Military vs. Diplomatic Overtures: A Comparative Study of North and South Korean Self-Defense Procedure in the Post-Cold War Period

 

 

A Paper Presented in the 18^th The International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA) conference

Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan,

December 6-10, 2004

 

 

Mortuza Khaled

Department of History

University of Rajshahi

Bangladesh

 

 

 

 

Military vs. Diplomatic Overtures: A Comparative Study of North and South Korean Self-Defense Procedure in the Post-Cold War Period

 

 

 

At the end of the 1940s Korea was divided on the question of socialism vs capitalism. In 1950 Korean War started for the unification of peninsula by force. After a bitter fighting for three years and after millions of killings the war ceased without any result. The conflict been brought to a conclusion in a truce, not a peace treaty and two Koreas technically remain at war. After war, the main ally of South Korea, the United States deployed a large numbers of solders in South Korea for her security and territorial integrity. On the otherhand, socialist China and Soviet Union followed by same security to North Korea. Since division of the Korean peninsula until the early 1990s, the two Koreas had competed to defeat the other completely rather than to accommodate with each other.^[1] The North concentrated its efforts to build up forces to wipe out the South Korea. On the contrary, South Korea focused on economic development to win the competition with the North, while relying on the security provision by the United States.^[2] On the other hand, North Korea continues to give priority attention to its military build up despite its deteriorating economy.^[3] In this paper attempt has been made to study both Korean self-defence procedure and its impacts on peninsula as well as East Asia.

 

 

North Korea�s Defense Policy, 1953-1991

In the Korean War China directly and Soviet Union indirectly participated. The USSR supplied arms, ammunition, medicine and food. After the War both super powers countries remained ally and helped to reconstruction of North Korea. In spite of the help of socialist block, North Korea preceded to develop its own defence mechanism. It's military build up began as an impact of Soviet strategic and Chinese tactical influences since 1960s. North Korea adopted a new military line on the basis of four basic themes for Korean People�s Army. First, arming the entire population of the North; Second, the fortification of the total country; Third, the training of all soldiers as a cadre force, and Forth, modernization of arms. On the question of military strategy and tactics, the Pyongyang government always gives ideology and politics first priority and can be expected to continue to try to keep a firm lid on creeping professionalism in the armed forces. Kim Il-sung, the leader of North Korea remarked, �The outcome of a war is not decided by modern weapons and military technology. Even if the imperialists have superior military technology, the People�s Army of North Korea has superiority in political ideology. ... By virtue of these political and ideological superiorities the People�s Army may win over the technically superior enemy.�^[4] The DPRK also places great emphasis on military techniques, technology, and weapons build up. After the Korean War, North Korea proceeded to increase its arms and ammunition production capability. Initially, it was limited to producing small arms and ammunition, and artillery rockets. With these ends in view, the DPRK singed certain agreements with the former Soviet Union which allowed North Korea to manufacture weapons system for a ten-year period, and usually replaced with a subsequent agreement. The DPRK did not limit these licensing agreements to the Soviet Union. Similar arrangements were also made with China, although acquisitions from China seemed to be limited to naval materials.^[5]

North Korea built up a large military force for security. Over 90 percent of all Korean People�s Army personnel -- more than 1 million troops are in the ground forces that are known as the Korean People's Army. In 1960s Ground forces may have totalled fewer than 400,000 persons and probably did not raise much above that figure before 1972. The force expanded relentlessly over the next two decades. In 1992, there were 1 million personnel. North Korea has organized a grand total of seven million men and women into reserve units. Reserve Military Training Unit, Workers-Peasants Militia, and the Young Red Guards make up most of the number. At the end of the 20^th century North Korea has promoted herself as the one of the most powerful military power in the world. The U.S. Department of States observes North Korea in the following manner:

 

North Korea now has the fourth-largest army in the world. It has an estimated 1.2 million armed personnel, compared to about 650,000 in the South. Military spending equals 20%-25% of GNP, with about 20% of men ages 17-54 in the regular armed forces. North Korean forces have a substantial numerical advantage over the South (approximately 2 or 3 to 1) in several key categories of offensive weapons--tanks, long-range artillery, and armoured personnel carriers.

The North has perhaps the world's second-largest special operations force, designed for insertion behind the lines in wartime. While the North has a relatively impressive fleet of submarines, its surface fleet has a very limited capability. Its air force has twice the number of aircraft as the South, but, except for a few advanced fighters, the North's air force is obsolete. The North deploys the bulk of its forces well forward, along the DMZ. Several North Korean military tunnels under the DMZ were discovered in the 1970s.^[6]

 

At the beginning in the 1970s, North Korea began to seek technology and equipment for arms. It�s made agreements with Japan, West Germany, India, as well as several other West European countries. Japan supplied the much needed technology for marine radars, medium and heavy trucks, telecommunications equipment, and great quantities of underwater infiltration gear. From Austria, North Korea received gun barrel technology and forging equipment.^[7] In the 1980s, North Korea began a major reorganization and modernization of its ground forces. Between 1984 and 1992, the army added about 1,000 tanks, over 2,500 APC infantry fighting vehicles, and about 6,000 artillery tubes or rocket launchers. In 1991 North Korea had about twice the advantage in numbers of tanks and artillery, and a 1.5 to 1 advantage in personnel over its potential adversaries, the United States-Republic of Korea defenses to the south. Thus, North Korea maintains the world�s fifth largest, heavily armed, and mostly forward-deployed military forces.

 

North Korea�s Nuclear Program

Thus North Korea has built up a powerful military service. Besides these it took initiative for development of nuclear weapons too. It began its nuclear research in the early 1950s and established the institutional base to train the human resources for its nuclear development program. The Atomic Energy Research Institute was established along with the Academy of Sciences in December 1952, but the nuclear program did not began until North Korea signed agreements with the Soviet Union. In February 1956, Pyongyang approved the founding charter of the Soviet Union�s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, and began to send scientists and technicians there for training.^[8] In 1959, North Korea and the USSR signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy that included a provision for Soviet help and cooperation in establishing a nuclear research complex. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided widespread technical assistance to North Korea and constructed its Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Centre. It installed a Soviet IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor, and other facilities. The research reactor was used to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel.^[9] The cabinet and the Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the nuclear facilities. The program appeared to begin as a peaceful one. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 may have prompted North Korean leaders for initiation of a dedicated nuclear weapons program.

In the late 1960s, North Korea continued to expand its research to support a nuclear program for both civilian and military applications. By the early 1970s, North Korean scientists were successful in using indigenous technology for the expansion of the IRT-2000 reactor. During this time Pyongyang began to acquire plutonium-reprocessing technology from the Soviet Union. In July 1977, North Korea signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the USSR that brought the IRT-2000 research reactor and a critical assembly in Yŏngbyŏn-kun under IAEA safeguards.^[10]

North Korea�s energy concerns make nuclear energy a legitimate rationale for nuclear power, and Pyongyang explored the acquisition of light water reactor technology in the early to mid-1980s. During this period North Korea signed the NPT in December 1985 in exchange of Soviet assistance in the construction of four light water reactors. In North Korea�s case, it was later discovered that the agency provided the wrong documents for the safeguards agreement and the IAEA subsequently gave North Korea an additional 18 months to complete the agreement. Nevertheless, North Korea failed to meet the extended deadline.

In order to build up a powerful military set up North Korea maintained good relations with China, Soviet Union and also with the Socialist block of East Europe. All those countries had become long-term allies of North Korea. In this way, North Korea reconciled her security problem. But this status quo was stalled at the beginning of 1990s at the collapse of socialist block also as well as Soviet Union.

The Fall of the Soviet Union and Socialist country in Eastern Europe created a changed political situation. Since 1980s China started pursuing open market economy policy. This changed political situation had created an impact on North Korea. First, North Korea had a large business market in those countries which collapsed. Second, North Korean financial proprietors become bankrupt. Third, North Korea had last its sources of arms. According to Professor Jin-Hyun Paik, �The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet empire took away from Pyongyang the protective nuclear umbrella of its former ally.�^[11] The collapse of communism around the world worried Pyongyang that it might meet the same fate that befell its former allies in Europe.

Moreover, North Korea also dislikes the rapid Moscow-Seoul rapprochement and full diplomatic relations by September 1990. Later on, Russia�s Boris Yeltsin administration showed unsophisticated attitude towards North Korea. Post-Mao China also established diplomatic relations with South Korea. All those external changes created new security concern for the North. The leaders of the above mentioned countries believed that North Korea must solve its security problem herself. It came to see the nuclear weapons program as a key to its very survival.^[12] In this situation North Korea took initiative to arm with Nuclear weapons. On March 12,1993, it declared its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) The leader of North Korea claimed that its actions were �well-justified self-defense measures against the nuclear war manoeuvres of the United States and the unjust acts of the International Atomic Energy Agency.�^[13]

 

South Korea�s Policy towards North Korea up to 1993

In comparison to North Korea�s military build up South Korean preparation is meager. The Republic of Korean army is composed of 11 corps, 50-odd divisions, about 20 brigades, some 560,000 troops, 2,200 tanks, 4,850 pieces of field artillery, and 2,200 armoured vehicles. The ground forces are organized into three armies and several independent operational and functional commands. To conduct offensive manoeuvre warfare, the ROK military has gained offensive manoeuvre capability by reorganising some of its infantry divisions into mechanized units. It has reorganized other infantry divisions as well, and increased unit force capability with new firearms to secure combat capability at the initial stage of a war.^[14]

In spite of the military armament of North Korea, South Korean leader continuously pursue a soft engagement policy towards North Korea. South Korea first openly rejected the policy of unification by force in the 1960s. On September 24,1960 South Korea�s Foreign Ministry Chung Il-hyung declared in the Parliament �..such reckless policy of trying to unify Korea by force as advocated by the past government should now be discarded.�^[15]� Thus, South Korea started a soft engagement policy since 1970s in order to transform the North into a moderate one.

The process continued during the next president Park Chung-Hee. President Park Chung Hee appealed, to the North Korea in his 25^th anniversary of independent day lecture on August 15, 1970. He proposed North Korea for the first time that the ROK was willing to coexist peacefully with Pyongyang and urged the North to replace the hostile military confrontation with socio-economic competition.^[16] On 4^th July 1972 for the first time since the Korean War the two Koreas sat for unification in a round table conference and for avoiding war between themselves. They established telecommunication system after this conference.^[17] Thus Park Hee initiated talks with North Korea. This policy also followed by the next president ruler Choon Do Hwan. In 1980 he told a Japanese journalist that, he was eager to talk with North Korea on the question of unification and would like to meet the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung.

Park�s successor, Chun Doo Hwan, went one step further. In his 1982 �New Year�s Policy Statement� he had announced a �new peaceful unification formula� for the Korean peninsula, Chun urged that the �unnatural relations� between the two Koreas be brought to an end and be replaced by �normal contacts that promote the national well-being.�^[18] To him these contacts should be based on fully �normalized relations,� He further stated that both Koreas should promote a broad range of North-South exchanges and cooperation, including trade, transportation, communications, and many other areas. Repeating an idea he had raised the previous year, Chun formally proposed the exchange of high-level delegations to work out procedures for a summit meeting between the top leaders of the two Koreas that would serve as the impetus for a normalization of relations.

The approach of Roh Tae Woo, who succeeded Chun as South Korea�s president, represents a significant extension of this evolving policy. He took much initiative for the development of relation with Socialist countries including North Korea. His policy was known as Nordpolitik. It was an imitation of Germany�s Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik initiated by Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany.^[19] Under this policy South Korea established commercial and diplomatic relations with socialist countries in Eastern Europe. President Roh Tae Woo declared in his inauguration speech in February 1988 that Nordpolitik was the top priority of his presidency. Subsequently, President Roh substantiated his northern policy in the form of the July 7 Declaration of 1988 in which he spelled out the basic guiding principles of his effort to improve relations between South Korea and socialist countries as well as South and North Korea.^[20] Under this policy South Korea was able to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other East European countries. South Korea hoped that successful pursuit of Nordpolitik would reduce the danger of war and bring North Korea to the negotiations table to discuss about varieties of problems concerning the relationship between South and North Korea and ultimately the problem of national unification. In explaining the nature of Nordpolitik South Korean�s Foreign Minister Choi Kwang Soo declared the following statement in July 16,1988,

Recognizing North Korea�s status in the international community, we hope that North Korea will contribute to world peace and the development of mankind in accordance with the spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter; we will cooperate with North Korea so that it will participate in the international community as a responsible member.^[21]

On the whole, however, Nordpolitik was successful, and Seoul's accomplishments could be readily observed in the arena of� sports, trade, and diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst for Nordpolitik. It was the first Olympic Games in twelve years not marred by a bloc-level boycott and had the highest participation ever--159 nations and more than 9,000 athletes. Seoul gained new global recognition and visibility as more than 3 billion people around the world watched the games being televised live.

 

On nuclear issue South Korean President Roh Tae Woo confirmed that South Korea, �...will not manufacture, posses, deploy or use nuclear weapons.�^[22] He also stated that South Korea, �will faithfully carry out this non-nuclear, no chemical-biological weapons policy.�^[23] Therefore, developments continued to unfold. On December 26, Pyongyang made an official statement that it would sign the IAEA safeguards accord soon and it proposed a draft agreement for a �denuclearized Korean Peninsula.� President Roh Tae Woo confirmed on 18 December 1991 that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons.^[24] After wards the North and South Korea signed the �Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,� whereby both sides promised, �not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.� The agreement also bound the two sides to forgo the possession of �nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.�^[25]

 

Nuclear Crisis and Agreed Framework and President Kim Young Sam�s North Korea Policy

Against the backdrop of North Korean nuclear armament South Korean stand was very much clear. South Korea�s policy regarding the North Korea�s nuclear issue was to deter North Korea form developing nuclear weapons and secure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.^[26] For this purpose, South Korea�s Kim Young Sam Government followed the policy to change its position on nuclear weapons by employing of inducements and pressure. In this process South Korea has made some material concessions to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. South Korea agreed with this view and it was acknowledged, though implicitly, in 1991 that American nuclear weapons deployed in the territory of South Korea was removed. To annual �Team Spirit� of military exercises were cancelled for 1992. South Korea even expresses its desire for US-North Korea direct negotiations.^[27] After this historic event, North Korea finally signed the inspection agreement with the IAEA on January 3, 1992. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea provided an �initial declaration� of its nuclear facilities and materials and provided access for IAEA inspectors to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration. Six rounds of inspections began in May 1992 and concluded in February 1993. In this way, South Korea pursued a diplomatic means to achieve its security.

South Korea did not followed the same way of military build up policy in Korean Peninsula as the North did it. In the early 1990s, South Korean diplomatic means was completely successful. The South Korean leader continued to pursue this policy later on too. In this way the two Korean leaders started a series of prime ministerial meetings since September 1990, which resulted the signing of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and the Joint Declaration of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Since then inter-Korean trade has been also growing to reach a total volume of $300 million per annum.

In this background the United States proceeded to unravel the problem. President Bill Clinton appointed former President Jimmy Carter as negator. In June 1994, Jimmy Carter travelled Pyongyang to meet Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader. Carter announced from Pyongyang that Kim had accepted the broad outline of a deal that was later finalized as the �Agreed Framework� in October 1994. Under the agreement, North Korea reaffirmed its membership in the NTP and has frozen its nuclear program. Specifically, on November 1,1993, the North Korean Administrative Council made the decision to halt construction of its 50-MWT and 200-MWT reactors, cancelled the pending reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and sealed the radiochemical laboratory. The IAEA was allowed to conduct a comprehensive inspection to certify the nuclear freeze. In exchange, the United States agreed to lead an international consortium to construct two light water power reactors, and provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the first reactor came online with a target date of 2003. Furthermore, the United States was to provide �formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US.� The name of the treaty was Agreed Framework and it was signed by the Clinton Administration and North Korea on October 21,1994.^[28] Article III, Section 2, of the agreement provides that the US �takes steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.� But later on with the deterioration of the situation, North Korea refused to negotiate with South Korea. In the half year since the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, North Korea made clear that it has got no intention to talk with Seoul. It has taken a step further by resurrection its refusal to accept South Korean light-water nuclear reactors as part of the Agreed Framework. In this situation on March 15, 1995, when Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States expressed their common desire to implement the key provisions of the Agreed Framework and signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). As KEDO's founding members, these three countries constituted the Organization's Executive Board. However, KEDO's charter allowed for additional states and international organizations that support the purposes of the Organization and offer assistance, such as providing funds, goods, or services, to also become members of the Organization. Furthermore, the establishment Agreement also allows for expansion of the Executive Board on the basis of substantial and sustained support to the Organization.^[29] In its reactions, North Korea insisted that it would sign the contract only with the United States. North Korea based its stance on dealings with South Korea. President Kim Young Sam decided in July 1994 not to issue any official statement of condolences to North Korea over the death of its leader Kim Il-sung. Later on, South Korea softened it tone and in the speech as of National Liberation Day President Kim stated that, �We do not want North Korea to be isolated. We hope that North Korea will become a sound member of the International community so that, together with us, it can enhance the capability of our people and make contributions to the world.�^[30]

South Korean�s first civilian President Kim Young Sam came to power in February 1993 in the changing climate of the post-Cold War era. In the past Germany and Yemen, which divided in Cold War age were again united. In these circumstances, Korea has been facing more favourable situation for national unification. He continued to follow the policy of soft engagement to North Korea. He proposed a unification policy toward North Korea, which was familiar as �Unification Formula for National Community.� The formula is subject to three-phased approach to unification and its final goal was unified Korea of one nation and one state. Kim Young Sam also shared former president Roh Tae Woo�s commitment to encouraging North Korea to set aside their ideological rivalry and, as he said in his August 1994 Liberation Day speech, engaging Pyongyang in steps toward building �a national community within which all Koreans can live together.� He further proposed a �Four Party Talks� among the United States, China, and the two Koreas, primarily as a means of bringing Pyongyang into discussions with South Korea. Insisting that the �problems of the North are our own problems� as well, Kim backed up this talk by donating 150,000 tons of rice to relieve Pyongyang�s severe food shortage� the first time South Korea had ever provided the North direct assistance.^[31]

The first phase of unification focuses on the opening of an era of reconciliation and cooperation replacing the long-standing confrontation and antagonism. North and South should attempt to build a genuine partnership for fruitful cooperation. Political reconciliation, military confidence-building, and social and cultural exchanges will be promoted in this regard.

The Second Phase would be the era of the formation of South-North Commonwealth. At an interim stage pending full-fledged unification, the strategy is to institutionalise a Korean Commonwealth and national community. During this phase, a National Community Charter would be promulgated to govern the North-South relations. At this state inter Korean relations would be regularized to some extent and some North-South organizations launched. Inter-Korean disarmament conferences would be pursued and the armistice mechanism would be replaced by peace structure.

In final phase, the North and the South would build a single, democratic republic through their ultimate union according to the Constitution of Unified Korea and through General Elections. National well-being, which stands for the conditions to materialize freedom, equality and human dignity of each member of the community would be attained.^[32] President Kim reaffirmed the goal of a gradual, long-term, peaceful process of unifications, with the building of a single �national community� being the interim objective. Ho-Yeol P.Yoo, one of the top officer of the Foreign Ministry commented on the proposed Unification Formula in this way, � ... A majority of South Koreans agreed with the government�s unification formula and considered it the most realistic way of unifying the divided land.�^[33]

Unfortunately, however, President Kim Sam Young�s soft approach did not satisfy North Korea. The Agreed Framework treaty has frozen North Korea�s nuclear Program. North Korean leader now again proceeded for the rearmament of his country by the development of a different type of weapon program --- the Missile Program.

 

North Korea's Missile Program

Since 1997, North has been stated developing missile weapons. Much of North Korea's rocket technology is based on Soviet-designed SCUD missiles.^[34] North Korea acquired 'SCUD B' technology through collaboration with China and Iran, as well as Egypt in the early 1980s. With the help of Iranian finance, North Korea extended the payload and range of the type, and produced a very much enhanced model powered by multiple engines-designated the No-dong-which was test flown in May 1993. This missile, which has got a range of 1350 kms, covered all of Japan and North and East China.

The two missile variants were then used as the basis for a multi-stage rocket-designated the Taep'o-dong-which was used, according to the North Koreans, to launch a satellite in August 1998. The second stage of the vehicle overflew Japan, splashing down about 1500 kms from the launch site. At that time, US specialists could find no trace of the alleged satellite. Later reports claimed a third (and solid fuelled) stage, though unsuccessful if its payload was a satellite, nevertheless traversed much of the Pacific before crashing into waters off Alaska. US specialists maintain that North Korea has been developing a longer-range Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) version of the Taep'o-dong which could strike targets in the continental US and much of Asia by around 2003. This missile appears to be a further development of SCUD technology using multiple engines. According to some sources, certain of its features may also be copied from the CSS-2 missile type already developed by China.^[35] North Korea's missile program also has an export dimension. It has been claimed that North Korea has exported as many as 400 SCUD type missiles to Iran and Syria. Iranian testing and production of SCUD type missiles was the result of the transfer of technology and components from North Korea.

The Clinton administration came to conclusion that North Korea was expanding its nuclear and missile capability for its security concern and North Korea would abandon its missile program if the security concern were eliminated.^[36] Therefore, President William J. Clinton opened dialogue with North Korea. He appointed his Defense Secretary William Perry for negotiation and his Secretary of States Medellin All Bright also visited North Korea. As a result of kind of favorable U.S response North Korea stop developing missiles. Thus peaceful environment was created in the Korean Peninsula at the end of 1990s. The situation further improved after Kim Dae-jung was elected as the President of South Korea in 1998.

 

President Kim Dae-jung and Sunshine Policy

Kim Dae-jung was elected President in February 1998. He proposed a moderate policy toward North Korea, which is known as the Sunshine Policy. His Sunshine Policy clearly resonated with Clinton�s policy of �engagement� with North Korea.^[37] After his election one top Clinton foreign policy adviser told the press, �We�ve got the man who can probably do more than anyone else to deal with North Korea.�^[38]

The goal of Kim Dae-jung�s policy was not unification but to maintain peaceful coexistence with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung�s policies aim at was consolidating peace by the improvement of relations between the South and North Korea. There are three main characteristics of this policy. First, South Korea would not tolerate of any North Korea�s armed provocation. Second, South Korea has got no intention to undermine or absorb North Korea. Third, South Korea would actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation with the North. The Sunshine policy�s intent was to foster peace, exchange and cooperation with the North. Under this policy, Kim Dae-jung provided humanitarian aid to the North, promoted inter-Korean contacts, and encouraged the U.S and Japan to normalize relations with the North Korea. It backed Pyongyang�s bid to become a �responsible� member of the international society. South Korea had also taken steps to help North Korea revitalize its economy. Under this policy, South Korea provides 3.2 billion US dollars to the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea which amounts to 75 percent of the cost. Humanitarian aid in the form of food and agricultural aid was� provided to North Korea. This enabled the north to meet its food crisis. President Kim Kim Dae-jung has pursued Sunshine Policy although out till his tenure.

Collapse of the Agreed Framework

But Sunshine policy was hindered by the U.S president George Bush administration. The coming of the George Bush administration in Washington in January 2001 marked a turning point in Washington-Pyongyang relations. After Sixteen months in office, in 2001, the Bush administration initiated a North Korea policy review. The policy review concluded that the United States should seek �improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea�s missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture.� From Washington�s perspective, �improved implementation of the Agreed Framework� meant an acceleration of safeguards inspections, even though the agreement did not require Pyongyang to submit to full safeguards inspections to verify its past activities until a significant portion of the reactor construction was completed but before the delivery of critical reactor components. Basically, Bush administration did not trust North Korea and is determined to undo the things its predecessor had done to North Korea.^[39] Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz also dismissed the 1994 Agreed Framework as flawed and criticized Clinton administration for providing the North Korea with too much financial aid.

In response of this action of the USA North Korea has again activated its nuclear program. On Oct. 16, 2002, the U.S.A disclosed that North Korea has admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for the use in nuclear weapons. In December 2002, United States suspended oil shipments to North Korea. North Korea retaliated it by announcing that it would go ahead to restart the plutonium production process again. On December10, 2002, North Korea expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who monitored the Agreed Framework. North Korea also withdrew itself from the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), On Jan. 10, 2003, Pyongyang declared that it would not return to the NPT. In support of its policy North Korea stated, �A dangerous situation where our nation's sovereignty and our state's security are being seriously violated is prevailing on the Korean Peninsula due to the US vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK.�^[40] In this way a decade long peaceful environment has been collapsed. Thus North Korea again starts walking on the way of armament.

Roh Moo-hyun�s North Korea Policy

President Roh Moo-hyun took his office on February 25, 2003 as the 16^th President of Republic of Korea. In his inaugural speech on February 25, President Roh unveiled North Korean Policy what he called the �policy of peace and prosperity.� He has undertaken principles for the reunification of Korea and a peaceful co existence of the two states. These are, (a) Seoul would try to �resolve all pending issues through dialogue.� (b) �give priority to building mutual trust and upholding reciprocity;� �seek active international cooperation on the premise that South and North Korea are the two main actors in inter-Korean relations� and (d) Fourth, �enhance transparency, expand citizen participation, and secure bipartisan support.� Against the backdrop of North Korean armament, it is necessary to develop to a well-defined strategic vision to transform the Korean peninsula from a land of conflicts and disputes into a land of peace and prosperity. President Moo-hyun thinks that North Korean nuclear North Korean problems have become a source of concern not only for South Korea but also indeed for the entire international community. The goal of this policy is to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula and produced substantial improvements in inter-Korean relations. In order to achieve this goal on the basis of the policy of Peace and Prosperity, South Korea hopes resolving North Korea�s nuclear and missile issues peacefully. South Korea has extended large scale of economic cooperation to Pyongyang too. It is opposed to any activity that may escalate military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, South Korea has pursued a comprehensive security policy that takes into account the positive impact of inter-Korean economic cooperation on the promotion of peace.^[41]

Thus, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun administration has proceeded to raise up North Korea�s armament problem as an International one and has taken initiative for a peaceful solution. To solve North Korea�s nuclear problem Japan, U.S.A. Russia and China and Russia have been invited to participate in different conferences held between the North and the South between August 2003 and June 2004. In Beijing, three round talks were held in to prevent North Korean�s nuclear threat. The first round conference was held in 27-29 August, 2003; the second round in February 25-28, 2004 and the third round between June 23 and 26, 2004. In the second round South Korea proposed that if North Korea makes clear its position to dismantle its entire nuclear program it is to be provided with energy assistance by the South.

In the third Round of the Beijing Six-Party Talks North Korea acknowledged that most of its nuclear programs are weapons related. No progress has been achieved so far in the six-party talks. After the third round talks all parties agreed in principle to hold the forth-round talk in Beijing by the end of September 2004.

Conclusion

From security concern North Korea gradually developed its strong-arm force and weapon in the cold war era. In the Post-cold war era, North Korea has developed a policy of self-defense and a steady expansion of its military service both in size and quality. At present it possesses an army of 12 million which stands 4th in rank in the world's largest army. Since 1989 North Korea has undertaken a project for the manufacturing of nuclear arms. In 1994, the Agreed Framework was postponed for the time being. In the second half of the decade of 1990s North Korean nuclear re-armament was stopped for a while and renewed its missile project which led to the development of the Nodong, the Taepodong-2. In 1998 the three-storied Taepodong missile has been developed. The Taepodong ran over South Korea and was dropped into the Sea of Japan. It has also developed its submarine project. North Korea again has initiated its nuclear program in 2001 by breaking terms of the Agreed Framework and created a nuclear panic in the Korean Peninsula as well as in East Asian region.

On the contrary, from the beginning South Korea followed the path of dialogue for a peaceful settlement of the peninsula affairs and economic development. It has developed cordial relations with its former Cold War foe and also pursuing a soft engagement policy towards North Korea. President Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam tried their best to bring about a peaceful reunification of the peninsula through dialogue and conversation. South Korean President Dae-jung under his sunshine policy tried only of unification but a peaceful coexistence with the North. It however, failed to achieve its goal. Present Roh Moo-hyun administration is also pursuing a peaceful co existence policy toward North Korea. It�s trying to uphold good relation with North and brought North Korean nuclear dilemma in international arena. The six-party talk is going on to solve this problem. Against the backdrop of North Korean desperate nuclear build up, South Korea maintains the diplomatic means for self-defense. This is the basic principle of South Korean foreign policy.

 

 

References