For the majority of human beings, the boundaries of morality extend primarily to the end of our own species. Although many people would likely agree that unnecessary cruelty towards other animals is unjustified, when the interests of human beings are in conflict with the interests of other animals, human interests are almost always placed ahead of individuals of any other species regardless of the degree of interest involved. As an example, few people would condone caging a bird in excessively small quarters when adequate space is available for the animal to be comfortable, but when the bird becomes "poultry," and it is in the interest of humans to conserve as much space as possible, the majority of us seem to have no problem crowding chickens into the space of a half sheet of paper, with the birds "virtually sitting on top of each other" (Singer 113). People that condone this type of practice usually claim to do so with one of three statements:

• Animals do not suffer.

• Animals do suffer, but human interests override the interests of other animals.

• Animals do suffer, but I do not care about the morality of the situation.

It should be noted that the second reason has different degrees for some people. Some people feel that human interests override the interests of other animals only in most or certain situations. The third reason I have no interest in discussing, for my argument is an argument for determining what is ethical, and it is of no interest to those that lack the desire to act ethically. For those of us who are interested in acting ethically, however, it will be shown that arguing animals' lack of ability to suffer is logically absurd and that we have no reason to divide the line of morality between species; happiness and suffering should be viewed independent of the entities in which they are displayed.

To say that other animals are incapable of suffering is a very strange statement to make, and the argument became especially expressed under the influence of René Descartes. Descartes claimed that animals "do not have immortal souls" and as a result "do not have consciousness either;" although Descartes acknowledged that animals may squeal and writhe to escape blades or hot irons, he believed that these animals are merely "governed by the same principles as a clock" and that no pain is actually experienced (Singer 200). This position is becoming harder to defend as the advancements of science increase. After more information was learned about the anatomy of other animals, scientists started to discover just how similar in design humans are to these animals. The French author and philosopher Voltaire expressed his outrage after observing physiologists "discover in [other animals] all the same organs of feeling as in [humans]," and he asks why nature would arrange "all the springs of feeling in [such animals]" if in the end they did not feel (Singer 202). Indeed any individual today that has studied biology in depth would likely consider it absurd to believe that, despite the complex nervous system that is found in other animals, especially in our fellow vertebrates, these animals are incapable of perceiving pain. Exactly how much consciousness different animals may posses is debatable, but for those readers that think all non-human animals are completely devoid of consciousness, or if the reader is one to believe that human beings have immaterial "souls" that are not present in animals, this is often used as a reason to believe animals do not comprehend or experience pain as humans do. Suffering and understanding suffering are two independent things, and our moral circle should not extend only to those that understand suffering, for if these are the standards of morality, we have no reason to prohibit treating small children and the mentally disabled any differently than our current treatment  of other animals. Regardless of an entities' method for perceiving pain, the presence of suffering alone should place the being in our moral circle. Those that disagree with the previous statement must provide some reasoning for why some perceptions of pain are acceptable to allow, and others should be reduced. Those that rest their ethical interests on the concept of a soul must somehow explain how this immaterial substance relates to physical suffering, and why other animals should react in such a similar manner as humans to the apparent sensations of pain and posses such similar biological equipment for the perception of pain.

Although most people are willing to admit that other animals are capable of suffering on some varied level depending on such qualities as biological structure, the majority of humans conclude that human interests are in some fundamental way more important than the interests of other species. Those people that advocate such a position must decide what characteristics our species possesses that make our interests more important, for it is "we that choose to divide animals up into discontinuous species" (Dawkins 21). In an evolutionary view, there must have been intermediates between humans and other apes, and, if we go far enough back, all life has a common ancestry. It is merely convenience for the speciest that intermediates no longer exist, but this convenience should not matter to a moral philosopher; if all intermediates in the lineage between, say, early vertebrates and humans were to remain intact, where would we draw our moral boundaries? Note that even if the reader does not acknowledge evolution as fact, this does not justify tossing the argument aside. With the advances of modern genetics, it will no doubt be possible in the future for scientists to, as Dawkins suggested, breed "a chimpanzee/human hybrid" (Dawkins 25). What if this hybrid were somehow repeatedly hybridized with a human; how close to a pure human would such an organism have to be before being allowed into our moral circle? In the mind of a utilitarian, there is no problem, and the hybrid's interests and capacities for pleasure and pain are taken on their own merits separate from their labeled species. Those that view human interests as fundamentally more important than other animal's interests are in a bit of a corner, however, for in such a case where we have human/chimp hybrids of all sorts in our world, we must decide which animals interests should be elevated as "human interests," in superiority to the interests of the rest. Those who believe that the elevated interests of humans rests on some sort of immaterial "soul" must decide amongst a potentially limitless set of human/chimp intermediates which animals are endowed with this soul, and why they are more entitled to have their interests fulfilled than their soulless cousins that are nearly identical in every other aspect, including the capacity to suffer.

It is for these reasons that the existence of interests alone, including capacity for suffering, should be the only criteria for judging moral actions. We must judge each individual's interests independently without discriminating interests on the basis of species. Every being, regardless of species, deserves equal consideration for their interests, but this not to say that every individual's interests deserve equal weight. It can be argued that killing great apes such as ourselves against our will is a more immoral act than killing aphids because great apes produce more total interest; we have plans for the future finding food and raising families, whereas it is unlikely that aphids have any future interests about what is to happen to them the next morning. It should be noted that if some being were to come along with a lifespan of three thousand years and having such long-term interests, we must also concede their interests to live as having more moral weight than our own. Time, however, should not be a factor when we consider the moral weight of inflicting suffering on another animal at any given instant. When any animal is suffering, the length of its lifespan or the animal's capacity for intelligence are irrelevant; only the intensity of the suffering and the amount of interest that animal has in the avoidance of suffering can be added into our moral equations. Based on all of our observations, the animals we currently use as food and clothing have equal capacity for pain as ourselves, and, therefore, we should regard inflicting such suffering on these animals with equal moral weight.

Despite these reasons for not discriminating ethically on the basis of species, and viewing an entities interests independently, many people state that they simply do not care about the welfare of other animals, or refuse to put some interests of other animals ahead of their own. This attitude will likely continue as long as it is considered socially acceptable, but the social acceptance of condoning the blatant torture and exploitation of other animals has nothing to do with its morality. Therefore I urge the reader to disregard however acceptable it is in our culture to hold such speciest views and step back to look at the morality of the situation in its own right. Although humans may have some interest in the use and consumption of animal products, this interest does not nearly outweigh the collective interest of millions of animals that suffer extraordinarily to provide us with a tastier meal or a nicer pair of shoes, both of which can be substituted with cruelty-free products.
 

Dawkins, Richard. "Gaps in the Mind." A Devil's Chaplain. Comp. Richard Dawkins. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003. 20-26.

Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. New York: HarperCollins, 2002.