| Chinese Regionalism One country, many systems? By ERIC TEO CHU CHEOW, Special to The Japan Times SINGAPORE -- China is said to be changing fast and profoundly, but three recent issues highlight best the changing concept of regionalism in China: * In a statement May 17, China warned Taiwan not "to cross the red line" of Taiwanese independence while acknowledging that Taiwan might be accorded some "international living space" on condition that it accept the "one China" policy. This was the first time that such a phrase (which appears more often in the vocabulary of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian than Beijing leaders) was ever used in an official Beijing statement. Furthermore, the statement did not even mention the "one country, two systems" mantra and significantly downplayed "unification." * China also recently announced that it would allow Guangdong, Hong Kong and other southern provinces to create a regional Pearl Delta grouping. Although this measure was surely aimed at wooing Hong Kong residents before July 1 -- when demonstrators are expected to take to the streets calling for a greater say in Hong Kong's political future and criticizing the beleaguered Tung administration -- the grouping concept departs from the established norms of centralism in Beijing and the Communist Party of China. * In the present debate over China's overheating economy, the central government has been sending inspectors out to the provinces to deal with people's grievances against provincial and municipal government officials -- from fraud and corruption to unequal social treatment and nonpayment of subsidies and wages. Beijing is intent on reining in centripetal forces in its provinces, especially as China goes through one of its biggest socioeconomic revolutions ever. How do these three issues mesh with China's changing concept of regionalism? Let's bear in mind three historical and social factors: First, China's 3,000-year history has been plagued by the key issues of unity, separatism and warlordism. China's unity as a civilization, despite multiple dynasties, has come at a high price. The Chinese warlords of the early days of the republic are not far from people's minds. It took the hardfisted approach of the Communist Party to "re-unify" China after eliminating the warlords. The massive celebrations in early April at the Huangdi (Yellow Emperor) Mausoleum in Shaanxi Province mark the unification of China by the famous emperor 3,000 years ago; Chinese leaders are now referring to China's glorious past and its great civilization in efforts to maintain unity. Second, China prides its civilization before its status as a nation. Throughout Chinese history, the Hans have "sinicized" their invaders. The Mongols during the Yuan Dynasty and the Manchu under the Qing both took on Chinese culture and norms. China's haute civilization was "soft power," which perhaps helps explain the alarm raised in Beijing by threats to "de-sinicize" Taiwan. China's scholars and intellectual elite are grappling with how best to allow regionalism and dialects to flourish while ensuring the preservation of their civilization. Third, China urgently needs to fill a sociocultural void that has emerged. It is obvious today that, with the demise of communism, the frightening advance of materialism and the timid revival of religion, Chinese society has probably no other choice than to turn to nationalism and the glory of its past (and recent) "high civilization" to hold the country together. In this regard, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin's "spiritual civilization" (the third of his "Three Represents"), now inscribed in the constitution, could become the basis of this nationalist revival. More attention must now be focused on managing the quality of growth, including redistributing it among the widest possible cross section of China's population and examining the implications of China's social experimentation, which is already engendering deep tensions. So what is the place of regionalism in the new" China, given the three recent issues and the three socio-historical facts mentioned above? First, China needs to rationalize relations between Beijing and its provinces. This fact is clearly borne out by Beijing's attempt to control and "inspect" its provinces closely, especially as it tries to cool the economy and weed out corruption at local levels. Second, as regionalism seeks to fill the void left by communism amid the current threat from materialism, it must balance the greater economic and political autonomy given to the provinces with the Communist Party's and the central administration's assertion of authority. The Hong Kong controversy highlights this dilemma. Third, China's new regionalism could inspire some hope for future cross-strait relations in terms of according Taiwan "international living space" on condition that it accept the "one-China" policy. China has been deeply shaken by rising Taiwanese nationalism and Taipei's efforts to de-Sinicize just as China is emphasizing its haute civilization. Regionalism in China seems to be poised to take off a la chinoise -- just like socialism before it. This new regionalism would therefore have its own nationalistic characteristics. But hopefully this is the first step in Beijing's march toward a more federalist version of a "one country, many systems" China in the future. Eric Teo Chu Cheow, a business consultant and strategist, is council secretary of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs. The Japan Times: June 22, 2004 |
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