By 1930, the US economy was “vital to the prosperity of the rest of the world, yet the domestic market remained far and away the major focus of American production and investment. In short, America mattered to the world economy far more than the world economy mattered to the United States.”[1] Despite this responsibility, or perhaps because of it, Americans lived in constant fear during the late 1930s of being dragged into a second world war. “Three attitudes dominated American world policy during the mid-thirties: isolationism, preoccupation with internal affairs, and complacency.”[2] The majority of the United States population was reluctant to get dragged into a war which they believed was not theirs and had no bearing or effect on American society. They hid behind numerous Neutrality Acts and stalled the passing of legislation designed to aid the Allies. Isolationist public opinion, coupled with a very fickle-minded United States population combined to keep the U.S. out of war until 1941, when the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii left them with no other choice but to declare war on Japan.

            Most Americans truly believed that the aggression found in Europe had nothing whatsoever to do with them. “At the beginning of 1938, the United States was a country still mired in the Great Depression, with nearly a fifth of its workforce unemployed and investment at less than half the level of 1929.”[3] Americans were more preoccupied with self-preservation than with getting involved in a conflict situated across an ocean. Most of the United States population did not consider war in Europe to pose any significant threat to U.S. interests or security. Also, “few Americans realized that Hitler’s basic objectives would nullify the results of the First World War and jeopardize the nation’s security.”[4] In addition, Americans felt that Britain was the main line of defense against Axis aggression, and therefore attempted to hide behind her throughout the progression of the war. There was no reason to involve the United States in the war if Britain could take care of herself by defeating the Axis powers. In fact, “for the United States, the continued independence of Britain was to provide the margin, the buffer, to make nonintervention an acceptable strategy.”[5]

            If, by some small chance, Germany did defeat Britain, then the United States would deal with the situation at that time. Most Americans held the view that “the United States was distant, possessed great resources for a mobilization base and would not be immediately harmed in any serious way by German domination of much of the continent.”[6] Concurrently, Americans also realized that Germany did not possess a very impressive navy, and in the event of continental domination, Germany would have had a very difficult time mounting an all-out naval attack on American soil.

            On the other front, Americans were likewise unconcerned with any threat from Japan. “Above all it seemed unlikely that Japan, so lacking in war resources, would dare challenge the United States, from which it imported 80 percent of its oil products, 90 percent of its gasoline, 74 percent of its scrap iron, and 60 percent of its machine tools.”[7] While the United States had great sympathy for China, the country which Japan had decided that it needed to conquer, and disliked Japan for attacking them and putting them in such a difficult position, most Americans felt that this aggression, similar to Germany, had no bearing on their country and did not pose a significant threat to national security. If, at some point, action had to be undertaken to deal with Japan, “…there was apparently less fear of the consequences of a tough line [towards Japan] than in the case of antagonism to Germany.”[8] When the situation eventually escalated in Asia, Americans did begin to take a slightly more interested view of events, but even then the United States was only concerned with U.S., British and Dutch island holdings in Asia; China could continue to fend for herself.

            Although this may seem terribly insensitive, it must be noted that “by the early twentieth century, Americans lived on a continent in which no great power contested their predominance.”[9] The United States had become a powerful country, and one of the biggest fears of the American public was the idea of being challenged for this power. America had never before been threatened by possible attack from both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. In fact, the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan “had always been considered as a deterrent to keep America out of the war by confronting her with a two-front conflict if she tried to deal with just one opponent at a time.”[10] This scare tactic worked as planned. Americans could not fathom how the United States could possibly fight a two-front war, and instead insisted on keeping out of the entire affair altogether. Indeed, even at the expense and collapse of other friendly countries.

            This isolationist view was predominately that of the American population. President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself felt the need to get the nation more deeply involved in the Asian conflict. As Wayne Cole writes:

 

            President Roosevelt believed the United States could most effectively increase the

possibility of peace in the 1930’s by using its power to discourage potential aggressors from provoking war. In this aim, however, he was handicapped by the ‘isolationist’ attitude of the American people and particularly by the powerful opposition in Congress.[11]

 

 

Likewise, Bruce Russett points out that “he was fully aware of the need to secure congressional approval for war, of the strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States, of the difficulties involved in demonstrating that an attack on British and Dutch colonies was a direct threat to American interest, and of the dangers inherent in going to war with the country deeply divided.”[12] Roosevelt intuitively realized that without the full backing of the American people, he was not going to achieve anything and his popularity would take a fatal plunge. “Significantly, FDR held back his aid initiative until after Britain had beaten back the first wave of the German air assault. But whatever his personal auguries, he remained a prisoner of the Neutrality Acts, Congressional isolationism, and U.S. public opinion.”[13]

            In an effort to keep itself out of war, the United States turned to legislation designed to implement neutrality. “Lobbied intensively by various peace groups, Congress in August 1935 passed a Neutrality Act. This radically changed America’s historic policy of freely trading with belligerent countries in time of war […] The Neutrality Acts were emblematic of a nation that had lost confidence in itself.”[14] This Neutrality Act was first passed on April 9, 1935 and authorized the President to withhold passports from American citizens traveling in war zones, forbid loans by private citizens to foreign governments at war and introduced an impartial embargo on the shipment of arms to all belligerents.[15] Such was the overwhelming desire and obsession of politicians and the American public to remain out of war, that “many of the Senators had not even read the bill; one told a State Department aide that all he knew was that he had just voted to keep the United States out of war!”[16]

            It is clear that America believed that this Neutrality Act would ease their fears of American involvement in war and keep the United States safe from aggression. However, Robert Divine postulates that “hypnotized by their own fear of war, the American people had chosen to support legislation which made war more likely by informing potential aggressors that the U.S. would abandon any effort to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and follow carefully delineated policies once they did occur.”[17] The American people did not see this inevitability and instead began to feel safe hiding behind the ‘protection’ of this Neutrality Act. In fact, so safe did the public feel about this legislation that after a brief debate in both Houses, Congress passed a bill continuing the 1935 Neutrality Act, which was set to expire in 1936, until May 1, 1937. To this act, Congress also added a ban on loans to belligerent governments[18]

            The United States essentially used the Neutrality Act as a scapegoat for fading into the background, so to speak. They could remain an isolationist country simply by citing the terms of the Neutrality Act as a reason why they were not helping the Allies in their endeavor to fight. However, America soon realized that by cutting themselves off from all belligerent countries, they were essentially cutting themselves off from lucrative trading partners as well. This is why on November 4, 1939, the Neutrality Act of 1939 was signed. “…For the first time since the outbreak of war, American citizens could sell arms, ammunition and implements of war to the European belligerents…”[19] The term ‘cash-and-carry’ was coined to describe this new change in policy. This provision would allow America to give much needed aid to the Allies while at the same time remaining (relatively) neutral. Any belligerent country could now come to the United States and procure goods as long as they carried the supplies back to their country on their own ships. This kept both American ships and civilians off of the seas and safe. In theory, even Germany could buy supplies from the United States, which is why the administration claimed that the policy continued to follow in the neutral spirit of America. However, with Germany lacking an impressive navy and Britain primarily controlling the seas, this was not a feasible option, and this idea of cash-and-carry essentially became a conduit for Allied support. Therefore, “instead of choosing between peace or prosperity, [the United States] chose both.”[20]

            Another reason for U.S. reluctance to join a second world war was motivated by sheer fear. Many Americans still had vivid memories from World War I firmly entrenched within their minds. “The World War of 1914-18 was supposed to [have been] the war to end all wars.”[21] The American people recalled how devastating the losses were during that war and were not optimistic about the casualty rates and destruction that yet another world war would cause. In addition, many Americans believed that the only reason why the United States had been dragged into World War I to begin with was simply because America had such strong economic ties with England and France. Americans did not want history to repeat itself in this respect, which is why the Neutrality Acts had initially been created.

            While the American people were feverishly trying to focus on self-preservation, the Germans were taking notice of America’s attitude towards the war:

 

            The German Embassy watched the growth of organized isolationism with interest.

Unbeknownst to most of the movement’s adherents, the embassy secretly began to provide monetary support for it. Funds flowed, the German Embassy established a camouflaged literary agent to commission suitable books and articles. German representatives bribed Republican and Democrat Congressmen alike to influence their Presidential conventions toward ‘no foreign war’ platforms, and they continued to promote tired denunciations of British propaganda.[22]

 

 

This nicely illustrates just how important the United State’s decision to go to war actually was. Not only did Americans have a stake in this decision, but all belligerents did as well.

Despite America’s objections to entering the war, “Roosevelt had led the nation to the brink of war by the summer of 1941, but he refused to take the final step until the nation was ready.”[23] While the public continued to ponder the issue, Japan made the decision for them. After suffering from supply depletion brought on by an embargo imposed by the United States, Japan felt that it had no choice but to attack America. Japan’s primary goal was to simply disable the U.S. naval fleet so that America could not interfere with Japan’s conquest of China. This attack instantly changed American’s minds and revenge became the primary motive for declaring war on Japan and entering into World War II. This miscalculation by Japan was to be their downfall.

“American entrance into [World War II] came late – more than two years after hostilities began – but America had been increasingly committed to the Allied cause even before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 elicited a declaration of war.”[24] The farce of governmental neutrality could not mask the fact that the United States had been aiding the Allies for years. Despite this, the mood of the American public just before the attack on Pearl Harbor continued to be isolationist in nature; however, Japan’s action instantly negated these feelings, and history now records that the United States fought in the Second World War with a feverish intensity, whether they wanted to or not.

           

Bibliography

 

Primary Sources:

 

Secondary Sources:

Cole, Wayne S., ‘American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal’, The

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 43 (Mar., 1957), 595-617.

Cull, Nicholas J., Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American

Neutrality in World War II (Oxford, 1996).

Divine, Robert A., The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New

York, 1965).

Heinrichs, Waldo, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt & American Entry into

World War II (Oxford, 1988).

Reynolds, David, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of

the Second World War (Chicago, 2001).

Russett, Bruce M., No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into

World War II (New York, 1972).

 Winkler, Allan M., Home Front U.S.A.: America during World War II (Arlington

Heights, 1986).