... MKULTRA was approved by the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence ] on April 13, 1953 along the lines proposed by ADDP [ Associate Deputy Director for Plans ] Helms.

... Over the ten-year life of the program, many ‘additional avenues to the control of human behavior’ were designated as appropriate for investigation under the MKULTRA charter. These include ‘radiation, electroshock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials.’ 

... LSD was one of the materials tested in the MKULTRA program. The final phase of LSD testing involved surreptitious administration to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by undercover officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the CIA.

The rationale for such testing was ‘that testing of materials under accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations.’ [ Inspector General Report on MKULTRA, 1963, p. 21 ] 

... The late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by concern over the threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United States concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and biological agents in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pressure for a ‘defensive’ program to investigate chemical and biological agents so that the intelligence community could understand the mechanisms by which these substances worked and how their effects could be defeated. 

... As the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to tile cessation of unwitting testing:

‘While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability.’ [ Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from the Deputy Director for Plans, 12/17/63,  pp. 2-3 ]

... On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a memo to the DDCI, who with the Inspector General and the Executive Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two aspects of the problem: (1) ‘for over a decade the Clandestine Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing human behavior;’ and (2) ‘testing arrangements in furtherance of this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable as possible.’  Helms argued that the individuals must be ‘unwitting’ as this was ‘the only realistic method of maintaining the capability, considering the intended operational use of materials to influence human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting. Should the subjects of the testing not be unwitting, the program would only be ‘pro forma’ resulting in a ‘false sense of accomplishment and readiness.’ ’ [Memorandum for the Record prepared by the Inspector General, 5/15/63]

... Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing, the Agency's ‘positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing, owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing knowledge of the state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances in this field.’  [ Memorandum from DDP Helms to DCI, 6/9/64, pp 1-2. ]"