Taiwan Strait
21 July 1995 to 23 March 1996
The "one-China policy" had its origins in 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek
moved the seat of his defeated Government to Taiwan. Chiang in Taipei, and Mao
Zedong in Beijing, both maintained that there was only one legitimate government
of China, with authority over both the mainland and Taiwan. When America
switched recognition to the it continued to honor the formula, and thus has no
formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The one-China concept has been the
cornerstone of normalized relations between Beijing and Washington.
The long-standing United States position is that the issue of reunification
be handled by the Chinese people on both sides of the straits, but that policy
was founded on the understanding that the question of Taiwan would be resolved
peacefully. The leadership in Beijing never renounnced to possible use force
against Taiwan, and China has threatened to use force against Taiwan under
various scenarios, including Taiwan's construction of nuclear weapons; a revolt
on the island; or a declaration of independence, even if that declaration is the
outcome of a democratic process such as a plebiscite or democratic elections.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, any threat to the peace and security of
Taiwan is of grave concern to the United States. The act explicitly states that
the United States is obliged to make available to Taiwan such defense articles
and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient defense capability.
Although American naval forces had not been involved in the Taiwan dispute
since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, an encounter in 1974 set the
stage for subsequent events in the Taiwan Strait. Beginning on 27 October 1994
the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk was involved in a three-day running
encounter with a Chinese Han-class nuclear attack submarine in the Yellow
Sea, 100 nautical miles west of Kyushu, Japan. American anti-submarine aircraft
spotted the Chinese sub some 450 nautical miles northwest of the Kitty Hawk,
and thee Chinese dispatched jet fighters which intercepted the US planes. The
encounter continued until the sub came within 21 miles of the Kitty Hawk,
and ended when the Chinese submarine broke off contact and returned to base.
The following year Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui concluded a private trip to
a Cornell University reunion. President Lee's visit to his alma mater on 9-10
June 1995 marked a bold, symbolic step out of Taiwan's decade and a half of
official international isolation. And his repeated use of the terminology
"Republic of China on Taiwan" was taken by Beijing as a challenge to
the "One China" formulation. In response, the PRC conducted tests of
six missiles from July 21 to 26 in an area only 60 kilometers north of Taiwan's
Pengchiayu Island. The tests came amid a flurry of mainland Chinese invective
denouncing the private visit of President Lee Tang-hui to Cornell University.
The missiles were all MTCR class four short range and two intermediate range.
All were modern, mobile, nuclear-capable. At the same time, the PLA mobilized
forces in coastal Fujian Province and moved a number of Jian-8 aircraft to the
coast. The result was predictable--the stock market and the local currency in
Taiwan fell precipitously.
The People's Republic of China announced a new series of guided missile tests
in the East China Sea between August 15 and 25, 1995. While similar tests are a
usual part of the annual training exercises of the Chinese 2d Artillery Corps,
these were the only times in many years that the tests have been announced
publicly. In conjunction with the tests, Taiwan intelligence reported that the
PRC was planning on conducting a joint sea-air military exercise codenamed `Jiu-wu-qi'
and that on July 16 the PRC Air Force stationed a number of F-7 or F-8 aircraft
at airports located within 250 nautical miles of Taiwan --a highly unusual and
provocative move.
As of early 1996 Beijing had redeployed forces from other parts of the
country to the coastal areas facing Taiwan and set up new command structures for
various kinds of military action against Taiwan. Allegedly, the People's
Liberation Army prepared plans for a missile attack against Taiwan consisting of
one conventional missile strike a day for 30 days. These strikes were to take
place just after the March 1996 Presidential elections.
In early March 1996 China began a week-long series of ballistic missile tests
and announced it will conduct an additional set of live fire military maneuvers
as well. Together they constituted the fourth set of major military exercises
the People's Liberation Army had undertaken in the straits since July 1995. On
March 5, 1996, the Xinhua News Agency announced that the People's Republic of
China would conduct missile tests from March 8 through March 15, 1996, within 25
to 35 miles of the 2 principal northern and southern ports of Taiwan , Kaohsiung
and Keelung. On March 9, China announced plans to conduct live-ammunition war
exercises in the Strait of Taiwan until March 20.
The missile tests off the shores of Taiwan were the third test series since
Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hut visited the United States in June 1995. When
China conducted similar missile tests in July and August of 1995, the target
areas were 85 and 80 miles north of Taiwan, respectively. By contrast, the
target zone for the surface-to-surface missiles fired in March 1996 were only
half as far from Taiwan, and far too close to major airline and shipping routes.
Of the three missiles launched, two landed near the port of Keelung which is
only 23 miles from Taiwan's northern coast and approximately 30 miles from
Taipei, Taiwan's capital. The third missile landed in a target zone near the
port of Kaohsiun, which is only 35 miles from Taiwan's southern coast. Over 70
percent of commercial shipping enters Taiwan through these two port cities. The
proximity of these tests to the ports and the accompanying warnings for ships
and aircraft to avoid the test areas resulted in the effective disruption of the
ports, and of international shipping and air traffic, for the duration of the
tests. The escalation in both scope and nature of the March exercises raised the
risk that conflict could start through miscalculation or accident. The People's
Republic of China ended the missile tests as scheduled on March 15 and one of
its naval exercises on March 20, and the People's Republic of China indicated
that it did not plan to attack Taiwan.
These tests, and the military exercises that preceded them last year, were
clearly meant to intimidate the people of Taiwan in the run-up to the
presidential election. On March 23, 1996, the people of the Republic of China on
Taiwan elected Lee Teng-hui as their first directly elected President. President
Lee had served as the President of the Republic of China on Taiwan since 1988.
Taiwan's electorate demonstrated to Beijing that its bellicose campaign of
threats and intimidation was ill-conceived and ineffectual. Rather than
diminishing support for President Lee, as Beijing and the PLA had hoped, the
People's Republic of China's round of missile tests and live-fire military
exercises seemed only to have served to solidify his support; President Lee won
with some 54 percent of the vote.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act proclaimed American support for the peaceful
reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, and commited the United States to help
Taiwan defend itself in case of Chinese aggression. On 19 December 1995 the US
sent the USS Nimitz from the Eastern Pacific to the Taiwan Straits, the
politically treacherous waterway between Taiwan and China. This marked the first
time American ships had patrolled the straits since 1976.
The US Seventh Fleet monitored Chinese military live-fire exercises off the
coast of Taiwan in March and April 1996. The forward-deployed Independence (CV
62) carrier battle group (CVBG), with embarked Carrier Air Wing Five, responded
to rising tensions between China and Taiwan by taking station off the eastern
coast of Taiwan. USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), operated south of Taiwan using its
SPY-1 Aegis radar and other means to observe the missile tests. Other ships
operating with the Independence included USS Hewitt (DD 966), USS O'Brien (DD
975), and USS McClusky (FFG 41). These forces provided a visible sign of US
commitment to stability in the region.
The Nimitz (CVN 68) CVBG transited at high speed to arrive in the South China
Sea within days, intensifying the signal of US resolve. As of 11 March 1996
Nimitz was participating in Operation Southern Watch in the Arabian Gulf, but a
week later the carrier was in the Indian Ocean, en route to South China Sea.
Accompanying Nimitz were USS Port Royal (CG 73), USS Callaghan (DD 994), USS
Oldendorf (DD 972), USS Ford (FFG 54), USS Willamette (AO 180), USS Shasta (AE
33) and USS Portsmouth (SSN 707). Aircraft from Carrier Air Wing Nine were
embarked with Nimitz. The Nimitz and six additional ships arrived near Taiwan
before the 23 March presidential election.
Chinese Premier Li Peng warned Washington not to make a show of force by
sending the Navy through the Taiwan Strait. Secretary of Defense William Perry
responded with a boast that while the Chinese "are a great military power,
the premier--the strongest--military power in the Western Pacific is the United
States" -- but the US Navy kept away from the strait.
Subsequently, tensions in the Taiwan Strait diminished and relations between
U.S. and China improved, with increased high-level exchanges and progress on
numerous bilateral issues, including human rights, nonproliferation and trade.
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in the fall of 1997, the
first state visit to the U.S. by a Chinese president since 1985. In connection
with that visit, the two sides reached agreement on implementation of their 1985
agreement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, as well as a number of other
issues. President Clinton visited China in June 1998.
As a measure to build up mutual trust, an Agreement between the Ministry of
National Defense of the People's Republic of China and the Department of Defense
of the United States of America on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to
Strengthen Military Maritime Safety was signed by General Chi Haotian, Minister
of National Defense of the People's Republic of China and Mr. William S. Cohen,
Secretary of Defense of the United States during the latter's visit to China on
19 January 1998. This was intended to improve the ability to deal with incidents
at sea and increase mutual understanding of naval and navigational practices for
both ships and aircraft, and to reduce the chances of miscalculation. Under the
agreement, DoD and the Chinese defense ministry will meet annually to discuss
mutual concerns that relate to activities at sea by their naval and air forces.
Chronology
- Jan. 21, 1993 -- The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes public
the White Paper on ROC Foreign Policy. It stipulates that the ROC's foreign
policy is one-China, two entities, and equality at the interim. The policy
paper says that the government will pursue an international space, with a
long-term goal of returning to the United Nations and the eventual goal of
China's unification.
- April 8, 1993 -- The first preparatory meeting for the Koo-Wang
Talks is held in Beijing, and the two sides agree on the establishment of
institutionalized communication channels. Some progress was made on
cross-strait exchanges and dialogue.
- April 8, 1995 -- President Lee Teng-hui issues a statement at the
National Unification Council, "Foster Normal Cross-strait Relations,
Create a Favorable Climate for Unification." He introduces a six-point
proposal for normalizing cross-strait relations.
- May 27-28, 1995 -- The first preparatory meeting for the Second Koo-Wang
Talks is concluded with an agreement that the second preparatory meeting
will be held in June, and the Second Koo-Wang Talks is slated for July in
Beijing.
- June 7, 1995 -- President Lee departs for the United States for a
private visit and returns to Taiwan on June 12. In between, Beijing
publishes five articles to criticize Lee during his U.S. trip.
- June 16, 1995 -- Mainland China’s Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) sends a letter to Taiwan's Straits
Exchange Foundation [SEF] to postpone the second Koo-Wang Talks, saying it
will contact us at an appropriate time.
- June 17, 1995 -- Taiwan's Mailand Affairs Countil [MAC] makes
public a statement, expressing its hope that institutionalized negotiation
channels will remain open, and that the second preparatory meeting of the
Second Koo-Wang Talks will take place as scheduled.
- June 22, 1995 -- PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen
introduces a seven-point principle to handle the post-1997 relations with
Hong Kong and Taiwan.
- June 30, 1995 -- ARATS telephones SEF saying that the
institutionalized negotiation channels be postponed. Beijing’s reason was
that President Lee Teng-hui had accepted the invitation of his alma mater,
Cornell University, to deliver a speech on “Taiwan’s Democratization
Experience.”
- July 7, 1995 -- MAC issues a news release, stating that the ROC
government always promotes a pragmatic foreign policy and mainland policy
without conflicting with each other. The government will promote one policy
not at the sacrifice of the other.
- July 7, 1995 -- Xinhua News Agency announces that the PRC military
will launch missile tests and fire ground-to-ground missiles from July 21 to
28 on the high seas of the East China Sea. MAC immediately issues a news
release to point out that the missile test will endanger the peace and
safety of the Asia-Pacific area, hurt the feelings of the Taiwan people, and
run against the common interests of the two sides.
- July 21~26, 1995 -- The PRC proceeds with the first missile
shooting near Taiwan waters, launching a direct military threat against the
ROC.
- July 23, 1995 -- People's Daily, quoting Xinhua News Agency,
publishes the first commentary to accuse Taiwan leaders.
- July 24, 1995 -- People's Daily, quoting Xinhua News Agency,
publishes the second commentary to accuse Taiwan leaders.
- July 25, 1995 -- People's Daily, quoting Xinhua News Agency,
publishes third commentary to accuse Taiwan leaders.
- July 26, 1995 -- People's Daily, quoting Xinhua News Agency,
publishes the fourth commentary to accuse Taiwan leaders.
- July 31, 1995 -- On the 68th anniversary of the establishment of
the PLA, PRC Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian states that the PLA
will never renounce the use of force regarding the issue of reunification.
He says that if Taiwan authorities act without discretion to create a split,
the PLA will never sit by and watch.
- Aug. 2, 1995 -- Quoting Xinhua News Agency, the People's Daily
publish a criticism of ROC President Lee Teng-hui.
- Aug. 4, 1995 -- Quoting Xinhua News Agency, the People's Daily
publish a criticism of ROC President Lee Teng-hui.
- Aug. 6, 1995 -- Quoting Xinhua News Agency, the People's Daily
publish a criticism of ROC President Lee Teng-hui.
- Aug. 10, 1995 -- Xinhua News Agency announces that the PRC military
will carry out a live ammunition exercise with guided missiles and cannons
in the area of the East China Sea from August 15 to 25. MAC says this is an
"unfriendly and irresponsible" move.
- Aug. 11, 1995 -- When interviewed by the China Times, MAC Chairman
Vincent Siew states that the ROC government has a firm position against
Taiwan independence, which has remained unchanged for many decades. However,
mainland authorities always distort the ROC's position.
- Aug. 15~25, 1995 -- The PRC proceeds with the second wave of
missile tests, threatening the ROC with military force.
- Sept. 9, 1995 -- On an inspection tour in Quemoy, ROC President Lee
states that the ROC now stands on Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, and Matzu, a
reality not to be denied by any one. The ROC government insists on adhering
to the principles and stages established under the Guidelines of National
Unification to pursue unification under the systems of democracy, liberty,
and equal prosperity, and not under "one country, two systems."
- Oct. 21, 1995 -- In an interview with the U.S. News & World
Report, Zhang Wannian, vice-chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission,
says that if Taiwan declares independence, the PRC will certainly resort to
force.
- Oct. 24, 1995 -- Representatives of the two sides reach agreement
in the negotiation for Taiwan-Hong Kong aviation rights and sign into effect
the minutes of the meeting. The document becomes effective Dec. 30, 1995.
- Oct. 24, 1995 -- U.S. President Bill Clinton and PRC President
Jiang Zemin have a summit meeting, and reach an understanding that the
Taiwan Strait issue will be dealt with in accordance with the three U.S.-PRC
communiques.
- Nov. 24, 1995 -- Xinhua News Agency prints an article "China's
sovereignty belongs to the entire Chinese people." It says that no
matter what changes happen in the way the Taiwan leader is selected, nothing
can change the fact that Taiwan is a part of China.
- Nov. 25, 1995 -- Xinhua News Agency announces that a joint landing
maneuver staged in late November near Dongshan Island, Fujian Province, by
the army, navy, and air force of the Nanjing Military Area Command, is
concluded.
- Jan. 24, 1996 -- Premier Lien
Chan reiterates that the ROC government does not wish to see cross-strait
relation strained at issuing statements and creating publicity. The two
sides should sit down and meet each other across the table to negotiate
various issues. If the disrupted cross-strait negotiation channels could be
resumed, issues of mutual concern will be able to be discussed.
- Jan. 30, 1996 -- The PRC celebrates the anniversary of Jiang's
eight-point proposal. Li Peng makes a statement that only when Taiwan
authorities abandon creating "two Chinas," or "one China,
one Taiwan" both in rhetoric and in practice can cross-strait
relation normalize.
- March 1996 --When the ROC held the first Chinese direct
presidential election in March 1996, the PRC conducted three rounds of
military exercises, launching missiles against Taiwan, with the objective
of affecting the election.
- March 5, 1996 -- The PRC makes a statement in the early morning
that it will launch a military exercise during March 8-15, firing
ground-to-ground guided missiles into waters 20 to 40 nautical miles due
east of Keelung, and 30 to 50 nautical miles due west of Kaohsiung.
- March 8, 1995 -- The mainland military begins to stage missile
tests near the waters north and south of Taiwan.
- March 12, 1996 -- The PRC begins to stage live ammunition firing
in a sea and air maneuver off the coastal areas stretching from Xiamen,
Fujian Province, to Shantou, Guangdong Province.
- March 13, 1996 -- The PRC fires the fourth guided missile into
the waters off Kaohsiung harbor.
- March 18, 1996 -- The PRC launches a joint force maneuver in the
sea near Pingtan, Fujian Province.
- March 19, 1996 -- The PRC stages a landing exercise on a small
islet.
- March 21, 1996 -- The PRC stages an air strike exercise.
- April 23, 1996 -- In Kampuchea, Liu Huaqing, vice chairman of the
PRC Central Military Commission, reiterates that "Taiwan is an
inseparable part of China." He insists on "reunification by
peaceful means, one country, two systems" and that PRC will resort to
the use of force should Taiwan declare independence or face foreign
intervention.
- April 29, 1996 -- SEF writes to ARATS to suggest the resumption
of the Koo-Wang Talks and institutionalized negotiation channels.
- April 30, 1996 -- ARATS responds negatively to the resumption of
Koo-Wang talks and institutionalized negotiations.
- May 5, 1996 -- Chang King-yuh, chairman of the Mainland Affairs
Council, says it is the PRC which erects barriers against the resumption
of cross-strait negotiations. Since ARATS has replied negatively regarding
the resumption of negotiations, the government will not seek other ways to
express its willingness again.
- May 20, 1996 -- In his inaugural speech, President Lee notes the
developments related to cross-strait relations. First, the two sides
should face how to end the hostile status. Second, both should note the
reality that the two belong to separate jurisdictions and accept the
common goal of national unification 3. Both should open up a new situation
in which "Chinese help Chinese."
- May 29, 1996 -- Xinhua News Agency publishes an article titled
"The one-China principle is inevitable," with a byline of
"Jin Xi," criticizing ROC President Lee's failure to mention
"one China" in his inaugural speech.
- June 23, 1996 -- The spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office of
the State Council reiterates the "One China" principle.
- June 26, 1996 -- Giving an interview to the media while visiting
in Spain, PRC President Jiang Zemin says that the two sides can enter into
cross-strait negotiations for peaceful reunification and follow the
principle of "One China" to terminate the hostility between the
two sides. Asked to comment on a meeting between leaders of the two sides,
Jiang says he welcomes the Taiwan leader to visit the mainland in an
appropriate capacity.
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