PART TWO The town of Gorazde was another Bosniak Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia that the UN had proclaimed a "safe area." At the time, Bosnian Serb forces were threatening to take Gorazde. "For the Dutch, the meeting represented an informal occasion, not a binding agreement. What was important in our view is that this meeting had negative consequences as it gave the Muslims an illusion that they would be protected, but that was not so. According to our findings, Naser Oric, who was the main leader in Srebrenica, and who was already outside the enclave, probably in Tuzla, was informed about the results of the meeting. He was skeptical ... The IKV has attached too much importance to this meeting," Blom said. The NIOD report pays a great deal of attention to the role of General Mladic. He is presented as the man most responsible for the massacre, although the report makes clear that no written documents related directly to Mladic's role were found. The report states that Bonian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic ordered the Bosnian Serb Army to cut the corridor linking Srebrenica and the nearby enclave of Zepa. It is unclear, according to the report, whether Karadzic knew in advance that mass killings of Bosniak Muslim men and boys would take place after the Serb army took Srebrenica. "We only say that we did not find any evidence that Karadzic knew about the massacre, but we can also say that there is no evidence that Karadzic didn't know. We nevertheless believe that the former is the case, given that the relations between Karadzic and Mladic were very tense. They quarreled all the time and communication between them was difficult. But after everything became known, Karadzic didn't care at all what had happened to the Muslims," Blom told TOL. Many were surprised by the NIOD's conclusion that the massacre was not planned in advance. "The plan for the offensive on Srebrenica was drafted on 2 July and the action itself started on 6 July. The aim of the attack was not to take Srebrenica, but to cut the corridor Srebrenica-Zepa and to downsize the territory of the safe area," Blom said. The first attack was successful, and given that the resistance of the Bosniak Muslim forces in Srebrenica was weak, Mladic decided on 9 July to go further and see if he could occupy the whole enclave. Two days later, Mladic and his troops entered Srebrenica. The NIOD researchers concluded that the 28th Division of the ABiH, which defended Srebrenica, was in bad shape as many fighters and able men left the town prior to the attack. The rest of the population found shelter in Potocari near Srebrenica, in the Dutch battalion camp. The IKV research also concluded that the massacre was not planned in advance. "After Srebrenica was taken by the Serbs, Mladic proposed on 11 July to Karremans that the UN organize the transportation of 25,000 Muslims, both men and women, from Srebrenica to Tuzla. Karremans immediately went to Sarajevo, where he presented Mladic's proposal to the UN General Cees Nikolai. High-ranking officers in the Dutch Defense Ministry were informed about this. The UN was late and they didn't give an answer. That's how the opportunity was missed to transport safely most people to Tuzla," states the IKV report. The NIOD findings confirm parts of this account. "Mladic was really proposing in the beginning that the UN organize the transport of Muslims to Tuzla. However, a few hours after Srebrenica fell, there was an unpleasant surprise for both Mladic and the Dutch troops. Namely, groups of Muslim men, contrary to the agreement, fled Srebrenica to nearby forests, trying to reach Tuzla. This infuriated Mladic, because it caused a logistical problem for him in the northern part of the frontline, just at the time when he was planning to mount an offensive against Zepa," Professor Blom said. It was exactly then, in the evening of 11 July and on 12 July, that Mladic decided to deal brutally with the Muslims, according to Blom. "It is believed that in the forests around Srebrenica some 1,500 Muslims were killed, while more than 4,000 were captured and later killed. Besides, Mladic allowed the Serbs from nearby places to come to Srebrenica and kill the Muslims. It was classic revenge. Between 100 and 400 Muslims were killed in this way, not at random--concrete people were sought. This was all happening right near the Dutch camp," Blom said. The Dutch soldiers could not see the massacre, but surely they must have heard the shooting. Both Blom and van den Berg agree that the soldiers heard the gunshots, but couldn't see anything because this particular part of the massacre took place at night. "Karremans did not allow the troops to leave the camp and see what was going on. That's how it was, not only then, but also before that whenever there was an incident," van den Berg explained. Although the NIOD report concludes that the massacre was not planned in advance, it also makes clear that everything was done in a rather systematic way after the decision to kill the Muslims was taken. Execution sites were found, the Muslim men and boys were transported there, and troops to carry out killings were quickly organized. In the last six years, the Dutch public has been most disturbed by allegations that the Dutch soldiers took part in separating Bosniak Muslim men and boys from the rest of the population. When Professor Blom said, at the presentation of the NIOD report, that he had concluded this was not the case, a group of Srebrenica women in attendance walked out in protest. END OF PART TWO |