| Problems with Moral Relativism | ||||||
| According to Resnik, the arguments for moral relativism include: i) cultural diversity, ii) moral disagreement, and iii) moral tolerance. The argument from cultural diversity claims that it is a matter of fact that people from different societies have different customs and conventions. This is an empirical observation which is difficult, if not impossible, to deny. The second argument suggest that people will have conflicting opinions about moral standards even within the same country, and that therefore morality must be relative. Lastly, the argument from moral tolerance looks at the moral implications of relativism, and claims that it is only through accepting moral relativism that people are able to tolerate moral standards which are not their own. In response to these claims, the non-relativist will argue that even though empirical evidence supports cultural diversity, all cultures have a shared 'core morality,' [1] which is necessary for the survival of any society. Another argument that has been put forward concerns the evolutionary basis of moral values - since we have a shared biology, we must have similar interests and needs related to our survival. The second argument for moral relativism is easily refuted as it commits the naturalistic fallacy. [2] In addition, moral disputes may be due to factual, rather than fundamental moral disagreements. Another case against relativism attacks the claim that relativism implies tolerance. It would be contradictory to believe that tolerance is a universal maxim yet subscribe to moral relativism. Moral relativism is defensible only to the extent that previous attempts to refute it have failed; however, the arguments against relativism have unequivocally established the existence of certain constraints on moral systems. One such constraint is arrived at from the idea of a 'core morality' common to all cultures. The core morality argument opposes the concept of incommensurability, which states that, i) different cultures use different systems of concepts to understand the world, and ii) there is no (non-question begging) way of showing which set of concepts is best. [3] If these claims were true, then it would be impossible to identify other moral systems. At the very least, there must be a shared subject matter on which various cultures may differ in opinion. [4] Similarly, the appeal to our biological nature and interests also places constraints on relativism. It is obvious that humans share basic values, such as the value of nutrition. However, this can only prove that all ethical systems must be compatible with biology, not that they must necessarily share the same fundamental moral principles. [5] In conclusion, the moral implications of both moral relativism and objectivism favour neither perspective; therefore, in considering the opposing views, one must turn to the formal structure of the arguments to determine whether they are valid, and whether the beliefs espoused are, in fact, justified. The arguments put forward hitherto suggest that moral relativism is possible, but it is not without its boundaries, and that proof for an objective morality is unlikely, even though a universal morality is plausible. If a universal morality did exist then it would imply that everyone believes in the same fundamental moral principles, but these values may or may not be objectively right. As a corollary, it is possible that fundamental moral beliefs have changed throughout time and could continue to do so. [6] |
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| Bibliography Levy, Neil. Moral Relativism: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002). [1] Resnik, David B. "Ethical Theory and Its Applications," in The Ethics of Science (London: Routledge, 1998), 14-33. [2 - 6] |
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