rise to the opportunities.
The Bulgarian National Assembly took more than six months to set on the question
of the legation. 37 Radoslavov took another month to notify Vopicka that Panaretov
had been chosen for the post, and it was not until December 6, 1914, that Panaretov
finally reached New York. He was the object of much interest as Bulgaria's first
envoy to America. On arriving he indicated to the press that he intended to "pay
particular attention to agricultural industries in the United States and make

arrangements for  number of young Bulgarians to come here and study farming,
as we consider tnat America is ahead of all European countries in agriculture."
Bulgaria, he declared, wished to "remain neutral, if possible, in the great European
conflict."38
In Washington Panaretov encountered a prompt reception and most favorable
atmosphere. Within two weeks he was received by the Secretary of State, William
Jennings Bryan, and four days later, by President Wilson to present his credentials.
His reputation, of course, preceded him. Extraordinarily helpful in this respect was
Wilson's close friendship with the president of the board of trustees of Robert
College, Cleveland H. Dodge. A classmate of Wilson at Princeton, Dodge became
 a wealthy industrialist and Financier and contributed liberally to educational and
humanitarian institutions including the American University in Beirut, the Young
Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in New York, the American Red Cross, the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the New York Public Library, and
others. He worked for Wilson in his campaigns for the presidency in 1912 and 1916
and his fight for the League of Nations, and had easy access to him. Shortly before
Panaretov arrived, Dodge saw Wilson and told him of Panaretov's "history and
character." He also made it a point to relay such in fomation to Bryan. To quote
his letter, Panaretov was "one of the First Bulgarian students who graduated from
Robert College in Constantinople and was a favorite pupil of Dr. Washburn, who
had a great influence over him. He has been, for over thirty years, Professor of
Bulgarian History and Literature in Robert College, and has had a very remarkable
influence over a large number of Bulgarian students who have become important
leaders in statesmanship and education. Excepting Dr. Washburn himself, there is
probably no one who has had a greater influence in developing the high character
and ideals of the Bulgarian leaders. He is a man of high intelligence, and speaks
and reads English like a native. His wife is an American woman and I take it for
granted than she will accompany him to this country. He only resigned his
Professorship in Robert College to take up the important post to which he has been
appointed, feeling that he could crown his life's work for his country by representing
it in the United States."39
Bulgaria, too, enjoyed a very favorable reputation and widespread goodwill. One
of her admirers was Theodore Roosevelt, the former Republican president, who
was greatly impressed by her general progress as well as the military victories over
the Turks in the First Balkan war. Writing in his forum. The Outlook, about the
toughness and valor of the Bulgarian soldier in the war, he concluded:
"No other nation has traveled so far and so fast as Bulgaria has traveled in the
last third of a century. Americans have a just cause to feel proud that Robert
College gave to many of the leading Bulgarian citizens their educations, so that it
has played a peculiar part in the making of the Bulgarian nation. Not the rise of
Japan itself has been more striking and unexpected than the rise of Bulgaria.
Whatever may be the decision of the European Powers regarding [the peace
settlement], the sympathy of the people of both Europe and America ought to be
Wholly with the people of the Balkans in their heroic struggle for liberty.”

Before Panaretov reached Washington, two books very favorable to Bulgaria
had just appeared. The first was the report of the Carnegie Commission, largely
written by Miliukov, finding that some of the Greek charges of Bulgarian atrocities
"were grossly exaggerated" (the archbishop and the two bishops were alive and
well), but even-handedly concluding that, while the Greeks were worse offenders
than the Bulgarians, all belligerents were guilty to one degree or another. In regard
to the question of Macedonia, the report found that the Bulgarians had a stronger
claim than the Greeks or the Serbs and that the treaty of Bucharest, having
"sanctioned the illegitimate claims of victorious nationalities," was "a work of
injustice" which would eventually crumble. The report charged that the Greeks
and the Serbs had undertaken the suppression and expulsion of the Bulgarian
element from their parts of Macedonia, resulting in masses of refugees in Bulgaria,
and urged "mutual tolerance" and "an effective mutual guarantee of religions and
educational autonomy" as the only remedy possible in the existing circumstances.4'
Reviewers of the book underscored the objectivity of the commission and the
reliability of the evidence it had collected. Particularly emphatic was Professor
Ferdinand Schevill of the University of Chicago, a leading historian of modern
Europe who subsequently branched out into the Balkans. Schevill found the report
"a king of vindication" of the Bulgarians that gave the Greeks a "blacker record
than the enemy they had slandered." As to Macedonia, he charged that the Greeks
and the Serbs had seized the bulk of it "and by the most brutal military pressure
immediately attempted to 'convert' the native Bulgarian population to either the
Greek or Serbian nationality. The evidence on this head is overwhelming and is
even more revolting than the crimes committed in the heat of open conflict, for
these conversion tactics were applied from day to day in cold blood and, we must
believe, are employed at this hour as vigorously as ever."
The second book was a 410-page compendium Bulgaria and Her People, by
another academic. Professor Will S.  Monroe.  Monroe was an educational
psychologist who had studied at Stanford University, as well as France and
Germany, and had First visited Bulgaria in 1900, which led to the translation of his
works into Bulgarian.43 The Balkan wars took him back to Bulgaria, and the result
was the compendium on "Bulgaria and her people, with an account of the Balkan
wars, Macedonia, and the Macedonian Bulgars," covering geography, history,
demography, government, religions, education, folklore, literature, economy,
American influence in Bulgaria, and much else. As the first factual handbook for
the American public, it became an effective vehicle of the author's pro-Bulgarian
sympathies. Concerning the conduct and results of the wars, Monroe declared that
his own First hand investigations confirmed the report of the Carnegie Commission
and that the Bulgarian majority in Macedonia was being systematically uprooted
from the regions annexed by the Greeks and the Serbs.
Panaretov proceeded at once to make arrangements for Bulgarian students to
enroll in American universities and study agriculture. He also hoped to induce the
Department of Agriculture to send experts to assess and report on Bulgaria's
possibilities, and proposed the establishment of a steamship line between Bulgaria
and America via the new ports of Dedeagach and Porto Lagos.  Although the war
-250-

involved two of Bulgaria's neighbors, Serbia and Turkey, it had still not dimmed
the hopes for neutrality and peaceful pursuits. In fact, the Bulgarian government
requested the admission of six cadets from the Military School in Sofia to the U.
S. Naval Academy in Annapolis in the fall of 1915 for training as naval officers.
The Navy Department, however, was against the idea, and Franklin D. Roosevelt,
then acting Secretary of the Navy, informed the Department of State that it was
inadvisable, for reasons of confidentiality, to admit any foreigners to the academy. 45
Panaretov's appointment to Washington revived the old question of assigning
an American diplomat solely to Sofia. The question arose first in the opening of
American diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, when the consul-general in Turkey,
Charles M. Dickinson, was appointed also diplomatic agent in Bulgaria but residing
in  Constantinople.  The  Bulgarian  government  resented  the  formula  for  its
implication of Bulgaria's subordination to Turkey which it was determined, ever
since 1878, to nullify, and never recognized Dickinson as an accredited diplomat.
The Bulgarian sensitivities were assuaged in 1903 when the Department of State
decided to add Bulgaria to the territory of its minister to Greece, Rumania, and
Serbia residing in Athens (until 1907 when Greece was separated and the residence
was moved to Bucharest), but the wish for an American diplomat with sole
responsibility for Bulgaria continued to exist and perhaps accounted for Bulgaria's
slowness to send a minister to Washington. In any case, the unexpected resignation
of Kermektchieff in the beginning of 1915 provided an opportunity to station an
American in Sofia, and the State Department upgraded the post to a consulate-
general (subordinated to the minister in Bucharest) and assigned Dominic 1.
Murphy, then serving in Amsterdam, to it.  The question of sending a minister
remained open.
In the spring of 1915, as the Allies opened a Balkan front at the Dardanelles,
the position of Bulgaria became increasingly crucial to both sides in the war. For
the Allies, Bulgaria's intervention on their side was to assure the defeat of Turkey
and the opening of a sea route to aid Russia and save her as a fighting ally. For
the Central Powers, Bulgaria was needed to liquidate the Serbian front and open
an overland route to Turkey. The bidding became particularly intense during the
summer, "the Bulgarian Summer," as Marcel Dunan aptly called it.  The Central
Powers far outbid the Allies by offering Serbian-held Macedonia as well as
territories from Rumania and Greece, were they to enter the war on the side of
the Entente,49 and on October 14, 1915, Ferdinand and Radoslavov brought
Bulgaria into the war against Serbia. In the ensuing days the Entente powers
responded by declaring war on Bulgaria.
The United States, adhering to a policy of neutrality, had no part in these
developments, but Bulgaria's intervention on the side of Germany could have only
a jarring effect on Bulgarian-American relations and Panaretov's mission in
Washington. Fearful that Panaretov might transmit information useful to the
Germans, particularly about trans-Atlantic shipping, the Allies pressed the State
Department to monitor his communications to Bulgaria. As a result, he was asked
to hand over the legation code, if he wished to use it for his cables, which led him
simply to rely on the department for channels of communication with Sofia.  As

the war widened, the channels through Rumania, Austria, Turkey and Greece were
shut and Panaretov became practically isolated in Washington.
Another immediate result was the United States' assumption of the protection
of British interests in Bulgaria, including British prisoners of war taken on the
Macedonian front. England had acted to protect American interests from 1879 until
after Kermektchieff was appointed consul in Sofia, and now it was simply America's
turn. The Department of State sent for the purpose a "special agent," Lewis
Einstein, a career diplomat then serving in the same capacity in Turkey. Einstein,
it turned out, had a genius for antagonizing people.  He had only contempt for
Vopicka as a political appointee uninitiated in the arcane of diplomacy, and sought
to make himself wholly independent from him. To the Bulgarian government he
represented himself as "charge" and set up a "legation" office at Hotel de Bulgarie,
some distance from the consulate-general at ul. Slavianska 39. His treatment of
Murphy, a much older man, was similarly offensive, communicating with him by
letter. A multilateral correspondence of charges and countercharges reaching the
Department of State ensued, with Einstein threatening to resign if he did not have
his way and Secretary of State Robert Lansing admonishing him that Vopicka was
his superior. Einstein's highhanded manner also antagonized Radoslavov after some
initial efforts to win him over with prospects of an American legation in Sofia and
American loans after the war. As Einstein reported them, "At Sofia, they have
always been inclined to resent the fact that Bucharest should be the seat of our
Legation and thought with reason that as the capital of the most important country
in  the  Balkans,  they  were  entitled to  separate  representation.  [They]  have
interpreted my appointment as the initial step toward later permanent representation
 by accredited representative. They appreciate our absence of political
interest and that our aims here are moral and economic. The latter interests them
more especially. Having shut the money markets of London and Paris by their
entry on the side of the Central Powers, they will require money with peace, which
will be hard to Find in Berlin and Vienna."51 Confrontations over the treatment of
the British POWs led the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry to cite reciprocity and ask
Einstein to hand over his code. He left Bulgaria in a huff in April 1916, indicating
that his wife was ill in London as the reason.
Murphy, in contrast, won general admiration in Sofia. A gentle, grandfatherly
figure,  he  was  affectionately  called  diado  Murphy  and  enjoyed  access  to
Germanophobe and Germanophile circles alike; after the war General Ludendorff
wrote with resentment that he had "very cleverly" exerted much influence on behalf
of the Entente. 52 On the great national holiday celebrating enlightenment and
education (May 24) in 1916, he hoisted the American flag at the "legation" in Hotel
de Bulgarie and at the consulate as a reminder of the American-Bulgarian ties
through education and a token of support for Bulgaria. The gesture evoked a fervent
response in the press, including an article presumably inspired by Radoslavov
himself. ~ Receiving him later in July, Radoslavov displayed "great cordiality [and
spoke] freely of his earnest desire to maintain the friendliest relations with the
United States which all Bulgarians love and respect."

The events in Rumania further enhanced Murphy's role. Rumania's entry into
the war against the Central Powers led to the occupation of most of the country
by the German, Austrian, and Bulgarian forces while the government retreated to
Jassy in the east and Vopicka proceeded, via Berlin, to the United States for
consultations. Arriving in March, 1917, after the United States severed relations
with Germany, he found himself involved in the debate about the declaration of
war. He urged the President to include Austria, which Wilson was reluctant to do,
and plunged into making "some forty speeches" on behalf of Wilson's policy. After
three months' stay he was instructed to join the Rumanian government (via the
Pacific,  Japan,  and  Russia)  at Jassy,  where  he  arrived in  September,  1917,
completely cut off from Murphy in Sofia. 55
As the United States moved to war with Germany, an effort was made to assure
Germany's allies that they did not need to be involved. On February 6, 1917, the
State Department notified the Bulgarian government, through Murphy, that it
assumed "the friendly relations between Bulgaria and the United States will
continue in spite of the necessity which has arisen for the United States to sever
relations  with  Germany."  Murphy  was  instructed  to  "convince  Bulgarian
authorities that it is for the mutual interest of Bulgaria and the United States to
avoid the suspension of the friendly relations which have always existed between
the two countries." At the same time the Department transmitted a message from
Panaretov to Radoslavov (through the embassy in Vienna and Murphy), indicating
that he was "assured the United States earnestly desires that relations between it
and Bulgaria should continue friendly as heretofore." Radoslavov's response
(through Murphy) was equally emphatic, instructing Panaretov to "declare to the
Honorable Government of the United States on behalf of the Royal Government
that Bulgaria intends also on her part to preserve the relations of perfect friendship
that she has always been happy to maintain with the United States." Murphy further
reported that his audience with Radoslavov had been "marked by extreme
cordiality. He assured me that he could think of nothing that would force Bulgaria
to break the exceedingly pleasant relations with the United States which he was
assured would always continue; that Bulgaria, although allied with Germany, was
perfectly free to manage her own policies with neutral and other countries."
The first test of this freedom came when on April 6, 1917, the United States
declared war on Germany. The Germans expected their allies to demonstrate
solidarity and at least sever relations with the United States. Austria and Turkey
did within a few days, but Bulgaria refused on the ground that her treaty with
Germany in 1915 required her to render assistance only if Germany was attacked
by country adjoining Bulgaria.   Resentment of German policies, especially in
Rumania, also played a part. In Dobrudja, which the Bulgarians felt was theirs on
historic grounds, the Germans imposed a joint possession (condominium) and in
some areas reinstated the Rumanian civil and religious authorities. Having been
rebuffed by the Germans on Dobrudja, Radoslavov was prepared to rebuff them
on America.   Most importantly, Radoslavov kept in mind the simple fact that,
with Germany heading for a stalemate if not defeat, Bulgaria needed America's
goodwill and support.   Despite heavy German and Austrian pressure, he stuck to

that policy and Panaretov remained at his post, the only ranking diplomat from the
enemy camp in Washington.
It was Panaretov's conviction in these circumstances that the United States
should station a regular diplomatic representative in Sofia in order to underscore
the importance it attached to preserving the relationship with Bulgaria. The State
Department shared his view, and as the American diplomats in Turkey prepared
to leave, it sent instructions for one of them to move to Sofia, but the cable arrived
too late. Lansing offered the Bulgarian government (via the American and Bulgarian
legations in Switzerland) to send a diplomatic representative with the rank of charge
d'affaires and asked for a frank expression of views since he understood that, in
view of the continuous German pressure to break off relations with the United
States, "the  Bulgarian government might Find it embarrassing to receive a
diplomatic officer from the United States at this time, and might prefer" relations
to remain at consular level in the hands of Murphy.   In support Panaretov cabled
the foreign ministry (through the same channel), urging acceptance of the offer
and a prompt reply, but the reply was disappointing: the appointment was useless
since "for a very long time [there was] no communication link with America, [and
it] could be postponed until later." Panaretov also urged Lansing, to no avail, to
station Vopicka in Sofia rather than in Jassy.
Isolated in Washington, Panaretov felt that one of the things he could do was
to explain in print Bulgaria's position to the American public and to counter Serbian
and Greek propaganda. He quickly acquired a reputation at the State Department
for writing letters to newspapers and wielding an effective pen. For greater effect,
in the early part of 1917 he published, under the pseudonym "Historicus," a sizable
brochure entitled Bulgaria and Her Neighbours (New York, 1917, 110 p.), and
subtitled’ An Historic Presentation of the Background of the Balkan Problem, One
of the Basic Issues of the World War." Four of its ten chapters dealt with Bulgarian-
Serbian relations and the clash over central and northern Macedonia, two with
Bulgarian-Greek relations and disputed territories, and the rest with Bulgarian-
Rumanian relations and the question of Dobrudja, the Balkan wars and the
Bucharest settlement, and Bulgarian-Russian relations. In justification of Bulgaria's
claims  Panaretov adduced findings of European scholars  and international
authorities on the ethnic character, language, culture, and national sentiment of
the populations involved, and asserted that they were "overwhelmingly in favor of
the Bulgarian contention that the Macedonian Slav population is Bulgarian" and
that "the Greek and Serbian claims are artificial." Bulgaria, he caustically
concluded, had a better claim to Macedonia than France did to Alsace-Lorraine.
It was therefore not surprising that he became the object of virulent attacks.
Reacting to one of the milder complaints to the State Department, the Assistant
Secretary, William Phillips, wrote in an internal memorandum on June 9, 1917,
that "at the present time and in view of our anxiety regarding Bulgarian relations,"
he thought it would be "wiser to refrain from taking the matter up officially" with
Panaretov who, Phillips felt, "means right, his chief concern [being] Bulgaria's
relations with Serbia, [and] is a real friend of this country." Panaretov could be
"casually" asked later on when a charge d’affier was stationed in Sofia "and

everything is  settled," to "go  slow in  such matters lest his  position  be
misunderstood" as advocacy of Germany's cause.
In Bulgaria, the Radoslavov government also initiated efforts to influence
European and American option and prepare Bulgaria's case for the coming peace
conference. A special "Bulgarian Cultural Mission," staffed by University of Sofia
professors and other experts, was established at the legation in Switzerland to
publish the necessary materials. In regard to America, the government found a
special opportunity among the missionaries in Bulgaria. Two members of the
younger generation, Edward B. Haskell (scion of well-known family, born in
Bulgaria) and Reuben H. Markham (in Bulgaria since 1912), and others had taken
to press with articles declaring that if the fate of Macedonia was determined by a
plebiscite, Bulgaria had nothing to fear, and that the United States was unique
among the leading countries in having in the missionaries people who knew every
nook and cranny of the Balkans after seventy years of work there and who could
help it play the role of arbiter of the Balkan disputes.   Since Haskell and Markham
wanted to return to the United States, Radoslavov seized the opportunity to reach
the missionary circles in America and possibly draw them into countering the
Serbian and Greek propaganda against Bulgaria. The two were advanced money,
later repaid, for passage via Switzerland to confer with the Bulgarian mission
regarding methods and materials to use in their efforts."
In the United States, the leaders of the missionaries needed no stirring or
instructing. The foreign secretary of the Board of American Missions in Boston,
Dr. James Barton, had a clear understanding of the issues as a result of years of
service in Turkey and as a trustee of Robert College. Visiting him in September,
1917, Panaretov found him concerned that there was no one in the State
Department with a solid grasp of the Balkan situation to advise the American leaders
in the making of the peace. There was no doubt, Panaretov felt, that Barton would
command exceptional attention in that case.  The Board's representative in
Washington, William W. Peet, had the same experience and convictions; as mission
treasurer in Constantinople, he had been directly involved in the so-called Miss
Stone Affair (the kidnapping of a missionary, Ellen Stone, by Macedonian
revolutionaries for ransom in 1901) and had a firsthand knowledge of the
Macedonian question.
In the fall of 1917, the question of the United States' relations with Bulgaria as
one of Germany's allies moved to the point of decision. Italy's misfortunes against
the Austrians and the Germans raised the prospect of American troops having to
be deployed on the Italian front and the requirement of declaring war on Austria.
Logic and opportunity seemed to many Americans, Democrats and Republicans,
to call for a simultaneous declaration of war on the "Teutonic allies," Turkey and
Bulgaria, as well, although there was no likelihood that American forces would be
used against them. On the Republican side, particularly vocal was Theodore
Roosevelt, who switched from The Outlook to The Kansas City Star as a regular
editorial writer. In a piece on November 20, 1917, entitled "A Fifty-Fifty War
Attitude," he demanded an end of the ambivalence toward Germany's "vassal
allies." In regard to Bulgaria, he declared: "I was formerly a staunch champion of

Bulgaria, and would be again if she returned to her senses. But she now serves the
devil, and shame be upon us if we do not treat her accordingly. No one can doubt
that the Bulgarian Legation is an agency for German spies in this country. The
Administration has published reports showing that for over a year, previous to our
entry into the war, the German Embassy was the center of the spies and dynamiters
with whom Germany was already waging war against us. These papers show that
Germany's allies are her mere tools and that Germany is withheld by no scruple
from the commission of every conceivable treacherous intrigue and brutal outrage
against us. Under these conditions it is a grave offense against our allies not to
declare war on all of Germany's allies."68 Roosevelt's view was fully shared by
Senator Henry Lodge of Massachusetts and other Republican leaders in Congress.
Wilson was just as convinced that the declaration of war on Austria should
include Turkey and Bulgaria. The draft of his message to Congress of December
4, 1917, written by himself, was a straight recommendation "that the Congress
immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary, with
Turkey, and with Bulgaria."69 Had it not been for a strong and effective opposition
from an unexpected quarter, the United States and Bulgaria would have been at
war a couple of days later.
The opposition came from the leaders of the missionaries and educators who
became fearful that the declaration of war would entail destruction of their
institutions and activities throughout the Ottoman empire and even physical
reprisals against Americans. In the case of Bulgaria war was even less justified,
since the Bulgarian government had resisted severing relations with the United
States, despite heavy German pressure, and exhibited a most friendly attitude
toward America and Americans. Particularly effective was the Boston Board's
representative in Washington, William Peet, who lobbied members of Congress and
submitted material to Secretary of State Lansing. The man to reach the President
was, of course, Cleveland Dodge, who was pressed to do so by the former
ambassadors to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau and Abram 1. Elkus, as well. His letter
to Wilson on December 2 was probably decisive.
In any case, Wilson changed his mind. In his message on December 4, he asked
Congress to declare war only on Austria and explained that "The same logic would
lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria [since] they also are
the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct
path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry
us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical
considerations lead us and not heed any others."  Sentiment in Congress, however
worried him, and on December 5 he wrote Dodge that he was "trying to hold the
Congress back from following its inclination to include all the allies of Germany in
a declaration of a state of war, I hope with all my heart that I can succeed)17
The following day Lansing submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee a lengthy memorandum on the "inadvisability" of declaring war on
Turkey and Bulgaria "at the present time" and "notes on arguments why" war
should not be declared "just at present," citing Peet and Haskell as authorities.
In regard to Bulgaria, Lansing pointed out, "The wisdom of a declaration of war"
 

was "even more doubtful" than taking such a step against Turkey. The Bulgarians
had "always been extremely friendly toward the United States. Robert College at
Constantinople is often referred to by Bulgarians as 'the Cradle of Bulgarian
Liberty.' The Bulgarian Minister to the United States was for more than thirty
years a professor at Robert College, and he has always been very friendly disposed
toward both the United States and the Entente powers. The Bulgarian interest in
.     this war is a purely local one, the Bulgarians are merely Fighting out their old feud
'    with the Serbians. The Bulgarians not only have no interest in the German plans
for world conquests but, on the contrary, they are already beginning to appreciate
the dangers of German domination. There are no Bulgarian troops on the Western
[front] and Bulgaria has no submarines; there is, therefore, no danger of any direct
conflict between the American and Bulgarian forces." In regard to the charges that
\   Panaretov served as a spy for Germany, Lansing stressed that he had "no
communication whatsoever with his own Government or with any of the Bulgarian
representatives in neutral countries. He has no pouch service, and cypher messages
are not permitted to be exchanged by him with anyone."
'       In the House of Representatives, the Republicans' position was presented by
;   Clarence B. Miller of Minnesota, who agreed, in deference to the President as the
country's leader in war, that the declaration of war should be confined to Austria
but "confidently predictjed] that before many weeks have passed he will come and
ask that we declare war on Bulgaria and Turkey." The war was being fought. Miller
said, to bring "death to the German power. This means death to the Bulgarian and
Turkish part of it. Bulgaria, we know, entered this war for a selfish purpose. She
has no friend among the allies; she deserves none. She knows that live or die her
fortunes are irretrievably linked with those of the German-Austrian powers. She
has made common cause with their piracy, and together they will hang or together
they will plunder the world. Then another thing, of great importance. Many of us
have recently been astounded to find how accurate has been the German
information of what we are doing and what we plan to do. Information requires a
source. I feel justified in stating to you that many of our friends among the allies
feel that the presence in Washington of the representatives of Turkey and Bulgaria
constitute an international menace. It may be true that we do exercize pretty close
censorship, but there are ways of people finding out and sending information.
The Democrats' response was given by the chairman of the House of Foreign
Affairs Committee, Henry D. Flood of Virginia, who pointed to the fact that there
was no Turkish representative in Washington because Turkey had broken off
relations in April. Bulgaria, he said, had "not even broken off diplomatic relations
with this country. They have the kindest feelings toward America. Americans are
well thought of there. I have clipped from the Washington Times an interview with
Dr. Stephen Panaretov, the Bulgarian minister here, in which he says: It is well
known that great pressure has been brought to bear upon Germany's allies to break
with the United States. Bulgaria alone has been able to resist this and follow her
own inclinatiQns. I do not expect to see Bulgars fighting outside of what is
considered Bulgar territory. Our men have never fought on the west front and
never will. Even Teuton prisoners captured by Italians declare that there are no
 

Bulgars engaged in the drive against Italy.' That is from the minister here. He
certainly is not unfriendly to this country." As to Panaretov's ability to spy. Flood
reiterated that he could send "no information abroad that does not go through our
State Department. Everything that the Bulgarian Legation here sends to its country
from anywhere in this country goes through the State Department, so there can
be no danger from that source."
In the Senate, Lodge also agreed (December 7) for the sake of unity, that there
was no practical necessity "at this moment" to declare war on Turkey and Bulgaria,
but argued that the Bulgarian legation must be closed since "the officers of that
legation if they are friendly to us and to the cause of the allies are traitors to their
own country and to their own allies, and if they are true to their own Government
and their own ally, Germany, then it is a legation representing Germany and her
allies." Granting Wilson's point that Bulgaria was a mere tool of Germany, Lodge
argued that "the only way to deal with an obnoxious tool is either to break the tool
or paralyze the arm that wields it. It is a dream, in my judgment, to think that we
can datach either Turkey or Bulgaria from the German alliance. It is as much of
a dream as that which seems to have had some currency that we could detach
Austria-Hungary. Nothing is gained by our maintaining a nominal peace with any
of them.""
On December 7, just as Congress was voting to declare war on Austria alone,
The New York Times interviewed Panaretov, headlining the interview "Bulgarian
Minister Says His Land Is Not Our Foe" and giving his views a full airing.  There
were two reasons. Panaretov pointed out, why the United States should not declare
war on Bulgaria: Bulgaria was fighting for President Wilson's principle of ethnic
justice and, secondly, there was no chance that American and Bulgarian forces
would ever meet on the battlefronts. The charge that he was supplying information
to the Central Powers made by Representative Miller and Theodore Roosevelt was
groundless because he had "had no communication whatever with my Government,
except through the American State Department, for the last two years; no honest
man," he jabbed at the former president, "would say without proof." As to
speculation that Bulgaria might be induced to withdraw from the war, this was
militarily not possible since "Germany would take an army from the Russian front
and invade us. Between Turkey on one side and Germany on the other, we would
be crushed." Moreover, Bulgaria had "never declared war against England or
France or Italy" and was fighting only in the Balkans for territories her neighbors
took in 1913. She had acted thus from the same motives as Italy and Rumania,
who entered the war to achieve their own territories' aims. Rather than calling the
Bulgarians plunderers, Panaretov said, "it would be fairer to recognize the fact that
Bulgaria, in her war against Serbia, on no front where American troops will be, is
herself Fighting for the very thing that President Wilson and the American people
stand for  the political and territorial rights of the small nations. We are no vassal
or tool of Germany. Regardless of the fact that Russia, under Alexander II, won
for Bulgaria her independence, we would never submit to Russian domination. It is
not reasonable to suppose that we would submit to Prussian domination. We are

not interested in the Mitteleuropa," Germany's scheme to integrate mid-Europe
for her political and economic ends.
The issue of war or peace with Bulgaria did not end on December 7. Since
Wilson himself indicated in his message that the "necessities" of the conflict might
require change in the policy he recommended and Lansing defended it as
appropriate "at the present time," the advocates of stern action continued the
pressure well into 1918. Some of it was in the form of attacks on Panaretov and
his "agency of German spies," as Roosevelt called the Bulgarian legation.   One
of the most vitriolic was an article in The Outlook by Demetra Vaka, the Greek-born
wife of Kenneth Brown and a well-known author and journalist like her husband.
She thought that Panaretov's interview in The New York Times was "diabolically
clever propaganda work of Germany [in] our newspapers" which unconsiously let
themselves be used. Germany's aim was to create "a Bolshevik movement" in the
U.S. and pit disaffected Americans against the war effort. As for Bulgaria's charges
against Serbia and Greece, "Serbia did not block the ways to negotiations with
Bulgaria, but consented to give up the territory demanded by rapacious Bulgaria"
and Greece offered her the Drama-Kavala-Seres area "on August 3, 1915, to gain
her neutrality."80 Among those who wrote to protest the attack on Panaretov was
Reverend Arthur S. Hoyt, of the Auburn (New York) Theological Academy,
declaring that "Dr. Panaretov is one of the best products of Robert College, a
special protégé of Dr. Cyrus Hamlin, a trusted friend and co-worker of Dr. Georg
Washburn, always treated by them like a very son. For forty years Dr. Panaretov
has been one of the noblest forces of Robert College for the higher life of the
peoples of the East. A hundred well-known men in America, graduates of Robert
College, former tutors and professors, will stand by him. He is as liberty-loving as
Theodore Roosevelt. I would as soon charge Dr. Lyman Abbots with being a
secret agent of the Kaiser as Dr. Panaretov."
In Congress there were several attempts to revive the issue and bring it to a
vote. The main one was the resolution of Senator William H. King of Utah on April
2, 1918, to declare war on Bulgaria and Turkey. It was brought to a debate on April
23 by Senator Frank B. Brandegee of Connecticut, who asserted without any
evidence that Bulgarian troops were Fighting on the western front, while "the
Bulgarian minister sits here in Washington, persona grata to the State Department."
Senator Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, President Taft's Secretary of State in
1909-1913, could not see why there should be a Bulgarian minister in Washington
with "access to the Department of State and to the ear of the President? Why should
he be received in the homes of American citizens to pick up the information that
may be dropped at dinner tables and on other social occasions which may be of
great value to his country's allies? Does anyone here imagine for one second that,
with Bulgaria standing in the relation she does to the Kaiser today, such information
is not going and going constantly?" The President, Knox demanded, should, "if not
incompatible with the public interest," inform the Senate if there was any reason
why the United States should not declare war on Turkey and Bulgaria.
There were in fact several reasons, and they eventually prevailed. One was the
 

Inquiry, the group of experts advising Wilson on the peace issues."" The offensive
was to be first directed to Bulgaria as the weakest link in the chain of the Central
Powers. What bound Bulgaria to them was "the ability of Germany to exploit the
wrong done Bulgaria in the Treaty of Bucharest." To detach her, the best leverage
was "the possibility of satisfying her just claims," such as southern Dobrudja lost
to Romania in 1913, the Enos-Midia line with Turkey, and Aegean coast from Enos
to the bay of Orfano west of the Struma estuary; the disposition of Macedonia,
however, was to be made only after further study. Another reason was the Bulgarian
government's evident desire to find a way out of the war through American
mediation. Since December, 1917, a wealthy exporter of rose oil to the United
States, Teodor K. Shipkov, was engaged in unofficial discussions with American
diplomats in Switzerland toward that end. In Washington, the missionaries,
especially Haskell and Markham, also played a role. In May, 1918, both of them
addressed the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with what was
widely praised as a most effective presentation of Bulgaria's case and the arguments
for preserving peace between the two countries.
A month later events in Sofia took a turn in the expected direction. The new
government formed by the leader of the Democratic party, Alexander Malinov,
who also became foreign minister, was oriented toward the Allies and was
determined to leave the war on the basis of the American peace program. As
Murphy reported his first audience with Malinov, "The prime minister, who was
most cordial in his greeting, is a warm friend and admirer of the United States, one
expression he used deserving to be remembered. It was to the effect  1 beg to
assure you that during my administration, Bulgaria's conduct will be such as will
never offend the United States'. All the members of the new cabinet are friends of
the United States. To be just to the former prime minister, it must be said that he
invariably treated me, as the American representative in Bulgaria, with the most
distinguished courtesy. He firmly resisted the German pressure which has been
steadily applied to force a break in the relations between Bulgaria and the United
States. How much of his attitude, however, was attributable to the wishes of His
Majesty, King Ferdinand (who has always been friendly to the United States), I
am not prepared to say, but I want to give Dr. Radoslavov all the credit that belongs
to him. It would be a thousand pities if any misunderstanding should arise now
between Bulgaria and the United States  after the coming into power of this new
democratic cabinet, every member of which is friendly to us. Mr. Malinov has
closely followed the program of the President and unhesitatingly expressed his
approval of it. [He] and his colleagues admire and respect the stand America has
taken in this world war and her defense of the small nations."
Less than three months later, as the war moved to its denouement. Murphy
found himself pulled by the Malinov government into the role of intermediary to
engage the good offices of America between Bulgaria and her enemies. It was a
role which he gladly played since he had become deeply convinced that Bulgaria's
cause was just. On September 21, he transmitted the favorable Bulgarian response
to the Austrian peace note of September 16, adding on his own that he felt "justified
in saying that Bulgaria is in accord with the principles announced by" Wilson and

that "Bulgaria accepts with good will that the President should be the arbiter of
the Balkans."  Four days later, as Bulgaria faced debacle on the Macedonian front,
he agreed without proper authorization from the State Department, on his own
responsibility and at risk to his health, to accompany by car the Bulgarian armistice
delegation (headed by Andrei Liapchev, Minister of Finance) to the Allied
headquarters in Salonika.   Before he left, he cabled Lansing, via the Bulgarian
and American legations in Switzerland, at Liapchev's request, that Bulgaria had
decided to ask for the cessation of hostilities with the Entente powers, that he was
going to the front "where delegates of the Bulgarian Government will ask for the
arrangement of an armistice," and that it "begs energetic steps from the United
States to the end of putting a stop to bloodshed."   On the way he fell ill, but his
aide, Archibald Walker,  delivered his handwritten letter to General Franchet
d'Esperey, the Allied commander, to transmit to Washington the Bulgarian
government's petition for American mediation in obtaining an armistice and
discussing a separate peace.
Murphy's intervention gained him not only resentment at the Allied
headquarters, but also disapproval in Washington, leading to a decision to remove
him from Sofia as too Bulgarophile.  The decision was coupled with another, long
in the making, to separate Bulgaria finally from the legation in Rumania and station
an independent representative. The choice was a career diplomat, Charles S.
Wilson, counselor at the embassy in Spain, who had served in the Balkans, including
Sofia, in 1901-1906.   Wilson arrived in Sofia as charge d'affaires on December 8,
with instructions from Lansing stressing the "great importance" of his assignment
and requiring him to "refrain carefully from committing this Government or
yourself in any way and particularly as being either sympathetic with or opposed
to Bulgaria's aspirations towards expansion of territory." Wilson was also to "furnish
the Department with much information which it now lacks regarding Bulgaria,"
data on the charges by the Greek and Serbian governments "regarding the atrocities
alleged to have been committed by the Bulgarians while in occupation of Macedonia
and Serbia, as well as full reports as to the good faith of the Bulgarian Government
and people."  In responding to Wilson's appointments, the new Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teodor Teodorov, cabled Lansing his hope that Wilson
would "strengthen the very remarkable work of Mr. Murphy, who has [served]
with so great distinction and whose activity, so greatly appreciated by us, will leave
an ineffaceable memory in the heart of all Bulgars." Wilson proved the most durable
American representative in Bulgaria; he was promoted to minister in 1921 and
served until October 1928, nearly ten years since he arrived in Sofia.
Murphy, for his part, was given what appeared to be an even more important
assignment, that of advising the American peace delegation in Paris, and left
Bulgaria in January, 1919, as he wrote later, "with great hopes for [her] future."
They were soon shattered, however, as his efforts to secure justice for "poor
Bulgaria" proved to no avail. Four years before he died, he still felt that this was
"the heaviest disappointment of my life from which I have not yet recovered."
The end of the war also changed Panaretov's role. Restoration of American
communication lines and the arrival of Charles Wilson in Sofia made it simpler for
 

the Bulgarian Government to reach Washington through him rather than through
Panaretov. A case in point were the arrangements for food shipments by the
American Relief Administration to avert starvation in 1919.  Panaretov had
practically no part in them, particularly since the head of ARA, Herbert Hoover,
operated from Paris.
The general preoccupation with the peace conference in Paris, where Wilson
and Lansing were from December (with a break) to the conclusion of the German
peace treaty on June 28, 1919, further put Panaretov on the sidelines. On June 3,
he was asked by Teodorov, who led the Bulgarian delegation, to hasten to Europe
in the apparent hope that his good standing with Wilson and Lansing would provide
an avenue to them, but the delegation, including Panaretov, arrived after they had
left Paris.   On his return to Washington in August, Panaretov approached Lansing
for an audience with the President to deliver a letter from Teodorov, but Wilson
97
"thought it unwise to see him at the present time."  As Panaretov noted in his
diary on August 28, 1919, Lansing told him that the United States was forced to
compromise on the Bulgarian issues in the negotiations with the "big four"
(England, France, Italy and Japan) because they were so set against Bulgaria that
otherwise "she would lose all." Since the United States had not fought against
Bulgaria, it had in fact no reason or justification to take part in concluding the
peace with her. It had, however, intervened in the peace negotiations in order to
prevent Bulgaria's enemies from taking, as they intended, everything from her
since, Lansing said, "they are utterly hostile to Bulgaria."
A succession of developments in the United States in 1919-1920 turned
Washington into a diplomatic backwater. By September, 1919, the Senate, control-
led by the Republicans led by Lodge, was set to repudiate Wilson's work in Paris.
Wilson took the issue to the people, delivering thirty-seven speeches in twenty-two
days, but only succeeded in ruining his health. The Treaty of Versailles, with the
covenant of the League of Nations "riveted in," was rejected by the Senate in
November, 1919, and again in March, 1920. The Republican victory in the elections
later in November sealed the debacle, and the new president, Warren G. Harding,
inaugurated the era of isolationism. From the Bulgarian perspective, Washington
became a diplomatic post of no consequence.
Abruptly, in November, 1920, Panaretov's career seemed to be over. While the
prime minister, Alexander Stamboliiski, was in Paris, his lieutenant and acting head
of the foreign ministry, Alexander Dimitrov, cabled Panaretov on November II
that "due to budgetary considerations" he was dismissed at 99 It was a bolt
from the blue. Suspecting other motives, Panaretov asked Stamboliiski, through
the minister in Paris, if the dismissal was properly authorized and if he could remain
in the post until his successor arrived. Stamboliiski replied that he was sorry about
the dismissal which was not his idea, but being abroad, he did not deem it proper
to interfere with his deputy's actions. From Sofia Dimitrov cabled stiffly that the
ministry had no funds to meet Panaretov's request. The legation secretary, Dr.
Pavel Lesinov, was appointed to take over as charge d'affaires, although from Paris
Stamboliiski continued to maintain that he knew nothing about Panaretov's

"resignation" and offered to appoint him delegate to the League of Nations, into
which he had just negotiated Bulgaria's admission.
As Stamboliiski returned to Sofia, Dirnitrov's real motive came out: he wanted
the Washington post for himself. Stamboliiski's minister of internal affairs and
principal lieutenant, he was especially hated by the enemies of the Agrarian
government and was targeted for assassination by the Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization.   Stamboliiski at first agreed to the scheme as a way
of saving  Dimitrov's life,  and approached the American charge  about the
appointment, stressing that he had a "high opinion" of Panaretov and intended to
show it by appointing him delegate to the League of Nations. Charles Wilson
expressed a strong view, in a "strictly confidential" report to the Secretary of State,
that Dimitrov was held by the diplomats in Sofia to be "the most objectionable as
well as the most incompetent member of the present Cabinet," that he knew "not
a word of any language but Bulgarian," and that although he was an admirer of
the  United States,  he "certainly will  not make  a favorable  impression  in
Washington." Stamboliiski, Wilson indicated, viewed the Washington post as
"extremely important" and wanted in it a man who "was in fact almost his second
self," especially since he and  King Boris intended to visit the  United States
shortly.'"
Despite Wilson's negative report, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes
recommended and President Harding agreed on April 9 to receive Dimitrov as the
Bulgarian minister. Stamboliiski, however, changed his mind. He wanted Dimitrov
at his side in Bulgaria, giving him the ministry of war, which led to his assassination
by IMRO elements in October, 1921. For the Washington post he chose again
Panaretov, who re-entered his functions, after proper diplomatic formalities, on
August 24,1921.
In his remaining years in Washington Panaretov served as an ad hoc Bulgarian

delegate to the League of Nations in the fall of 1921 and gave numerous puuin;
lectures, some of which appeared as a book. Near Eastern Affairs and Conditions
(New York, 1922). In December, 1924, Wilson reported from Sofia that Panaretov,
then 71, would retire and that his successor would be Nikola Milev, a professor of
history at the University of Sofia, who was of Macedonian origin and intensely
involved in Macedonian affairs. If Milev was sent to Washington, Wilson thought,
"it will be mainly with the object of carrying on pro-Macedonian and anti-Yugoslav
and anti-Greek propaganda, and also to encourage the rather considerable number
of Macedonian immigrants in the United States and Canada, to be more generous
in their financial support of the Macedonian cause, for it is largely from this source
that arms and bombs are purchased, and the revolutionary bands maintained."
The appointment was widely thought to be a way of saving Milev from assassination
by left-wing elements in IMRO but the assassins reached him before he left for
Washington. His successor was Simeon Radev, another Macedonian, who was a
career diplomat and less directly involved in the Macedonian issues. However, he,
too, was expected by Wilson "to organize and consolidate Macedonian sentiment
among the numerous Macedonians in 1,104
 

Upon his retirement on June 1, 1925, Panaretov and his wife chose to remain.
in Washington where he planned to devote himself to lecturing at George
Washington University and other activities. She passed away on March 31, 1931
and he followed her on October 19 of that year.'" In his will he left 2,523,450 lev
to Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, with which it established a library and readin
room named after him for use by professors and students of the University of Sofi
and seating thiry-two persons.
Appendix
Cleveland H. Dodge to President Wilson:
Riverdale, New York City, Dec. 2nd 191

My dear President
I hesitate to butt in on matters of State, especially when I am biased by personal
considerations, and in this case what I write may be unnecessary. Still I know you
will forgive me and understand my motives.
Those of us who are interested in the great educational, missionary and relief
work in the Turkish Empire are worried over the possibility that the anomalous
but friendly relations that now exist between this country and Turkey may be
changed by a declaration of war, which would be fatal to our interests. Having my
son Bayard, with his wife and two babies, at Beirut, and Elizabeth and her husband
in Constantinople, I have a personal anxiety which is trying. In case of war, with
due warning, those in Constantinople could probably get out in time, but our friends
in Syria would Find it almost impossible.
I have recently conferred with Dr. Barton of the American Board, Dr. Brown
of the Presbyterian Board, and representatives of the two American Colleges in
Constantinople & those in Smyrna & Beirut, also with Mr Elkus and Mr
Morgenthau, and the managers of the Armenian and Syrian Relief. It is the unanimous
 feeling of all, that war with Turkey would be a serious blow to these great
American enterprises & would jeopardize many American lives besides stopping
the work we are doing in saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of natives.
Nevertheless we all feel that our selfish interests should not stand in the way of
what you may think it best to do in carrying out your great purposes to end the
war.
Mr Elkus expects to be in Washington tomorrow, and hopes to be able to see
you, and has urged me to write to you to reinforce what he may say. I am therefore
writing from Riverdale in hopes that my letter may reach you before you see or
hear from him. He thinks it might be wise to warn Americans to leave Turkey
now, but I hope that that may not be done, except in case of an actual decision to
declare war. Everything is going on beautifully at present & an unnecessary warning

~                                                                                                                                                                                                                 ~
would have a bad effect. From all accounts the Turks are treating our people with
great & actually friendly consideration. They want peace badly & have no love foi
the Germans.
There may be good reasons for declaring a state of war with Austria, but except
for the fact that Turkey and Bulgaria are allies of Germany, I do not think that
the same reasons would necessarily apply to those countries.  Roosevelt is
lambasting poor Mr Panaretoff the Bulgarian minister, & calling him a spy, but I
know him so well that I have utmost confidence in him, and would vouch for his
integrity.
I have thoroughly approved of your wise policy towards Austria, Bulgaria &
Turkey, and whatever you decide to do now, I know will be right, but I earnestly
hope that you may not be forced to change your policy, especially in respect to
Bulgaria & Turkey.
I had expected to go to Washington next week, but have been lately having
trouble with my insides, which does not prevent my going to my office, bul
necessitates daily medical treatment, which will last for some time & I am therefore
obliged to postpone my trip, and fear that I cannot have the pleasure of seeing you
until later in the Winter, unless you come to New York.
I am watching Col. House's great mission with keenest interest. What a wonder
he is! My thoughts are constantly with you, and I devoutly trust that your health
may stand the new strain when Congress gets to work. I am simply lost in
admiration over all that you are doing.
Mrs Dodge joins with me in warm regards and best wishes, for Mrs Wilson anc
yourself.
Ever sincerely and affectionately yours,
Cleveland H. Dodge

Notes
See my paper Charles M. Dickinson and U.S.-Bulgarian Relations, delivered
at the Second International Congress on Bulgarian Studies (Sofia, May 25-29, 1986).
The papers of the Congress are to be published by the Bulgarian Academy of
Sciences.
ZRockhill, one of the largest perfume importers in the United States, had been
to Bulgaria in connection with the rose oil business. He was appointed honorary
consul-general of Bulgaria in New York in 1914; cf. his biography in National
Encyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 28, 1940, p. 316.
The family was from Sliven. Panaretov's uncle was Sava Dobroplodni, a well-
known bookman and teacher in the national revival period. Cf. Panaretov's
autobiographical notes in Kniga na daritelite na Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite,
Vol. I (Sofia, 1937), p. 271 and L. Kasurov, Entsikiopedicheski rechnik, Vol. II,
(Plovdiv, 1905), pp. 1763-64. (Kasurov was also a graduate of Robert College)
4Gorbanov later published a Rukovodstvo ia iluchavane na bulgarskiia ezik
(Sofia, 1879) and became a tutor in Bulgarian of Prince Alexander.
SSto godini Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, 1869- 1969, /. Akademisti i chlenove
korespondenti, ed. by P. Zarev (Sofia, 1969), p. 519. See also Panaretov's review
of Sintaksis na bulgarskiia ezik by T. Iliev in Periodichesko spisanie na Bulgarskoto
knizhomo druzhestvo. Vol. XVIII-XX, 1989, pp. 668-674.
6P. Petkov, "Stefan Panaretov. Dnevnik 1917-1920," livestiia na durzhavnite
arkhivl. Vol. 48, 1884, p. 249. In his editorial notes Petkov indicates that for many
years Panaretov and Stoilov carried on a regular correspondence conseming
political developments in Bulgaria and Constantinople. A leading conservative and
prime minister in 1894-99, Stoianov founded the People's Party (Narodna partiia)
which in foreign policy was oriented toward the Entente.
7 a list of early  graduates of Robert College  and positions they held in
Bulgaria after 1878, see 1. llchev, "Robert Kolezh i formiraneto na bulgarskata
inteligentsiia, 1863-1878, Istoricheski pregled, 1981, No I, pp. 50-62.
pAccording to Washburn, "the great majority of the graduates" were Bulgarians
and for that reason "Robert College was looked upon by the Greeks as a Bulgarian
College." His sympathies are evident in his memoirs Fifty Years in Constantinople
and Recollections of Robert College (Boston, 1909).
90n the translation of the Bible, see M. Pundeff, "Bulgaria's Cultural
Reorientation after 1878," Papers/or the V Congress of Southeast European Studies,
Belgrade, September 1984, ed. by K. K. Shangriladze and E. W. Townsend
(Columbus, Ohio, 1984) pp. 303-304. For these activities the Bulgarian Academy
of Sciences elected Long a honorary member.
'OPanaretov's ties with the Bulgarian Exarchate in Constantinople, obviously
stemming from his father's position, were first noted in Petko Slaveikov's
newspaper Makedonia, August 3, 1981; cf. Kiril, Patriarch of Bulgaria, Ekzarkh
Antim 1, 1816-1888 (Sofia, 1956), p. 464.
"Kniga na darilelite, p. 272.
12 E. Geshov, "Zapiski na edin osuden," Istorichesko spisanie na Bulgarskoto
knizhovno druzhestvo. Vol. XXXVI, 1891, pp. 942-48; reprinted in lv. Geshov,
Spomeni i studii (Sofia, 1928). Schuyier's secretary and interpreter on the tour was
to be Petur Dimitrov, who was then on the staff of Zornitsa, the weekly missionary
newspaper.
'3Cf. Panaretov's obituary in Letopis na Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite. Vol.
XV, 1931/32, pp. 65-66; Kniga na daritelite, p. 272.
'4Washburn, Fifty years, pp. 110-111.
150, Gladstone's motives see R. T. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian
Agitation (London, 1963).
16Department of Foreign Affairs, Vunshnata politika na Bulgaria: dokumenti i
materiali, Vol. 1 1879-1886, (Sofia, 1978), pp. 166-169; E. Statelova, Diplomatniata
na Kniazhestvo Bulgaria, 1879-1886, (Sofia, 1959), p. 145.
"Foreign Relations of the United States (Hereafter FRUS), 1902-1903, pp.
21-23.
 

The Bulgarian pavillion was humourously described by Aleko Konstantinov
in his travel notes Do Chikago i naiad (Sofia, 1894), which were a light-hearted
account of his trip and popularized in Bulgaria the image of America as a
technological giant and a land of opportunity. The person in charge of the Bulgarian
pavillion was Vulko 1. Shopov, a product of the American missionary schools and
later a mayor of Plovdiv.
gThe commissioner was Petur Mateev, an 1869 graduate of Robert College
and a diplomat; cf. his Veliki blagodeteli na bulgarskiia narod (Sofia, 1934), p. IX
and "Bulgaria at the Universal Exposition, Saint Louis 1904," Official Catalogue
(no place, no date).
Statisticheski godishnik na Bulgarskoto tsarstvo, which started in  1909,
provides some figures for 1904-1910. American immigration statistics mixed
Bulgarian with Serbs and other "Balkan Slavs" or nationals of the Ottoman empire
and are therefore impossible to unscramble; cf. N. Altankov, the Bulgarian-
Americans. (Palo Alto, California, 1979). The lower estimate comes from Albert
Sonnichsen, a noted American journalist and activist in the cooperative movement,
who spent some time in the Balkans getting the "inside" story of the Macedonian
revolutionary movement and later served as an expert of the U.S. Immigration
Commission; cf. his Confessions of a Macedonian Bandit (New York, 1909);
Bulgarian translation, 1983, and his biography in Dictionary of American Biography,
Vol. 9, pp. 396-397. There is a good review of the question in George J. Prpic,
South Slavic Immigration in America (Boston, 1978), pp. 212-223.
21See communications of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
American minister, John B. Jackson, May 8, 1912 and Jackson to the Secretary of
State, May 13, 1912; U.S. National Archives, Bulgaria, Instructions, C8. I (hereafter
Instruction) volume for July 1, 1911 to July 31, 1912.
M. Mateeva, Diplomaticheski otnosheniia na Bulgaria, 1879-1974, Vol. I (Sofia,
1976), p. 256.
The brochure is appended Instructions, volume for January 1, 1914 to
December 31,1914.
24A clipping of the article is attached to document 701.7411/2, U.S. National
Archives, Diplomatic Branch (hereafter USNA-DB). Among Dimitrov-Strogov's
publications is a memoir to President Wilson entitled Mirut i Severoamerikanskite
suedineni shtati (Sofia, 1917).
William W. Hall, Puritans in the Balkans: The American Board Mission in
Bulgaria. 1878-1918 (Sofia, 1938), p. 20 and pp. 212-213; Stephan Constant, Foxy
Ferdinand. 1861-1948. Tsar of Bulgaria. (London, 1979), pp. 211-212. Eleonorahad
won admiration as the "Florence Nightingale of Manchuria" during the Russo-
Japanese war and was decorated for her service on the Russian side by Nicholas
II.
See, for example, Atrocites en Macedoine. Faits et documents. Expose soumis
par ie recteur des universites d'Athenes aux recteurs des universites d'Europe et
d'Amerique (Athenes, 1913).
27 Mateev attributes the initiative to Washburn (Veliki blagodeteli, p.15), while
other sources (Ivan Dimitrov Strogov among them) indicate that it came from the
 

Bulgarian government. The Russian member of the Commision was Professor Pavel
Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) in the Duma, who had
taught, during years of exile, at the University of Sofia and had investigated the
tangled Macedonian question; cf. Almanakh na Sofiiskiia universitet Kliment
Ohridski: zhivotopisni i knigopisni svedeniia za prepodavatelite (Sofia, 1940), pp.
351-352 and Thomas Riha, A Russian European: Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 206-209. He was attacked by Serbs
and Greeks as pro-Bulgarian. The British member Henry N. Braiisford, Macedonia.
Its Races and Their Future (London, 1906), was also accused of such bias.
28Text in Vladimir A. Tsanoff, Reports and Letters of American Missionaries
Referring to the Distribution of Nationalities in the Former Provinces a/European
Turkey, 1858-1918 (Sofia, 1919). The three missionaries also pointed out that "the
language of preaching in all places of assembly except Prishtina and Mitrovitsa,
where Serbian is used, is Bulgarian." It was hoped that the European powers, being
signatories of the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, would review its revision by the
Bucharest conference,
"E. C. Heirnreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Harvard
University Press, 1938), p. 395.
30quoted in V, A. Zhebokritskii, Bolgaria vo vremia balkanskikh voin, 1912-1911
(lzdatel'stvo Kievskogo universiteta, 1961) p. 243.
31In a piece entitled "Balkan Ideas of Liberty," The Outlook, New York, noted
on November 29, 1913, that Serbia's and Greece's treatment of their new subjects
violated the freedoms of Bulgarian, American, and Albanian Protestants.
32Ferdinand's manifesto to the army after the peace treaty spoke of having to
"furl the flags for better times," presumably in the coming general war. According
to Sir Buchanan, British envoy to Bulgaria in 1904-1909 and Russia in 1910-1918,
Ferdinand vowed: "Ma vengeance sera terrible." Cf. his My Mission to Russia and
Other Diplomatic Memoires (Boston, 1923, 2 vols). Vol. I, p. 148.
33The minister to the three countries resided in Bucharest. From 1903 to 1907,
when Greece was in his territory, he resided in Athen. Vopicka held the post in
regard to Bulgaria until December 17, 1918; cf. Principal Officers of the Department
of State and United States Chief of Mission, 1778-1986 (Washington, 1986), pp.
27-28. On Vopicka, a beer brewer of Czech origin in Chicago and a fund raiser for
Woodrow Wilson in 1912, see Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. XI
(Supplement 1), pp. 694-695.
34Clopicka to the Secretary of State, December 29, 1913; Instructions, volume
for 1913.
35See numerous communications between Vopicka and the Department of State,
ibid., volume for 1914.
36Vopicka  to  Kermektchieff,  July  II,  1914,  U.S.  National  Archives.
Correspondence, American Consulate Sofia, 1914-1915, W. U. Friedrich, Bulgarien
und die Machte, 1913-1915 (Stuttgart, 1985), pp. 25 and 88; and The Outlook,
December 30,1914.
""Dnevnitsi na Narodnoto subranie, July 17 (30), 1914, pp. 2805-2808.

3 The New York Times, December 7, 1914. Panaretov was accompanied by a
secretary of legation, Georgi N. Puliev; the rest of his staff consisted of a clerk
and a messenger. A. Pantev, P. Petkov, SASHT i Bulgaria po vreme na Purvata
svetovna voina (Sofia, 1983), p. 52, errs about Panaretov leaving for Washington
"in the beginning of 1914."
"Dodge to Bryan, December 2, 1914; document 701.7411/10, USNA-DB.
Dodge's biography is in the National Encyclopaeda of American Biography, Vol.
XXVI, pp. 407-408.
40 Outlook, November 23, 1912; Roosevelt was the journals' special
contributing editor. For other favourable views, see A. Pantev, Istoricheskata
bulgaristika v Angina i SASHT, 1856-1919 (Sofia, 1986), pp. 205-212.
Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct
of the Balkan Wars (Washington, 1914), pp. 78, 206 and 268 in particular. Miliukov
wrote four of the report's seven chapters (I, III, IV and V), but no authors were
i    identified by name and the commission took collectively the responsibility for the
report. The only fold-out map of Macedonia (in color) attached to it was an
i   ethnographic map presenting the Bulgarian point of view and based on Vasil
Kunchov's Findings and an ethnographic map of 1900. In Bulgaria, University of
I    Sofia professors took the initiative to send an address of thanks to Andrew Carnegie,
i   and the academic council entertained a proposal to name after him one of the main
'    lecture halls, but the matter was postponed until the central university building was
:    erected; cf. M. Arnaoudov, Istoriia na Sofiiskiia universitet Sv. Kliment Ohridski
preipurvoto mupolustoletie, 1888-1938 (SoFia, 1939), p. 342.
;      42~he American Historical Review, Vol. 20, 1915, pp. 638-639.
i      W. Monroe, Razvoi na sotsialnoto suznanie u detsata. Translated by M.
Katranova (Kiustendil, 1904), No 2 of the series Uchitelska biblioteka. Monroe
taught at the University and elsewhere; for a brief biography see Who Was Who

44The Outlook, December 30, 1914.
,      45Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, February 271,  1815; Document
811.3277/1, USNA-DB.
"See Note I above.
Kermektchieff wrote Vopicka on March 10, 1915, that it was better to put a
foreigner in that post and that "the next thing now is to have an American minister
here"; U.S. National Archives, Correspondence. American Consulate (Sofia, 1914-
1915). On Murphy, see Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 7, pp. 347-348.
M. Dunnan, L'Ete bulgare. Notes d'un temoin. Juillet-Octobre 1915 (Paris,
1917).
James M. Potts, The Loss a/Bulgaria, Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe,
1914-1917. by Alexander Dallin and others (New York, 1963), pp. 227-229.
MS,, below, pp. 23-26 and p. 34.
Einstein to Lansing. October 27, 1915; this and other relevant State
Departments records are in Instructions, volumes for 1915 and 1916. Einstein's side
Is in his A Diplomat Look Back (Yale University Press, 1968), especially pp.
 

XXIV-XXV, 118, 147, 149 and 160-172, and in his manuscript Sofia Diary held by
the library of the University of Wyoming.
"Ludendorffs Own Story (New York, 1919), pp. 162 and 367.
Murphy to Lansing, June 17, 1916; Instructions, volume for 1916, with
translations of the articles.
Murphy to Lansing, July 13, 1916; ibid.
"Charles J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans (Chicago, 1921), pp. 118-132.
56FR S, 1917, Supplement I, pp. 116, 37-38 and 172; Supplement 2, Vol. I, p.
67.
"V. Radoslavoff, Bulgarien und die Weltkrise (Berlin, 1923), pp. 247-248; Victor
S. Mamatey, "The United Staes and Bulgaria in World War I," The American Slavic
and East European Review (April, 1953), pp. 233-257. For a text of the treaty see
B. D. Kesiakov, Prinos kum diplomaticheskata istoriia na Bulgaria, 1878-1925, Vol.
I (SoFia, 1925), p. 71.
ssV. Radoslavoff, Bulgarien und die Weltkrise, pp. 249-250, quoting Bulgarian
documents; further details in Pantev and Petkov, SASHT and Bulgaria, pp. 64-66,
"'Ibid., pp. 253-254.
60The Bulgarian honorary consul-general in New York, Clayton Rockhill,
resigned on December 1, 1916, "owing to [the] risk he runs of injuring his
commercial interests"; Panaretov to Radoslavov (through the State Department
and Murphy), December 9, 1916. Radoslavov replied (through the same channel)
that the appointment of a new consul was "reserved till after the war." Cf.
Documents 702. 74111/7-8 (2)-9, USNA-DB.
61Lansing to the Bulgarian government, June 8, 1917; document 124.74/15 c,
USNA-DB. See also, documents 124.74/16-17, ibid.
62Panaretov to the Bulgarian Minister in Berne, June 29, 1917; document
124.74/20, ibid., and Panaretov, Dnevnik..., pp. 255-258.
"Document,01.7411/25 and the attached memoranium by Philips, USNA-DB.
a4p~ Petkov, "Amerikanskite protestantski..., 1917-1918"; Istoricheski pregled,
No 2, 1981, pp. 75-87.
65V Radoslavoff, Bulgarien und die Weltkrise, p. 253; the above article, p. 83;
W. Hall, Puritans in the Balkans, pp. 237-260, where the biographies of Haskell
and Markham to 1918 are given. Markham later became a distinguished Balkan
correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor.
66p,,,,,tov, Dnevnik..., p. 258.
"W. Hall, Puritans in the Balkans, pp. 156-158; Laura B. Sherman, Fires on the
Mountain. The Macedonian Revolutionary Movement and the Kidnapping of Ellen
Stone (Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 68-85.
68Roosevelt in The Cansas City Star: War Time Editorials (Boston, 1912), pp.
54-55.
In The Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, quoted in
Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and Bulgaria..., p. 236.
70quoted in FRUS, 1917, Supplement 2, Vol. I, pp. 449-452.
The letter is reproduced in full in the Appendix.
-270-

iext of the message is in Congressional Record-House, December 4, 1917,
pp 22-23.
Ray S. Baker, ed., Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. 7 (New York,
1939), pp. 392-393. The letter is addressed "My Dear Cleve" and ends "In a tearing
haste, but with the warmest affection. Faithfully yours, Woodrow Wilson."
"*FRUS, 1917, Supplement 2, Vol. I, pp. 448-454. Since Haskell and Markham
reached the United States in early 1918, Haskell's memorandum to the State
Department was apparently sent through Switzerland.
Congressional Record-House, December 6, 1917, pp. 50-51.
76 pp. 52-53.
Congressional Record-Senate, December 7, 1917, p. 64.
"'The New York Times, December 9, 1917, Section VIII, p. II.
79Panaretov, Dnevnik..., p. 259, entry for December 20, 1917. Roosevelt
remained adamant on the issue to the end of the war. Dodge tried to sway him,
but he wrote Dodge on May 15, 1918, "with regret" that he had to disagree "so
radically and so fundamentally"; The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. by E.E.
Morison (Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 1316-1318.
'"The Outlook, January 16, 1918.
81 was a guiding spirit of The Outlook, venerable clergyman and
theological writer; see Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. I, pp. 24-25.
82rhe Outllok, February 13, 1918.
83Congressional Record-Senate, April 23,  1918, pp. 5472-5476; Victor S.
Mamatey, The United States and Bulgaria..., pp. 247-248.
iext of the memorandum, which was the basis for Wilson's "Fourteen Points"
of January 8, 1918, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. by Arthur S. Link and
others (Princeton University Press, 1984), Vol. 45, pp. 459-474. For a detailed
discussion, see A. Pantev, "Proekti na SASHT za opredeliane granitsite na Bulgaria
prez 1918-1919 g.," Istoricheskipregled, 1981, No I, pp. 33-49, and his "The USA
and the Bulgarian Problem, 1918-1919," pp. 33-49, Bulgarian Historical Review,
1981, No 1-2, pp. 46-65; Christo A. Christov, Bulgariia, Balkanite i mirut, 1919
(Sofia, 1984), pp. 103-109.
Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and Bulgaria..., pp. 238-247; W. Hall,
Puritans in the Balkans, pp. 260-262; Panaretov, Dnevnik..., pp. 265-266.
86_Murphy to Lansing, June 29, 1918; Instructions, volume for 1918.
1I'IMurphy to Lansing, FRUS, 1918. Supplement I, Vol. I, pp. 326-327.
Ts. Biliarski, A. Ognianova, "Korespondentsiiata na Dominique Murphy a
Grigor Vasilev,"  livestiia na  durzhavnite  arkhivi.  Vol.  49,  1985,  p.  167;
reminiscences of Grigor Vasilev in 1936. Vasilev, who accompanied Liapchev
unofficially as a friend, was on close terms with Murphy and prevailed upon him
to act as mediator.
89 p. 162; FRUS, 1918, Supplement I, Vol. I, p. 323.
90 p. 329.
On the British reaction to Murphy's intervention, see A. Girginov, Ot voina
kum mir (Sofia, 1937), p. 146, citing Liapchev; on Lansing's decision to recall
Murohv. see Panaretov. Dnevnik.... D. 269.
 

"On Wilson, see Who's Who in America, 1932-1933, p. 2476.
93 123W69/106a, USNA-DB', emphasis in the original.
94Letter of June 8, 1926, K.orespondentsiiata na Domenique Murphy s Grigor
Vasilev, p. 176.
95V Hadzhinikolov, N. Todorov, "Politikata na SASHT sled purvata svetovna
voina i amerikanskata prodovolstvena "pomosht" za Bulgaria prez 1919,"
Istoricheski pregled, 1953, No 4, pp. 345-373. The author's facts, derived from
Bulgarian archives, generally conform to the facts in the records of the U. S.
National Archives, in particular the collection called American Legation, Sofia,
Telegrams Sent and Received C8.2, Vol. I, December 8, 1918-December 31, 1919.
Their conclusion that the American assistance was "only a means for implementing
the American expansionist plans in the Balkans" is, however, far-fetched in the
light of the fact that within a year the United States turned to a policy of
isolationism.
96panaretov, Dnevnik..., pp. 279-281; Chr. Christov, Bulgaria, Balkanite i mirut
lists Panaretov as one of the six advisers of the delegation,
97Lansing to President Wilson, August 21, 1919, and notation, document
701.7411/99a, USNA-DB.
98
99 p. 298.
'Oolbid., 298-299; V. Topalov, "Priemaneto na Bulgaria v Obshtestvoto na
narodite," lzvestiia na Inslituta po istoriia. Vol. XXVI, 1983, pp. 80-120.
10iK. Todorov, Politichka istorija savremene Bugarske (Belgrade, 1938), pp.
316-330; John D. Bell, Peasants in Power (Princeton University Press, 1977), p.
200.
'02Wilson to Secretary of State, February 9, 1921, document 701.7411/111,
USNA - DB. The six-page report is mostly a characterization of Dimitrov; see also
other documents in the 701.7411 group.
'03Wilson to the Secretary of State, December 19, 1924, document 701.7411/146.
'04Wilson to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1925, document 701.7411/159.
105 New York Times, April 2, 1931; October 30, 1931.
106Letopis na Bulgarskata Akademiia na naukite. Vol. XV, 1934, pp. 12-13,
65-66 Vol. XVII, 1935, p. II; Vol. XVIII, 1936, p. 13; Vol. XIX, 1940, pp. 17-18.
In "The Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress," published
in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. by Arthur S. Link and others, Vol. 45
(Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 185-186.