Hannah Arendt concludes the first volume of *The Life of the Mind* thus:

If judgment is our faculty for dealing with the past, the historian is the inquiring man who by relating it sits in judgment over it. If that is so, we may reclaim our human dignity, win it back, as it were, from that pseudo-divinity named History of the modern age, without denying history’s importance but denying its right to being the ultimate judge. Old Cato . . . has left us a curious phrase which aptly sums up the political principle implied in the enterprise of reclamation. He said: “*Victrix causa dei placit, sed victa Catoni*” (“The victorious cause pleased the gods, but the defeated one pleases Cato”). (1978, 1: 216)²

This article is an exercise in reclamation of the kind that Hannah Arendt describes. I wish to reclaim the cause for which Demosthenes struggled, the cause of democratic freedom, from the judgment of history expressed in the defeat of Athens and her allies at the hands of Philip of Macedon. Though politics is attenuated in the contemporary world, we can understand the peculiar characteristics of political action by reconstructing in our imagination those moments in the past when political life was richest. Here I am going to take up an aspect of political action that is particularly well-illuminated in Demosthenes’ speech *On the Crown*: the role of time in the judgment of political action.³

We can approach Demosthenes’ political career for a variety of purposes: The easiest to understand, because it is in many ways the most superficial, is with the motives of the humanist. We study the political speeches of Demosthenes in order to be inspired to value political freedom.
and to learn how it can be defended. The trouble with this view is that it assumes that the conditions for political action are present for us, as they were for Demosthenes in the Athens of his time, and that political action is itself something serious men (and now women) ought to undertake. That these two assumptions are edifying and patriotic does not make them true.

We can also approach Demosthenes as an exercise in historical science (that is, *historische Wissenschaft*). The scientific historian wants to learn the facts about the rise of Philip’s hegemony over Greece. The scientific historian therefore prefers objectivity to edification. As George Cawkwell, a leading participant in the *Demosthenesstreit* in the ‘60s and ‘70s, wrote, “Moral edification and history can be kept separate” (1969, 166).

I find this the most difficult purpose to understand, because it is unclear how this scientific-historical perspective can be connected with the human-all-too-human perspectives of the participants. When, for example, Cawkwell writes of the age of Demosthenes that “The central fact of the age is military, not moral—viz. the huge preponderance in military potential of the Macedonian state over the power of any Greek state,” he cites a fact whose truth he himself perceives in part from Philip’s victory over the Thebans and Athenians at Chaeroneia in 338 B.C.E. and Alexander’s campaign against Thebes in 335. Cawkwell does not trouble himself to explain how Demosthenes or anybody else could possibly have learned the fact of Philip’s greater military strength and resources prior to these events. Nor does Cawkwell refute the claim that given Philip’s failures before Perinthos and Byzantium in 340, at the very time that Demosthenes led the Athenians to war it was reasonable to suppose Philip much weaker than he had seemed, or seems to us (Pickard-Cambridge 1979, 491). He does not even show how Philip could have known his own capabilities prior to his success. It is thus unclear what use historical-scientific judgment could be, since it is not clear how to relate historical-scientific judgment to the judgment of participants in human affairs.

I should stop here, not least because I have little to add to what Nietzsche said on this question (1997). Let me just make one final suggestion before moving on, that one should try to understand the origins of the historical perspective historically, in order to find the human perspective that can make use of it. Modern historical judgment begins with the repudiation by Machiavelli and Hobbes of the superficial adoration of ancient political freedom that possessed the humanists.
I will now describe the third approach, one that puts in practice at least as great a demand on our scholarship as either of the first two. This approach aims to use the ancient sources to illuminate the possibilities of political life in Athens and, in particular, the meaning of political action. This demands precise and accurate accounts of norms and institutions, and sees knowledge of facts as instrumental to the elaboration of such accounts. We need the historical facts that the scientific historian wishes to uncover, but these facts are of importance for the political possibilities that they illuminate. This approach to Demosthenes is in its central respects the one taken by Jaeger in his highly controversial Sather lectures. It is also the approach taken to the Attic orators more generally in Josiah Ober’s book *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Ober 1989). The controversy over Demosthenes, whether Demosthenes’ policy was correct either in its ends or in its means, cannot in principle be settled by this third approach, because to illuminate the possibilities of ancient politics is also to illuminate the possibilities in the ancient city. As Aristotle said, there are three ways of life that have received approbation: the life of enjoyment, the life of philosophy, and the life of political activity (*Eudemian Ethics* 1215a35–b5, 1216a27–b37). Those who valorize either the life of enjoyment or the life of philosophy would not judge Demosthenes favorably, at least if one takes seriously the relation of the philosophers, such as Speusippos and Aristotle, to Philip and Alexander.7

From 346, Demosthenes had striven to form an alliance capable of defying Philip of Macedon. In 339 Thebes and Athens had at last come together as the pillars of such an alliance, but their confrontation with Philip ended in defeat at Chaeronea in 338, although not in disgrace for Demosthenes. Demosthenes was given charge of the defenses of the city, and he oversaw the repair of the city wall and the reorganization of the city’s finances so as to meet the emergency. Demosthenes’ political friend Ctesiphon thus proposed in 336 that Demosthenes should be crowned with a golden crown in the theater of Dionysus, “and the herald is to proclaim in the theater before the Greeks that the Athenian People crown [Demosthenes] for his virtue and manly worth, because he continues saying and doing the best things for the People.”8 The proposal was passed by the council, but Demosthenes’ principal rival Aeschines immediately charged Ctesiphon with having proposed an illegal decree. Aeschines thereby blocked the decree from being considered by the Athenian people in the assembly.
When Aeschines finally brought Ctesiphon to trial in 330 B.C.E., he alleged three points of illegality in Ctesiphon’s decree: first, it illegally proposed awarding Demosthenes his crown in the theater, before a mixed audience of Athenians and foreign Greeks, even though the law demanded that all crowns awarded by the people could be proclaimed only in the Assembly, from which foreigners were excluded. Second, Ctesiphon had proposed crowning Demosthenes even though Demosthenes was ineligible to receive honors at the time, since Demosthenes held offices for which he had yet to make his accounting to the people. Third and most important, Ctesiphon had proposed to engrave false claims among the decrees passed by the people, since, as Aeschines puts it, Demosthenes “has not even begun to speak the best things, nor does he now continue to do what has the most advantageous consequences for the People.”

The speech On the Crown is Demosthenes’ speech advocating the acquittal of the defendant, Ctesiphon, for bringing an illegal decree. The speech On the Crown, as Stephen Usher puts it, transcends genre (1999, 270 n. 91). It is forensic in that it is a speech advocating the case of the defendant, Ctesiphon, but its concern is the deliberative prowess of the two real contestants, Demosthenes and Aeschines. The speech is evocative of epideictic insofar as Demosthenes argues that his actions and advice were the only possible ones worthy of Athens (Usher 1999, 275; Yunis 2000, 2001). The speech is a defense of Demosthenes’ whole career, in order to defend Ctesiphon for proposing to honor Demosthenes.

What time is it, when we sit down to read and imagine that we hear the speech On the Crown? It is time for thinking about politics, a moment of theoria, one might say, of meditation upon the spectacle of the confrontation between Philip and Athens. We can only watch because, as Demosthenes puts it, the time for action to save Athenian freedom has passed (46), yet “even if the opportunity (kairos) for actions has passed,” he says, “the opportunity to know these sorts of things is always present for those who are sensible” (48).

At this time, Demosthenes says, it is his whole life, both his private life and his political actions for the common, that are being judged in this trial (8). That is to say that judgment of Demosthenes’ public life disaggregates into judgment of his political acts. In contemporary moral philosophy we are used to a distinction between agent-morality or virtue ethics and a morality of intentions. Political judgment, as Demosthenes invited his audience to exercise it, would be judgment of an agent through his acts, or judgment of an actor as he appears in his acts.
What the jury was asked to do was to judge whether Demosthenes’ actions undertaken in defense of the freedom of the Athenians were worthy ones. Now there are two obvious ways in which time comes in to the assessment of actions. Actions are, in the first place, assessed by the intention with which they are undertaken: intentions are prior to action in time. Actions are also assessed by their consequences, and consequences are posterior to actions in time.

Yet to acquit Ctesiphon and thus defend his own life and all his public actions, Demosthenes has to convince his listeners that neither the assessment of an action based on its intentions nor an assessment based on its consequences is the fundamental form of the judgment of actions already completed. Demosthenes does not deserve to be crowned simply because of his intentions at the decisive moment. The jury, and all patriotic Athenians, all intend or wish that Athens be saved, Demosthenes says, during his account of the crucial moment of his intervention in the assembly, when Philip had captured Elateia: “Well, had your city needed those who wished her to be saved, all of you and the rest of the Athenians would have stood up and made your way to the platform. For all of you, I think, wished that she be saved.” Nor can Demosthenes contend that he deserves to be crowned because of the consequences of his actions. The final consequences, as Aeschines points out at length in the accusation of Ctesiphon, were apparently bad: Athens and her allies lost at Chaeronea.

Demosthenes asks his audience to judge him as one deserving of honor despite the consequences of his policy, and despite the fact that he could hardly be honored for his intentions, since by his own admission his intention to preserve the freedom and security of Athens was that of every decent citizen. Political judgment would then be distinct from what we think of as moral judgment or judgment of actions based on their intentions. It would also be distinct from what we might be tempted to contrast with moral judgment as “political judgment,” that is judgment of actions by their consequences, though the scientific historians, like the Athenians whom they study, can rarely resist judging actions by the event of their consequences.

Political judgment in the sense in which Demosthenes invites the judgment of his fellow citizens is some third kind of judgment of actions. It is judgment after the fact, but not judgment in the light of the consequences only. Consequences and intentions are part of the story: Demosthenes claims that Aeschines is unworthy in part because he has never moved any decree that has had good consequences for the city.
Regarding Demosthenes’ own policy, he argues that Athens, for all her ills, has fared better than those cities that betrayed her for alliance with Philip (254).\(^\text{12}\) Certainly, to be worthy, an action must take account of the foreseeable consequences: Demosthenes condemns Aeschines because his single most notable action, his intervention in the Amphictyonic Council, brought down upon Athens, as was foreseen by Demosthenes, the bad consequence of an Amphictyonic war.\(^\text{13}\) Yet consequences are not the whole story. Manly virtue can be recognized and esteemed even in failure, Demosthenes tells the jury, since “You justly honor alike those who fell in victory and those who fell in defeat” (208). That is to say, through political judgment it is possibly justifiable to judge that an action is noble even though its consequences were bad.\(^\text{14}\)

What, then, are the temporal criteria of a worthy act? A worthy act must in the first place be oriented in the present toward the future. “What are these things,” for which an orator is responsible, Demosthenes asks, and then answers: “to see affairs in their beginnings, to foresee [their consequences], and to foretell them to others” (192).\(^\text{15}\) My proposals have always been forward-looking, Demosthenes claims: By reorganizing the finances of the fleet, he enabled these important provisions to be made at the right time (\textit{en kair o-i}) (102).\(^\text{16}\) Ask, he invites the jury, what I added to our means and resources (233), unlike Aeschines, who never added anything (309–11).

In particular, a worthy political act should be oriented toward future benefits and harms rather than past grievances. In the past, I always advised the city to look to the future, not the past, Demosthenes claims. Your support of the Spartans, after their defeat at Leuktra, against the Thebans who had defeated them, served as the precedent for the alliance I proposed with Thebes against Philip (96–101). We will drive the Thebans into the arms of Philip, Demosthenes claims that he said at the time, “if we will prefer at the present, if the Thebans have done something disagreeable to us, to recall this and to distrust them as though they were in the ranks of our enemies” (176).

Nor are worthy actions oriented even toward the recollection of past benefits (268–69). In politics it is unworthy to remind others of what they have done to you, or of what you have done for them. Finally, one should not look for small gains in the face of great dangers. After the taking of Elateia is an \textit{aischros kairos}, an “ugly moment,” to be asking things of the Thebans (178).
How then, as Demosthenes says in the speech Against Leptines, are we to descry the future toward which our actions ought to be oriented, “for that which is to come is unclear to all human beings, since insignificant happenings (mikroi kairoi) are the causes of the greatest things” (20.162)? The possibilities of the future become visible to us from the study of past actions of present men. To quote once again from the high point of the speech, when Philip, having captured Elateia, is menacing Thebes and Athens:

That moment and that day did not call for the man who was merely wealthy and benevolent, but for he who had followed these matters from their beginning and deduced why Philip had done these things and what he wanted. For the one who did not know these things, nor had foreseen them when they were still distant, neither were he benevolent nor were he wealthy would he know what was to be done, nor would it be possible for him to advise you. (172)

This is not so much history as intelligence, in the sense of political or military intelligence.

We are invited by Demosthenes to judge after the fact that an action had been oriented (pluperfect) toward the future. We must consider the future as its possibilities were humanly foreseeable then, at the moment of action. “The future as it was,” Demosthenes reminds us, is something that becomes cloudier for us as the moment of decision recedes into the past (226). We must always keep in mind that to miss what cannot be seen is neither to do wrong nor to make a mistake, but merely to be unfortunate (275). Having defined his ground Demosthenes can take his stand:

That I did not choose all the things that were present to the extent available to human reckoning, and did not carry them through honestly and diligently and with energy beyond my strength, or that I instituted acts ignoble and unworthy of the city and unnecessary, show these things, and then it will be time to accuse me. (193)

The statesman must rely on others to make use of what he provides: his task is to encourage them and hasten them on to what must be done (246). If the ship is adequately provisioned, the owner has done his part, and cannot be blamed if it goes down, for neither the shipowner nor the statesman reigns over fortune (194).

To have deliberated well, then, is to have judged well in the past what present facts then indicated as the possibilities of the future.
oriented toward the future is not to raise hopes or make promises; it is rather to speak about present things so as to show what may be in the future—so as to show what opportunities or advantages or dangers are now present. It is to see things beginning, to see where they are going, and to tell them before the event to others (246), not to carp at failure after the fact. Demosthenes in this fashion both praises himself and condemns Aeschines:

It belonged to the just citizen to show to all then, if he had something better than the things [that I proposed], not now to chastise. For the counsellor who deliberates and the malicious accusing sycophant—not that they are alike in any other respect—in the following respect differ most. The one reveals his judgment before the actions, and makes himself responsible to those who were persuaded by him, to fortune, to the moment, to any who would call him to account. But the malicious accusing sycophant, who shut his mouth when it was necessary to speak, if something disagreeable consequences, this he reproaches. (189)

Demosthenes, both in *On the Crown* and throughout his career, repudiates “the cheap glory of denouncing” the mistakes of others after the fact.\(^{19}\) I will go so far out, he says at the moment of trial in 330 B.C.E.,

that if someone now has something better to show, or, altogether, if there was then present any alternative apart from the things I then preferred, I agree that I did unjustifiable things. For if there is anything that someone sees now, which would have had beneficial consequences had it been done then, this I say that it is necessary for it not to have eluded me then. But if there isn’t anything nor wasn’t anything, nor would be anything for anyone to say at any time and even today, what is it necessary for the counsellor to do? Was it not of the things that were presently manifest to choose the best? This is what I did then, for the herald was asking, Aeschines, “Who wishes to address the assembly,” not “Who wishes to make accusations concerning the things that have gone,” nor “Who wishes to make promises about the future.” (190–91)

Like the doctor who advises only when the patient is dead, the opportunity for Aeschines to advise is the moment most unfortunate for the city, Demosthenes says (308, cf. 323, 233). It is a kind of perverted opportunity, after the opportunity for action has come and gone.

The last Demosthenic criterion for a worthy action that I shall discuss is that the action must be fitting the competition of Athens through all time for the first place in honor and glory (66, 99–101, 193, 203). It was therefore fitting for the Athenian demos more than any other Greek city to
resist Philip, Demosthenes claims (66–72). Present actions must be worthy of the city’s past: In the affairs of private life we must act according to the ordinary laws and precedents, but in political life we must look toward what is worthy of our ancestors (210). Harvey Yunis argues that Demosthenes contends for the rightness of his policy on the grounds that “questions of self-interest are still subordinated to questions of honor, as they always have been in the Athenian tradition” (2001, 15). Yet even when Demosthenes invites his listeners to judge his counsels before Chaeronea as if “the things that were to be were clear beforehand to everyone,” as if everyone had known in advance that Philip would triumph, he says that “Not even then ought the city to have distanced herself from these things [the policy of resisting Philip], if she took account of fame, ancestors, or the ages that will be” (199). Resistance to Philip served not just Athenian honor but the future of Athenian freedom. We read the speech “On the Crown” with the foreknowledge that the future of Athenian freedom after 330 B.C.E. was to be short and dim, but here, too, our scientific-historical knowledge is an anachronistic bar to rhetorical and political comprehension.

More important for our purposes, Demosthenes explicitly denies that he could be worthy of honor merely because his policies expressed the sentiments and traditions that are common to all patriotic Athenians. Demosthenes’ actions fit the city so well that it would be unbecoming of him, he states, “to claim to have brought you to think things worthy of your forefathers” (206). Far be it from Demosthenes to remind Athenians how to be Athenians, nor is it for this that he deserves to be honored. In order to defend the exceptional honor that he has received, Demosthenes must show himself to be exceptional, while in order to avoid alienating his audience, the jury, he must grant them an equal share of noble and just motives. For this reason too, it is impossible to agree with Harvey Yunis (2000; 2001, 15–17, 219–20) that Demosthenes takes his stand on the nobility of his actions, since the Athenian orator is rhetorically constrained to grant these sentiments to all worthy Athenians.

Demosthenes warns against comparing him with his ancestors, with Themistocles, Pericles, or Cimon—ask only whether he intended the same things as they (315 ff.). Here too, Demosthenes contrasts himself with the prosecutor Aeschines: Demosthenes acts in anticipation, while Aeschines anticipates misfortune (308) and delights in it when it comes. Aeschines shines on the stage only when it is time to accuse others unjustly (313), and then invokes past glories—to calumniate present citizens. Demosthenes
uses the past to encourage us to emulate it, he claims, while Aeschines uses the past to encourage us to be jealous of those who at present strive to emulate it. Demosthenes resembles the heroes of the past, he asserts, and Aeschines the villains (317). Nonetheless, Demosthenes entreats the jury not to compare him to the men of the past but to those of the present, for it is in comparison to present men that he deserves all the crowns that he has received (319–20). Demosthenes invites the very comparison that he modestly refuses. Yet by invoking the comparison while (paraleptically) denying its application to himself, Demosthenes benefits from the comparison while diminishing the envy of his audience that he supposes the comparison to provoke.

The past is open to argument, and so, in a way, is always multiple: there are different versions of the past. The trial of Ctesiphon was a contest among different versions of Philip’s rise to hegemony over the greatest Greek cities. Yet we can never have the last word about the past; someone can always come and tell us what we should have done, as Demosthenes invites Aeschines (190). It is because we can never do anything about the past that we can never stop talking about it. The need to act does not intrude on our historical discussions, as it does when we have to act with a view to the future. In talking about the past, in presenting to one another different perspectives on a past that is shared because it is the trace of what was once a common future, we carry forward that past and thus regenerate our community. This argued-over past maintains the community that is to act in the future. The community can persist because the conversation about the past need never come to an end.

Demosthenes’ speech On the Crown is the classic of Greek oratory both because it presents us with the standards on which it, and thus Demosthenes, should be judged, and because it manifestly succeeds according to those standards. Its success is repeated for the reader, as long as the standards themselves, which are the standards of free and noble action, are felt to be worthy of emulation. Of course the modern age, the age of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Descartes, Hegel, Kaiser Wilhelm, and the great scientific historians, is distinguished by its repudiation of these standards.

To many thinkers and actors of the present, the first thing one has to know about the modern age is that it has come to an end. Only if the end of the modern age is also the end of history in Fukuyama’s sense—that is, the end of the age of conflict over questions of political principle—can we regard the question of Demosthenes as capable in principle of being settled. Many doubts, both conceptual and empirical, have been raised about
Fukuyama’s claim, but the most basic has rarely been raised. Fukuyama’s thesis is that liberal democracy is the only form of government that can be legitimated in the present or that will ever be legitimate in the future (Fukuyama 1992). Yet liberal democracy, as has always been clear to great liberals such as Lord Acton, is a combination of opposites, democracy constrained by liberalism, and thus democracy in constant conflict with liberalism.

Insofar as we are liberals, we are devoted to the liberty of the individual. To our liberal soul, the liberty of the city for which Demosthenes struggled appears, at best, instrumental to the protection of individual liberties. It is an instrument of uncertain value, as the fate of Socrates, not to say the fate of Moses Finley, reminds us. Insofar as we are democrats, we are devoted to the liberty of the political collective from domination by foreign powers or entrenched particular and private interests. Our democratic soul cannot help but be uplifted to the standards and examples of judgment to which Demosthenes summons us. It is that tension, more than anything else, that compels us to the study of ancient democracy and its last great figure, Demosthenes.

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Notes
1. This article was presented at the conference “Demokratia: Athenian Political Thought and Political Culture in the Classical Age,” at Tel Aviv University 1 June 2000. I would like to thank conference participants Josiah Ober, David Schaps, and Charles Blattberg for their comments. My understandings of temporality, possibility, and action owe a great deal to Irad Kimhi’s lectures at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for 1999–2000.
2. As David Schaps pointed out to me, while Arendt is quoting Lucan, De Bello Civili 1.128, the Cato referred to by Lucan is Cato the Younger, not “Old Cato,” and the line is not attributed to Cato but is spoken by the poet in his own person. However, none of this is relevant to my purposes in this article.
3. Here I take political judgment to be bound up inextricably with the purposes that structure political life. It would appear, however, that since Arendt herself shares Kant’s critique of these purposes, the account here presumed of political judgment could not be hers. On this point, see Beiner 1982 (135–36).
5. On the gap between our assessment of Philip’s potential and the assessments of his contemporaries, see also Ellis 1976 (57–58, 181).
6. Jaeger in his programmatic statement gives the method an inappropriately subjectivist cast, saying that Demosthenes’ speeches are “sources for our understanding of the inner process by which his political thought develops” (1938, 6). Jaeger saves a better description of this third method for his notes: “The problem of the Greeks’ conception of the way things happen in the life of mankind—of individuals and whole peoples alike—is of the utmost importance in understanding their poetry as well as their political speeches and their histor-
ography” (1938, 241 n. 37). Here I mean to praise only Jaeger’s approach; on the book’s
defects of execution see Badian 1992.
7. For Speusippus, see his notorious letter to Philip, available in Parente 1980, fragment
156, 123–27; on the Philipizing of the philosophers and rhetoricians resident at Athens, both
citizens and metics, see Markle 1976.
8. Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, sec. 49. All translations are my own.
9. Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, sec. 50.
10. On the Crown 171. For other uses of the commonplace that “All Athenians have patri-
otic intentions” see Demosthenes, Letter 1.8, Prooimion 41.1.
11. Aeschines 3.154–58, 244–45. When Polybius, writing long after the events, reminds
his readers of the disastrous consequences of Demosthenes’ policy for Athens (18.14), he
does not explicitly deprecate the policy on that score. Rather, he points to these consequences
to exculpate from the charge of treason the men in other Greek cities who persuaded their
fellow citizens to join Philip. This is not the same thing, obviously, as saying that the policy
pushed by Demosthenes was the wrong policy for Athens to adopt, and I am not sure that we
should infer that Polybius thought that it was. See on this point Hammond and Griffith (1979,
480).
12. In the Funeral Oration ascribed to Demosthenes, the speaker claims that Philip de-
cided not to press his attack on Athens lest he have to face more men as brave as those who
fought and fell and Chaeronea (20).
13. De Corona 143; cf. Prooimia 9, 33.3.
14. In the speech Against Androtion Demosthenes says “I wonder at this, that he consid-
ered it worthy to crown the Council for the things that had gone wrong. For I, for my part,
believed that these sorts of honors were restricted to deeds done correctly” (Demosthenes
22.17). Yet in that speech the failure of the Council is to make adequate provision for the
Navy: it is a failure to bring an act to completion, to do it right, not a failure to achieve the
intended consequences.
19. Jaeger 1938 (159), discussing On the Peace (Demosthenes 5.2). For other versions of
the commonplace that accusations about the past have no place in deliberations about the
future, see Prooimia 11, 20, 30.2, 35.1–2, 40.3, 41.1.
20. For the influence of German nationalism on historians’ views of Demosthenes, see
Knipfing 1921, Jaeger 1938 (1–4), Ellis 1976 (6).
21. See the essays and reviews on the American Civil War in Acton 1985a, 216–373; see also
the fragments collected by the editor J. Rufus Fears under the heading “Democracy” in Acton
1985b, 549–57.

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