Taiwan's quest for identity and international status continue to vex Beijing-Taipei and Beijing-US relations. Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui triggered the latest round of cross-strait tensions by calling for "special state-to-state" relations with China.
It is evident that the present Taiwan crisis comes at a time of unusual tension between America and China. A string of incidents over the past two years -- the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo war, Congressional charges of Chinese attempts to corruptly influence American elections and policies, the 1998 scandal over satellite and rocket technology transfer and the 1999 scandal over possible theft of nuclear secrets -- have substantially complicated an unavoidably complex relationship.
The common theme in these developments is the debate over the fundamental direction of America's policy towards China. The engagement policy of the Clinton Administration has followed the general direction charted by the executive branch since the Nixon Administration. Over time the rationale for engagement has shifted from a strategic partnership to contain the Soviet Union to one of encouraging Chinese support for American security policies in areas such as nonproliferation, while simultaneously encouraging the restructuring of Chinese domestic institutions towards the democratic and market-oriented New World Order norms. Chinese cooperation with the Clinton Administration's security agenda has been substantial though far from complete. And domestic Chinese structural reforms, though far from meeting prevailing global standards, have substantially confirmed the charges by the Gang of Four that Deng Xiaoping was a "capitalist roader" who would move China away from the command economy Soviet model.
These developments notwithstanding, the American critics of engagement have enjoyed growing success in advancing their case for abandoning engagement and returning to some version of the containment policy that prevailed before Nixon went to China in 1972. While the critics of engagement have consistently failed in their efforts to deny China the benefits of Normal Trade Relations [the new less-controversial name for Most Favored Nation status], the sources of discontent with engagement are deep, diverse, and span the political spectrum. Political liberals and their domestic constituencies are troubled by China's human rights record, and the impact of cheap Chinese imports on the American workforce. Political conservatives and their domestic constituencies are animated by traditional friendship with Taiwan and hostility towards the Communist mainland, concerns over Chinese repression of religious practice, the diverse opportunities to undermine the Clinton presidency through scandal-mongering, and the felt need to identify a main adversary to replace the Soviet Union. Counterveiling constituencies on the specific issues that animate the critics of engagement are notably scarce -- business community support for engagement has largely remained decoupled from other controversies which have thus far left the centerpiece of engagement -- Normal Trade Relations -- unscathed.
The sources of the shifting American mood towards China are both structural and incidental. From Nixon through Reagan the case for engagement was founded in the apparent and immediate national security objectives of ending the Vietnam War and containing the Soviet Union. Clinton's rather more attenuated case for engagement rests largely on the premise that over time the structural transformation of China will lead to integration into the New World Order, and elimination of the material basis for future military conflict. While the present benefits of Sino-American security cooperation and trade are not insubstantial, the shift of the core payoff of engagement from present to future tense has substantially enlarged the structural opportunities for the critics of engagement.
These critics have risen to these structural opportunities through a series of incidents in recent years, which if not inspired by Taiwan have certainly advanced the cause of one view of Taiwan's interests. It is difficult to gauge, or even detect, the direct hand of Taiwan itself in promoting the various China scandals that have enthralled Washington in recent years, but it is difficult to ignore the role of the traditional friends of Taiwan in advancing these perception management exercises. The succession of scandals -- campaign finance, rockets, and nuclear weapons -- has hastened a return to those thrilling days of yesteryear, with "Red China" and "CHICOM" rapidly returning as normal terms of discourse.
The evident change in political context is matched by an equally evident, though obscurely less apparent, change in the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. With the end of the Cold War both China and Taiwan embarked upon far-reaching upgrades to their naval and air forces. China returned to Mosow for assistance denied since the Sino-Soviet rift of the Khruschev era, while Taiwan turned to France and America. Although this fact seems largely un-noticed, Taiwan's military buildup has succeeded and is now largely complete, while China's rearmament effort has faltered and is many years away from completion. The present military balance across the Taiwan Strait is more favorable for Taiwan than at any point in recent history, and Taiwan's relative strength will inexorably decline over the coming decade as China's rearmament effort slowly catches up.
- Both China and Taiwan have rid themselves of elderly aircraft, and acquired more modern units. The total number of Chinese fighter aircraft has apparently decreased by one-third over the past five years, from about 4,000 to about 2,500. Force improvements have been limited almost exclusively to the addition of a few dozen first-rate Su-27s purchased from Russia, with the remaining inventory consisting of obsolete designs which dated from the 1960s. In contrast, Taiwan's fighter force has increased by one-third, with the bulk of the force consisting of nearly 300 modern first-class aircraft. With deliveries to be completed in early 2000, Taiwan's air force will enjoy its greatest advantage relative to China in recent memory, though this advantage will erode over the next decade as Chinese modernization plans are eventually fullfilled.
- Both China and Taiwan have rid themselves of elderly ships and acquired more modern major surface combatants. Ambitious Chinese plans to acquire at least a pair of Russian Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, as well as to construct a number of other modern ships, remain future ambitions rather than present achievements. Currently, only seven Chinese ships, of the Luhai, Luhu, and Jiangwei classes, approach world standards for modern major surface combatants. In contrast, Taiwan's navy has recently completed the acquisition of a total of 21 Perry, Knox and La Fayette class frigates equipped with modern shipboard combat systems.
According to the estimates of the Taiwan Ministry of Defense, the forces available to the PLA for the invasion of Taiwan include about 80,000 troops of the 31st Army Group deployed in Fujian region. The PLA could reshuffle in a short period some of the “Rapid Reaction Force” of other military regions, which along with strategic reserves would bring perhaps another 250,000 troops to the area, according to estimates of the Taiwan Ministry of Defense. Naval forces, including submarines and motorized fishing vessels, could establish a sea blockade. Naval units could lay mines over the peripheral waters of Taiwan proper and the offshore islands, while concentrating amphibious landing craft transporting one reinforced division to conduct a regular landing operation. Or motorized fishing vessels could carry up to 350,000 light infantry to undertake an irregular landing operation. At the 13 military-civilian airports within 250 NM from the Taiwan proper, the PRC's Air Force could station up to 1,200 combat aircraft and maneuver five dozen air transports to carry two airborne regiments for operational mission. The DF-15 (M-9) and DF-21 could directly attack key political, economical, and military targets.
The military balance is of course more complex than can be depicted by considering only a few indicators. There are certainly areas, such as anti-shipping cruise missiles, in which China fields a formidable force. Taiwan has not been entirely successful in bringing its new hardware up to combat full readiness, and such defficiencies surely compromise other evident advantages in command and control. But in terms of gross overall capabilities, over the next few years Taiwan will enjoy the greatest margin of military advantage relative to China in recent history, and the greatest margin that it will enjoy for the ponderable future. This observation does not go to the question of the overall military balance between the two countries, which is difficult to gauge in the absence of considering specific scenarios. But it does suggest that whatever that overall balance might currently be, it is almost certainly significantly more favorable to Taiwan than it has been in recent years, and surely more favorable than it will be in coming years.
The course of political events is not simply or even largely dictated by the military balance. The political standing of Taiwan in the international community is influenced by many factors, few of which can be influenced by resort to the force of arms. But questions of military efficacy are not entirely absent from Taiwan's security calculus, as witnessed by the efforts expended in force posture upgrades in recent years.
It is a commonplace that German decision-making leading up to both World Wars was influenced by fears that a window of opportunity was closing, that German arms had achieved a transient advantage over adversaries that would erode with time. There is some sense in which a similar military window of opportunity presently confronts Taiwan, and surely some sense in which this window will inexorably close over the coming decade. Of course, Taiwan in 1999 is not Germany in 1914, and different courses of action will inevitably suggest themselves [surely, Taiwan is not contemplating an attack on France].
Military history is replete with exemplars of the inability to translate tactical or operational success on the battlefield into desired political outcomes, and the path from Taiwan's passing military advantage to some improved political end-state is not immediately apparent. However, to the extent that the military balance does influence political decision making, Taiwan's present passing military advantage may create both the opportunity and the incentive for policies characterized by a greater propensity for risk-taking.
It is almost impossible to envision how Taiwan might directly compel China by force of arms to formally acknowledge Taiwan's self-defined status in the international community. It is rather less difficult to imagine how Taiwan, emboldened to some extent by transient military advantage and apprehesive in some measure lest the moment be frittered away through inaction, might embark on a course of action intended to enhance and consolidate its international status. And it is even less difficult to imagine such initiatives in the context not only of the present military situation, but also of the present political climate between America and China.
It would not be difficult to imagine the "clever briefer" in Taipei explaining that the present military and political moment offered unique opportunities for proactively and concretely exploring the possibilities for moving away from an increasingly burdensome and annoying "One China" policy. The influence of this hypothetical "clever briefer" on precipitating the present crisis remains entirely conjectural. But the political and military content of such a briefing will increasingly define the present crisis, to the extent that events move towards more direct confrontation and escalation.
President Lee intentionally made his comments in advance of a planned trip to Taiwan by China's top cross-strait negotiator, Wang Daohan -- who was scheduled to visit the island in October 1999. This visit will at least be postponed. President Lee wants to increase Taiwan's visibility around the world and to gain understanding for Taipei's view of the island's status. Continuing political evolution and economic necessity have increased the pressure on Taipei to participate more visibly in international organizations.
Taiwan is currently China's fifth-biggest trading partner. Taiwanese investment in Southern China has financed an unprecedented boom, providing thousands of jobs, job training, and exposure to new technology. The present crisis comes at a difficult time for China's stalling economy, with the risk of political instability in China should its economy continue to drift and if unemployment increase. But China has gone to war before, despite catastrophic consequences for the economy. And Chinese conservatives might try to hold the country together by whipping up nationalist fervor over Taiwan.
China has a longstanding position that Taiwan is an internal matter, that they want to see it resolved peacefully, but they don't rule out the use of force. China will not compromise on the issue of eventual reunification. China's leaders are disinclined to compromise on what they regard as core foreign and national security issues. The legitimacy of the leadership depends on their ability to link China's domestic and foreign policies of building a rich country that can redress the perceived abuses of the past and form a basis for China as a global power. The cultivation of nationalism makes it difficult for Beijing to compromise on important foreign policy issues. The leadership cannot afford to appear to compromise on core issues that involve sovereignty or national prerogative, such as relations with Taiwan. China is concerned that Taiwan's growing autonomy would evolve into an unsurmountable obstacle to reunification. In the longer run, this would establish an unsettling precedent for greater autonomy, if not outright independence, for other regions of mainland China, such as Tibet. Mindful of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership cannot regard such scenarios as entirely theoretical.
The Chinese people widely supported Beijing's March 1996 exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, despite the generally negative impact on Beijing's relations in the region and with the United States. The leadership gained political credit for resolute action in defense of China's sovereignty and national integrity.
Both China and Taiwan wish to avoid military conflict. Beijing's March 1996 exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait aimed to limit Taiwan's behavior, not to attack Taiwan or any of the islands under its control. Understanding the likely course of events in the present crisis requires some understanding of the basic intentions of the relevant actors. On the eve of a crisis of uncertain proportions, these are almost unknowable, just as such intentions remain the fodder for historical controvery long after the fact [Chou En-lai famously observed of the significance of the French Revolution: "It is too soon to tell"].
The events of July and August 1999 provide some insight into the initial predispositions of the relevant actors that may illuminate future developments:
- Taiwan couched its new definition of its international status in terms that go beyond "One China" but that fell short of the "One Taiwan" declaration of independence that would transgress the mainland's causus belli declaratory policy. Taiwan evidently wishes to explore the extent to which it might asymptotically approach independence, without running the risks that would attend moving directly and explictly to that end state. That this exploration has only just begun is suggested by the fact that responsible Taiwan officials continue to articulate the "special state to state relations" policy, and have not retreated from this posture, some early reports of backpeddling not withstanding.
- China, after persistent verbal provocation from Taiwan, offered only verbal responses, while hinting that more concrete responses might be subsequently forthcoming. This pattern of behavior suggests little more than the evident truths that China rejects the "special state to state relations" approach, and that it wishes to return to the status quo at the least possible cost. However, since the present provocation from Taiwan would appear to be more substantial than the provocations that occaisioned the 1995-96 crisis, it would also appear that China is impelled towards a more substantial response than was forthcoming in the previous crisis.
- In the United States, the executive branch reiterated the "One China, peaceful resolution" policy of the past quarter century, while the Congressional mood tends toward a more muscular tilt towards outright independence for Taiwan. Neither the executive branch nor the Congress was prepared to specify precisely what events would trigger direct American military involvement in the Taiwan Straits, and ambiguity on this point has been the centerpiece of America's "One China" policy since 1972. It is clear, however, that the Congressional mood is more disposed toward American military intervention at some early stage in a crisis, leading to a redefinition of Taiwan's political status, while the Executive appears disposed to direct intervention only under the extreme circumstances that arise from a direct Chinese effort to extinguish the present regime on Taiwan, and that this intervention would be intended to restore rather than transform the status quo ante bellum.
China has historically used military confrontations as a means of redefining the extent of some great power's commitment to a regional actor. The two Taiwan crises of the 1950s were in no small measure intended to test the willingness of the Soviet Union to come to the aid of China in a confrontation with the United States. And the punitive expedition against Vietnam in 1979 was intended to demonstrate the limits of Soviet support for that country. In all these instances, the Soviet Union was weighed in the balance and found wanting.
American crisis response behaviour is equally stylized, though with American characteristics. Since the end of the Second World War, two of America's four major wars have resulted from ambiguities in pre-war commitments -- in both the Korean War in 1950 and the Gulf War in 1990 the United States "discovered" vital security interests once the war was in progress that had been denied prior to the fact.
The challenge for both Taiwan and China is to explore American commitment and risk aversion in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan will seek more explict support for moving beyond the constraints of "One China" -- and China will seek to demonstrate that Taiwan cannot hope for such support. Chinese initiatives beyond diplomacy will seek to demonstrate the limits to Taiwan's freedom of action and that these limits are determined by China not Taiwan, while avoiding provocations that would lead to direct American involvement. China's exploration of American ambiguity will seek to demonstrate that the threshold for American intervention is really rather high, and that little short of existential threats to Taiwan would provoke direct American response. Taiwan's exploration of American ambiguity will seek to demonstrate that the American threshold for response is rather lower than might have been imagined, and that it extends to not merely confirming the status quo but to defending Taiwan's status as defined by Taiwan.
The fact is that the United States is not a unitary actor, but rather a complex system with emergent properties. Although participants in the policy process surely have individual views of the matter, the United States Government as a corporate entity almost certainly cannot know its threshold for intervention any precision prior to the actual fact, as was demonstrated in Korea and the Gulf War. The danger is that the American threshold for intervention is probably higher than might be hoped in Taiwan, but rather lower than might be expected in China, and that a process of escalation once begun may have conequences unintended by and harmful to all the parties to the process.
A walk down the esclation ladder may illustrate the range of possible actions that may be expected over the course of this crisis. Those rungs on the escalation ladder of greatest interest are those that may not provoke direct American response, but that would demonstrate the dispositive influence of Beijing over the status of the territory presently controlled by the Taipei regime, and Beijing's ultimate control over the relationship between that territory and the rest of the world.
- Nuclear Attack on Taiwan -- China would almost certainly not contemplate a nuclear strike against Taiwan, nor would Beijing embark on a course of action that posed significant risks of the use of nuclear weapons. The mainland's long term goal is to liberate Taiwan, not to obliterate it, and any use of nuclear weapons by China would run a substantial risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. An inability to control escalation beyond "demonstrative" detonations would cause utterly disproportionate destruction.
- Full-Scale Invasion -- A main force attack to "Liberate Taiwan" would be an extremely high risk undertaking with uncertain prospects for success. Invasion is unlikely, since the PLA cannot yet transport a credible invasion force to Taiwan. Amphibious forces are capable of transporting no more than a single division [15,000 troops], and military air transports could add no more than a few thousand additional soldiers. Taipei would have significant warning time if Beijing were to prepare for an invasion, and could mobilize significant reserves that would outnumber the invading force by a wide margin. Taiwan retains significant qualitative advantages against the numerically superior PLA in fighter aircraft, surface warships, air defenses, and many ground force capabilities. Although it is unlikely that China would initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction in the context of a conventional invasion of Taiwan, it is quite possible that Taiwan would initiate the use of chemical weapons in respose to such an invasion in the event that a purely conventional military response appeared inadequate. In any event, if Beijing's amphibious assault did not spontaneously collapse, such an invasion would almost certainly provoke an American intervention sufficient to terminate hostilities on terms unfavorable to Beijing.
- Air Operations -- Air operations could be conducted in concert with a naval blockade, amphibious operations, missile strikes against Taiwan-held islands, or missile strikes against Taiwan. Taipei's qualitative advantages would help offset the PLA's numerical superiority. But air operations could cause great damage that might eventually enable China to achieve air superiority, and could force Taipei into a political settlement on China's terms unless Taiwan were to receive external assistance. The United States would almost certainly be prepared to provide aircraft and ordnance to replace combat losses, though it is rather difficult to imagine modern counterparts to the "Flying Tigers." It is unclear how or whether American carrier-based aviation would be used to enforce a no-fly zone in the Taiwan Strait. Such enforcement would probably come towards the end of a military crisis to either administer a cease fire or revser the declining fortunes of Taiwan. American carrier aviation combat operations at the outset of a Chinese air campaign against Taiwan would appear unlikely under current US declaratory policy, although there could be substantial Congressional pressure for such a committment.
- Naval Blockade -- The PLA Navy would face serious difficulties in coordinating an effective naval blockade enforced through the combined efforts of air, surface, and submarine forces. But the reaction by Taiwan and the international community to the PLA's March 1996 exercises and missile tests suggests that less comprehensive measures could substantially disrupt Taiwan's economic life, potentially creating pressure over time for a political settlement. Depending on the modalities of such an embargo, the United States might have difficulty in identifying politically appropriate or militarily effective means of countering Beijing's interdiction of international commerce with Taiwan. Mine-sweeping operations might not be sufficiently effective to restore the confidence of commercial shippers, and the US Navy might be loath to proactively sink Chinese submarines that were not immediately attacking friendly shipping. Consequently, a partially effective Chinese blockade of Taiwan would appear to be an attactive option for concretely demonstrating China's ultimate authority over Taiwan without prokoking an American military challenge to this assertion.
- Peripheral Assaults -- Taiwan occupies one island in the disputed Spratly chain, and the handful of small islands occupied by Taiwan near the mainland coast are far less heavily fortified than Quemoy and Matsu. Chinese seizure of these otherwise insiginificant specks of real estate could be accomplished with relative ease, and as with a partial naval blockade would concrete demonstrate Beijing's dispositive influence over territory claimed by Taipei. The United States is extremely unlikely to assist Taiwan in the recovery of the legally disputed Spratly, and would be only somewhat less unlikely to directly participate in the recovery by Taiwan of minor specks of territory in the Taiwan Strait.
- Unconventional Warfare -- Chinese attacks on critical infrastructure could unsettle Taiwan's economy without provoking American military involvement, and perhaps without even being directly attributable to the Chinese government. Although apparently coincidental, the island-wide blackout of late July 1999 is illustrative of such possibilities, and subsequently reported attacks on government computer systems may forshadow more ambitious attacks. It is rather difficult to envision effective modalities for American enhancements to Taiwans physical or technical security to counter such infrastructure attacks beyond modest technical assistance efforts. Although the potentially unattributable character of infrastructure attacks would deny Beijing the pleasure of explicit mastery over Taiwan, the absence of attribution would not diminish the impact on Taiwan's economy nor would it diminish from the depiction of Taipei as lacking effective control over its nominal territory.
- Military Exercises -- At a minimum, the PLA may repeat the military posturing of March 1996, and indeed it is difficult to imagine how a response of at least this intensity can be avoided. It is predictable, however, that the United States will respond by the deployment of military forces to some carefully calibrated locale, and that these manuevers alone will do little to resolve the present political crisis. To the extent that Taiwan's present political challenge is viewed as being more substantial than that of 1995-96, a simple repetition of the firepower displays of that crisis could demonstrate a lack of credibility and resolve on the part of Beijing, and could be readily characterized as inadequate.
- Diplomatic Initiatives -- Although a climb at least mid-way up the escalation ladder has some surface appeal and plausibility, there is surely a case to be made that the costs to Beijing will outweigh the benefits, and that in any event such a provocative course of action would merely play into Taiwan's gameplan for reducing the ambiguity of American commitments in its favor. Taiwan's declaratory shift has not been followed by overt acts, such as President Lee's 1996 visit to the United States, and indeed its declaratory initiative has been rebuffed by the US Government and by others. The counsel of patience would suggest that time is on Beijing's side, and that at some point the post-Lee leadership in Taipei will recognize the futility of his "state to state" formulation and return to some more constructive approach.
The absence of overt action on the part of either China or Taiwan over the past month does not indicate a resolution of the present crisis. The crisis in 1995-96 unfolded from July of 1995 through March of 1996, and a similar timeframe may be expected for the present crisis. The logical stopping point for the resolution of the present crisis would be the March 2000 elections in Taiwan, following which some mutually acceptable formulation could be reached by Taipei and Beijing. Both capitals, however, face strong incentives over the next six months to modulate events and American attitudes in their favor, and both capitals could probably withstand a considerable escalation of the confrontation before natural risk aversion came to dominate decision-making.
China's military posturing during 1995 and 1996 indicates that any use of force by China, whether demonstrative or in combat, will provoke domestic and regional demands for a n appropriate American response. The United States "One-China" policy is based on dialogue between the two sides and a peaceful resolution of any differences between China and Taiwan. The long-standing position of the United States is that any effort to resolve the issue of Taiwan by other than peaceful means would be considered "of grave concern" to the United States. The American deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait area in March 1996 set a precedent that is impossible to ignore. The United States faces extremely difficult choices in becoming more directly involved in a Taiwan-China conflict, and must carefully select the appropriate mix of military and political means. Although a direct force-on-force confrontation is unlikely, a reinforced American military presence directly adjacent to an escalating conflict in the Taiwan Strait would provide uncomfortable opportunities for accident or miscalculation to widen the confrontation.