“Bystanders to Genocide” by Samantha Powers, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001
A Report and Reflection by Tim Huether
In 100 days in 1994, over 800,000 people were murdered in a genocide in Rwanda, as the Hutu tried to exterminate the minority Tutsi. Meanwhile, the international community, most notably the U.S., stood by and allowed the killings to happen. Possible reasons include that the government didn’t know, knew but didn’t care, or that regardless of what they knew, nothing constructive could be done about it. However, according to Powers’ interviews, the U.S. clearly knew enough about the genocides early enough to save lives, but ignored chances to step in, and soon, staying out of Rwanda became a specific U.S. policy objective.
Initially, the killings were somewhat difficult to name genocide from the U.S. standpoint, as they may have been mistaken for unfortunate civilian deaths in the course of the ongoing civil war. However, it is hard to claim this as an adequate defense for U.S. policy when one considers that during the first three days of killing, U.S. diplomats in Rwanda told Washington that well-armed Hutu were intent on eliminating the Tutsi.
U.N. peacekeeping efforts within the years leading up to the Rwandan genocide, especially the failure in Somalia, helped create an America that was strongly against peacekeeping. During the conflict, the U.S. never even considered the possibility of sending troops.
Another major problem was with the U.N. When 2,500 peacekeeping troops under Romeo Dallaire were sent in following the signing of the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement between warring Tutsi and Hutu factions, Dallaire was told that both sides were committed to peace. Meanwhile a pair of international human rights organizations warned of imminent genocide. The peacekeeping force was also poorly equipped. Dallaire received eighty usable vehicles, all of which were recycled from a previous mission in Cambodia. The 2,500 troops were from 26 countries, and many were without necessary supplies.
The situation blew up when the Rwandan president’s airplane was shot down, presumably by Tutsi rebels, of April 6. In response, the Hutu began killing off large amounts of Tutsi, and, seeing this, the Tutsi rebels resumed the civil war in the south. This simultaneous civil war and genocide often confused international observers, possibly serving as a reason for a lack of determined intervention.
Some within the U.S. administration, however, were familiar with Rwanda and wanted to help. However, their attempts to help had three flaws. Prior to the plane crash, U.N. diplomats had continuously threatened to pull the peacekeepers out due to the Hutu’s failure to comply with the Arusha Accords, only encouraging extremists to break the Arusha accords more often. Secondly, the U.S. didn’t fully grasp that it wasn’t dealing with two distinct, clear nations, that just because they received assurances from the Hutu government didn’t mean that Hutu would stop killing Tutsi. Lastly, those familiar with Rwanda had been numbed by the astounding amount of killing in the past, and assumed that the killings, while tragic, would subside shortly.
The major international objective initially was to evacuate foreign nationals, which was mostly accomplished by April 10, four days after the Rwandan president was killed. By then estimates of Tutsi killed exceeded 10,000, and in the three days when foreign nationals were evacuated alone (April 9-11), about 20,000 Rwandans were killed.
Western press soon picked up the story. By April 19, Human Rights Watch estimated 100,000 dead in Rwanda, and the estimate was used in an article on the front page of The Washington Post on April 24. Despite the massive amount of dead, the U.S. continued to refuse to call the conflict genocide, often tip-toeing directly around the word. In fact some in the administration referred to it as “the g-word.” The government believed, rightfully so, that to call the killings genocide and do nothing would harm U.S. credibility.
Meanwhile in Washington, Rwanda had dropped off the radar screen since Americans were evacuated, and the country never even received a top-level meeting from the foreign policy team of the Cabinet. The editorials in newspapers across the country discouraged U.S. involvement, too. The American public and special interest groups remained silent.
Then, as the killings in Rwanda increased, Dallaire’s force received a crushing blow. After ten Belgian soldiers were killed and their bodies mutilated, Belgium decided to pull out all of its troops--by far the best Dallaire had at his disposal at the time. Belgium asked Washington to back their decision, so as to take heat off Belgium, and the U.S. was more than happy to oblige, soon requesting a full U.N. exit. On April 19, the Belgian soldiers were gone, and Dallaire was left with 2,100 men. Two days later, the U.N. Security Council voted to decrease his force to a mere 270 troops. Most of the remainder was evacuated on April 25, while Dallaire was able to hold on to 503 peacekeepers to protect the 25,000+ Rwandans under U.N. supervision.
The U.S. administration did have daily meetings regarding what to do in Rwanda at this time, but they feared anything the U.S. contributed could eventually lead to a contribution of troops--something the U.S. definitely did not want. Ideas of arms embargos and disabling the hate radio station Mille Collines’ broadcasts were thrown around as options, but in the end discarded as well. Pentagon planners understood that stopping the genocide required a military solution, but they did not want to be a part in the military solution. So, instead of working on some other form of intervention that may have helped, the U.S. justified inaction by arguing that a military solution was required.
In late April, an international push through the U.N. was made to increase the number of soldiers and resources, provide more aggressive rules of engagement, and recognize the peacekeeping force’s obligation to protect lives. Two proposals came about, an inside-out strategy, proposed by Dallaire and an outside-in strategy, promoted by the U.S. While either would have helped, neither was instituted quickly enough to do any good, in part because of international delays, and in part because of the U.S.’s stubbornness and refusal to work with the U.N. On May 17, when most of the Tutsi had already been killed, the U.S. approved of a version of Dallaire’s plan, but still it wasn’t put into practice early enough to do any good.
In short, the U.S. failed to see the genocide created by the Hutu by choice, and, in order to avoid sending forces, used the “slippery slope” excuse to justify doing nothing. More intriguing, most people involved in shaping U.S. policy believed that their policy was not only the best for America, but was the ethical and moral thing to do. Officials used excuse after excuse, saying that if they get involved in Rwanda, they would be forced to involved everywhere. They didn’t consider enough alternatives to sending in troops, especially for a country so dead set against sending in troops. The “slippery slope” excuse became just a cheap cop-out. Another excuse said that in order to save future peacekeeping missions, the mission in Rwanda had to be sacrificed. If U.N. troops suffered a bitter defeat there, peacekeeping could be dead forever, and no one wants that. So let’s just ignore these 800,000 dead bodies and say we did all we needed to. Finally, and most tragically, some were able to convince themselves that what was going on in Rwanda was not genocide. How they did this is difficult to fathom, assuming they had at least some information at their disposal.
I end my report on the article with the most striking and telling passage in the whole article, in my opinion:
“What is most frightening about this story is that it testifies to a system that in effect worked. President Clinton and his advisers had several aims. First they wanted to avoid engagement in a conflict that posed little threat to American interests, narrowly defined. Second, they sought to appease a restless Congress by showing that they were cautious in their approach to peacekeeping. And third, they hoped to contain political costs and avoid the moral stigma associated with allowing genocide. By and large, they achieved all three objectives. The normal operations of the foreign-policy bureaucracy and the international community permitted an illusion of continual deliberation, complex activity, and intense concern, even as Rwandans were left to die.” (pg. 19)
Surprising as it is, and as sick as I often became while reading this, I condemn the U.S. government less now I did before reading the article. The image of President Clinton in absolute frustration and despair over his lack of action showed me a human side to the U.S. government, too.
That is not to say I was not moved by other things. I was absolutely appalled when reading that people were more concerned with the safety of the gorillas in the area than the people. However, this made me think about what made me appalled. There are many groups who care about animals in this country, and do many great things. Many people also live in our country in utter despair and suffering. Yet I am not appalled by this on a day-to-day basis. In a way, I can see that in order to condemn the decision to care about the gorillas and not the humans, it is in some way like our society, but for this crime, we seem much guiltier. Maybe it is the way in which so many were killed in such a short time, and how many ways we could have done something. We did nothing.
While many gave talks about “never again” in the United States and in the world, never again would there be genocide, never again like the Holocaust, events were happening in Rwanda with chilling similarity. The plane of Rwandans that reached Kenya, but then was sent back to Rwanda reached me and helped me make the sad connection most of all.
It is amazing how heartless countries can be when they separate themselves from the situation, making forthright decisions for the political good of their country from behind a desk, never witnessing the suffering, death, and destruction they have caused. This is what I think Clinton realized that day reading that article, and that is, in part why I feel for him and his administration. But through much of the rest of the article, it is very hard to believe that Clinton is telling the truth. How could he not have known?
I suppose that it comes down to, as all things, a matter of faith. I think I put my faith in Clinton, rather than his subordinates. But why wouldn’t they have told him? That question I can’t answer. All I know is that too often, our government officials become heartless and distance themselves from the true humanity of the problem. This comes not just with international issues, but domestic too. While not truly knowing how terrible the situation is for all involved, officials make decisions based vaguely on what is “good for the country.” All too often that amounts to “what is good for me.” The fundamental flaw with U.S. government, the government supposed to protect and represent the free world, is that “Policy—good, steady policy-is made by the ‘tough-minded.’ To talk of suffering is to lose ‘effectiveness,’ almost to lose one’s grip. It is seen as a sign that one’s ‘rational’ arguments are weak,” according to “The Human Reality of Realpolitik,” and article in Foreign Policy. In order to effectively lead their country, groups of people for who, according to Buddha, suffering is an undeniable truth, leaders must deny suffering. To recognize suffering as a basic fact of life is to have weak rational arguments. How can one effectively lead a country when they are not allowed to take into account human suffering? I suggest that they cannot. This was the major flaw in the Rwandan instance of U.S. government policy, and I think can still be seen today, as President Bush deploys meager initial estimates for foreign aid following the tsunami, only changing once public opinion went against him, and as the Sudan, where 200,000 are dead, is entirely overlooked. If humanity recognized the reality of suffering throughout the world, society would be a lot better off. Its time to stop telling ourselves lies.