In the field of memetics, a tricky subject that has come into play in the last few years is the matter of belief. Several authors have written about the way in which memes are related to belief, but my approach will be one that is a bit different. In a publication entitled “Why the `Thought Contagion' Metaphor is Retarding the Progress of Memetics,” Derek Gatherer sets up a thought experiment inquiring as to whether or not an individual is capable of transmitting a potentially limitless set of memes as allomemes of “Napoleon died in the year X” actually retains a limitless set of memes (1998). Gatherer notes that a difference between the allomemes “Napoleon died in the year 1821,” which is replicated in the history books, and other allomemes is that the former is believed, while others, for the most part, are not. In an earlier paper, Aaron Lynch advocates the position that beliefs in statements are memes, as well as the statements themselves. Lynch states that:

If we define mnemon P as belief in proposition X, then non-belief is ~P. If awareness of proposition X is designated as Q, then unawareness is ~Q. An exposed non-host of the proposition is designated as ~P*Q. Exposed hosts are P*Q. Unexposed non-hosts are ~P*~Q. The P*~Q combination presumably has a host population of zero. The resulting mathematical model therefore has three equations modeling N1 hosts of ~P*~Q, N2 hosts of ~P*Q, and N3 hosts of P*Q” (1998).

In Lynch's paper, the word mnemon is used to describe “the principle abstractions manipulated with memetics theory,” but I feel that menmon is an unnecessary distinction from the term meme, as Lynch contrasts mnemons with things “such as chain letters, Bibles, etc.,” which I believe to be phenotypes of replicators, not replicators themselves (1998). I will use Lynch's notation throughout the process of describing the relationship between memes and belief; this will be done with some slight modifications that I believe are necessary to illustrate my own hypothesis. It is also necessary the the reader be familiar with Lynch's distinction between homogenic and heterogenic events.

The problem with Lynch's position, as Gatherer correctly points out, is that belief cannot be transmitted between individuals. Awareness of proposition X, designated by Lynch as Q, is the only meme that needs mentioning in this specific case. All of those that have the meme Q are hosts regardless of whether or not Q is believed.

Trying to trace the replication of belief is likely a futile exercise unless we are to look at belief from the correct perspective. Instead of looking at a belief as a meme, we should instead view belief as a niche for a variety of competing allomemes. The designated awareness of X, Q, introduces a new loci the brain for allomemes to compete. The awareness of proposition X itself is a meme capable of spreading itself into other brains. If, however, the proposition is able to occupy the niche of belief, the proposition has a much greater chance of being expressed and spread.

Expanding on Lynch's notation, I will display two allomemes competing for the same niche in the human brain. These allomemes may be analogous to two different alleles competing for spots in a biological organism's genome. In keeping with Lynch's and Gatherer's papers, allow:

Meme a: “There is only one true God”.
Meme b: “Christ is Lord”.
Meme c: “Unbelievers are damned”.
Meme d: “Earthly life is better among believers”.

Note that, unlike Lynch's paper, the letters representing each meme are not capitalized. I will return to this later. In addition to these four memes, I will introduce four opposing, albeit mundane, memes:

Meme a': “There is no God”.
Meme b': “Christ is not Lord”.
Meme c': “Unbelievers are not damned”.
Meme d': “Earthly life is not better among believers”.

The reader should note that an individual may hold all eight of these memes, but cannot, at any one time, hold more than four as a belief. Of course there are other memes that might fulfill the same niche as memes a and a', (read “a” and “a prime,” with additional memes such as a'' being read “a double prime,” etc.) but for simplicity's sake we shall put those aside for the model. An individual cannot believe that earthly life is both better among believers and nonbelievers, and although it is possible to hold beliefs in a and d' at the same time, a, b, c, and d, tend to promote each other's replication presumably better than any one meme can do on its own, as is the case with a', b', c', and d'. Unfortunately, at this point I feel it is necessary to complicate things even more, for we must have some way to distinguish between competing memes, say a and a', which meme occupies the niche of belief and is therefore more likely to be expressed and replicated to others. The belief niche shall be signified by capitalizing the letter of the meme that occupies the niche.

As a result, for any individual that is Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*~d~d', and is presented with both d and d', that individual is more likely to have d selected to occupy the niche. Using Lynch's equations, we can represent this as: Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*Dd'+Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*~d~d'= 2(Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*Dd'). Here, both memes d and d' are presented to Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*~d~d', and d becomes the meme that is believed, which is expected based on the fact that cooperating memes a, b, and c are all believed by the host, and that, in the propagator of memes d and d', d holds the niche of belief as well as memes a, b, and c.

I have described the whole process of, to use Lynch's term, a homogenic event, but it is unlikely that many allomemes such as d are able to replicate themselves alone. Even in such a case, as is surely not uncommon, that only d is transmitted, the allomeme d' is likely to be introduced heterogenically. Because it is unlikely that Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*Dd' would transmit both d and d' to Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*~d~d', a much more likely equation would be Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*Dd' + Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*~d~d'= Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*Dd' + Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*D= 2(Aa'*Bb'*Cc'*Dd'), with d' being introduced heterogenically.

As with Gatherer's example of the year of Napoleon's death, the meme “Napoleon died in the year 1821” is separated from all other allomemes because it occupies the niche of belief. In effect, we can view all other allomemes regarding Napoleon's death as competing for the niche of belief, with N1821 being clearly dominant in the minds of most, if not all, scholars due to the extraordinary amount of historical evidence supporting it.

Works Cited

Gatherer, D.  (1998). Why the Thought Contagion Metaphor is Retarding the Progress of Memetics. Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission,2.http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/1998/vol2/gatherer_d.html

Lynch, A., 1998; Units, Events and Dynamics in Memetic Evolution. Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission, 2.
http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/1998/vol2/lynch_a.html