THE NET MAKES IT WORK, THE NET MAKES IT WORSE
Nuria W. Soeharto
University of Indonesia
May 21, 1998 is a date widely remembered by the Indonesian people, especially by those of them who suffered under the three decades of Soeharto's rule. That date, Soeharto announced his unscheduled resignation in the wake of several days of civil unrest. Soeharto was deposed by "people power", with students taking to the streets and demanding change. They stood up in the front, backed up by the professors, NGO activists, women & mothers, businesspeople, and other citizens. Plus of course, the press.
Another support which was strongly used is the Internet. Through that medium, information spread out by minute, all around the clock, running behind and beyond the eyes of the armed-government. The Net was then becoming the weapon to boost the information, reaching a wider community within a much shorter period of time.
After the departure of Soeharto, the Indonesian traffic of information on the Net lost its focus. People went back to their own agendas. Individuals and groups sought to have their own views heard. The nature of the Net allows them the freedom to pour out their feelings and needs. The Net then became a jumble of competing and contradictory themes. Words against words may subsequently be connected to disorderly action in the off-line world for now people are more disrespectful of the law.
With this background in mind, I have prepared this paper to explore the idea that there is a marked difference between Indonesian attitudes towards the Internet during the reign of Soeharto and Indonesian attitudes towards the Internet after Soeharto. This paper will examine the thesis that the Internet is now regarded in Indonesia with suspicion and mistrust, whereas during the Soeharto era, the Internet was seen as a tool for liberation. This is then related to identity of the Internet users behind all the messages. And, with regard to the practice of anthropology, I propose the question of identity that is related and connected to methodology.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section examines the condition of the Indonesian media on or about May 21, 1998. The second section will examine role of the Internet on or about May 21, 1998 and whether that role has changed in the post-Soeharto era. Finally, the third section will examine the perception of the credibility the Internet's content on or about May 21, 1998 and whether that perception has changed.
Section 1. The Indonesian Media
The Mainstream Media
During the Soeharto era, the problem facing the Indonesian media was government control of the press. The content and distribution of information by the mainstream media was strictly controlled by the government, either directly through government censorship or indirectly through the ownership of the major media companies by Soeharto's family and their colleagues. The issue of licenses for the operation of media companies was restricted, the monopoly on newsprint was controlled by a New Order disciple, Bob Hasan, and the largest print media companies were owned by Soeharto's friends and family, including Bob Hasan, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Soeharto's daughter), Probosutedjo (Soeharto's stepbrother), Sudwikatmono (Soeharto's cousin) Abdul Latief (Minister of Manpower under the New Order) and Harmoko (Minister of Information under the New Order).
New Order ownership of the media was even more pronounced in amongst the electronic media companies than it was amongst the print media. Four of Indonesia's five television stations at that time were owned by companies in which New Order supporters held controlling interest. Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI) and Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI) were owned by Bambang Trihatmojo (one of Soeharto's sons) and Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (one of Soeharto's daughters). Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV) was controlled by Sudwikatmono (Soeharto's cousin) while Indosiar was financed by Liem Sioe Lioing, another apparatchik of the New Order. The remaining television station, Andalas Televisi (AnTeve) was owned by Agung Laksono, a member of Soeharto's ruling Golkar party, and the Bakri Bros. Conglomerate.
Through its grip of key media companies, the tentacles of Soeharto's family ensured a vertical integration between political authority and the press. They curbed the press and exercised control over media content and editorial opinions. News and opinions unfavorable to the Soeharto, his family or the New Order were excluded from the press and the government restrictions on media licensing made certain that new media outlets did not materialize as forums for alternative views.
While it may be argued that the purchase by Peter Gontha of the English-language daily "The Indonesian Observer" invalidates the thesis that Indonesia media ownership during the New Order was restricted, it should be borne in mind that Peter Gontha was also a shareholder in RCTI with Bambang Trihatmojo (one of Soeharto's son).
As a de facto apparatus of the state, the Indonesian media during the New Order era served to build and maintain the authoritarian political order. With the exception of Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI) and Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), which were wholly-owned by the Indonesian government, the private media in Indonesia sought to became "partners" with the state and, in fact, served as instruments of the New Order hegemony. It was the task of the media to spread the New Order's "development ideology" among the population and portray the authority (or economic) distribution in the New Order era as an objective norm.
The press then had a dual or double position - one, as a hegemony instrument, and two, as a capitalist institution. The first put them in the role of guarding the stability of the New Order's authority while the second needed to focus on gaining market dominance.
This dual role of the press as government instruments and profit-driven corporations produced interesting contradictions. As profit-driven corporations, the media companies found that the best way to expand their market shares and increase their profits was through the publication of "forbidden" stories. Accordingly, notwithstanding legal restrictions on media content, the press-owned primarily by Soeharto's family members and New Order disciples-began to ignore certain of the content restrictions in an effort to produce stories that would increase their audiences, even though such stories violated the laws imposed by the very regime that the media served. Yet the privileges of TV owners (Soeharto's family and friends) resulted in them being able to find ways to avoid the regulations. Despite the media's bending (and occasional breaking) of the laws controlling media content, certain topics remained strictly taboo in the Indonesian media, and the issues of Marxism, racism and the behavior and role of Soeharto and his family were rarely discussed. The state authority always managed to come up with another legal provision to counter any that opposed their authority, and those individuals who penned such stories, or stories questioning the New Order's commitment to human rights or democracy, quickly found themselves seeking new employment, if they were lucky, or languishing in jail, if they were not. This happened many times since Indonesian professional journalists held to the belief that the press was the fourth estate that had a role as a watchdog, that should publish any abuses of human rights, and support the principles of justice, and democracy. With such a stance they incurred the anger of those media owners.
The Net and 'Netizens'
Before 1995, access to the Internet in Indonesia was restricted primarily to a small circle of students and academics in Indonesian universities. Together with the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi - BPPT), they worked to establish IPTEKnet, an information network for academics and researchers.
May 1995 is known as the "self-murder" of Indonesian authority. It was then the Indonesian state took that resulted in the blossoming of Internet connection among students. They released permits for Radnet (Rahajasa Media Internet Company, Ltd) to set up the first Indonesian based ISP company. Soon after, several additional ISP companies were licensed and by the end of 1995, 15,000 subscribers were being provided with Internet access by five separate Indonesian companies.
In 1996, the second 'suicide' of state authority occurred. They allowed the Indonesian Postal Service to expand its business beyond the delivery of mail and to establish ISPs in each provincial capitals. Internet kiosks, commonly referred to as warnet (warung internet), began to flourish around the country soon thereafter and enjoyed a reasonable popularity, particularly amongst high school and university students. By July of 1996, there were 15 ISP companies in Indonesia providing service to 40,000 subscribers.
By May 1997, the government had issued permits to 41 ISP companies and 85,000 subscribers were then recorded by July 1997. These numbers remained constant until the onset of the Economic Crisis in 1998 when, perplexingly, the number of subscribers began to increase. According to figures published by the Indonesian Association of Internet Service Providers, there were 250,000 paid-up subscribers in Indonesia in September 1999. This number, however, represents only less than 0.2% of the 210,000,000 people resident in Indonesia.
User statistics appear difficult to verify. Published reports indicate that, geographically, Jakarta boasts the highest number of Internet subscribers of any city in Indonesia, followed by the city of Bandung in the Province of West Java, where the city's universities provide the service. More than 50% of Indonesia's Internet subscribers access the Internet from home, as public and university Internet facilities remain limited. Given this dearth of public Internet access facilities, the average Indonesian Internet subscriber comes from the middle or upper income group.
Notwithstanding the limited number of Internet subscribers and the limited demographic groups with ready Internet access in Indonesia, the Internet has an unrivalled capacity to disseminate information quickly and directly, without legal or editorial restrictions. These qualities render the Internet a superior medium in many respects to other media, enabling significant change for most people in the archipelago.
Section 2. The Role of the Internet
The Net Makes It Work
Repression of the mainstream media gave space to the Internet to be used as a platform for dissent and as a weapon against state censorship. It has been suggested that it was only after the government crackdown on current affairs periodicals such as Tempo, Editor and DeTik in 1994 that the Internet in Indonesia began to be used as a medium for independent expression. Journalists and non-governmental organizations in particular found the Internet to be an effective means to express opinions free from the constraints imposed by the government and the media companies. Not only was the Internet free from censorship, it was also an inexpensive channel for the distribution of ideas: as the price of newsprint increased, access to the Internet remained affordable. In a nation with a web of formal and informal controls on the mainstream media, the Internet became the easy way to publish free thought.
The circle of dissent became wider and stronger as the political situation heated up. Politicians became so worried about survival that they forgot about controlling the media. Consequently, mainstream media then published and broadcasted views similar to those expressed on the Internet. In addition, mainstream media came under heavy pressure from the citizenry to change the political rule in Indonesia so now the regular press also contributed to the flow of citizens' demands and also played a role as a catalyst for reform (Reformasi).
In the final days of Soeharto's regime the most active users of the Internet were students. They used the Internet to disseminate local information overlooked by the mainstream media, to co-ordinate demonstrations, to exchange information and to provide information to individuals and organizations outside of Indonesia. They bypassed the government-controlled media and disseminated information via emails, newsgroups, and used chat groups to exchange tips on how to resist the troops. When student demonstrators occupied the Indonesian National Parliament Building, Abigail Abrash of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, in Washington DC, received reports from someone inside the Parliament Building. This someone had taken their laptop into the Parliament Building and was sending out updates of the situation, notwithstanding that the Parliament Building was surrounded by troops.
The anonymity of communication allowed by the Internet served as a catalyst to free speech. E-mail could be sent anonymously from Internet-based e-mail sites such as Hotmail and Yahoo! And sophisticated tools such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) protected anonymous users from being tracked by the State. Given the relative novelty of the Internet in Indonesia at the time and given the government's disorder in the face of the Economic Crisis, the limited efforts by Indonesian government agencies to control Indonesians' access to the Internet and to identify those using it for the publication of "heretical" views were unsuccessful. They realized too late just how fast information could flow and spread via the Internet.
Indonesian students overseas used this privilege to discuss academic topics at first but then they went further, addressing the current taboos in order to reveal home truths. In 1990, John MacDougall-a US citizen whose firm specialized in research findings and quality articles from Indonesian media-had created a mailing-list known around the world as 'Apakabar (how's life)'. Considering the content of news spread out in 'Apakabar', this mailing-list grew phenomenally and became a key center of information.
At home, the banning of three leading magazines Tempo, Editor, and DeTIK in 1994 created another flock to the Net. Journalists of ex-Tempo decided to go online with 'Tempo Interaktif'. They then joined with other journalists and activists from NGOs and the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum - LBH) who had already connected to worldwide institutions overseas.
The Indonesian people's need and desire for reliable and trustworthy information created even wider use of the Internet. Sites and list-services regarding Indonesian hot news brightened up the Indonesian netters. Besides Apakabar and Tempo Interaktif, there were also: Joyo News Service (in English), SiaR, KDPNet (by the activists), AJINews (by the Alliance of Independent Journalists), MateBEAN (specializing in matters concerning the then-province of East Timor), MamberaMo (specializing in matters concerning the province of Irian Jaya), MeunaSAH (specializing in matters concerning the province of Aceh) and even GoRo-GoRo which was filled with political jokes. Journalists posted their mainstream-rejected-news to these lists, together with other posters that consisted of academics, researchers, activists, and also military and government personnel.
This flood of uncensored views and information was printed up at warnets by student activists and entrepreneurs and sold on campuses. The white-collar workers distributed downloaded items and articles to their relatives and friends. Photocopy operators kept some of the copies and disseminated them within their neighborhood. On and on, the information spread quickly and widely like a bushfire in a dry season. Together with the advocacy works of activists, oppressed people joined the students rallies to go downtown to Parliament. Previous incidents such as the lack of food, currency's falling, student killings by troops, plundering in riots, helped foster a strong drive for unity. Mainstream media instinctively followed the market imperatives as the authorities became too busy trying to save their own lives and to maintain a watch or control on media reporting.
The Net Makes It Worse
The resignation of Soeharto opened up a Pandora's box. Pursuant to the Indonesian Constitution, Soeharto was succeeded by his Vice President, B.J. Habibie, a man of considerable scientific skills who, nonetheless, had never been expected to govern the nation. Prior to Soeharto's resignation, the post of Vice President in Indonesia during the New Order had been largely a sinecure and few imagined that a Vice President might actually be called upon to succeed President Soeharto.
Beginning with banners rejecting B.J. Habibie's Presidency that were up on the walls only three hours after his inauguration, the country staggered from crisis to crisis. Top men vied one another for the first place as power became more diffuse. In the vacuum created by the resignation of the only President that many Indonesians had ever known, B.J. Habibie found himself too busy trying to survive the machinations of his political rivals to address the crises facing the nation. With all certainty seemingly gone, interests that had united to depose Soeharto now fell apart and competed with each other to promote their particular interest in the new political environment. Communities returned to their own agendas and demanded their needs be met.
The Minister of Information under the Habibie administration, Yunus Josfiah, de-regulated the media and Press Publication Enterprise Permit (SIUPP - Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers) became easily available. As a consequence, more than 1,600 SIUPP were issued between 16 months, May 1998 and October 1999. By comparison, only 267 SIUPP were issued during the entire 32 years of the New Order.
Josfiah also eliminated the monopoly of the Indonesian Journalists Association (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia - PWI), which was the only legal journalists union throughout the reign of the New Order. New journalist associations and unions soon sprouted.
Under the umbrella of these new freedoms, the freed-up media personnel rushed to owners' replacements. Politicians, activists and academics now express their views freely on news programs, talk shows and in print. Topics of discussion range from religion to race and even to the wealth of Soeharto and his family.
On the Internet, traffic has increased as ordinary citizens can also voice their views and opinions alongside journalists, academics and other "experts". As the technology becomes more common among certain people in the cities, the sites and list-services continue to expand and so a new uproaring of life has begun.
By way of example, we may cite the letter "Cried of a beloved Native Son", which was forwarded by an anthropology lecturer to a local anthropology mailing-list. It was a replied-message by "M" who showed sympathy to an anonymous letter with the plight of the Dayak people in the province of Central Kalimantan and complained of how the Dayaks, who were "forced" by the government to give their traditional lands to transmigrants from the province of Madura, were victims in their own land. This referred to the ethnic conflict (Dayak-Madura) occurred in Sampit - Palangka Raya - Central Kalimantan on Sunday, February 18, 2001. The long 'original' message told of how the Madura migrants did not behave well, playing on the popular image of the Dayaks as 'cannibals'. It presented many arguments. The poster "M" suggested readers respect Dayak people, and support their cause.
"Cried of a beloved Native Son" drew a reply from an Indonesian anthropologist in Australia who questioned the impartiality of "M", inquired as to the "unique wisdom" supposedly held by the Dayaks, questioned whether the Madurese transmigrants were in fact arrogant, and suggested that the Dayaks had little claim to their "traditional lands".
The exchange of postings was enthusiastic but brief, and gradually faded away. Some days later, the topic was revived by a new author who quoted the contents of "Cried of a beloved Native Son" in a manner that suggested that it was a work of fact rather than opinion. And it is herein, perhaps, that the problem lies.
As the same views are expressed and expressed again by diverse parties, matters initially expressed as opinion soon come to take on the characteristics of fact. The original statement is lost in the deluge of comment that follows and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to establish the veracity of a statement. As Roland Barthes puts it, text has no beginning and no end when the reader becomes the producer of text as well as its consumer.
The chain of arguments illustrates how people need to have second thoughts on accepting the substance or content of what gets posted on the Net. Interpretation upon interpretation continue to be posted and no body knows the identity of the first poster of that specific information.
Section 3. Perceived Credibility of the Internet's Content
Pre-resignation
The inability, in the face of the Economic Crisis, of the New Order to continue to provide Indonesians with the economic advantages that formed the basis of Indonesia's social contract gave dissatisfied Indonesians a common goal: the dethroning of Soeharto and the destruction of the New Order.
Because this common goal was held so widely in Indonesia, and because the Internet was a-perhaps the-medium through which this goal was promoted and organized, information posted on the Internet in Indonesia before the resignation of Soeharto was widely regarded as credible and accurate. This was the case notwithstanding that the anonymity of the Internet and the fear of the authorities ensured that no one knew the source of the information posted or the identity of its author. The sharing of a common goal generated a degree of trust between Indonesians, and it was this trust that was the foundation of the reputation for veracity that the Internet enjoyed in Indonesia prior to the resignation of Soeharto.
Post-resignation
With the resignation of Soeharto, Indonesians' common goal was fulfilled. Without the unifying force of a common goal, interests and individuals within Indonesian society began to compete in their attempts to promote their own views and ideas in the uncertain aftermath of Soeharto's fall.
And what better instrument could there be for the promotion of views and ideas than the Internet? Having proven its effectiveness in the struggle to depose Soeharto, the Internet was quickly drafted by innumerable Indonesians as a tool for free expression, as a forum for their point of view. And it is at this point precisely that the credibility in Indonesia of information posted on the Internet began to wane.
The reputation for veracity that the Internet enjoyed in Indonesia prior to the resignation of Soeharto fell victim to the loss of the Indonesians' common goal and to the very freedom of speech that the Internet allows. Without the unity of a common goal and with the free expression of competing views, the nature of the information posted on the Indonesian Internet changed: the united certainty of the Soeharto-era postings was replaced with the divisive uncertainty of the post-Soeharto postings. And in this context of competing and contradictory views, the trust which came of unity and which formed the very basis for the Internet's reputation for truthfulness in Indonesia, crumbled.
Conclusion
The case studies examined in the preparation of this paper suggest that trust and belief generated between parties via the Internet can carry over into everyday life and motivate individuals to action. They also suggest a mutual dependence between the Internet and the mainstream media.
These conclusions must be viewed in the light of the identity of the authors of Internet postings. Commonly, information posted on the Internet is authored anonymously. Thus, many of the researcher's tools-observation, in particular-become limited or useless in the context of a study of on-line information. With the identity of the author concealed, the researcher is limited solely to the analysis of the information posted. Those who are used to knowing clearly the identity of their informants will now wonder about the restricted identity given by the on-line informant. Observation of informants' daily activities can not be explored. Closeness to an informant common in off-line fieldwork where the researcher can chat daily, is now limited to the on-line informant's reply.
Within the methodological understandings of Anthropology, it is an accepted standard that the clear and distinctive identity of an informant or a subject is imperative. Nevertheless, the informants and subjects found on the Internet have, frequently, anonymous identity. It may be argued, therefore, that the Internet is not a proper sphere for Anthropological study. If so, then, what is the role of identity in our appraisal, evaluation or understanding of information and communication?
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