Basic-beliefs in Epistemic Justification

Mohammad Mozammel Hoque

Asst. Professor of Philosophy

University of Chittagong

Abstract: In the epistemic appraisal, both in foundationalism and coherentism, basic-beliefs play a vital role. In foundationalism it is the justification criteria and in coherentism it constitutes the belief-set as the atoms forms of a matter. But the basic-beliefs are left by both groups as unexplainable in their constitution and true nature. Here epistemic justifications of both kinds face the perennial problem of dogmatism on one side and skepticism on the other side. In this paper the author will intend to identify the 'reality' of basic-beliefs in epistemic justification as something like 'intuitive', instead of empirical, but still epistemic justification is possible.

Epistemic Justification: Foundationalism-

            Foundationalism and coherentism are proposed alternatively as theory of epistemic justification by the leading epistemologists[1]. "Foundationalism holds that a justified belief that is not itself immediately justified must be grounded in such a way that belief in the ground, or in the ground of the ground, or in a ground of that ground at least immediately justifiable."[2]

^*Our basic-beliefs are beliefs, which is concern with the nature of our sensory states, our own immediate experiences. According to Chisholm, the self-presenting basic apprehensions of empirical beliefs 'may be justified even though no other belief constitutes a reason for thinking it to be true'.[3]

            Foundationalism is of two kinds: (a) with fallibility, (b) and without fallibility.

Foundationalism with infallibility: These is the form of classical foundationalism or foundationalism in the strong sense. C.I. Lewis, the most eminent classical foundationalist of this century, held that 'unless something is certain, nothing else is even probable.'[4] There are two forms of justification: non-sensory by sensory and justification of the sensory beliefs. In this form of foundationalism 'justification of the sensory' beliefs is unworking as the sensory beliefs are reduced ultimately in non-inferential infallible basic beliefs.

Foundationalism without infallibility: However there are some other forms of foundationalism, which attempt to accommodate some sort of 'justification' of the basic-beliefs. These weaker versions of foundationalism are stated briefly-

q       Dancy's conditional justification form of foundationalism: Jonathon Dancy proposes a weaker version of foundationalism accommodating the role of non-basic belief in the partial justification of basic beliefs. He puts an example of traffic light to mention his view with the following argument: "although we do normally accept without query a person's description of his own sensory states, we sometimes object by saying, for instance, 'surely that traffic doesn't look orange to you. It's the top light and the top lights are always red'. If non-basic beliefs such as (this) can reduce the justification of basic beliefs, they can presumably also increase it, and in this case there would be the possibility that although our beliefs about out sensory states are always partially justified just because of their subject matter, they are never completely or satisfactorily justified unless there is confirming or at the least a lack of disconfirming evidence at the non-basic level."[5]

q       C.I. Lewis[6] considers the basic-beliefs as incorrigible portion of the epistemic structure.

q       Rene Descartes considers the basic-belief (his cogito) as indoubitable in his Meditations.

q       J.L. Austin introduces his defeasible justification form of foundationalism in his Sense and Sensibilia[7]. He considers the basic-beliefs as given 'data', which are fully justified unless something arises to defeat their justification. He seems to claim that beliefs are justified by appeal to the facts. He argues, "what justifies my belief that there is a pig before me is just the pig".

q       Dancy, however, proposes an another possible weaker version of foundationalism which he claims as 'a final version' that holds beliefs given us as 'data' are never fully justified merely for that reason, but that all such beliefs are already partially justified, quite apart from any further support they may receive from other beliefs. ...This is the foundationalism, which accepts F¹ but not F².[8] F¹ is a foundationalists response to the regress argument that there are two forms of justification, inferential and non-inferential. And, F² means the assumption that the basic-beliefs are never justified even in part, by appeal to non-basic beliefs.

Coherentism-

            According to coherentism each belief is to be tested by appeal to the role it plays in a given set of beliefs. If the set is more coherent with any particular belief as a member is rather than with any alternative, the belief is justified.[9] Coherence is of two kind: (a) Internal, (b) and External Coherence. A.I. Goldman[10] is one of the leading externalists. On the contrary L. Bonjour[11] and like others prefer internalism as the form of the coherentist theory of epistemic justification. The main thing in internalism is that 'everything relevant to justification should be transparently available to the believer, for, what he believes is dependent not only on his subjective states but on the independent state of the world. Internal justification occurs when all the relevant clauses are true; external justification occurs when all the other clauses are true too.[12] In the internalist justification 'the coherence of the set would always be increased by the addition of the belief that the relevant relations of mutual explanatoriness exist'.[13] But an externalists position is that a's belief that p was acquired simply by a reliable method.[14]

Forms of Coherentism-

            There are a few forms of coherentism as theory of epistemic justification. All coherentists agree that consistency is a necessary condition for coherence. Bradley[15] included completeness as a necessary condition of coherence. Brand Blanshard[16] emphasizes on the notion of entailment as one of the conditions of coherence theory of epistemic justification. Given a, if a entails b then b must be true.

On basis of security status of beliefs epistemic coherentism can be classified with two positions: Pure (or classical) coherentism and weak coherentism. We know, it is only the beliefs that constitute the belief-set. Before the inclusion of a particular belief in a particular belief-set, the justification status of it is considered as the antecedent security and after placement of that belief in that particular belief-set, the status of the concern belief will be considered as its subsequent security. Pure coherentism holds that 'no belief has any greater antecedent security than any other[17]. Extreme form of 'pure coherentism' maintains that no beliefs have any antecedent security at all'. Mainly to meet the demand of 'empiricism' weak coherentism admits sensory beliefs of having antecedent security. F.H. Bradley, an empiricist-idealist intends to classify that 'data stand for acceptance into our world in the same way and by the same criteria, as does any other proposition.[18] The test in each case what he calls 'system'.

            This is a brief sketch of foundationalism and coherentism as the competing theories. Next, the author is willing to attempt to determine the position and role of basic-beliefs; at first in coherentist approach:

The Role of Basic-beliefs in Coherentism:

            In all the forms of coherentism, basic-beliefs have its own place. Actually, coherentism, in my consideration, is an extension of foundationalism with a different approach. It deals with belief-sets, not with individual beliefs. But, where from this given belief-sets - question like this is very much relevant. A belief-set is a some total of beliefs, we know. Coherentism is consistent only in its extreme form that no belief has any antecedent security at all. If we claim that all beliefs are with equal antecedent security, we are clearly mistaken. Equality denotes the presence or possibility of inequality. And even the possibility of inequality (in antecedent security) will obviously destroy coherentism as a non-foundational and independent theory of epistemic justification.

            In fact coherentism is acceptable when an already established belief-set is present, or proved as possible there. To verify a new candidate, it's all right. In this case, we can even ignore the regress argument that our concern is not to justify the 'whole' (if any) set, but to test the coherence-contributing capability of the new candidate (of belief). But, without the given set, and by denying any sort of antecedent security, the whole coherentists' structure cracks down. Obviously we find that some independent reasons of sensory beliefs has some special role in the epistemology. Jonathon Dancy, who finally contended to identify himself as a coherentist in the classical sense, does confesses that 'not all these reasons are of equal weights'.[19] Moreover, we have pointed it that coherentists can refute the regress argument only in the form of justification of parts, not of the whole set. Justification of 'parts' in a given set is all right if and only if the 'parts' have no antecedent security at all. But justification is a mutual process, not only among the parts (i.e. the beliefs) of a set but of the parts with the non-inferential basics of that particular belief. 

            Why we need epistemic justification? If the answer is that justification is just for justification, not for finding the truth, then coherentism is partially acceptable. But, if we need justification to reach the level of truth then the coherence line of argument is totally unacceptable. Roderick M. Chisholm puts a nice example about the notion of transitivity of propositional relations as follows:

  "A is the surface of a chessboard and thus contains 64 squares; B is a subsurface of A that contains 36 squares; C is a surface of B that contains 25 squares; and D is a subsurface of C that contains 16 squares. Clearly, most of the squares in A are in B, most of the squares in B are in C, and most of the squares in C are in D. But it is not the case that most of the squares in A are in D." [20]

 I agree with Chisholm that 'any adequate theory of knowledge and epistemic justification requires basic apprehensions as well as mutual support'.[21] But my interest (and objection as well) is in the formulation of these 'basic-beliefs'. I agree also that if once, any way, we are able to determine the required basic-beliefs properly; there is no problem to build an epistemic superstructure by both the basic-beliefs and mutual entailment of propositions. To avoid this problem of determining the basic-beliefs with justification, the coherentists intend to discard the sense perceptual degrees though they are primarily committed to clarify the real sense of this sensual world; no matter in the empirical or rational approach.

            If we once admit the inequality in the degree of sensual perception, we are instantly dropped into any of the forms of foundationalism; where sense data are classified by inferential and non-inferential forms.

            Is foundationalism sound enough? Yes, it is, if the acquisition process of the level of basic-belief stand undisputed. But the matter is not the so and these so-called basic-beliefs can be attacked seriously from many points. The idea of partial justification of basic-beliefs by appeal to non-basic-beliefs replaces the unique characteristic of foundationalism with a contradictory two-tier justification. The proposals of 'weaker versions' of foundationalism seem to intend to cross the verification-gate by using the excuse of possibility of verbal errors of expression or description. Any foundationalist, somehow, admits some sorts of infallibility of basic-beliefs in the base level of epistemic appraisal.

            Hence, what is the source of these main ingredient basic- (i.e. infallible, at least as it is taken) beliefs? The 'object' (if any)? Or, the sense states? Or, the beliefs? Or, the linguistic expressions? This complexity is shown in the following diagram:

(A₁)Non-substantial or abstract Realities

(A₂)Objects      

(B)Sensual States     

(C)Beliefs                  

(D)Linguistic Expressions   

 Here, A_1, A_2, B, c and D all are directly concerned with                                                        Infallibility of basic beliefs.

Which is the source of epistemic infallibility, no matter this kind of infallibility is absolute or conditional? A₁ or A₂? B? C? Or D? Foundationalists do not answer this basic question. On the contrary, the coherentists' attitude to bypass the intensity status of belief itself by denying the possible inequality of antecedent security is just like to recognize anything that looks like a man but actually is a human-dummy. Or, to identify a dead body as a man. Foundationalists' attitude is to recognize anything as man that response like a man though, may be, it is merely a robot.

Foundationalists' primary aim too, we know, is to find any way to establish epistemology as possible. Surprisingly, they claim for no justification of the epistemic 'seeds', which they call 'basic-beliefs'. To introduce a lucid term as 'self-presenting basic apprehensions', is easy, perhaps necessary; but to give-up its justification is definitely contradictory.

The weaker forms of foundationalism consider the basics as incorrigible, or indoubitable which is neither empirically, nor rationally acceptable as the foundation of knowledge. Incorrigibility is always tentative. It may be relatively true. It is always under the threat of correction, which may turn on the entire epistemic structure. Rather, it lacks the well-propagated certainty of knowledge. Descartes' indoubitability too has the same problem. Is indoubitability empirical? Or, non-empirical? If it is non-empirical, than what is it other than intuitive? If it is something rational, then instantly the Cartesian group has to answer the (existentialistic) question: Among the reason and the self, which is the first, and generates the another? To my consideration, the reason may be a process or way to know the 'self', but the precedence of the self can't be denied under any circumstances. Not even to establish a rationalistic theory concerning the source of knowledge. As, rationality considers empirical sources up to a limit, but goes beyond the empirical phenomenon to rational criteria; so the rational criteria with their own validity and acceptability ultimately have to accommodate the phenomenon of intuitive faculty.

            At this stage a rationalist have to stand on something indoubitable as the cogito of Descartes, which has no (external) 'proof' and primarily evidence-transcendent. Without any usual 'proof' it is true, just because it can't be doubted in any way. Why? Because, we feel 'it', obviously without any intermediary link or help. Then this sort of knowledge is of what kind, other than intuitive?

            Somehow, my main point is to light upon the constitution and true nature of basic-beliefs, which appears to be something like 'intuitive'. Portraying the basic-beliefs as intuitive is no solution at all. The problem of justification is not solved yet. We know, intuition do not cares for justification. It justifies the others keeping itself beyond any justification.

            With all the problems, viz. of whom sensory states and when, basic-beliefs have something to get acceptance, even if these are as intuitive in nature. Let us consider the case of the existence of our own selves. Even if we fail to identify it with any of our organs or region of our body, or by any of our activities, still everyone feels it by himself alone. And when we, in any way, communicate with other persons, we come to know convincingly that they also feel and recognize their own 'self' most certainly. This is what I intend to call the tacit-agreement of personal feelings which is the proper way for the basic-beliefs to play active part in epistemic appraisal.

            If we leave up the justification after a few or sufficient immediate circle(s), then epistemology is possible in the traditional approaches of foundationalism and coherentism. I have already agreed with Chisholm that both foundationalism and coherence is necessary for epistemic justification. Chisholm is well satisfied just to refer to the self-presenting basic-apprehensions. But the paper presenter is uncontended but compelled to take such a position in absence of any acceptable alternative. Intuitive faculty, as well as empirical and rational, may also be a realistic working source of knowledge. The alternative to this proposed coherentist-foundational form of epistemic justification, is skepticism, which is leading to agnosticism. I will place only two arguments against skepticism, though the present topic is not mainly focussed on the 'skepticism issue'.            

(a) In the case of foundationalism, the skeptics are unstopped to demand 'justification'. They consider any inference at all time, as conditional; which is a form of dogmatism in the disguise of regress.

(b) In the case of coherence, the skeptics are untiringly interested to invite any further justification, which is neither appeared yet, nor have any actual possibility of becoming immediately, or at some time to come. In all perspectives, they do believe in a quite unreal 'final set'. This skeptic position too, is dogmatic.

Conclusion: On my observations on foundationalism and coherentism as epistemic justification theory, it appears that the basic-beliefs are inevitable. Basic-beliefs can rightly serve us to build an epistemic structure in the way of the tacit-agreement of personal feelings. Yet, they are at best the 'working units'; not defined truly as definite as we generally think of the 'empirical inputs'. In this way an operational form of Epistemology is possible. The non-empirical (perhaps, intuitive) nature of basic-beliefs make them most vividly evident to the subject, but remain as most difficult, even impossible to be recognized unless he (the another person) himself achieve them equally in his own way, and in his own perceptual-world. Somehow, any justification criterion actually seems to overshadow the sanctity of certainty in epistemic appraisals, and introduces some more metaphysical questions that should be discussed separately, and are yet to be answered properly.