Ayub had lost a lot of political ground. Perhaps he felt that by 
becoming the liberator of Kashmir he would redeem himself in the eyes of the people

Unfortunately most of our history, particularly that relating to the conduct of military operations, remains shrouded in mystery as the actual details are not made public. Consequently, even those like myself who possess some knowledge of actual events need to piece together the entire picture with educated speculation. Today, after 38 years, the true story of the 1965 War remains untold. 

Within the military an effort has been made to detail and analyse the actual events but even these efforts might not be the whole truth, nor have they been made public. Therefore, it is sensible to treat this version with scepticism. However, I will attempt to relate the events as I am aware of them. If these read like a comedy of errors, I can only say that occasionally truth is indeed stranger than fiction.

Early in 1965 the Pakistan army had successfully defended itself against attempted Indian incursion in the Rann of Kutch, but that chapter was closed since the dispute had been referred for arbitration. Why therefore should Pakistan embark on a venture that might and did lead to war remains an unanswered question to date, particularly when we were aware that a venture in which we were considered the aggressor would result in severance of aid from the US. This is what did happen ultimately. 

It is on record that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister, convinced Ayub Khan, the president, that the Indian response to our incursions in Kashmir would be confined to Kashmir and would not extend to an attack across the international boundary. Bhutto must have offered powerful diplomatic arguments as forcefully and articulately as he could, but I still find it difficult to comprehend how Ayub accepted an argument which was militarily untenable; while Ayub could be accused of many things, he was far from being militarily unwise. 

Secondly, the undertaking of guerrilla operations necessitate special conditions: not only must the terrain be suitable, which it was, but there must be guaranteed local support, without which guerrilla operations are not sustainable. Preferably there should be preliminary reconnaissance and liaison which sets the ground for the operation. For some obscure reason, Pakistan undertook Operation Gibraltar without preparing the grounds for it or ensuring guaranteed local support, or even attempting to assess the mood of the Kashmiri people. They only relied on the assessment offered by some adventurous element of Kashmiris from Azad Kashmir without any verification. One cannot but wonder why? What was the reason for such haste? I am afraid that I can only conjecture.

We witnessed a number of events in 1965. First, two of Ayubs sons kidnapped the daughter of the IG Police. This was more than what the loyal Nawab of Kalabagh could bear and he resigned when Ayub prevented him from taking any action. This was also the year Ayub contested the elections against Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah. In my opinion Ayub would have won any way and I also feel that her election to the office would not have been a success. Nonetheless, not only did two of his sons open fire on demonstrators in Karachi killing thirty odd people and wounding many more, but it was also commonly accepted that the elections had been rigged. Other incidents that drew attention to Ayubs nepotism also came to light in this period. 

Hence Ayub had lost a lot of political ground. Perhaps he felt that by becoming the liberator of Kashmir he would redeem himself in the eyes of the people or he hoped to unite the people behind him through such a venture; there is little doubt that there has never been greater unity in the country than during war and immediately afterwards.

Whatever his reasons, Pakistan undertook Operation Gibraltar without any preliminary preparations and initiated a guerrilla operation inside Indian-held Kashmir with a large number of regular soldiers (some SSG elements and a smattering of irregulars), expecting to be welcomed by the local population. They also hoped to stir them up the Kashmiris against the Indian government. But Pakistan was destined to be rudely disillusioned. 

Far from rising up in arms, the local population was not interested in helping the infiltrators and in many instances handed them over to Indian troops. An act for which they should not be blamed in any way as they were reconciled to staying within the Indian union and Pakistan had made no preparations for such a venture. It was to take another 24 years before there was an indigenous uprising against the Indian union. Gibraltar was unsuccessful to say the least. A number of the infiltrators were captured by the Indian troops, though some managed to ex-filtrate.

In 1965, the division responsible for the defence of Kashmir and Northern Areas had about 400 miles to defend and was stretched thin on the ground. Gibraltar necessitated the release of more troops for infiltration, since acclimatisation was a major consideration and these were the only troops acclimatised to operate in the inhospitable terrain of Kashmir. 

The failure of Gibralter was followed by a number of Indian assaults on various posts held by the Pakistan army which fell to the Indians. Maj Gen Akhtar Malik, the divisional commander, was an intelligent and bold commander who led from the front. However, in this situation there was little that he could do. Stretched thin on ground, with little or no reserves and a 400-mile front to cover, he could not even reach the localities under attack, let alone influence events in any way. 

Since Gibraltar had been planned to succeed, no contingency plans had been made in case it didnt work. This is another inexplicable oversight, since militaries are taught to consider and be prepared all possibilities. It was in this environment that Operation Grand Slam was launched to set things right. 





















Taking full advantage of the impoverished state of the Pakistan Army, 
in terms of the logistical support, training facilities, and the
 dilution of its energy on rehabilitation of a flux of refugees and 
other attendant problems, India deemed it expedient to send its forces
 into Kashmir with a view to forcibly occupy vast area of its 
territory and then compelling Pakistan to a cease-fire fait accompli, 
on their terms and conditions. Pakistan, viewing the enormous threat 
to its existence and the manifest aggressive overtures of India, 
deemed it desirable to seek assistance in terms of acquisition of 
weapons, equipment and other accessories from USA. This way Pakistan
 was able to achieve considerable level of sufficiency, to be able to
 meet the Indian aggression, but in the 1965 war, unfortunately our 
performance fell short of the expectations. The ostensible reason was
 lack of proper training and state of operational preparedness. Though
 our soldier and junior leadership was endowed with the gift of great 
courage and fortitude and there are numerous accounts of individual 
acts of chivalry and soldierly sacrifice, yet our higher leadership
 was lacking in awareness of the modern concepts of warfare. By and 
large, this war was fought brilliantly at tactical level yet it was 
devoid of higher strategic vision. The other contributory factor, 
which largely impaired the professional competence was the tragic 
legacy of the Martial law from 1958 to 1965, which gave very little 
time to higher military command to concentrate on the profession and 
military preparedness, thus adversely affecting the Army culture. 



















At the age of twenty I once again crossed into Lahore one week before 
the 1965 India-Pakistan war and on the fateful day of the start of the
 war I was here in Lahore and saw the perils this great city faced. 
Lahore welcomed me with its usual hospitality and after the end of the
 war I was given traveling documents to leave for the U.S. for the next
 part of my life journey. 


