SPEAKERS CONTENTS INSERTS
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92–870PDF
2004
FIGHTING
TERRORISM IN AFRICA
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND
SESSION
APRIL 1, 2004
Serial No. 108–82
Printed for the use
of the Committee on International Relations
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Available
via the World Wide Web:
http://www.house.gov/international—relations
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois,
Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER,
Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice
Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA
ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER,
California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE
CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ROY BLUNT,
Missouri
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH,
Michigan
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JOSEPH
R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK
GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G.
McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida
TOM LANTOS,
California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI
F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT
MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN,
California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D.
DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE,
California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL,
Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
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SHELLEY
BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF,
California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY
McCOLLUM, Minnesota
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
THOMAS E. MOONEY,
SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
ROBERT R. KING,
Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Africa
EDWARD
R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
THOMAS G.
TANCREDO, Colorado
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
DONALD
M. PAYNE, New Jersey
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE,
California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
THOMAS P. SHEEHY,
Subcommittee Staff Director
NOELLE LUSANE,
Democratic Professional Staff Member
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MALIK
M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member
GREG GALVIN,
Staff Associate
C O N T E N T
S
WITNESSES
Karl Wycoff, Associate
Coordinator for Press, Policy, Programs and Plans, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of
State
Douglas Farah, former Washington
Post Correspondent
The Honorable Princeton N.
Lyman, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow in Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE
HEARING
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement
Karl
Wycoff: Prepared statement
Douglas Farah:
Prepared statement
The Honorable Princeton N.
Lyman: Prepared statement
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APPENDIX
The
Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the State of New
York: Prepared statement
The Honorable Barbara
Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Prepared
statement
FIGHTING TERRORISM IN AFRICA
THURSDAY, APRIL 1,
2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on
International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The
Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:32 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office
Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce presiding.
Mr.
ROYCE. We are going to ask that this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Africa come to order. This hearing, like one that we had 2 months after
September 11th, is focused on fighting terrorism in Africa, and at that hearing
several years ago, I said ''Africa must be placed in the United States's
strategic spotlight.'' And I know that, at the time, other Committee Members
here expressed the same concept. I think we are getting there.
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Last
May, the head of the U.S. European Command, General James Jones,
said,
''I think Africa is a continent that is going to be of very, very
significant interest in the 21st century.''
The European Command now
spends more and more time focused on Africa. Earlier this month, it assisted
Chad in successfully hunting down Algeria-based, Islamic militants with ties to
al-Qaeda. The Administration has launched several anti-terrorism initiatives in
the last few years, and this includes the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa, based in Djibouti, which now has 1,800 personnel combating and
countering terrorism.
Much of Africa,
unfortunately, is hospitable ground to terrorist groups, as the continent has
very vast and very remote areas, and it has a number of weak governments and
weak security services as well. For the past 2 decades, Wahabist charities have
supported a growing number of madrassas throughout Africa. This mostly Gulf
State-sponsored phenomenon, unfortunately, is often aimed at radicalizing Islam
in Africa. For example, if we look at North Africa, several Moroccans and a
Tunisian are believed to have been involved in the recent Madrid bombings.
Africa, indeed, with resource-strapped governments, is unable often to
effectively control their territories, and this has been, frankly, described as
the ''soft underbelly of the war on
terror.''
Africa faced enough challenges,
frankly, without the emerging terrorist threat, and at the hearing of several
years ago, I mentioned, at that time, that our concern, as Members of this
Committee, is to make certain that the resources necessary to tackle HIV/AIDS
and economic development would not be short changed in this effort to engage
Africa on this issue of terror. The Administration and Congress, I believe, have
allayed these concerns because we have passed a historic HIV/AIDS commitment,
and we passed the Millennium Challenge Account.
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A
good anti-terrorism strategy, I think, requires a multi-track approach with
military, diplomatic, and financial tactics. We need more resources devoted to
these pursuits in Africa, including more resources devoted for the intelligence
operations there. We significantly trimmed our diplomatic presence,
unfortunately, and trimmed our intelligence capabilities in Africa post-cold
war. Embassies and consulates were, at that time, shuttered, and this left us
short of valuable intelligence about the continent. One of today's witnesses has
reported on an al-Qaeda activity in West Africa, where Charles Taylor and
President Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso reportedly profited from al-Qaeda's
trade in diamonds. So I do not think that activity has been properly
registered.
United States officials have reported
generally good cooperation in fighting terrorism from African governments.
Looking ahead, we need to be sensitive to the fact that this is Africa's fight
every bit as much as it is ours. For example, the Revolutionary United Front,
with the assistance of Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, and then Liberian President
Charles Taylor, used terror in an attempt to seize power in Sierra Leone. The
Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda is terrorizing civilians. The spread of
militant Islam provides an increasing number of African recruits for
international terrorist groups, but it also undermines social harmony and
undercuts the development of stable African governments by pushing aside the
traditionally tolerant Islam of Africa. It is our interest to help combat these
brutal attacks.
The Administration reports that
Sudan and Libya, designated state sponsors of terrorism in the past, have moved
away from supporting terrorism. Needless to say, this bears constant watching.
Sudan's government is backing militant forces that are carrying out gross human
rights abuses, essentially terrorizing civilians in the Darfur region.
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I
will now turn to Mr. Payne, the Ranking Member of this Committee, for his
comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce
follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.—The
following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce
(R–CA–40) at this afternoon's hearing on terrorism in
Africa:
''At a hearing the Subcommittee held on
terrorism in Africa, two months after September 11th, I said, 'Africa must be
placed in the U.S.'s strategic spotlight.' Other Subcommittee Members expressed
similar sentiments. We're getting there, I
believe.
''Last May, the head of the U.S.
European Command, General James Jones, said, 'I think Africa is a continent that
is going to be of very, very significant interest in the 21st century.' EUCOM
now spends more and more time focused on Africa. Earlier this month, it assisted
Chad in successfully hunting down Algeria-based Islamic militants with ties to
al Qaeda. The Administration has launched several anti-terrorism initiatives in
the last few years. This includes the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa,
based in Djibouti, which now has approximately 1,800 personnel countering
terrorism.
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''Much
of Africa, unfortunately, is hospitable ground to terrorist groups, as the
continent has vast and remote areas, with far too many weak governments and
security services. For the past two decades, Wahabist charities have supported a
growing number of madrassas throughout Africa. This mostly Gulf
State-sponsored activity, unfortunately, is often aimed at radicalizing Islam in
Africa. Several Moroccans and a Tunisian are believed to have been involved in
the recent Madrid bombing. Africa, indeed, with resource-strapped governments
unable to effectively control their territories, has been described as the 'soft
underbelly' in the war on terror.
''Africa faces
enough challenges without the emerging terrorist threat. At the hearing I
mentioned, concerns were expressed that resources to tackle HIV/AIDS and
economic development would be shortchanged. The Administration and Congress, I
believe, have allayed these concerns with a historic HIV/AIDS commitment and the
Millennium Challenge Account.
''A good
antiterrorism strategy requires a multi-track approach—with military,
diplomatic, and financial tactics. We need more resources devoted to these
pursuits in Africa, including intelligence. We significantly trimmed our
diplomatic presence and intelligence capabilities in Africa post-cold war.
Embassies and consulates were shuttered. This left us short of valuable
intelligence about the continent. One of today's witnesses has reported on al
Qaeda activities in West Africa, where Charles Taylor and President Blaise
Campaore of Burkino Faso reportedly profited from al Qaeda's trade in diamonds.
I don't think this activity was properly
registered.
''U.S. officials have reported
generally good cooperation in fighting terrorism from African governments.
Looking ahead, we need to be sensitive to the fact that this is Africa's fight
every bit as much as ours. The Revolutionary United Front—under the sponsorship
of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi and then-Liberian President Charles Taylor—used
terror in an attempt to seize power in Sierra Leone. The Lord's Resistance Army
in Uganda is terrorizing civilians. The spread of militant Islam provides an
increasing number of African recruits for international terrorist groups; but it
also undermines social harmony and undercuts the development of stable African
governments by pushing aside the traditionally tolerant Islam of Africa. It's
our interest to help combat these brutal attacks.
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''The
Administration reports that Sudan and Libya, designated state sponsors of
terrorism, have moved away from supporting terrorism. Needless to say, this
bears constant watching. Sudan's government is backing militant forces that are
carrying out gross human rights abuses, essentially terrorizing, civilians in
the Darfur region.''
Mr. PAYNE. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this very important and
timely hearing. It is good to see the witnesses—Mr. Wycoff, just to mention,
have worked together in Asia and Burma, and, of course, Princeton Lyman, who has
such a distinguished career dealing with Africa in his diplomatic assignments
throughout the year. It is also good to see Howard Wolpe, former Chair of the
African Subcommittee, in the audience. So I would like to welcome all of the
witnesses and the participants.
On August 7,
1998, two bombs exploded almost simultaneously at the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. At least 213 people died, including 12
United States citizens, and more than 5,000 were injured in Nairobi's explosion,
and 11 people, none of them Americans, in Dar es Salaam. This tragic act of
violence called the attention of the world to the Horn of Africa and raised
serious questions about terrorism there. The United States Government still has
yet to adequately compensate victims of this heinous act that occurred, in
effect, on U.S. soil. I had been to the Kenyan Embassy several times that year,
and to go back and to find that there are still people who were affected by that
terrible act and the same way in Tanzania is
disturbing.
We also, if we had a strong policy
dealing with Sudan at that time, where Osama bin Laden lived for 6 years
planning this dastardly act, if we had aggressively had a policy of dealing with
Sudan and the government of Khartoum, this, too, may have been prevented.
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Now,
the United States counterterrorism initiatives in the region are carried out
through the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, in Djibouti. It was
created to not only provide a staging point for Middle East engagements such as
the invasion of Iraq but also because the Horn of Africa is a key region for
counterterrorism. The task force coordinates activities between Sudan, Kenya,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Needless to say, this is certainly a
tough neighborhood.
However, I have to commend
the IGAD organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development process,
for its hosting of the Somali peace talks, which is in its third and final
stage. IGAD, as you probably know, consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somali, Sudan, and Uganda, and I had the provide to sit in on discussions
with the Somali factions as the process was going on in order to come up with a
government of reconciliation several months
ago.
United States support of African initiatives
and talks are key, and strengthening existing efforts, such as the IGAD process,
only makes these efforts even more successful. It is so key that the United
States remains engaged with these
organizations.
Recently, there have been
disturbing reports of renewed flows of arms into Somalia. This is in violation
of the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by Security Council Resolution 733 in
1992. Reports such as these send a message that there is more that needs to be
done in fighting terrorism and that more attention needs to be paid to Somalia.
While we urge African nations to join us in the war on terrorism, which many
have done, more willingly, we must also put our money where our mouth is. We
must support these African governments with resources and support if we expect
them to be able to do an adequate job.
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After
all, what is it that is driving the growth of terrorism in Africa and around the
world? We know what they are. They have been discussed for decades and decades:
Severe poverty, extreme frustration, with the feeling of being left out and
forgotten by the rest of the world and, in particular, the West. This is not to
say that poor people are more prone to turn to violent acts of aggressions, but
we must understand that if we are not paying attention and meeting people's
needs, in that vacuum someone else will, and that is what we have found, in
particular, in Africa.
Extremists, fundamentalist
groups know where the roots will be and where the fertile ground and where the
growth can come about, and they invest their resources in that area so that they
can use these problems of the region for their benefit. They build madrassas, as
the Chairman mentioned, where they indoctrinate the youth with anti-American and
anti-western rhetoric. We should be targeting these social problems and helping
governments to not only actively fight terrorism but also to keep it from ever
taking root in the first place. And if we had had different policies throughout
the years, I think that much of this could be
prevented.
President Bush's initiative on
fighting global terrorism should have a similar premise to his education
initiative. We have an education initiative, Leave No Child Behind; let us leave
no country or community behind. Here is the caveat: If we do not support African
nations in this fight, they will be forced to divert resources from basic social
programs and, therefore, will be fighting a losing battle. We fight terrorism by
paying attention to people, the poor and the
uneducated.
Reviving economies is also paramount
because once governments increase revenues, they can not only invest more in
education, health, and other basic services, but they will be able to have more
of a capacity to beef up counterterrorism efforts by strengthening
infrastructures and institutions.
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If
we are going to strengthen ecotourism in Africa, as laid out by AGOA III, where
some of us may have to go to a press conference that is going to be held on AGOA
III, it is imperative that we work closer with African governments and provide
resources and training on border patrol and such things, especially, as game
parks and cross-border programs that are near international airports where they
are vulnerable to terrorists.
So as I conclude,
lastly, let me make our counterterrorism efforts a constructive effort for
African countries. Kenya, which has been one of our biggest supporters and
collaborators of global anti-terrorism campaigns, has suffered greatly by virtue
of their friendship with the United States, and now because of the U.S. State
Department's warning against nonessential travel to Kenya, which has been in
effect since May 2003, it has actually just about driven the tourist sector out
of Kenya and is creating a terrible problem because there is an estimated seven
million pounds being lost to the Kenya Wildlife Service because of this new
policy. The Kenyan government, under Mr. Kibaki, elected in 2002, has
significantly improved the national security apparatus of the country over the
last 12 months, has formed the National Counterterrorism Coordinating Center to
enhance these efforts, and forced a regional
cooperation.
It is my hope that we support such
efforts as the Counterterrorism Coordinating Center and that we keep a
reasonable approach to stamping out terrorism in East Africa. We must also
revisit such actions as the renewal and expansion of the travel advisory to
other countries in the region. We do not fight terrorism by isolating countries
and cutting them off from foreign investment in terrorism. There has got to be
more a constructive way to deal with terrorism in the region. Some examples are
training police, cross-border intelligence, and so forth.
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So,
therefore, I applaud the United States pledge of $100 million for the East
Africa Counterterrorism Initiative and around $30 million for Kenya. Let us
always remember to take a reasonable approach to terrorism in the Horn of
Africa. This is an important issue, and I commend the Chairman for calling this
hearing. Thank you again.
Mr. ROYCE.
Thank you, Mr. Payne.
We are now going to go to
our first panel. Karl Wycoff is the Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism
in the Department of State. He has held that position since June 2003. Mr.
Wycoff is a career Foreign Service officer. He served in Africa and, most
recently, in Asia. Mr. Wycoff, please.
STATEMENT OF KARL WYCOFF,
ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND PLANS, OFFICE OF THE
COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. WYCOFF. Mr. Chairman, thank
you. Distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today. Africa is an important front in the global war on terrorism, and
this hearing provides a good opportunity to bring you up to date on the many
programs we are implementing to combat terrorism in that region. In the interest
of time, I would like to give you a summary of my testimony and ask your
permission to submit the rest of it for the
record.
Mr. ROYCE. Without
objection.
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Mr.
WYCOFF. Africa is vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism
and important in our efforts to counter that menace. While 9/11 is generally
regarded as the watershed event in the threat from al-Qaeda and its allies, the
horrible August 7, 1998, attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam were, in fact, an earlier wake-up call. These attacks killed and wounded
far more Kenyans and Tanzanians than Americans and brutally demonstrated the
willingness of these terrorists to kill and maim large numbers of persons in
far-flung corners of the earth.
Additional
attacks in Mombasa in November 2002 showed that terrorist cells were still
active. Although we are concerned about attacks elsewhere in Africa, we consider
the Horn to be the area most at risk.
The main
contributing factors, as Members of the Committee have noted, include proximity
to the Arabian Peninsula and the failed state of Somalia. There are large areas
in this region where government control is weak, and the countries have
inadequate counterterrorism and police capabilities, and there is the probable
continued presence of al-Qaeda cell in East Africa that carried out the 1998
bombings. Working with the African front-line states, we are implementing a
policy that encompasses both containment and action against al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations. We are working with partner countries to closely
monitor the situation in the Horn and are prepared to take appropriate action
when we can.
One of our principal tenets in the
war on terrorism is that, whenever possible, our foreign partners should take
the lead in combating terrorism in their own territory, with the U.S. Government
in a strong support role when needed. The ability of most African states to
effectively participate in our campaign against terrorism is getting stronger
day by day with U.S. help. The President's $100 million East Africa
Counterterrorism Initiative, announced in June 2003, is designed to strengthen
these capabilities.
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I
would like to briefly describe some of the programs that the U.S. uses to that
end. On the CT finance front, for example, the interagency Terrorist Finance
Working Group is working closely with Kenyan officials to develop a
comprehensive, antimoney-laundering/counterterrorist (CT), finance regime. An
interagency team conducted an assessment of Kenya's financial systems in August
2003. Kenya is in the process of considering comprehensive counterterrorism
legislation, a process which we have supported. Once the law is enacted, we will
provide a variety of assistance, including, most likely, a resident legal
adviser.
In an effort to assist countries
threatened by terrorist transit, we have instituted the Terrorist Interdiction
Program (TIP). Since mid-2003, this program has been operational at select
airports in Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia and is expected to be operational
later this year in Djibouti and Uganda. The TIP hardware/software package is
intended to significantly reduce terrorists' freedom of movement between
countries by providing the participating nations with a state-of-the-art
computer network that enables immigration and border-control officials to
quickly identify suspect persons attempting to enter or leave the country. We
have requested $5 million for this program in fiscal year 2005 to allow us to
continue to implement it on a global basis.
On
the CT police-training front, Kenya has been a prime beneficiary of training and
assistance provided to front-line states under the State Department's
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. This counterterrorism/law
enforcement-training program helps countries to develop and institutionalize
their own capabilities. The types of training including detection and rendering
safe explosive devices, post-blast investigation techniques, VIP protection,
senior leadership crisis management, hostage negotiations, and a variety of
other courses.
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For
fiscal year 2005, the Administration has requested $128 million worldwide for
this program. We ask for your support. We also note that requests for this
program are backed up substantially as a result of cuts in our fiscal year 2004
appropriation request for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program.
The Sahel region is also an area of deep
concern to the Administration and to the U.S. as a whole. We are implementing
the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which provides training and equipment for
quick-reaction forces to secure the vast borders of the region. Mali and
Mauritania are completing their training cycles, and Chad and Niger will begin
training cycles later this year.
Events over the
past several months have underscored the need for continued training and
cooperation in this very region. After European tourists were kidnapped by
members of the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat, known as GSPC, in
2003, this group was said to have received a large ransom payment for their
release. After reportedly using this money to purchase weapons, ammunition, and
equipment, members of the GSPC were pursued across the desert, as Congressman
Payne noted. One portion of this group was cornered and forced out of Mali and
promptly captured by Algerian security forces. Another portion turned up in
Chad, where Chadian and Nigerian forces attacked and defeated this group,
suffering casualties in the process.
In parts of
West Africa, we have seen dramatic rises in the level of anti-American and
extremist Islamic rhetoric, most notably in northern Nigeria. We are working to
support effective and inclusive governance in these countries to dilute the
appeal of extremists.
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We
continue to work with the nations of southern Africa to find and capture known
terrorist operatives and to disrupt terrorist financing. South Africa has set up
its own financial intelligence unit to track terrorist assets and place them out
of terrorists' reach.
Last year, we held a major
counterterrorism conference for 13 nations in southern Africa. These sessions
included crisis-management workshops and discussions of ways to strengthen
counterterrorism laws. The year before, in 2002, six African countries took part
in a week-long, counterterrorism legislation seminar that we co-sponsored with
the Justice Department.
We are currently in the
process of organizing an international conference later this month to discuss
progress made in fighting terrorism in East Africa. As part of the conference's
goals, the participants will be considering ways to make further progress
against terrorist cells, as well as to diminish the conditions which allow
extremists and terrorists to recruit new
followers.
The states of North Africa have had
long experience with terrorism and continue to combat this scourge. In the
aftermath of the May 16, 2003, bombings, Moroccan authorities conducted an
investigation that uncovered extremist Islamist cells in nearly every major city
in Morocco. Through the summer and fall of 2003, over a thousand suspects were
arrested on terrorism charges, and over 800 have now been prosecuted under
Morocco's new terrorism law.
In the aftermath of
last month's horrible Madrid bombings, Moroccan authorities immediately sent a
team of investigators to Madrid to work with Spanish authorities. I understand
that the cooperation between the two governments in this investigation is
exceptionally close and productive.
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We
are assisting the Moroccan authorities in a number of key areas of
counterterrorism through a variety of programs, including the ATA program and
the Terrorist Interdiction Program.
Throughout
Africa, the prevalence of poverty, famine, and disorder offers terrorists an
opportunity to insert themselves and to troll for new members for their groups.
Charitable and nongovernmental organizations have been abused by terrorists. One
such organization, al-Haramayn, has been identified in several locations in
Africa. Its offices are being closed. However, in addition to serving extremist
ends, it also did a variety of good works. Closing these offices has had the
unintended consequence of depriving some of the needy of
help.
It is, therefore, essential that the U.S.
pay attention to development issues and to public outreach. USAID has designed
and implemented programs to assist Muslim schools. Department of State public
diplomacy programs promote discussions, seminars, and travel by selected policy
and opinion-makers to explore Islam in America, to explore U.S. values,
traditions, and American society as part of our effort to expand mutual
understanding. These long-range programs are essential to ultimate success in
the war on terrorism.
We at the State Department
deeply appreciate your support and partnership for these efforts and seek your
continued support for our future efforts.
Mr.
Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I look forward to hearing your comments and
will be happy to take any questions.
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[The
prepared statement of Mr. Wycoff follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KARL
WYCOFF, ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND PLANS, OFFICE OF
THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today at your hearing on
''Fighting Terrorism in Africa.'' This hearing provides a good opportunity to
bring you and your colleagues up to date on the many, and varied, programs we
have developed and are implementing to combat terrorism in
Africa.
Africa is vulnerable to the threat of
international terrorism and important in our efforts to counter that menace.
While 9–11 is generally regarded as the watershed in the threat from al-Qaida
and its allies, the horrible August 7, 1998, attacks on the U.S. Embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania were an even earlier wake-up call.
These attacks killed and wounded far more Kenyans and Tanzanians than Americans,
the ostensible target. These mass bombings brutally demonstrated the willingness
of these terrorists to kill and maim large numbers of persons in far-flung
corners of the earth, in countries that were not directly involved in the
grievances of South Asia and the Middle
East.
Additional attacks in Mombasa in November
2002 showed that terrorist cells were still active. Although we are concerned
about attacks elsewhere in Africa, we consider the Horn of Africa—Djibouti,
Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya, and Tanzania—to be the area most at
risk.
The main contributing factors include
proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and the failed state of Somalia, large areas
where the governments' control is weak or non-existent, weak CT and police
capabilities of host nations, the probable continued presence of the al-Qaida
cell that carried out the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar Es Salaam
and Nairobi, and armed conflicts that have long plagued the region. Working with
the African front-line states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, we have developed
and are implementing a policy that encompasses both containment and action
against al-Qaida and other terrorists and terrorist organizations. We are
working with partner countries to closely monitor the situation in the Horn and
are prepared to take appropriate action.
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We
are very concerned about the possibility of terrorist attacks in the Horn
region, especially in Kenya and Tanzania because, as the attacks of 9/11 showed,
al-Qaida will continue to plan and carry out attacks against a target if its
initial efforts failed or were only partially successful. Despite the
construction of new embassy facilities in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, and
continuing efforts of the host nations and their neighbors, the terrorism threat
in the region remains high.
USG EFFORTS TO BUILD CT CAPACITY IN THE
HORN
One of our principal tenets in the war on
terrorism is that, whenever possible, our foreign partners should take the lead
in combating terrorism on their own territories or in their own financial
systems, with the USG in a strong support role. The ability of most African
states to effectively participate in the campaign against terrorism is getting
stronger with U.S. help. The President's $100 million East Africa
Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) announced in June of 2003 is designed to
strengthen the capabilities of our partners in the region to combat terrorism
and foster cooperation among these governments. It includes military training
for border and coastal security, a variety of programs to strengthen control of
the movement of people and goods across borders, aviation security
capacity-building, assistance for regional efforts against terrorist financing,
and police training. EACTI also includes an education program to counter
extremist influence and a robust outreach program. The program is on
track..
The Department of State is currently
organizing an international conference to be held later this month to discuss
progress made in fighting terrorism in East Africa in the context of the
President's East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative. All East African nations
participating in EACTI will be invited to attend, along with observers from
other regional partners, and international partners in the global war on
terrorism. As part of the conference's goals and objectives, the participants
will be considering ways and means to make further progress against indigenous
terrorist cells, as well as to diminish the conditions which allow extremists
and terrorists to recruit and train new followers.
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In
addition to EACTI, we are using NADR funds, Economic Support Funds, and other
diplomatic and developmental tools to help strengthen democratic institutions
and support effective governance. At the conference I just mentioned, we hope to
encourage allies and partners to coordinate resources to ensure the sustained
effectiveness of our common efforts in the war against
terrorism.
I would like to briefly describe some
of the programs that the U.S. uses to strengthen African capacity.
CT
Finance Assistance:
The interagency Terrorist
Finance Working Group (TFWG) chaired by my office, is working closely with
Kenyan officials to develop a comprehensive anti-money
laundering/counterterrorist financing regime in Kenya. An interagency team
conducted an assessment of Kenya's financial systems in August of 2003, and has
developed and begun implementing a plan to develop Kenya's capacity in this
field. In January 2004, a DOJ representative, along with a legal expert from the
United Kingdom and a representative from the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering
Program (CALP) conducted a legislative drafting seminar for Kenyan officials
that resulted in draft Anti-Money Laundering/ Counterterrorist Finance (AML/CTF)
legislation that conforms to most international standards to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing.
These same
representatives traveled to Kenya last week to conduct a seminar to educate
legislators and the public on the urgent need for an AML/CTF law. Once the law
is enacted we will provide a Resident Legal Advisor to train prosecutors and
judicial officials, conduct financial investigative courses, steer financial
intelligence unit development and advise on financial regulatory assistance.
Curbing the flow of money to terrorists is important not only as part of the
global war against terrorism but also to help countries protect their own
citizens from attacks by groups operating locally.
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Immigration
Monitoring and Control
In an effort to assist
countries threatened by terrorist transit, the Department of State instituted
the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). Since mid-2003, the Terrorist
Interdiction Program computer system has been operational at select airports in
Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia, and is expected to be operational this year in
Djibouti and Uganda as well. TIP is a good example of international cooperation.
The program was conceived as a result of conversations with Kenyan officials
who, after the 1998 Nairobi attack, suggested that post-attack investigations
could be aided if a system were available for quickly checking suspects who
might have fled a country just before or after a major terrorist
attack.
The TIP hardware/software package is
intended to significantly impact terrorists' freedom of movement between
countries by providing participating nations with a state-of-the-art computer
name-check network that enables immigration and border control officials to
quickly identify suspect persons attempting to enter or leave the
country.
For example, Kenya previously had little
or no capability to identify and thereby apprehend suspect persons traveling
through air, land and sea ports of entry. TIP is jumping Kenya forward on this
front by providing it with a fast, secure and reliable means to check each
traveler's identity against a current terrorist watch list. The TIP watch list
is developed by each country but it may incorporate information from INTERPOL or
individual nations. TIP also provides nations with an increased capability to
collect, compare, and analyze traveler data and thereby contribute to the global
effort to understand terrorist methods and track their movements.
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General
Law Enforcement Training
The Department of
State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is
funding a police development program begun in 2002 for national police in
Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia. While not specifically CT focused, the program
is introducing essential skills-based learning and problem solving techniques to
build the capacity of these East African police forces to detect and investigate
all manner of crime, including terrorist incidents. INL is also funding forensic
laboratory development programs in Tanzania and Uganda, designed to build the
capacity of these governments to analyze evidence collected at crime scenes. In
Kenya, INL is funding technical assistance and training for the Anti-narcotics
Unit of the Kenyan national police and the anti-smuggling unit that work out of
the Port of Mombasa. These units jointly search containers entering the port of
Mombasa for drugs and other contraband that may be brought into Kenya otherwise
undetected.
Export Controls Assistance
The
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program, which is
funded through the NADR account of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill,
will be used in FY04 to assist Kenya and Tanzania to improve their border
controls to prevent transfers through their territory of weapons of mass
destruction and other items of proliferation concern.
Department of State
Anti-Terrorism Assistance—the Kenyan
Example
Kenya is an example of the many types of
training and assistance provided to front-line states under the State
Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program which was established in
1983. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, headed by my boss,
Ambassador Cofer Black, provides policy guidance for the program. It is
implemented by the ATA division of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which
works closely with the Department's Regional Security Officers in each embassy.
Funded through the S/CT NADR account, these law enforcement training programs
are intended to help a country develop its own indigenous counter-terrorism
capability. Types of training include detection and rendering safe explosive
devices, post-blast investigation techniques, VIP protection, senior leadership
crisis management exercises, hostage negotiations and much more.
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For
Fiscal Year 2005, the Administration is requesting $128.3 Million dollars
world-wide. We hope Congress this year will support the full funding request as
requests for training are backed up as a result of cuts in the FY 2004
Appropriation
DS/ATA has maintained a training
partnership with the Government of Kenya since 1989. Since that time ATA has
trained 594 personnel and has expended over $4.05-million. As part of the
President's East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), ATA has recently
conducted a comprehensive needs assessment and is currently developing an
in-country training and equipment program, including at least seven training
events in FY04 for Kenyan law enforcement agencies. Kenya's commitment to this
effort is reflected in its passage of anti-corruption legislation, its efforts
to pass counterterrorism legislation, the recent creation of an Anti-Terrorism
Police Unit, establishment of a National Security Advisory Committee to provide
policy guidance to its CT structures, and the opening early this year of a
National Counter-Terrorism Center. Kenya's National Security Minister Dr.
Christopher Murungaru, on a visit to Washington last month, reaffirmed Kenya's
commitment to partnering with the United States and neighboring African nations
in fighting terrorism.
Sudanese Peace Process and Somali
Stability
In the longer run, reestablishing an
orderly governance mechanism in Somalia and a successful conclusion to the
Sudanese Peace Process will help make the region more stable and less vulnerable
to terrorists and their facilitators. We are working diligently to bring the
Sudanese peace talks to a successful conclusion. Restoration of a functioning
central authority in Somalia would remove a failed state and thus the disorder
that provides haven and transit opportunities for extremist groups. We support
the efforts of regional leaders under the IGAD process to promote peace and
reconciliation talks in Somalia.
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The
Pan Sahel Initiative
The Sahel region, including
Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania, is also an area of concern. The immense size
of these countries, their physical geography combined with weak central
authority, and the traditional independence of nomadic life styles, make border
control and law enforcement exceedingly difficult. No longer isolated from the
rest of the world, the traditional caravan routes in this region now serve as
conduits for illegal migration and drugs and arms trafficking, as well as a
hideout and staging areas for international and regional terrorists and
criminals.
The State Department has formulated
and implemented the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which is providing training and
equipment for quick reaction forces to secure the vast borders of the region.
Mali and Mauritania are completing their training cycles, and Chad and Niger
will begin training cycles later this year. In light of recent events, we are
looking at what other forms of engagement may be
useful.
Events over the past several months have
underscored the need for continued training and cooperation in this region. When
European tourists were kidnapped by members of the Algerian terrorist group
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) in 2003, the GSPC was said to have
received a large ransom payment. After reportedly using this money to purchase
weapons, ammunition and equipment, they were pursued across the desert with the
cooperation of all four Sahel countries. One portion of this group was cornered
and forced out of Mali and promptly captured by Algerian security forces.
Another turned up in Chad, where Chadian and Nigerien forces attacked and
defeated this group.
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West
Africa
In parts of West Africa, we have seen
dramatic rises in the level of anti-American and extremist Islamic rhetoric,
most notably in northern Nigeria. We are working to support effective and
inclusive governance in these countries to dilute the appeal of extremists. The
end of conflict in Liberia and on-going efforts to stabilize Sierra Leone and
Cote d'Ivoire are fundamental to our interest in stabilizing the wider region.
The US is cooperating with other countries to address the enormous security,
development, and other needs of Liberia and to support efforts in neighboring
countries to ensure that this region does not become a haven for terrorist and
criminal activity.
Southern Africa
We
continue to work with the nations of southern Africa to find and capture known
terrorist operatives and to disrupt terrorist financing. South Africa has set up
its own Financial Intelligence Unit to track terrorist assets and place them out
of terrorists' reach. We are encouraging South Africa, one of Africa's
powerhouses of resources and expertise, to begin exporting training,
intelligence, know-how, and other assistance to neighboring countries. Regional
stability is essential, and we continue to watch for indications of trouble in
southern and central African countries.
Last year
we held a major counterterrorism conference for 13 nations in southern Africa.
The sessions, held in the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana,
included crisis management workshops and discussions of ways to strengthen
counterterrorism laws. In 2002, six African countries from various parts of the
continent took part in a week long CT legislation seminar in Washington that
State co-sponsored with the with the Justice Department.
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North
Africa
The states of north Africa have had long
experience with terrorism, and continue to fight this scourge. In the aftermath
of the May 16, 2003, bombings, Moroccan authorities conducted an investigation
that uncovered extremist Islamist cells (Salfiya Jihadiya) in nearly every major
city in the country. These ''cells'' were in various stages of planning and
organizing terrorist actions against the Government of Morocco. Senior Moroccan
authorities concede that if it were not for the Casablanca bombings, in which 45
people were killed and over a hundred injured, they would never have uncovered
planned terrorist operations in Morocco that could have resulted in several
hundred deaths. Throughout the Summer and Fall of 2003, over a thousand people
were arrested on terrorism charges and over 800 have now been prosecuted under
the new terrorism law passed in the aftermath of the May 16
attacks.
In February 2004, the Moroccan
Authorities disrupted two Salafiya Jihadiya cells in Fez and Meknes.
Thirty-seven people were arrested in the raids. Explosives, detonators and
rudimentary weapons were found in the safe-houses. Two of the people arrested
were wanted in connection the May 16 bombings and were believed responsible for
other murders of Moroccan police and
officials.
In the aftermath of last month's
Madrid bombings, Moroccan authorities immediately sent a team of investigators
to Madrid to work with Spanish authorities. The cooperation between the two
governments in this investigation is exceptionally close and productive.
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We
are assisting the Moroccan authorities in a number of key areas of
counterterrorism through a variety of programs including the State Department's
Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). ATA has so
far provided $6.5 million in training to the Moroccans in targeted CT skills,
such as investigations, forensics, and Post Blast investigation. We hope to
expand the TIP in FY 05 to assist Morocco with security and enforcement at its
seaports, airports, land border crossings and porous
borders.
Tunisia has been an effective partner in
the GWOT. We have an ongoing, high-level dialogue with the Tunisian government
about ways to increase their cooperation including information sharing. The
Tunisian government passed anti-terrorism legislation at the beginning of its
Fall 2003 session, and the government has introduced state-of-the art machine
readable passport in an on-going effort to secure its borders. Tunisia also
became more active in the State ATA program, participating in First Responder
Awareness course and Explosive Incident Countermeasures Courses in
2003.
Counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria
remains an important part of our bilateral relationship, one that has expanded
significantly since 9/11. Algeria has provided consistently outstanding support
and cooperation in the global war against terrorism. Cooperation has increased
particularly in the areas of information sharing, military cooperation, and the
tracking of financial assets. However, the Algerians continue to need assistance
in building their CT capabilities so as to better contribute to both regional
and international efforts against
terrorism.
Although there have been significant
improvements in the security environment in Algeria and terrorism no longer
threatens the regime, a residual, significant terrorist threat exists. Hundreds
of Algerians still die every year as a result of terrorism. The government's
ability to deal with this remaining threat will be key. We hope to continue our
close CT cooperation.
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A
LONG–TERM CONTINENT–WIDE EFFORT
Throughout the
continent, the prevalence of poverty, famine and disorder offers terrorists an
opportunity to insert themselves into a region, to develop support systems, and
to troll for new members for their groups. Charitable and non-governmental
organizations have been abused by terrorists and their supporters to raise
funds, disguise their true intentions, and travel internationally. Some
terrorists have been able to use charitable organizations, turning those
organizations into producers of ever larger numbers of extremists. One such
organization, al-Haramayn, has been identified in several locations in Africa.
Its offices are being closed. However, in addition to serving extremist ends, it
also built schools, hospitals, and engaged in normal charitable activities.
Closing these offices has had the unintended consequence of depriving some of
the needy of a source of help.
It is therefore
essential that the US pay attention to development issues and to public
outreach. U.S. A.I.D. has designed and implemented programs to reach out to
Muslim schools and offer support, materials, and training. Department of State
Public Diplomacy programs offer opportunities for discussions, conferences,
seminars, and travel by selected policy- and opinion-makers to explore Islam in
America, U.S. values and traditions, and American society in an effort to expand
mutual understanding. These long-range programs, are essential to ultimate
success in the war on terrorism.
This concludes
my outline of the current regional threat and our efforts to date to combat it.
I hope my testimony has provided you with a clear understanding of the broad and
deep range of challenges that we confront as we aggressively move to reduce
terrorist activity and sympathies on a continent that is rife with both. As all
of us know, the global war on terrorism cannot be won by half-measures or
temporary commitments. Attacking terrorism in Africa requires a mix of short-,
medium- and long-term strategies, and it will require additional resources.
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Many
of the short and medium-term programs are in place and working. Longer-term
strategies to address the factors that create an enabling environment for
terrorism—poverty, intolerance, political alienation, and corruption—are being
formulated and will require support not only from our African and other
international partners but also from this chamber. Our adversaries are committed
for the long term. I know that the State Department and the members of the
subcommittee are equally committed to helping African governments defeat
terrorists and eliminate their support base in Africa. The State Department
appreciates your support and partnership for these efforts and seeks your
continued support as we resolutely maintain and increase these efforts in the
future.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks.
I will be happy to try to answer any
questions.
Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank
you, Mr. Wycoff. Let me start with some conversations we recently had with
General James Jones of the European Command, and he was speaking about the
United States-backed Chadian operation against the Algerian-based militants
operating there in Chad, the GSPC, or the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, as
you call it. He said that that operation was a near-death blow, if not a death
blow, to this al-Qaeda-linked organization that has been a problem for many,
many years. I wanted to ask you for your assessment on that. Do you feel that we
were that successful?
Mr. WYCOFF. We
were clearly successful, and I should say, really, the bulk of the credit
should, of course, go to our partners, to the Chadians, the Algerians, who did,
in fact, suffer casualties in what amounted to combat operations against this
group. From my perspective, I would not want to say that we have been
successful. We would want to take a look at the future before we declare the
GSPC to be out of things, to have been terminated in this operation, but it
clearly was a success.
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Mr.
ROYCE. One of the rhetorical arguments we hear is what is truly the
chance of a successful operation stemming terrorism on the continent, given all
of the challenges there, and when we have the successful culmination of an
operation like this, I think it encourages those of us who are arguing that this
is worth the resources, that we have to pursue these efforts to work with these
African states to go after these terrorist
cells.
One of the questions I wanted to ask you
was the commitment for those resources, and if you were to quantify in some way
the attention and the financial support, the effort that we are making on the
African continent and compare with the effort we are making worldwide on the war
on terrorism, how would you rate that participation on our part? Is the
challenge commensurate with the threat on the
continent?
Mr. WYCOFF. Mr. Chairman,
if I could start by saying that we fully support DoD's efforts, EUCOM's efforts,
to engage with the militaries in Sahel. We view that as a critical part of the
Pan-Sahel Initiative, to try to improve the capability of those countries
militaries to protect their borders, to patrol, to have rapid-reaction forces.
We also are firmly convinced that we have no choice but to continue our
engagement—political, diplomatic, economic, financial, and so forth—with that
region as we attempt to completely eradicate terrorism in that
area.
In terms of the United States Government's
attention to Africa, is it commensurate with the role of terrorism, with the
threat of terrorism on that continent? I believe it is. It is an integral part
of our global strategy. The only figure that comes to mind that I could give you
off the top of my head would be in the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, in
recent years, say, about 5 years, about 22 percent of global funds for that
program have been spent in Africa.
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Mr.
ROYCE. One question that I know that all of the Members of this
Committee are very interested in is your assessment of any country in Africa
that we may not be receiving full cooperation with in terms of our mutual fight
on the war on terror. Would you want to single out for us any example right now
of where you are running into difficulty and where we might want to focus some
attention?
Mr. WYCOFF. We do face some
challenges in engagement on specific program activities in Eritrea, where we are
trying to get them to engage on certain activities with us, but we remain
convinced that Eritrea shares our commitment to fighting global terrorism and
note that it has been a solid partner in that battle in the past. Other than
that, there is no other country that comes to mind at this
time.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank
you.
Mr. WYCOFF. I think we have very
good cooperation from the governments of Africa, and I would leave it at
that.
Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate that. I
am going to go to Mr. Payne.
Mr.
PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Wycoff, maybe about 10 years ago,
there was, from what I understand, a restructuring, maybe 8 or 10 years ago, of
the whole intelligence operation around the world. There was a cutback in
funding and so forth. Do you have any knowledge, going back, that there might
have been a disproportionate reduction in Africa of intelligence apparatus
during that time? It was reported that the resources were made very, very
scarce, and it was practically virtually very limited, to almost no intelligence
agencies working.
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Mr.
WYCOFF. Congressman Payne, I would not have any comment. I am very
leery of addressing intelligence questions in an open session like this, in any
event. What I can say, sir, is that the U.S. Government has a policy,
implemented in a variety of ways, to increase information sharing, information
gathering in Africa and in every region of the world as part of the global war
on terrorism, and I would leave it there,
sir.
Mr. PAYNE. When the Embassies
were attacked in Africa, I ask once again, could you compare the security of our
Embassies in Africa today as compared to prior to the attacks? I know you just
indicated you cannot talk about the past, but where do they stand
today?
Mr. WYCOFF. I am familiar,
basically, only with our Embassies in Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam. As you know,
we have new facilities there. They meet the requisite standards, as I understand
it. We are happy with that.
One other comment
that I could make: We have a mission in Khartoum, and the Sudanese have been
very helpful in trying to ensure the security of that. I think it is safe to
say, for the State Department and other agencies that operate overseas, we are
very focused on the security of our Embassies. We are very focused on the safety
of Americans resident and traveling overseas, and I would leave it at
that.
Mr. PAYNE. Finally, as we all
know, and as I was attempting when the debate was going on about whether to have
preemptive strikes in Iraq or not, my concern primarily was that Iraq was
important but that al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, the cells that were around, the
fact that, of course, he left Sudan and went to Afghanistan, and that is where
our attention should have gone, to Afghanistan to attempt to eliminate al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan and to do damage to that command/control that was going on in
that country. The decision was made to do Iraq, and so presently al-Qaeda
perhaps is not as strong as it was but, in my opinion, could have possibly been
eliminated or inoperable at this time.
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So
my question, though, is, there are some beliefs that al-Qaeda is starting and
having a growing influence in West Africa and even in Nigeria, in particular. I
just wonder if there is any evidence that you know that al-Qaeda is targeting
and moving into West African countries.
Mr.
WYCOFF. It is certainly something that we are very interested in, and
that we try to monitor and gather information on a daily basis. I would not have
anything to confirm that al-Qaeda is actually active in West
Africa.
Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Well, once
again, I certainly appreciate the attention that is currently being given. I
still believe, as I have indicated in my remarks, that in addition to
anti-terrorism moves with military and other kinds of intelligence gathering and
so forth, I think that if we do a better job at trying to eliminate poverty,
trying to eradicate poverty, trying to get to some of the systemic problems that
keep Africa behind and, therefore, becomes a breeding ground for discontent and
frustration, I think that we could probably have had money better spent in the
past, and hopefully in the future we could convince the authorities that the
best way, in my opinion, to fight terrorism is by eliminating these breeding
grounds that people live in. So I will yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. TANCREDO [presiding]. Thank
you, Mr. Payne.
Let me, before I go to questions,
recognize the presence of a group of students here with us today from the
American school in Abuja. Where are you all? Welcome, welcome.
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Mr.
Wycoff, in your written testimony and in listening to your oral remarks, I was
looking for and listening diligently for a little greater explanation of the
situation, as you see it now, in Sudan, especially, and in your written remarks
there is just a cursory reference to it, that ''the Sudan peace process will
help make the region more stable and less vulnerable to terrorists and their
facilitators.'' Well, of course, I think that is probably
true.
We have been getting, however, quite a bit
of conflicting information about what is exactly going on in Sudan. Though this
hearing is not on specifically Sudan, it does, I think, have the situation
there, in terms of the peace process, that certainly, as you reference, will
affect our ability to deal with the terrorist activity emanating out of that
country. And so, therefore, I am concerned about the fact that many people whose
observations we rely upon and whose credibility we hold in high regard have
indicated to us that there are some severe problems. Certainly, Darfur is one.
It does not look as though things are as rosy as certainly the State Department
continues to try to paint it, in terms of the actual status of those
negotiations and the conditions in Sudan.
One of
the things, it seems to me, that is important for us to be watching for in Sudan
is exactly what happens to the people who are presently in the government, still
part of the government of Sudan, who have direct ties or have been linked to
terrorist activities in the past. And I would like to get an indication from
you, if you would, of what you think we should be doing about that. Do you
believe that should be part of the negotiating process, the peace process,
there, requiring that these people be at least brought to justice or at least
ousted from the government? And I guess I would like to ask you to start from
there.
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Mr.
WYCOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of the peace process for
the Sudan, I know that the State Department and others have been very active.
Secretary Powell has been very active on it. As you know, I work in the
Counterterrorism Office, so I am not in a position to address the situation in
Darfur or the peace process writ large.
Mr.
TANCREDO. I understand.
Mr.
WYCOFF. In terms of counterterrorism cooperation with Sudan, we have
seen significant improvement in sharing of information. I think the Sudanese,
last year, raided a suspected terrorist training camp, in May of last year, I
believe it was. There was a Syrian who was convicted in a Sudanese court, along
with a couple of Sudanese nationals, I believe, last year also, of engaging in
terrorist activities, training possibly for an attack against United States
interests. So I think it is clear that there has been a significant improvement
in the Sudan's situation vis-a-vis terrorism, cooperation with
us.
In terms of how personalities within that
government should be dealt with, I am not in a position to give you an answer on
that. Sudan remains a state sponsor of terrorism. That is part of the mix of the
overall United States policy toward Sudan, and as we move forward in Sudanese
policies, we will have to take a close look at exactly where they are in the
Sudan.
The other specific thing that I could say
is that we understand that there is a Hamas office and a Palestine Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) office still in Khartoum, and we have made it clear that they need to
close those offices down and need to cut links with terrorists.
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Mr.
TANCREDO. How about Hizballah?
Mr.
WYCOFF. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. TANCREDO. All right.
Well, I will only suggest to you that the presence of folks who, as I say, have
been linked to terrorist activities in the past and who are still part of the
government in Khartoum; I think that that is one of the reasons why we are
having a difficult time actually making our way through this piece process and
reaching an accord.
I think that they are part of
the problem, and I hope that the State Department is rigorously pursuing some
sort of solution to this that will make sure that when we come to the end of the
road in Sudan for us, we are looking at a peace process that, in fact, includes
some admission of the fact that these people were in the government, that they
have been put out of office or in some way dealt with because I think if they
are still there after the ink has dried, we will not have a successful peace
process in Sudan.
The staff has just handed me a
note saying that Hizballah does, in fact, have an office in
Khartoum.
Mr. WYCOFF. I could check on
that and see if I can submit anything else in writing at a later time, Mr.
Chairman.
[The information referred to
follows:]
Page 40 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
POST-HEARING
WRITTEN RESPONSE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY KARL WYCOFF, ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR
FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS AND PLANS, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
We
have researched this issue, and have been unable to identify an active Hizballah
operational presence in Sudan for several years. As you know, however, there are
both terrorist and political aspects to the organization we know as Lebanese
Hizballah. There may be individuals sympathetic to or affiliated with Hizballah
who engage in Fundraising, propaganda, political or religious activities in
Sudan. Current reporting indicates that Hizballah is not engaged in operational
activities in Sudan.
Mr. TANCREDO.
Yes. That would be certainly very helpful, and we will also be willing to
provide you with the information that we have upon which we make that
claim.
Mr. WYCOFF. Thank you,
sir.
Mr. TANCREDO. Okay. Ms.
Lee?
Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Good afternoon, Mr. Wycoff. Good to see
you here.
Let me ask you a couple of questions.
First of all, you know, like many, we believe that it is important to approach
the issue of terrorism in a very thoughtful and comprehensive manner, and we
need a strategy that, yes, is part military but also goes beyond military in
terms of addressing poverty reduction, development, aid, and trade. Desperate
people do desperate things, and as Congressman Payne mentioned earlier, many
countries, because of poverty and all of the other issues of underdevelopment,
are a breeding ground for terrorists.
Page 41 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
So
in our anti-terrorism strategy, how do you factor in the comprehensive approach,
for instance, in Tanzania or whatever country that we have military bases? In
fact, could you tell me where we have bases? Then where we have the bases, how
do we put that and package that military strategy with the fuller comprehensive
strategy?
Mr. WYCOFF. In Africa, I
believe we have a base of forces located only in Djibouti, at Camp Lemonier, and
what I could say, for purposes of my office, we focus more on operational
counterterrorism issues, and we look at all of the elements of national power to
try to prevent attacks on the homeland, first and foremost, attacks on American
interests abroad, and that is our primary
focus.
In a broader sense, what I could say to
you is that the U.S. Government, as a whole, is seized with these issues. USAID,
for instance, is engaged in a strategic policy dialogue and a joint planning
process with the Department of State, and as part of that process, my office was
involved in developing AID's strategic plan and seeing how that melded with the
Department of State's strategic plan not only on the counterterrorism front but
in security areas that might relate to military bases, military interests, and
other diplomatic and economic interests
worldwide.
Ms. LEE. So you do
incorporate your counterterrorism strategy with other strategies as part of a
full antiterrorist package.
Mr.
WYCOFF. Yes, ma'am. Congressman Lee, we do, indeed. We also try to do
that on the public diplomacy front in terms of trying to combat the
anti-Americanism and the Islamic fundamentalism, the extremism that is out
there. We do try to attack it on all fronts.
Page 42 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Ms.
LEE. Let me ask you, how are our efforts not perceived as anti-Muslim
in countries that have heavy Muslim populations? Do we have a way of making
sure, because I know the President indicated that the war on terror was not
addressed at Islam? Are we sensitive to that in our overall
plans?
Mr. WYCOFF. Yes, ma'am, we are.
We are very sensitive. I cannot say that we are 100 percent successful because
it is a perception problem among many of the audience, if you will, who are
prone to see something that we do in the war on terrorism as a strike against
Islam in some fashion. That is just totally untrue, and we try, through our
public diplomacy and through our public outreach programs, to combat that kind
of misunderstanding and misinformation, but there is, in the Arabic press, for
instance, a lot of misinformation that alleges that the global war on terrorism
is somehow a war on Islam. So we are very cognizant of it, and we do try, in all
of our information operations, public diplomacy, to take that into account and
to combat that phenomenon.
Ms. LEE.
Let me ask you now about the Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. What is
going on with regard to the compensation of all of the victims of those
bombings? Do you have an idea of what has happened? We have tried to get a sense
of why these Kenyans and Tanzanians have not received
compensation.
Mr. WYCOFF. I am afraid
I would have nothing to say on that. I would not be a good source for the
Committee on that. I would have to take that question and submit something for
the record at a later date.
Page 43 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
[The
information referred to follows:]
POST-HEARING WRITTEN RESPONSE SUBMITTED
FOR THE RECORD BY KARL WYCOFF, ASSOCIATE COORDINATOR FOR PRESS, POLICY, PROGRAMS
AND PLANS, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
In the aftermath of the Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam bombings, the U.S. Congress made available some $48 million in funding
for assistance to victims and their survivors. In both Kenya and Tanzania, these
funds were used to reimburse hospitals for treatment they provided to victims,
pay for mental health services, finance reconstructive surgeries, pay school
fees for children of deceased and permanently disabled victims, provide grants
to affected businesses to allow them to start up again, and to provide grants to
building owners to pay for repairs. In addition, Foreign Service National
employee victims and their survivors are receiving all benefits to which they
are entitled under U.S. law.
Ms. LEE.
Okay. I guess my final question is, once a country allows the United States to
work with them on a counterterrorism strategy, what is expected of the country?
Is there any quid pro quo? Is there any requirement of a country? Do you know
how countries perceive our being there? Do we provide the type of resources they
need on the development front in exchange for the
presence?
Mr. WYCOFF. No, ma'am. From
our perspective, the global war on terrorism is in everyone's interest. It is in
Kenya's interest, it is in Djibouti's interest, it is in Tanzania's interest,
and it is a partnership. We try to approach this as a partnership with host
countries. We certainly try to be responsive to their needs, to their
requirements, to their situation, to their public relations needs even, if you
will, but in terms of quid pro quos, I do not believe so.
Page 44 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Ms.
LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr.
TANCREDO. Thank you.
Ms.
McCollum?
Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr.
Chair. To follow up a little more on Ms. Lee's question about the perception
that the war on terrorism is not a war against the people who practice the
Muslim faith, Sharia law, which is an extreme form that they have pushed as
practice in some parts of Africa; there are many of us here in Congress and
people around the world who feel the stoning death of women for the way that
they are tried for adultery is a gross violation of human rights. What, if
anything, are you aware of, in dealing with issues of Sharia law, in countries
that we are active in? Are we seeing that as a concern, or are we staying away
from the issue of dealing with that at all because we do not want to be
perceived as being anti-Muslim?
Mr.
WYCOFF. I think we deal with those issues directly. As you know, the
State Department puts out human rights reports on countries around the world,
engages in human rights dialogue and human rights advocacy through most of our
Embassies, and those are the kinds of things that we would focus
on.
Ms. MCCOLLUM. But could you tell
me, as we have had a discussion about many of the challenges that Africa
countries are facing,—poverty, AIDS, and other disease, and these countries are
struggling to private basic human needs—what is the capacity of these countries
to provide their own, self-sustaining organizations to combat terrorism?
Page 45 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr.
WYCOFF. It is difficult for many of these countries. It is, however,
for them an important security issue, and so most of them are focused on it and
are doing their best, are devoting resources to counterterrorist organizations,
counterterrorist activities, and we, obviously, are trying to support those
efforts.
Ms. MCCOLLUM. Do we encourage
groups of countries to work together to share
information?
Mr. WYCOFF. Yes, we do,
indeed. The Pan-Sahel Initiative has an information-sharing component to it, and
then the East Asia Counterterrorist Initiative also has an information-sharing
component to it. And as I mentioned, we are putting together a regional
conference in East Africa, and that will bring together officials that are
involved in counterterrorism, as well as some officials from donor countries, to
help networking and to help sharing of information in that
capacity.
Ms. MCCOLLUM. Who is helping
to organize that and share and collect the information and then get it
distributed? Is the United States funding that? How is that funded so that it is
self-sustaining?
Mr. WYCOFF. It is a
matter of developing the networks and the communication path as opposed to
having an organization or a fusion cell or whatnot at this stage. So it is more
a matter of developing habits of communication, patterns of communication, and
providing information through those channels and encouraging countries to
communicate with each other.
Page 46 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Ms.
MCCOLLUM. As you have shared with and the panel has discussed, once
again, going back to the issue of AIDS and poverty and failed states being
breeding grounds for terrorism, when we talk about terrorism up here, we are
talking about al-Qaeda and threats to our country. Do we help also with
information that would help with terrorist organization that threaten the
stability of every day life among people who live in a country that might not
necessarily be a direct threat to the United States? In other words, we might
not see it as a terrorist organization to ourselves, but in many of the
conflicts in Africa with cross-border raiding going on, they view that as a
terrorist threat to themselves.
Mr.
WYCOFF. The counterterrorism assistance that we provide to countries
does not have a string attached to it, that the country can use it only for
international terrorists that might threaten U.S. interests. We try to provide
those countries with a counterterrorist capability that they can use in
accordance with their laws and with their human rights concerns against any
terrorist organization, so the answer to your question is
yes.
Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank
you.
Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. I have
one more question for you. There was a program we operated, the Anti-Terrorism
Assistance Program, and it was designed to provide support and training for
Kenyan officers in anti-terrorism activities. In the Mombassa bombing in 2001,
we found that none of them were there. None of them were available. They were
not around. And so I wondered, have you looked into that at all and determined
what happened there, what happened to the people, and whether things have
improved in that particular program and in Kenya, in particular.
Page 47 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr.
WYCOFF. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. We are, indeed,
aware of the situation in Kenya. The problems are not, in any way, shape, or
form, restricted only to Kenya of making sure that graduates of
ATA-assistance-training programs remain in their current positions for at least
2 years, which is part of the agreement when we provide training, and that they
be used wisely.
What I can say is, in Kenya,
specifically, we are very concerned about the sustainability of their
counterterrorism capabilities, as is the Kenyan government. Their minister for
national security, Christopher Murungaru, was in town 2 weeks ago for meetings.
He met with Deputy Secretary Armitage. He met with my boss, Ambassador Black. He
met with Assistant Secretary Taylor from Diplomatic Security. And that was one
of the central focuses of our discussions was how to put together a way forward
with Kenya that would be sustainable so that the Kenyans could keep working it
in the years ahead.
The Kenyans, as I mentioned,
are considering comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. They have made some
changes to their governmental structure. They have added a National Security
Advisory Council, which will provide CT guidance to the various ministries. They
have established a CTC, a counterterrorism center, headed by a very impressive
brigadier, and they are establishing an anti-terrorism police
unit.
We, on our side, are looking at ways of
helping them to institutionalize those changes that they have made so that they
will function well and then of providing the training and equipment that will be
needed to actually implement those kinds of policies so that when there is a
crisis of some kind, God forbid, be it a WMD attack or be it another bombing or
whatever contingency might arise, that Kenya and our other partners will have a
CT counterterrorism capability that can swing into action.
Page 48 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Mr.
TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Wycoff. Thank you very much for your
presence here today and for your testimony.
We
will have the second panel come on up now.
Mr.
WYCOFF. It has been a privilege, sir. Good day to you. Thank
you.
[Pause.]
Mr.
TANCREDO. Welcome. Douglas Farah spent 19 years as a foreign
correspondent and investigative reporter. In November 2001, Farah broke the
story of al-Qaeda's ties to the ''blood-diamond'' trade in West Africa. He has
also written on the ties of Hizballah and other terrorist organizations to the
diamond trade in Africa. In January, Mr. Farah joined the National Strategy
Information Center as a Senior Fellow. Welcome, Mr.
Farah.
Ambassador Princeton Lyman is the Ralph
Bunche Senior Fellow and Director of Africa Policy Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations. Ambassador Lyman's accomplished career in the State
Department and at USAID includes stints as Ambassador to South Africa and
Nigeria, as well as serving as a Deputy Assistant Secretary. He has published
books and articles on foreign policy, African affairs, economic development,
HIV/AIDS, U.N. reform, and peacekeeping. Welcome, Dr.
Lyman.
Mr. Farah.
Page 49 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
STATEMENT
OF DOUGLAS FARAH, FORMER ''WASHINGTON POST''
CORRESPONDENT
Mr. FARAH. Thank you for
the opportunity to talk with you today about the extremely important issue of
terrorism in West Africa.
We know there are at
least two international terrorist groups operating in West Africa: Hizballah,
which has long-standing, historic ties to the Lebanese diasporas centered in
Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and dominating trade throughout the region; and al-Qaeda,
which has had an interest in the regional diamond trade that extends at least
back to the mid-1990s.
Why would al-Qaeda choose
to operate in West Africa? There are multiple reasons, but one of the most
important factors is that in such states as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and most
others in the region, governments are weak, corrupt, and exercise little control
over much of their national territory. Some states, like Liberia under Charles
Taylor, were, in essence, functioning criminal enterprises. For the right price,
Taylor let al-Qaeda, Russian organized crime, Balkan organized crime, Hizballah,
and other criminal elements to operate under his
protection.
Al-Qaeda sought to exploit the
diamond business in West Africa, East Africa, and Europe for many years. New
evidence has emerged to support the data already public on the al-Qaeda ties to
the African diamond trade. The existing data comes largely from testimony of
al-Qaeda members convicted in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, my
own investigations on the ground into al-Qaeda's ties in West Africa,
particularly to Charles Taylor in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone; and
investigations by the London-based Global Witness group.
Page 50 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Among
the new elements are public statements by the prosecutor and chief investigators
for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the U.N.-backed body investigating crimes
against humanity committed in Sierra Leone's brutal civil war. Both men, veteran
Department of Defense employees, have verified the presence not only of the
three al-Qaeda members I had identified as running the diamond business but the
presence of at least two other senior al-Qaeda terrorists in West
Africa.
One of the most interesting confirmations
of bin Laden's personal interest in the West African diamond trade came in
November 2003. Shayk Abdul Qadir Fadlallah Mamour, a radical Senegalese Muslim
cleric expelled from Italy for supporting al-Qaeda, was asked by reporters if he
had, in fact, met bin Laden. He replied, yes, three times between 1993 and 1996
because, he said, bin Laden was financing Mamour's diamond business, which
consisted of ''selling diamonds between West Africa and
Belgium.''
The documentary and anecdotal evidence
points to two phases in al-Qaeda's diamond activities. The first started
sometime before 1996, when bin Laden lived in Sudan, and was aimed at helping
finance the organization. This lasted until the end of
2000.
Some of the evidence was provided by Wadi
el Hage, bin Laden's personal secretary until he was arrested in September 1998.
During his trial, el Hage's files of business cards, personal telephone
directories, and handwritten notebooks were introduced as evidence. The
notebooks contain extensive notes on buying diamonds, setting up diamond-mining
operations, setting up diamond-buying businesses, and chronicle the attempt to
sell diamonds across Africa and Europe. There is a page on Liberia, with
telephone numbers and names. His address books and business card files are full
of the names of diamond dealers and jewelers, often including the purchasers'
home phone numbers.
Page 51 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Unfortunately,
United States and European intelligence agencies paid little attention to what
was viewed as secondary documents and statements in the trial. Most of el Hage's
notebooks, written in Arabic, are still not translated into
English.
It is not clear how profitable
al-Qaeda's diamond ventures were. El Hage and others did not keep sales records.
The record in Sierra Leone and Liberia is also a little sketchy. The first known
contacts with the Taylor regime came in September 1998, just weeks after the
bombing of the two U.S. Embassies in East Africa. It appears that a group of
senior al-Qaeda leaders involved in those attacks simply moved to West Africa to
avoid the heat, and they intermittently sought to buy diamonds for the next 2
years.
The picture changes dramatically at the
end of 2000, when senior al-Qaeda operatives arrived in Monrovia, Liberia. They
held a series of meetings with senior Liberian officials and the commanders of
the RUF. They set up a monopoly arrangement for the purchase of diamonds through
Taylor with the RUF. Then al-Qaeda buyers went on a buying spree that lasted
several months. But here the intention was not to make money for the
organization but, rather, to buy the stones as a way of transferring value from
other assets. This was in the months immediately prior to 9/11, when the
terrorists were moving their money out of traceable financial structures into
commodities in preparation for the aftermath of the
attacks.
To do this, the al-Qaeda operatives were
paying a premium over the going rate for uncut stones, leaving regular buyers
without merchandise. This was my first clue that something was terribly the
matter with the market that year. The pace of the purchases picked up, beginning
in January 2001, and lasted until just before 9/11. Telephone records from the
middlemen seized by Belgian police handling the purchases show calls to
Afghanistan until September 10, 2001. The available evidence points to al-Qaeda
purchasing some $30 million to $50 million worth of RUF diamonds in the 8 months
prior to 9/11.
Page 52 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Hizballah
operates in a more institutional manner in West Africa, where it has been
operational almost since its birth in the early 1980s. Because of the hundreds
of thousands of Lebanese in West Africa, the vast majority being Shiite Muslims,
the organization has a natural constituency and family ties that bind the region
to the Lebanese conflict. Hizballah collects donations from businesses, shakes
down business operations, operates front companies, and is deeply involved in
the blood diamond trade.
For a glimpse of how
much money Hizballah raises in the region, consider one recent case. On December
25, 2003, a flight from Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa, to Beirut crashed on
takeoff. On board were senior Hizballah members carrying $2 million in cash and
contributions to the organization from across the
region.
In the diamond trade, Hizballah operates
in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These three
countries all provided diamonds as a revenue stream to all factions in the
Lebanese civil war.
In short, al-Qaeda and
Hizballah have maintained an active presence in West Africa for a significant
period of time. There is extensive European intelligence reporting on the
presence of Hizballah there. I have found very little awareness among the U.S.
intelligence agencies of their
operations.
Al-Qaeda does not appear to have an
extensive infrastructure in West Africa. Rather, the group was able to take
advantage of the settings and personal contacts, including their key contact,
who had been a mujahadeen in Afghanistan in the early 1980s, to further its
cause.
Page 53 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
I
concur with General Charles Wald, the deputy commander of United States forces
in Europe, who recently noted signs of al-Qaeda in northern Nigeria and
Mauritania, where radical Islamic clerics appear to have gained a
foothold:
''They are there for a purpose, whether looking for real estate
or recruiting or looking for arms; whatever it is, there is a
presence . . .''
Wald said.
''It may be small, but
it is a bad indicator.''
Hizballah uses the
region extensively to raise funds, recruit new members, and launder money.
Because it is part of a large community, its presence there is much greater than
that of al-Qaeda and more institutional. Because of that, it is both easier to
identify and more difficult to uproot.
If the
United States is serious about dealing with terrorism in Africa, the first step
must be to greatly enhance human intelligence on the ground. Societies in which
telephones are rare, Internet communications limited to a small percentage of
the population in the capital, and business deals depend largely on family
relationships, our high-tech monitoring systems are simply of little use. People
must be on the ground, not just in the capital but in the hinterland, to be able
to map the connections and trace financial patterns that can be used by
terrorists.
Page 54 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The
United States intelligence community must also take West Africa more seriously.
Since the end of the cold war, West Africa has been a backwater assignment,
where reports by even the most enterprising officials were often ignored. The
conditions that favored al-Qaeda in West Africa—corruption, conflicts over
natural resources that are little studied or understood, the lack of government
control in vast areas, the emergence of sophisticated organize criminal
networks—all continue to exist. These ''failed states'' or ''stateless regions''
are the ideal breeding grounds for terrorist and other groups that pose
significant threats to United States national security and the stability of much
of Africa.
Thank you, and I would be happy to
take any questions.
[The prepared statement of
Mr. Farah follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, FORMER
Washington Post Correspondent
Thank
you for the opportunity to talk to you today about the extremely important issue
of terrorism in West Africa.
We know there are at
least two international terrorist groups operating in West Africa: Hezbollah,
which has long-standing, historic ties to the Lebanese diasporas centered in
Abidjan, Ivory Coast and dominating trade throughout the region; and al Qaeda,
which has had an interest in the regional diamond trade that extends at least
back to the mid-1990s. Why would these groups chose West Africa? There are
multiple reasons, but one of the most important factors is that states such as
Liberia, Sierra Leone and most others in the region, governments are weak,
corrupt and exercise little control over most of the national territory. Some
states, like Liberia under Charles Taylor, were in essence functioning criminal
enterprises. For the right price, Taylor let al Qaeda, Russian organized crime,
Balkan organized crime, Hezbollah, and other criminal elements operate under his
protection in Liberia.
Page 55 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
Al
Qaeda sought to exploit the diamond businesses in West Africa, East Africa and
Europe for many years. Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance all
exploited Afghanistan's emerald fields to finance their activities, so gemstones
were not an unknown revenue source.
New evidence
has emerged to support the data already public on the al Qaeda ties to the
African diamond trade. The existing data comes largely from the testimony of al
Qaeda members convicted of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa; my own
investigations on the ground into al Qaeda's ties in West Africa, particularly
to Charles Taylor in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone; and investigations by
the London-based NGO Global Witness. Among the new elements are public
statements by the prosecutor and chief investigator for the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, the U.N.-backed body investigating crimes against humanity
committed in Sierra Leone's brutal civil war. Both men, veteran Department of
Defense employees, have verified the presence not only of the three senior al
Qaeda members I had identified as running the diamond business, but the presence
of at least two other senior terrorists.(see
footnote 1)
One of the most
interesting confirmations of bin Laden's personal interest in the West African
diamond trade came in November 2003. Shaykh Abdul Qadir Fadlallah Mamour, a
radical Senegalese Muslim cleric expelled from Italy for supporting al Qaeda,
was asked by reporters if he had ever met bin Laden. Yes, Mamour replied, he had
met bin Laden three times between 1993 and 1996. The reason, he said, was
because bin Laden had financed Mamour's diamond business, which consisted of
''selling diamonds between West Africa and Belgium.''(see
footnote 2)
Page 56 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The
documentary and anecdotal evidence points to two phases in al Qaeda's diamond
activities. The first started sometime before 1996, when bin Laden lived in the
Sudan, and was aimed at helping finance the organization. This lasted until the
end of 2000. Some of the evidence was provided by Wadi el Hage, bin Laden's
personal secretary until he was arrested in September 1998. During his trial, El
Hage's file of business cards, personal telephone directory and handwritten
notebooks were introduced as evidence. The notebooks contain extensive notes on
buying diamonds and chronicles attempts to sell diamonds across Africa and
Europe. There is a page on Liberia, with telephone numbers and names. His
address book and business card file were full of the names of diamond dealers
and jewelers, often including the purchaser's home phone
number.
Unfortunately, U.S. and European
intelligence agencies paid little attention to what was viewed as secondary
documents and statements in the trials. Most of el Hage's notebooks, written in
Arabic, have still not been translated into English.(see
footnote 3)
It is not clear how
profitable al Qaeda's diamonds ventures were. El Hage and others did not keep
sales records. The record in Sierra Leone and Liberia is also sketchy. The first
known contacts with the Taylor regime came in September 1998—just weeks after
the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa. A group of senior al Qaeda
leaders involved in those attacks moved to West Africa, where they
intermittently bought diamonds for the next two
years.
Because Taylor controlled the notoriously
brutal rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in neighboring Sierra
Leone, he was able to grant al Qaeda access to the some of the world's richest
diamond fields.
Page 57 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
The
picture in West Africa changes dramatically toward the end of 2000, when senior
al Qaeda operatives arrived in Monrovia, Liberia. They set up a monopoly
arrangement for the purchase of diamonds through Taylor with the RUF. Then, al
Qaeda buyers went on a spree that lasted several months. But here the intention
was not to make money, but rather to buy the stones as a way of transferring
value from other assets. This was in the months immediately prior to 9/11, when
the terrorists were moving their money out of traceable financial structures
into commodities in preparation for the aftermath of the attacks. To do this,
the al Qaeda operatives were paying a premium over the going rate for uncut
stones, leaving regular buyers without any merchandise. The pace of the
purchases picked up beginning in January 2001 and lasted until just before 9/11.
Telephone records from the middlemen handling the purchases show calls to
Afghanistan until Sept. 10. The available evidence points to al Qaeda purchasing
some $30 million to $50 million worth of RUF diamonds during the eight months
prior to 9/11.(see
footnote 4)
Hezbollah operates in a
more institutional manner in West Africa, where it has been operational almost
since its birth in the early 1980s. Because of the hundreds of thousands of
Lebanese in West Africa—the vast majority being Shi'ite Muslims—the organization
has a natural constituency and family ties that bind the region to the Lebanese
conflict. Hezbollah collects donations from businesses, runs shakedown
operations, operates front companies, and is also deeply involved in the ''blood
diamond'' trade. For a glimpse of how much money Hezbollah raises in the region,
consider one known case. On Dec. 25, 2003, a Union Transport Africaines flight
from Cotonou, Benin, in West Africa to Beirut, crashed on takeoff. On board were
senior Hezbollah members, carrying $2 million in contributions to the
organization from across the region.(see
footnote 5)
Page 58 PREV PAGE TOP OF DOC
In
the diamond trade, Hezbollah operates in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. These three countries all provided diamonds as a
revenue stream to all factions of the Lebanese civil war. Hezbollah remains the
strongest of the groups involved in the trade. I have spoken to Hezbollah
loyalists in the diamond trade in Africa. In one of the more unusual twists,
these same merchants do businesses with Israeli diamond merchants. The war, one
explained to me, was in the Middle East, while business was done in
Africa.
In short, al Qaeda and Hezbollah have
maintained an active presence in West Africa for a significant period of
time.
Al Qaeda does not appear to have an
extensive infrastructure in West Africa. Rather, a friendly member of the
mujahadeen, the group was able to take advantages of the setting and
resources to further its cause. I concur with Gen. Charles Wald, the deputy
commander of U.S. forces in Europe, who recently noted signs of al Qaeda in
regions such as northern Nigeria and Mauritania, where radical Islamic clerics
have gained a foothold. ''They are there for a purpose, whether looking for real
estate, or recruiting or looking for arms, whatever it is, there's a presence,''
Wald said. ''It may be small, but it's a bad indicator.''(see
footnote 6)
Hezbollah uses the region
extensively to raise funds, recruit new members and launder money. Because it is
part of a large community, it's presence there is much greater than that of al
Qaeda, and more institutional. Because of that, it is both easier to identify
and more difficult to uproot.
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If
the United States is serious about dealing with terrorism in Africa, the first
step must be to greatly enhance human intelligence on the ground. Societies in
which telephones are rare, Internet communications limited to a small percentage
of the population in the capital and business deals depend largely on familial
relationships, our high-tech monitoring systems are of little use. People must
be on the ground, not just in the capital but in the hinterland, to be able to
map the connections and trace financial patterns that can be used by
terrorists.
The United States intelligence
community must also take Africa more seriously. Since the end of the Cold War
West Africa, at least, has been a backwater assignment, where reports by even
the most enterprising agents were ignored. The conditions that favored al Qaeda
in West Africa: corruption; conflicts over natural resources that are little
studied or understood; lack of government control in vast areas; the emergence
of sophisticated organized criminal networks; all continue to exist These
''failed states'' or ''stateless regions'' are the ideal operating grounds for
terrorists and other groups that pose significant threats U.S. national security
and the stability of much of Africa.
Thank
you.
Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr.
Farah.
Ambassador Lyman?
STATEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, RALPH BUNCHE SENIOR FELLOW IN AFRICA POLICY
STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
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Mr.
LYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am
pleased to be asked to testify concerning the terrorist situation in
Africa.
It will not be possible for the United
States to have an effective worldwide campaign against terrorism unless the
threat is addressed in Africa. But it is important that we distinguish among the
threats. There are some immediate threats from existing terrorist networks. This
is particularly true in the Horn and East
Africa.
There are other dangers arising from
failed or failing states, as Mr. Farah has just very clearly explained. That is
true in Central and West Africa. Another threat is in the sparsely populated
area of the Sahel, which we heard about from Mr. Wycoff and the Pan-Sahel
Initiative.
But perhaps the most challenging of
all are the threats that arise from deepening economic and political crises in
countries like Nigeria. The brew of religious tension, economic deprivation,
declining law and order, and political instability could open that country of
130 million people to some of the most serious forms of criminal and terrorist
activity. In fact, in all parts of sub-Saharan Africa, our response to the
terrorist threat must be a broadly based one, as several of the Members here
have said, bringing political, economic, and sensitive public diplomacy assets
to bear.
Let me touch on those factors in just
the few cases that we have been talking about today. Take East Africa and the
Horn. First of all, in spite of a very aggressive response by the United States
and the countries in this area to terrorism, intelligence capabilities remain
weak. Much cross-border information is simply not available. That is just one
example.
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Coastal
control of shipments of arms in this area, the Horn, is almost nonexistent, in
spite of the Combined Joint Task Force and allied naval efforts, because most of
the arms shipments come in small dhows which are not inspected. Therefore, the
proliferation of arms coming in down from Somalia into Kenya, Tanzania, and
elsewhere, including shoulder-fired missiles, remains a major
threat.
The politics of this region are
important. One of the difficulties of coming to a political solution in Somalia
is some of the surrounding countries, like Ethiopia, have different interests
from Kenya. We know that the differences between Eritrea and Sudan and between
Uganda and Sudan contribute to the inability to deal with such horrific groups
as the Lord's Resistance Army.
Now, we have
talked about the response in that area and the response that the U.S. has made,
the $100 million that the President committed last year, but let us also be
candid. The $100 million really represented cobbling together a lot of existing
programs from existing funds. In the following year, and I think Congress has to
take responsibility here, the funds for these programs in Africa have declined.
We need a steady and adequately funded program in this
area.
We also have to be sensitive to the
politics. Congressman Payne has talked about the problems for Kenya and the
tourist advisory that has so affected Kenya's foreign exchange earnings. There
is also a case of the anti-terrorism legislation that Kenya was seeking to pass,
with American backing. But pro-democracy groups and Muslim leaders of Kenya were
worried that the legislation, as written, was really rolling back elements of
Kenya's democracy and really fomenting an anti-Muslim attitude. The Kenyan
government, rightly, stepped back to adjust that law. We have to be sensitive to
the fact that we cannot run against democracy in working against terrorism.
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We
have talked about failed and failing states. Let me just add one element to that
where we have difficulty. We have a problem in the United States in being able
to respond rapidly to conflict situations and in putting peacekeeping operations
together. Largely because of our budgetary situation, when a new U.N.
peacekeeping operation is proposed, we look around for how we are going to fund
it. So we say, well, let us cut down on what we have in Sierra Leone in order to
put one in Liberia, or let us do a smaller one in the Democratic Republic of
Congo than is really needed. Then violence occurs where the forces are
inadequate and the situation gets worse. Then we have to respond with more
peacekeepers, but late.
Again, Mr. Chairman, with
all due respect, Congress has a role to play here because Congress has resisted
Administration requests to create a contingency fund that would allow the U.S.
to respond to new situations like that more
rapidly.
Let me, then, say a few words about
Islam in Africa, particularly West Africa. Let me emphasize, first, the positive
potential for American policy in this region. The Islamic tradition in West
Africa is a rich one, with many facets that lend themselves to close
understanding and cooperation with the West. We hear a lot of debates these days
about whether Islam is compatible with democracy. Well, in Senegal, Mali, and
Niger, we have examples of Muslim-majority states that have fashioned working
democracies. Two Muslim countries in the region, Senegal and Mauritania, and
Nigeria, which has over 60 million Muslims, have diplomatic relations with
Israel.
Islamic traditions in West Africa are
moderate and are absent often the emotional antagonism toward United States
policy found elsewhere. We can learn much from close relations with the
political and religious leaders in this region.
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But
there is a struggle going on in the minds of the Muslim population in countries
like Nigeria, and it is tied up in the economic conditions and the political
turmoil that that country has experienced. I will not go into it in detail. We
have heard about the introduction of Sharia for criminal offenses. The motive in
some cases was political but the rapid spread was also a response to the
apparent loss of a sense of control and of order and of economic possibilities
on the part of the people in the street.
Nigeria
has experienced, over the last 15 years, a 2/3 decline in per capita GNP. It is
knowing poverty that it has not known for decades. When you add to that
migration and land pressures, it is not surprising that there have been a lot of
clashes over the last 4 years, some religious, some otherwise, that have taken
an estimated 10,000 lives. In that atmosphere, Osama bin Laden has said Nigeria
is a prime target. It has not happened yet in Nigeria, but we have to be able to
reach out and interact with the people for more than we now
do.
Let me go, then, straight to the question of
our own access and capability. We have talked about intelligence. Let me talk
about just normal, diplomatic outreach. In Nigeria, a country of 130 million, of
which half roughly are Muslims, we have no diplomatic presence in northern
Nigeria where most Muslims live. We have no eyes and ears there. We have no
day-to-day contact. We have no learning capacity or interaction capacity on a
regular basis. That makes it almost impossible to monitor what is happening, to
interact, to know, and to carry out public
diplomacy.
We have few senior officers in the
political or the economic sections of our Embassy in Nigeria. It is not just
religious tension that leads to terrorism. We have a serious insurgency going on
in the oil-rich delta area of Nigeria because of decades of perceived
inequality. That is a very important area for the United States, but we do not
have a diplomatic presence in the delta either.
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These
are things we must overcome if we are going to be serious about dealing with the
complexity of Africa.
Let me just conclude, Mr.
Chairman, by saying that one of the parts of the United States Government that
has responded most actively and aggressively to the threats in Africa has been
the United States military. The Chairman mentioned—you did, Mr. Tancredo—General
Jones of NATO and General Charles Wald, who have been traveling all over the
continent, and the aggressive action in the Pan-Sahel Initiative. This is
terrific. This is very welcome interest. But if it is not matched by diplomatic
and economic capability, we could stumble badly. We could make
mistakes.
Let me give you just one example in the
Sahel area. It is a very thin line in a country like Mauritania between who is
in the political opposition and who is a terrorist, and we have to be extremely
careful that we do not find ourselves inadvertently pushing legitimate
opposition people into the extremist camps. That is the kind of political
sensitivity we need as part of a total response
effort.
Finally, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee, the important thing here is that we stop thinking of Africa just in
humanitarian terms. That is obviously very important to us. But once we begin to
think of Africa in strategic terms, for all of the reasons, not only terrorism
but its role in energy, its role in trade, and in all of the other areas, then
we can look at the kinds of resources we need—diplomatic, economic,
intelligence, and military—that can deal with the problems we face there. Thank
you very much.
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[The
prepared statement of Mr. Lyman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, RALPH BUNCHE SENIOR FELLOW IN AFRICA POLICY
STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr.
Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be asked to testify
concerning the terrorist situation in Africa.
It
will not be possible for the United States to have an effective worldwide
campaign against terrorism unless the threat is addressed in Africa. But it is
important to distinguish among the threats. There are some immediate threats
from existing terrorist networks. This is particularly true in the Horn and east
Africa. Some arise from failed or failing states that allow financial
exploitation by terrorist groups or exploitation of internal conflicts to
recruit members to terrorist networks. This has been the case in central and
West Africa. Another threat is in the sparsely populated regions such as the
Sahel where terrorist groups, like the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) from Algeria, can find sanctuary and even set up training sites. Finally,
and perhaps most challenging of all, there is the threats that arise from
deepening economic and political crises in key states like Nigeria. The brew of
religious tension, economic deprivation, declining law and order and political
instability could open that country of 130 million people to some of the most
serious forms of terrorist activity. In fact in all parts of sub-Saharan Africa,
our response to the terrorist threat must be a broadly based one, bringing
political, economic, and sensitive public diplomacy assets to
bear.
EXISTING NETWORKS
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Terrorist
networks have already been established in the Horn and along the eastern coast
of Africa. The bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,
and the attacks on an Israel-owned hotel and airliner in Kenya in 2001 attest to
the immediacy of the situation there. While the African governments in the area
have responded with determination to stem the growth of these networks, their
abilities are limited. For one thing, coastal control of shipments is almost
non-existent, allowing arms to be smuggled from Somalia or elsewhere into Kenya,
Tanzania and other places. This is despite efforts by the U.S. Combined Joint
Task Force, headquartered in Djibouti and by allied naval forces to police the
area. Most arms shipments come by small dhows that escape such surveillance.
Intelligence capabilities are similarly limited and cross-country cooperation is
complicated by political rivalries. For example, efforts led by Kenya to bring
about a solution to the failed sate of Somalia founder in part by differing
interests of Ethiopia and other countries in the region as well as by continuing
differences among the Somali parties. That leaves Somalia a place where at the
least terrorists can transit fairly easily into and out of East Africa and
perhaps conduct other business. Continuing differences between Eritrea and
Sudan, Uganda and Sudan as well as Eritrea and Ethiopia limit efforts to control
border regions and eliminate such horrific groups like the Lord's Resistance
Army that plagues northern Uganda.
The U.S. has
responded fairly aggressively in this part of Africa. Not only the Combined
Joint Task Force, but a $100 million pledge of counter-terrorism assistance from
President Bush has provided a strong impetus to counter-terrorism activities.
The head of the CJTF recently reported arrests of members of terrorist
organizations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. The U.S. will
have to provide much more support, however, to maintain this momentum. The $100
million was less new money than programs cobbled together from existing funds.
Future funding has not been identified on the same scale. There has to be a
sustained focus on east Africa in our anti-terrorism budgets.
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The
U.S. has also been playing an active role in bringing about an end to the
decades long civil war in Sudan. Sudan once was home to Osama Bin Laden and
hosted other terrorist groups and individuals. Now the government is interested
in improving its relations with the U.S. Only a peace settlement with the south,
and an end to the government's punitive military action against the people of
Darfur in the west, will open that door. Once achieved it will close off what
was once a principal entrée for terrorist networking in sub-Saharan Africa and
beyond.
Experience in this region however also
demonstrates the need for greater political sensitivity. The U.S. strongly
backed anti-terrorism legislation being proposed by the government of Kenya. But
democracy advocates and civil society groups in Kenya, fresh from having rid the
country of one-party, one-man rule, resisted, seeing in the legislation the
seeds of new political oppression. In addition, Kenyan Muslims argued that the
legislation was anti-Muslim, aggravating the alienation in that community that
opened the door to terrorist infiltration in the first place. The Kenyan
Government finally agreed to redraft the legislation. Here as elsewhere, the
U.S. has to be sensitive to fledging democracies in Africa, and not fall into
the trap of promoting actions and leadership that would undermine the democratic
trend. Kenya also has suffered from the loss of tourism, its principal source of
foreign exchange, as a result of U.S. travel advisories related to the terrorist
threat. There may be no easy answer to this problem, but we must be wary of
creating a political backlash in as strong an ally in the war on terrorism as
Kenya.
FAILED AND FAILING STATES
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Failed
or failing states in central and west Africa have already provided opportunity
for al Qaeda and criminal networks possibly affiliated with it to profit from
the marketing of diamonds and other precious gems. Wars in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and Liberia opened this door and local
warlords like Charles Taylor readily
collaborated.
These states remain at best in a
fragile peace. The U.S. response however has been constrained by what are in the
end, or should be, extraneous issues. For example, the U.S. has been slow to
support aggressive and adequate UN peacekeeping missions in these countries
because of budgeting processes that do not allow for rapid response to new
situations. So, to finance the UN peacekeeping force in Liberia, the US has
urged a rapid drawdown of the UN force in Sierra Leone, a risky step when the
two civil wars are related and when the peace processes in Sierra Leone remain
incomplete. The US has urged a reduction in the proposed UN peacekeeping
operation in Cote d'Ivoire, again largely for budgetary reasons, when it is
apparent that the peace process there is on the verge of breakdown. Earlier,
provision of too small and inadequately provisioned a UN force led to the UN's
inability to prevent massacres in eastern DRC and the need for an emergency
European and South African military response while the UN beefed up its
presence.
Congress has an important role here.
Congress has consistently resisted Administration requests for a peacekeeping
contingency fund. That is no longer tenable if the U.S. is to respond rapidly
and responsibly to the volatile situations across Africa. Delays in providing
peacekeepers, and constant efforts to cut back on their size and capability,
prolong crises and weaken conflict resolution efforts. If failed or failing
states are as much a threat to terrorist exploitation as has been demonstrated
in Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, then we must reconcile
ourselves to a larger and more consistent commitment of resources to overcome
those situations.
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ISLAM
IN AFRICA
Beyond the obvious immediate threats,
the more difficult conditions for the U.S. to address lie in the economic and
political instability that grips many of the West African States where the
majority of African Muslim live. If terrorism will arise through the doors of
religious strife and political exploitation of religion, then Africa is indeed a
major area for attention. We need to remember that Africa has more Muslims than
the Middle East or Southeast Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria alone, with
some 66 million Muslims, has as many if not more Muslims than
Egypt.
Let me emphasize first the positive
potential for American policy in this region. The Islamic tradition in West
Africa is a rich one, with many facets that lend themselves to close
understanding and cooperation with the West. We hear debates these days whether
Islam is compatible with democracy. In Senegal, Mali, and Niger, we have
examples of Muslim majority states that have fashioned working democracies. Two
Muslim countries in the region—Senegal and Mauritania—and Nigeria with its large
Muslim population enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel. Islamic traditions in
West Africa are moderate and are absent the often emotional antagonism toward
U.S. policy in the Middle East that one finds elsewhere. We can learn much from
close relations with these countries and their political and religious
leaders.
But there is a struggle going on for the
minds of the Muslim population in countries like Nigeria, one that is tied up in
the economic conditions and political turmoil in that country over the past
several years. Introduction of shari'a for criminal acts has taken hold in
twelve of Nigeria's thirty-six states, across the largely Muslim north. That has
led to religious tension with Christians who live in those states and heightened
traditional tension between Christians and Muslims in the country. Growing
Christian evangelical activities have also contributed to growing tension
between the two religions. In several states of Nigeria local militias have
grown up, sometimes with the political support of state governors, producing
extra legal enforcement of religious laws or just political power of one group
over another. Within Nigerian Islam, religious debate has spilled over to
national political debate, even health issues. The degree of tension and
suspicion within Nigerian Islam toward the Nigerian government itself, and
beyond to the international community, is demonstrated by the resistance today
in Kano state to the vaccinations against polio. Some Nigerian religious figures
have preached that the vaccines are a Western plot to sterilize Muslims. The
dispute has stopped in its tracks the final stages of the World Health
Organization's program to eradicate polio worldwide.
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This
tension and debate, which I can only touch on here, has to be seen in the
context of the economic and political situation within Nigeria. In the past
fifteen years, per capita GNP in Nigeria declined by two-thirds. Nigerians are
experiencing an almost unprecedented level of poverty. Migration and land
pressures have added to the mix. Finally, after nine years of one of the most
repressive military leaders in Nigeria's history, Nigerians are experiencing a
new democracy, with less repression of political activity but without strong
governing or law enforcement institutions. All together these factors have led
to ethnic, religious, political and other sources of violence that took 10,000
lives from 1999–2003.
In this atmosphere, the
openings for terrorist infiltration cannot be overlooked. Osama Bin Laden
himself listed Nigeria as a priority target. So far, there is no indication that
terrorist networks have taken hold in Nigeria nor that even many radical Islamic
figures have contemplated a policy of violence. But the potential for linkages
between terrorist groups and Nigeria's already well developed criminal and drug
trafficking groups is a worrisome prospect.
We
must also be careful to recognize that not all terrorism or political violence
is religiously based. Just as serious in Nigeria is the armed insurgency in the
delta region of Nigeria, where the bulk of the oil industry—and American
investment—is concentrated. Violent acts against the oil industry pose a serious
threat to American interests and to the still fledgling democratic government of
Nigeria.
Nigeria is a classic case, however,
where our diplomatic and economic resources are poorly deployed. The U.S. does
not even have a presence in the Muslim-dominated north of the country—no eyes
and ears, no daily program of public diplomacy, no capacity for measuring the
trends of Islamic debate and their implications for the U.S. The U.S. similarly
has no presence in the oil rich, but deeply troubled delta region. There are few
senior officers in the political and economic sections of the Embassy. It is
hard to understand, therefore, how we can anticipate and respond to the
potential threats there.
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Moreover,
our response in Nigeria has to be more robust than it has been to date.
President Obasanjo, now in his second term, is pushing forward a more aggressive
reform program than in his first term. He is seeking to make the oil sector more
transparent, to privatize the refineries, and to attack corruption. There are
efforts, long overdue, to revitalize the agricultural sector. The United States
must be prepared to respond with further support and incentives. There is
understandable resistance to providing debt relief to Nigeria until some of
these reforms are more firmly in place. But now is the time to begin to lay out
the parameters of what debt relief would look like and to make clear that the
prospects are real as the reforms move forward. Nigeria also needs much more
technical assistance to take advantage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.
Except for oil Nigeria has hardly begun to exploit this
potential.
Congress must moreover resolve the
impasse over providing security assistance to Nigeria. There are serious human
rights issues with Nigeria's military. But poor police capacity and a military
without further training do not serve Nigeria's or our interests. The current
spate of political killings, in the context of local elections, only underlines
the seriousness of the security situation. If the Government does not soon get a
handle on law and order, the country could descend into a generalized violence
that could destabilize the entire nation. The lack of law and order was one of
the reasons people in the north took so enthusiastically to the imposition of
shari'a.
THE NEW FRONTIER: THE
SAHEL
Nowhere has interest and action on
terrorism moves so rapidly in Africa recently than in the areas bordering the
Sahara desert. A once small and almost unremarkable program, the Pan Sahel
Initiative, has been energized by the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in
conjunction with the states on both sides of the desert: Mauritania, Mali,
Niger, and Chad in the south; Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in the north. With
improved communication and logistical equipment, and assisted by U.S. satellites
and advisory troops, these countries have been engaging in military action
against the GSPC, chasing it across borders and inflicting significant losses on
its cadres. In an area where U.S. security presence has traditionally been
limited, and influence marginal, the U.S. has now become a significant player.
In the process, EUCOM spanned the bureaucratic divide that exists in the State
Department between North and sub-Saharan Africa to develop a cohesive and truly
regional approach.
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This
is a welcome initiative. As the President of Mali said in a speech in Washington
last year, it would otherwise be impossible to know what was transpiring in this
vast, sparsely populated area. Not only could it be a place of refuge but
potentially the site of new training sites for terrorists forced out of
Afghanistan and elsewhere.
But we also must be
concerned with the fragility of democracy in states like Mali and the
limitations on democracy in countries like Mauritania. Mali's democracy is
dependent upon the reconciliation that was achieved in the 1980s between the
majority people of the south and the Tauregs of the north, ending decades of
friction and occasional insurgency. Mali is understandably concerned that
nothing in the new counter terrorism efforts undermine that unity. Mauritania is
a country where the line between the government's legitimate opponents on the
one hand and terrorists and coup plotters on the other is a thin one. The U.S.
has to be especially careful that we do not become partners in a political
process that drives people into the arms of Islamic extremists. Chad is not very
different, with historic friction between north and south and between various
tribal groupings. Let us tread here with care and discretion.
THE NEED
FOR BALANCE
The one U.S. government agency that
has taken the terrorist threat in Africa to heart has been the Defense
Department, in particular the U.S. commanders in NATO, EUCOM, and the CJTF. NATO
Commander General James Jones has described West Africa as ''where the action
is.'' EUCOM Deputy Commander Charles Wald has traveled across the continent
several times and was instrumental in fashioning the Pan Sahel Initiative into
an active action program. DOD has undertaken HIV/AIDS awareness and control
programs with militaries throughout the continent. With additional resources DOD
is prepared to assist the oil producing countries of the West Coast in
establishing offshore security capability, guarding against attacks on the
drilling installations springing up all along the coast.
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Welcome
as this interest is, it is dangerous if not matched by an equivalent level of
interest and capability in State and USAID in addressing the political and
economic factors that make Africa worrisome. A response overly balanced to the
military side will push us too close to the line of oppressive regimes, too
insensitive to the political dynamics of an anti-terrorism strategy, too limited
in our response to the problems of poverty that underlie every African security
problem. Our military colleagues would in fact
agree.
I have already noted the shortfalls in
this regard in Nigeria. The same is true, however all across Africa, whether in
senior personnel, language proficiency, presence in strategic locations, or
dynamic public diplomacy. The problem is scheduled to get worse rather than
better. As the U.S. prepares to staff a new Embassy in Baghdad, personnel slots
are being taken from all over the world, including Africa—including Nigeria! We
are in danger of robbing Peter to pay Paul.
The
level of interest in Africa must in fact go higher than State and USAID. It must
go to the White House and the National Security Council, where there must be
recognition that Africa is of strategic interest to the United States, not just
humanitarian as has so often been the case up to
now.
There was a telling moment in this regard
during last year's crisis over Liberia. As rebel forces approached the capital,
African and European nations alike urged the U.S. to provide troops on the
ground to stabilize the situation. The UK had done so in neighboring Sierra
Leone, France in Cote d'Ivoire. The President sent 3,000 Marines offshore of
Liberia, but after a few days and after only a few troops had gone on shore for
a short while, the troop ship sailed away. The President said that our primary
interest had been that food and medicine could be provided, and once that was
done our job was largely done. However one judges the desirability of providing
American troops in that situation, the conclusion that our primary interest in a
failing state, where once al Qaeda had reaped fortunes in diamond trading, was
humanitarian was unfortunate. Our interest in Africa must be seen as strategic.
Once that fundamental recognition takes place, the resources that will be needed
can be judged accordingly. And only then will we meet the totality of the
terrorist threat on the continent.
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Mr.
TANCREDO. Thank you both for your testimony, very provocative and
insightful.
As we sit through these hearings and
listen to the problems that we face and listen to testimony from people to
describe the kinds of problems we face, especially in Africa, but other places
in the world, when we seem to provide support for governments that are
repressive, and we do so on the basis of the fact that we are getting some
information from them, that somehow or other they are friendly enough, anyway,
so that we will work to keep them in power, that, in doing that, we have been
told by many witnesses, we create problems for ourselves in the long
run.
Do you believe that there are criteria well
enough established for us to determine when a government actually is cooperating
and what that word really means, or is it a totally subjective thing on your
part how we analyze it and say there is enough there that we will overlook some
of the problems that we know are inherent in the government and they way they
treat their own people and also maybe some of the things they are doing against
our interests? I feel that we are often whipsawed there, and I am interested in
your opinion, Ambassador Lyman, especially, as to whether or not we have that
criteria, in your own mind, and whether it
exists.
Mr. LYMAN. It is an important
question, Mr. Chairman. The good thing is that there is a definite movement in
Africa toward more democratic regimes. Most governments in Africa are now
elected. The Africa Union itself has said it will not recognize any government
that comes to power through a military coup. So we have a democratic trend, and
we need to keep encouraging it.
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I
will give you an example. I was privileged to hear Chairman Royce the other day,
at a meeting on energy in Africa, point out that as important as it is to have
the cooperation we are having with Chad in the Pan-Sahel Initiative, it is
equally important that we keep a close eye on how the proceeds from the oil are
going to be used in Chad to benefit the people of that country. It is that
balance, I think, we have to maintain
throughout.
I think the criteria are clear
enough. I think the criteria of moving toward more democratic regimes,
respecting human rights, which are now on the African agenda, are there, and to
recognize that to undermine that would be to work against our objectives. So I
think we have the criteria; the question is, do we have the people on the ground
and the information on which to make the
judgments?
Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Farah,
the State Department consistently avers that al-Qaeda does not have a presence
in West Africa, and you consistently suggest that they do. To what do you
attribute this kind of division of
perception?
Mr. FARAH. I think that
there is a changing tide in this. The FBI has recently had people on the ground
in West Africa that have found much of what I have found. The work of the
Special Court of Sierra Leone, which has done a lot of work in trying to get
attention paid to the al-Qaeda connections and Hizballah connections that they
have repeatedly stumbled across as they have done their investigations into the
human rights violations; they have run up against stone walls, not only in the
intelligence community but also at the State Department.
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I
do not have a good explanation for why that is. I did not particularly like it,
but I think if you want to ignore The Washington Post reporter, that
is fine. You have prosecutors and investigators with 30 years of DoD experience
each who will put their reputations on the line to say this for no particular
reason except that they came across it; I find ignoring that of a little more
concern. And I think, as I say, the Treasury Department—is now acknowledging the
problem with diamonds in West Africa being laundered. The FBI has now
investigated it much more fully and come to the same
conclusion.
So I think that, over time, the
veracity of that has been borne out, but on a policy level, I do not know why
people—their knee-jerk reaction is it could not be happening, I think, largely
because they did not know it was happening.
My
contention, in my discussions with them, is that no one is alleging they were
stupid or incompetent; they simply had no one on the ground there to do it. I
found this by being on the ground in the diamond fields of West Africa. They did
not have the capacity to do it. They just simply did not have the people there
to do it. If they did, they may well have found the same thing, but that is why
one of my recommendations is getting people on the ground there. People knew
something was horribly wrong with the diamonds in Sierra Leone in the summer of
2001. Something was badly a skelter, and nobody could figure out
why.
Mr. TANCREDO. What about
Hizballah in Khartoum? Any idea about that?
Mr.
FARAH. I do not. I was not dealt with Sudan, and I do not know the
answer.
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Mr.
TANCREDO. Who is Ibrahim Bah, and what is his relationship to
al-Qaeda and Hizballah?
Mr. FARAH.
Ibrahim Bah is a Senegalese soldier of fortune who received religious training
in Egypt, went to work with Mohamar Qaddafi in Libya, traveled to Afghanistan in
the early 1980s, 1982 to 1985, I believe. He was with the mujahadeen in
Afghanistan. He returned to Libya briefly, went and fought with Hizballah in
Lebanon, and returned to Libya again just as Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh and
that group were being turned in Mohamar Qaddafi's
camps.
He trained them, and he returned to
Liberia with Charles Taylor's forces, was given the rank of general in the RUF,
and he led one of the first incursions of the RUF into Sierra Leone from
Liberia. He then became essentially the gatekeeper for diamond deals for Charles
Taylor's regime and for the RUF.
In my dealings
with the RUF, they thought that he was God, practically. He was someone who had
been in the outside world, who had told them these marvelous tales of
Afghanistan and Lebanon, and was viewed as something other worldly to them. He
was sought out, I believe, by al-Qaeda because they knew him. Rohan Gunaratna,
who is one of the leading experts in the world on al-Qaeda, a Sri Lankan who
wrote the book, Inside Al Qaeda, has found records of Bah in
Afghanistan, despite the denial of some American institutions to the veracity of
that claim. He has talked to numerous people who identified Bah as an al-Qaeda
businessman. So that is, in a nutshell, what I know of Ibrahim Bah.
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Mr.
TANCREDO. Thank you. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr.
Farah.
Mr.
Payne?
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farah, your articles in
The Washington Post detailing al-Qaeda's and Hizballah's presence in
West Africa; what was the response, and did you get any official response from
the United States Government?
Mr.
FARAH. The response I got consistently was that they had no
information. The CIA then began circulating to Members of Congress who inquired
that I had based my report on a single source who they had found not to be
credible.
I have explained to them, I would not
risk 19 years of my reputation on writing a story on a single source on
something like that. I had gone to great lengths to explain to different
agencies when they asked me how I got the story, which I normally would not have
done as a journalist, but I felt it was important in that case to outline the
extraordinary circumstances in which that developed and the verification that I
had gotten for the initial story.
As I say, there
is now a bit of a change in the attitude. I am finding that the Treasury
Department and FBI, particularly, are much more open in finding that, in fact,
that did happen and verifying it, or at least that it is credible that it
happened. As far as I know, the CIA still maintains it did not happen.
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Mr.
PAYNE. What about the RUF, al-Qaeda diamonds, weapons in Sierra Leone
and Liberia? There seemed to be a lack of attention drawn to that. Do you think
it is because assets have been taken out of Africa? I was aware of a cutdown in
intelligence in Africa. It was almost cut in half or maybe a third of what it
was in the past 6 to 8 years. Do you have any knowledge of the reduction in
that?
Mr. FARAH. I know the reduction
was massive. I know that, at least in the early part of 2000–2001, they had
station chiefs running two or three countries instead of a person in each
country. They had an extremely limited staff. This was the CIA. I knew some of
the station chiefs at the time. The DIA had, I think, a little more extensive
presence and were working with the training of different troops, so they had
different ways of getting different types of information. But there is no
question that the intelligence capability was reduced. They could barely meet
the minimum reporting requirements and had no capability, even if they wanted
to, to go beyond that.
Mr. PAYNE.
Thank you. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Lyman,
you mentioned that there are staffing deficiencies, both in terms of experience
and skills, in African Embassies, and that hampers your ability to fight
terrorism. Could you expand on that a bit? I certainly know the outstanding work
you did in Nigeria during tough transition
times.
I know, in South Africa, during the time
of transition from a white Apartheid government to a nonracial government, the
outstanding job you did in getting us out of the country when Chris Hani was
murdered that day, and you rushed me to the airport, and also the time when the
Ankarta came down and started firing at the bus we were on at another time. So I
do not know whether it was when I came into your country, I created a problem or
whether problems—but I am glad you got me out each time.
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What
is your assessment, if you would?
Mr.
LYMAN. Thank you, Congressman. I think it was just bad
timing.
Let me make a comparison because I think
it is relevant. During that period in South Africa when I was Ambassador there,
from 1992 to 1995, as you say, a very important time in the transition, we had
consulates in three parts of the country. We had Johannesburg. We had Durban in
the very troubled, Kwazulu-Natal province. We had a consulate in Capetown. I had
a full political section. I had Afrikaans speakers in my political section. I
had a Xhosa speaker in the political section. I had a labor officer dedicated
full time to the labor movement that was so heavily politically involved. We had
people all over the country.
If we were
successful in South Africa, it was because we had information coming into us. We
were interacting with all parts of the society and the political spectrum. I
think we were able, for that reason, to do what I think was a credible job in
helping and facilitating that transition.
Now,
Nigeria is a country more than three times larger in population, with a very
different mix, and with very different challenges, and there are no consulates
outside of Lagos. We have an Embassy in the capital in Abuja and we have a
consulate in Lagos. We have no one in the delta region, where all of the oil and
the trouble is; no one in the North, no Hausa speakers on the Embassy staff; no
permanent public diplomacy outreach with the Muslim population of the North. You
know, my friends who have become Ambassadors to Nigeria, I can only wish them
good luck because I think operating successfully in that atmosphere is going to
be extremely difficult.
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Now
we are putting together a very large and important Embassy in Baghdad. I can
tell you, positions are being taken from the Africa bureau, including Nigeria,
to help staff the Embassy in Baghdad. Well, it is robbing Peter to pay Paul. I
think that we cannot address the range of issues that we are talking about today
with such a thin staff on the ground. No matter how good they are, they have to
have more capability.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank
you very much. I think my time has expired. Thank you,
Ambassador.
Mr. ROYCE [presiding]. Mr.
Meeks?
Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I had an opening statement. May I ask unanimous consent to submit it
for the record?
Mr. ROYCE. Without
objection.
Mr. MEEKS. Thank
you.
Mr. Ambassador, unfortunately, I had to run
out, and you are part of the Administration, but you are not part of the
Administration, so to speak, but let me ask you this question. It is clear that
our travel advisories are having a negative impact on Kenya and Kenya's economy
and that poverty can play a huge role in the number of people fostering
terrorism. My question to you is, in your estimation, what would Kenya need to
do to have the advisory lifted?
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Mr.
LYMAN. Congressman, this is a very difficult area because you have to
have good and honest advisories to protect Americans going abroad. But in this
case we have to look with the Kenyan government at what areas can be improved,
particularly the areas where the tourist traffic is going to go and to see
whether one can put into place enough protection and assurances in that area
that we can modify the advisory.
Sometimes we
will have an advisory that says, ''Look, certain parts of the country are really
not safe, but other parts of the country are okay.'' I think if tourism is as
vital to Kenya as it is, and they cannot assure security generally, perhaps we
could work with them in ways in which the tourist trade, we can say, is
reasonably safe. That is a measure that could help them a great
deal.
The specific steps they would have to take,
I am afraid I am not close enough to the specifics to know. But maybe we could
work with them in that direction because, as you have pointed out and as
Congressman Payne pointed out, they are paying a tremendous price in this
situation in terms of earnings, and tourism is one of the few labor-intensive
industries, employment-creating industries, that developing countries like Kenya
have.
Mr. MEEKS. Given the price that
they are paying, they have tried, and they have put in place, various measures
for anti-terrorism, et cetera. Their economy is based on tourism. It is down. My
question then becomes—they are doing everything they can to be as good allies as
they possibly can—how can we then justify, for example, them just getting a
million dollars to fight terrorism so that we can make sure that things are safe
compared to, say, Pakistan, who is getting $4 million, and then it is even
projected in the future they will get $4 million, but Pakistan will get eight,
yet they are doing everything they possibly can. It almost puts them in a
chicken-and-egg-type situation.
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Mr.
LYMAN. I do believe we are going to have to commit more resources to
countries of Africa, and particularly in those situations of Eastern Africa and
the Horn, in the counterterrorism security area. As I mentioned, my
understanding is that the resources available for that purpose declined in 2004,
and I hope that they can be restored in 2005 to do exactly the things you are
mentioning.
Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Farah, to
what extent, in your view, are militant organizations, foreign or domestic,
active in Kenya, and what do you believe their influence may be to the Kenyan
Muslim community, in particular, and what are the likely consequences, if any,
for Kenya's political stability down the
road?
Mr. FARAH. Congressman, those
are all great questions. Unfortunately, I dealt in West Africa and did very
little in East Africa, and I would be, I think, out of my league to try to
answer those questions intelligently.
Mr.
MEEKS. Mr. Ambassador, can you answer
that?
Mr. LYMAN. I am sorry. Could you
repeat that?
Mr. MEEKS. Yes. To what
extent, in your view, are militant Islamic organizations present in Kenya, be
they domestic or foreign, and what kind of influence are they having to the
Muslim community within Kenya, and what will be the long-term effects that these
organizations will have to the political stability of Kenya?
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Mr.
LYMAN. Well, I think what has happened is terrorist elements have
found a niche within the Islamic community up and down the east coast of Africa,
capitalizing on some historic grievances and feelings of marginalization. It is
not the majority, but you do not need majority support to find enough of a niche
and a support base to create the kinds of terrorist cells, and then they can be
fed from outside by people moving in and out through Somalia, et
cetera.
So I think we have to be extremely
careful that we do not see the entire Islamic community in that region as
extremist or supporting terrorism. But clearly there is a home within that
community that terrorists have exploited. Terrorists need that kind of a home in
order to be able to plan and execute the kind of bombings that we saw in Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam and then the attack on the Israeli hotel, and that is
unfortunate. That is why the Kenyan government, in fashioning its antiterrorist
legislation, had to be very careful to get at the terrorists, but not to inflame
the entire Islamic community in those countries, and it is something to which we
all have to pay close attention.
Mr.
ROYCE. Thank you. Ms. Lee?
Ms.
LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to ask for unanimous
consent to insert my opening statement into the
record.
Mr. ROYCE. Without
objection.
Ms. LEE. Thank you very
much.
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Good
to see you again, Ambassador Lyman.
Let me ask
you a question with regard to your assessment that our involvement in Africa
should be, in addition to humanitarian, strategic. In many ways, that makes
sense, but I guess, on the other hand, strategic, in terms of whose interests?
Only the United States interests in terms of the continent and the interests of
the country? Whose strategic interests should our strategy focus
on?
Mr. LYMAN. Let me give you an
example of what I mean. We went through a very difficult set of decisions last
year, you will recall, over Liberia, whether the United States should put troops
on the ground to help stabilize that situation when the rebels were approaching
the capital. In the end, the Administration chose to station troops off-shore
and a few on-shore for a while who eventually pulled back. What the President
said was our primary interest was getting food and medicine into the country.
That has been accomplished; the troops can sail
away.
Now, in light of Mr. Farah's testimony,
that is not our only interest. It is an important interest, of course, but our
interest in the failed state, Liberia, is much greater than that. It is to
recognize that failed states are exploited, and, first of all, the people
suffer. What al-Qaeda did in West Africa is hook up with criminal and political
elements who, for their own reasons unrelated to al-Qaeda, were destroying those
countries. Now, the people suffered the most. Sierra Leone, as you know very
well, Congresswoman, I know, what happened in Sierra Leone was brutal and
Liberia. So the humanitarian, the political, and the strategic come
together.
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We
have a stake in helping those countries establish sound governments and economic
achievement. It is in their benefit. But if you only say our interest is
humanitarian, you can say the medicine is there, and we can sail away. What I am
saying is that our interests have to be much broader and deeper, and I think
that is consistent with the needs of the
Africans.
Ms. LEE. Let me give you an
example. Based on this, how does one work with an African country to determine
what the strategic interests should be?
Mr.
LYMAN. Well, let me give you a good example. I mentioned that
Chairman Royce, the other day, was speaking to a session on oil in Africa. Now,
oil and gas are strategically important to the United States, and the growing
importance of West Africa in that regard is in our interest. But it is also in
our interest, in a broad sense, and very much in the Africans' interest, how
those resources are used and where we can work with governments on transparency
so that everybody knows what is being paid and where that money is going, or, in
the case of Chad, to support the special arrangements for overseeing the
proceeds of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. That is an interest that serves us and
serves the African people very well. It serves us in the sense that if that
money continued to be used as badly as oil money has often been used in the
past, not only does it create a bad image for the U.S. in terms of our simply
taking out the oil while the people are suffering, but it also creates the kind
of instability that works against us as well.
Let
me give you another example. Nigeria is important for a lot of reasons. Oil is
one. Its role in Africa is another. It is a close ally in many ways. They are
going through a very important economic-reform program right now, and I think it
is more promising than we have seen for a long time. They have a tremendous debt
problem. There are a lot of reasons for not giving debt relief to Nigeria right
away. I mean, nine or 10 billion dollars went out the back door a few years ago.
People said, you know, why should I give debt relief?
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But
we have not begun to say enough to the Nigerians, that as they move down this
path of transparency, which they are really committed to, that we are prepared
to work on their debt. Their debt now takes a third of their revenue every year,
and by offering that promise, by saying we are ready to work with you on that,
already we are giving encouragement to the reformers, who have a political
problem at home with the debt.
So these are ways
in which are strategic interests and their interests can be brought together in
ways that I hope are win-win situations.
Ms.
LEE. Thank you very much for that
answer.
Let me ask you now with regard to the
Clinton Administration, when the Administration retaliated by bombing facilities
in Sudan and Afghanistan. Do you agree with the clinics, and I have not followed
this much for a few years, but critics of the Clinton Administration that they
hit the wrong target, specifically in Sudan?
Mr.
LYMAN. Well, I know there is a lot of controversy over the adequacy
of the intelligence on that, and I am not in a position to judge that
intelligence. I do know that because of the controversy over the intelligence,
there was more resentment, if you will, about our bombing of Sudan. I happened
to be, just after that, leading a United States observer delegation to the
nonaligned movement meeting, and what people told me in the corridors was if you
had just hit the Taliban in Afghanistan, we would have all cheered, but the fact
that you hit Sudan, and it was questionable why you did it, creates a problem
for us.
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So
I think it is again, and we have seen this in larger contexts, when we do
something like that, we have to have convincing information, and in that case,
many people were not convinced.
Mr.
ROYCE. Thank you very much,
Congresswoman.
Mr. Lyman, in your testimony, you
mentioned that Islam in sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally been very tolerant,
and one of the examples you have given is the election, by an overwhelmingly
Muslim Senegal originally, of their first President, Leopold Sedar Senghor, who
is a Christian and took office there, obviously, with a vast preponderance of
Muslim votes. The question that I wanted to ask you is if Wahabism, with its
Gulf state financing, has started to change the character of some of Islam in
that part of the world, the charity financing that we see coming out of the Gulf
states. Would you like to comment on that?
Mr.
LYMAN. I think the battleground is more in Nigeria and East in Sudan,
which you have talked about before. Senegal has a very, very
strong——
Mr. ROYCE. Excuse me. I may
have been misunderstood because I was giving Senegal as an example from your
report, but it is, in fact, Nigeria, where, when Don and I have been in Nigeria,
I have had a Nigerian governor and others who are Muslim who have told us, and I
will give you the direct quote:
''There is a new mosque across the street
from my old mosque. It is 10 times the size with 100 times the budget, and the
madrassa is teaching a very different education than the one I received, and
some of the young men are wearing Osama bin Laden t-shirts.''
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This
is what we are hearing on our trips to
Nigeria.
Mr. LYMAN. I think Nigeria,
this battle is going on, this debate is going on, and there is money coming in.
It has been coming in actually for a long time, but in the conditions I
described in Nigeria, it has become more intense and more
worrisome.
Mr. ROYCE. And why is it so
susceptible, in particular?
Mr. LYMAN.
Well, several reasons. One, I have described the declining economic situation
and the decline in law and order in Nigeria, et cetera, but also in the North
they have perceived to have lost political power in the last few years.
Traditionally, northern Nigeria controlled the military and the
government.
In the last few years, you have a
born-again-Christian President from the South. He stripped away, for different
reasons, many of the senior military who he thought were too much involved in
politics. The North perceives itself of having lost its traditional position.
Adding to all of the other aspects that I have mentioned, this kind of intense
religious competition, if you will, can become a very serious source of
concern.
Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, there
is another question I wanted to ask you and Mr. Farah, and that goes to the
question of whether West Africa is being used principally to launder money and
hide money or whether it is becoming a rather significant recruiting ground for
al-Qaeda, and you can probably tell us better than anyone, Mr. Farah. What is
your assessment?
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Mr.
FARAH. As far as I was able to determine while I was there, I do not
think al-Qaeda is doing a lot of active recruiting. Their presence in Liberia
and to the RUF was specifically through the gentleman I was asked about before,
Ibrahim Bah. I think without Bah, that connection may not have been made simply
because al-Qaeda was not going to wander into a place and start shopping around
for diamonds without knowing someone there that they could
trust.
Hizballah, I think, is a different
situation. Hizballah, I know, extensively recruits in West Africa, and I know
that people send their children back to get military training. They come back
and forth, and that is because of the huge diaspora, almost a quarter of a
million just in the tiny west coast there, and that is a much more significant
thing right now.
Mr. ROYCE. But that
is a little bit of a different issue because, given Hizballah's religious
differences with Shiia Islam as opposed to the Wahabi, Sunni version. Is there
reason to be concerned about how close their ties are becoming, or are those
really two organizations that are not destined to work in
cooperation?
Mr. FARAH. Well, I think
they are two different organizations and two different structures, but I think
if you look, going back to the time of bin Laden in the Sudan, clearly, when
Mughniyah, the Hizballah military leader, came over to train them in explosives,
there has clearly been a relationship between Hizballah and al-Qaeda that
crosses, at least, into the military term. Now, the middle men handling the
diamonds going to al-Qaeda were Shiites, and they are closely tied to Hizballah.
I think, again, it was much more of a personal relationship, but I think those
personal relationships often override their religious differences.
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Mr.
ROYCE. I appreciate that. I have got time for one more question, and
I wanted to ask you—a number of us on this Committee have been involved in the
effort to try to track and set up a system on blood diamonds in order to make it
more difficult for al-Qaeda to traffick in this particular methodology for
moving resources, and I was going to ask you if you thought that the steps that
have been taken have helped make it more difficult for them to traffick in blood
diamonds.
Mr. FARAH. The Kimberly
process primarily?
Mr. ROYCE. The
whole Kimberly process.
Mr. FARAH. I
think it has added another hurdle to their ability to do things. I think it has
made it slightly more than marginally more difficult for them. As you know, if
you can get a certification, virtually any country can still send your diamonds,
so, as you have probably read elsewhere, you see suddenly the Gambia exporting
huge amounts of diamonds, although there are no diamonds in the Gambia. The
Central African Republic spikes every time the Democratic Republic of Congo is
tamped down a little bit and gets rapped for the diamonds. As long as you can
get your diamonds to someplace they can certify them, they can still get into
the system.
Is it better than nothing? Certainly.
Is it the ultimate solution? No, because it is a business that is driven by
large amounts of money and where the profit margins can be significant,
especially the early markups from the diamond fields. I am not sure that there
are regulatory ways to really make sure that that cannot happen.
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Mr.
ROYCE. As an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury explained to me the
other night on this, he said:
''We have taken a situation where you put a
million dollars in diamonds on this end, and it comes out $200,000 on the other
end for the terrorist network by the time it gets into Afghanistan or Pakistan
or wherever. We have converted that into a situation where now a million dollars
on this end, you only get $20,000 on the receiving
end.''
In other words, we have made it more and
more expensive and more and more difficult for the resources to end up. And he
said, you know, for these terrorist operations, maybe it is a half million that
it costs to carry out a terrorist operation, and that is one without WMD, but he
said, if we begin to talk about the costs of WMD, that is a hugely expensive
operation. So what we are actually doing here, besides freezing the accounts,
besides putting pressure on the charities not to spend the money, and working
with the Gulf states to get them to ratchet that down, but there is one last
element of this, and this is this trafficking in blood diamonds and other
resources.
If we can choke that off, then it
becomes ever more difficult to reach critical mass in terms of having the
funding to carry out the truly grand schemes, and that is sort of the end game
for us, or should be: Finding ways in Africa and around the world to engage with
governments there and make it ever more difficult for the resources to be used
because you cannot conduct the recruitment, you cannot sustain the operation,
you cannot finance the operation without having these resources.
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Mr.
Farah, is that sort of your view of our tactical
program?
Mr. FARAH. I think that the
concept is right. I am not convinced myself that we have managed to reduce it
from a million going in to $20,000 coming out on the other side, but clearly
there has been an impact.
As you look in
retrospect now, International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), one of the
main charities, was operating in Sierra Leone and the diamond areas throughout
the time. The Bank of Credit and Commerce had some of its largest offices in
Sierra Leone. We just were not aware of what was going on. We were not paying
attention to what was going on there.
I think it
helps definitely to raise the cost, but it is information that you cannot get
unless you have people out there on the ground gathering information. And I
think that the U.S. Ambassador in Sierra Leone actually wrote a cable to the
State Department in the summer of 2001 saying, Something is really screwed up on
the diamond trade here. Diamond dealers are telling me we cannot buy diamonds.
Bad Lebanese, they call them, are buying diamonds. They send people in from
Liberia with $500,000 at a time. They buy up the entire thing, and they are
paying a premium. We cannot buy diamonds.
Nobody
knew what that meant at the time, and what little reporting was done was not
paid attention to, which is not surprising, coming out of West Africa at the
time. But that would have been detectable as an anomaly that was significant had
we been paying attention and had more people out there to be able to deal with
the situation.
So I think that that, to me, is
the big element missing in working toward a solution, is dedicating the
resources to people, not monitoring telephones and watching computer traffic,
but people out in the bush gathering information that, when you piece it
together, is important.
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Mr.
ROYCE. Mr. Farah, thank you for that assessment. I think you are
right, and I thank Ambassador Lyman for the same point, and we also want to
express our appreciation for both of you gentlemen coming here to testify before
us today, and this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the
Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Material Submitted
for the Hearing Record
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W.
MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW
YORK
Thank you Mr. Chairman for putting this
hearing together. The hearing could not have been more timely. The Bush
administration has heeded the call to investigate the horrendous attacks of
9/11. The investigations of the 9/11 commission, I believe, will afford us the
opportunity to learn lessons that will help us avert such horrible acts from
occurring again on our soil. It will also help us in the global war against
terror.
Evidence provided by Former Treasury
Secretary O'Neil and the Counterterrorism czar Dick Clarke to date have been
extremely revealing. That's why it is refreshing to learn that the National
Security Adviser Dr. Condoleezza Rice will testify before the commission in
public and under oath. I hope she provides in-depth insight and more
clarification to aid the commission's work.
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On
the other hand, our efforts at fighting terrorism will come to naught without
the support of our allies around the globe including our friends in Africa. One
such friend is Kenya. For me personally, I have followed with keen interest the
loyalty of Kenya to the cause of the United States. Kenya has stood by and with
us to fight the global menace of terrorism. Kenya has been the leader in
regional conflict resolution efforts in Somalia and the Sudan. Kenya's support
has been invaluable on many fronts to the extent of losing many of her sons and
daughters in the 1998 bombing of our embassy in Nairobi and the 2002 Paradise
Hotel bombing in Mombasa.
And sadly because of
Kenya's location, Kenya continues to be a target, in part, because of our
presence there. Kenya has done much to thwart the efforts of terrorists. The new
government has passed an Anti-terrorism bill, formed an anti terrorist police
unit, and created a Task-Force on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism. Kenya has repeatedly called for assistance in helping to
develop a viable government in Somalia.
Even so,
more is needed to strengthen security, immigration, and port services that allow
for terrorists to enter and operate within Kenya. And because ours and other
travel bans have weakened Kenya's tourist industry and overall economy, Kenya
cannot do this alone, even with all of its good
will.
Much has been made about our $100 million
contribution to fighting terror in the region. For Kenya this means a little
over $1 million, compared to a $4.2 million contribution for Pakistan. And this
trend persists as we look ahead. While requests for 2005 for Kenya are at $4
million, for Pakistan they are at $8 million.
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It
seems to me that we are not really serious about fighting terrorism in Africa
much less Kenya. Kenyans share our suffering. They too have been struck by
Al-Qaeda and the potential for terror to strike again in Kenya remains a real
threat. Our largest embassy in Africa is there. Yet, our aid to Kenya is simply
not enough. Families of loved ones who did not survive the 1998 bombings are
still awaiting compensation. We need to do more to assist the Kenyan families of
survivors.
We need to move our cooperation with
Kenya from the level of words to deeds if we want to see results. Now is the
time to do this as Kenyan's decide their Constitution and how their democracy
will move forward. I know that a strong relationship with a democracy like ours
can only strengthen Kenya's resolve to move in this direction. Kenya deserves
America's support and indeed the support of the international community to make
it a model worthy of emulation in the entire
region.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE BARBARA LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Chairman Royce, Ranking member Payne,
thank you for convening this hearing on Terrorism in
Africa.
It is very important that we approach the
issue of terrorism with a comprehensive and thoughtful strategy that also
addresses its root causes. We need a strategy that looks beyond building
military bases and air strips, and addresses poverty reduction, development, aid
and trade.
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In
the written testimony of our witnesses, it is implied that many of Africa's vast
and remote areas are governed by weak and insecure governments that are
potential breeding grounds for terror groups.
I
argue that if Africa has vast and under-developed land, weak governments and
security services, it should be our charge as the leaders of the free world to
invest in the people, their land, and their governments. Desperate people do
desperate things.
This hearing is necessary and
welcome. As a proponent of peace and development as the great weapon against
terror, I am particularly interested in hearing from Africans on this
issue.
In supporting a global war against terror,
African governments and particularly victims of terror acts should be
compensated fully as partners in the US war against terror as the ranking member
mentioned in his opening statement.
Never again
should we have victims who are not humanely treated and compensated as we did in
1998's bombings of the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy
bombings.
Those victims still deserve
compensation.
In closing it is my hope that the
United States looks not only at building bases, but moreover we should look at
building bridges.
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Bridges
for development, growth, and global respect and mutual
trust.
Thank you for this hearing and I look
forward to your testimony and the
dialogue.
(Footnote
1 return)
Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial
Network of Terror, Broadway Books, New York (to be published May 4,
2004)
(Footnote
2 return)
Al-Sharq al-Awsat website, Nov. 30, 2003.
(Footnote
3 return)
Farah, Blood From Stones, op cit, pp.
64–65.
(Footnote
4 return)
Ibid
(Footnote
5 return)
Matt Levitt, ''Hizbullah's African Activities Remain
Undisrupted,'' RUSI/Janes Homeland Security Monitor, March 1, 2004.
For a fuller discussion of the Lebanese connection, including that of Hezbollah
and the Amal militia, please see: Lansana Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra
Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection, The Diamond and
Human Security Project, Occasional Paper 6, January 2003.
(Footnote
6 return)
Todd Pittman, ''U.S.: Al Qaeda may be looking to Africa,''
Associated Press, March 6, 2004.