New York University

 

 

 

 

 

 

Not Peacekeeping Alone:

UN Peacekeeping Operations and

The Organizational Effectiveness of the United Nations

 

 

 

 

 

for

 

 

 

 

Professor Ahmad Kamal

The United Nations and International Organizations

 

 

 

by

 

 

 

Michiru Sugi

 

Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service

New York University

 

 

 

 

November 25, 2002


 

 

Table of Contents

 

 

 

 

I.  Introduction….. 1

 

 

 

 

II.  Facts….. 1

 

Overview….. 1

 

Peacekeeping Costs….. 2

 

Changes in the Environment….. 3

 

Recent Failures….. 4

 

Addressing Issues….. 6

 

 

 

 

III.  Analysis….. 7

 

Underlying Issues….. 8

 

Resolutions……. 10

 

 

 

IV.              Conclusion….. 12

 

 

 

Appendix A….. 13

 


 

I.       Introduction

 

The World War II caused devastation, and the world was torn by anarchy and ravaged by the excesses of aggressive, self-centered national states. [1] It was at the end of this war when the United Nations was conceived. The world leaders saw that maintaining international peace and security should be the first and foremost raison d’tre of the United Nations and included their declaration in the preamble of the United Nations Charter: “We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”[2] Therefore, this mission is the measure with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. However, over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet this challenge and must become more effective. It must review its current peacekeeping operations and reconsider how it should pursue its mission of ensuring world peace and security. This paper intends to assess the current UN peacekeeping operations, the environmental changes surrounding the Organization, challenges facing the United Nations, and the measures taken by the organization to address these challenges. Through these assessments, recommendations as to how the United Nations should pursue its mission will be presented.

 

II.    Facts

 

In this section, some facts that relate to the United Nation’s peacekeeping operations are listed in five major segments as follows: (1) overview, (2) costs, (3) changes in the environment, (4) failures, and (5) practices to address issues.

 

Overview

The United Nations was conceived as a result of the World War II, which caused significant devastation to humankind.[3] That is why maintaining international peace and security is deemed the most important function of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations says, the Organization was founded “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.[4] In order to meet this challenge, the United Nations states in Chapter 1 that it attempts to take “collective measures to take control of the international violence “by peaceful means.[5] The United Nations invented “peacekeeping” as its unique way to approach the challenge. Peacekeeping is a technique, pioneered and developed by the UN, which is placed between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation and fact-finding (Chapter VI) and more forceful action, such as embargos and military intervention (Chapter VII). Peacekeeping involves the deployment of primarily military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, to help control and resolve armed conflict between hostile parties. Since 1948, there have been about 50 United Nations peacekeeping operations, and there are currently 15 operations in the field.[6] As of September 2002, more than 1,700 military and civilian peacekeepers have died while serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations.[7] (Appendix A)

 

Peacekeeping Costs

Peacekeeping is an expensive function. The Security Council manages the peacekeeping budget, and the approved budget during the period of July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003 is about 2.6 billion, which is almost twice as much as the UN regular budget.[8] Annual cost of UN peacekeeping personnel and equipment peaked at $3.6 billion in 1993, reflecting the expense of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.[9] Peacekeeping costs fell in 1996 and 1997, to $1.4 billion and some $1.3 billion, respectively, and by 1998, costs had dropped to just under $1 billion.[10] With the resurgence of larger-scale operations, costs for UN peacekeeping have resurged since 1999. All Member States are obligated to pay their share of peacekeeping costs under a formula that they themselves have agreed upon.

 

Financial feasibility of peacekeeping is an ongoing challenge. Member States owed $2.1 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues as of October 31, 2000.[11] The finance has been in large part “a political problem resulting from disagreement over the establishment, control, and functioning of peacekeeping operations.”[12]

 

Other resources that are critical to peacekeeping operations include personnel. Members States, in response to a request from the Secretary-General, may volunteer personnel, equipment, supplies or other support for a peacekeeping mission. Countries providing these essential elements are reimbursed from the mission budget at agreed rates.[13]

 

Changes in the Environment

One of the primary reasons behind the development of UN peacekeeping was the Cold War[14]. During the Cold War era, the superpowers had an interest in bringing proxy wars to an end before they were themselves dragged into direct confrontation. Thus, peacekeeping tended to be limited to preserving an agreed cease-fire between opposing national armed forces. In the late 1980s, the scope, size and number of UN peacekeeping operations dramatically increased: of the 49 UN operations deployed between 1948 and 1998, 36 were deployed after 1988.[15] The United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland describes the transition, which peacekeeping operations have experienced:

 

“The new era of international co-operation that resulted from the end of the Cold War encouraged agreement in the Security Council over the sanctioning of collective security action. Thus, the UN was now to authorize peacekeeping operations in a broader set of circumstances, including in internal crises where consent is less well defined. Also, there was wider scope as to the functions that new operations could perform. The resulting multidimensional peacekeeping operations can incorporate elements of peace-making, peace-building, and preventive diplomacy. The broader mandates of multidimensional operations can involve a very wide variety of tasks, including: electoral support; humanitarian assistance; observation, and/or verification of cease-fire arrangements; preventative deployments; the demobilization of forces; and development initiatives.”[16]

 

Another major change in the nature of conflicts was a proliferation of civil wars and other armed conflicts within States, which threaten international peace and security and cause massive human suffering. Peacekeeping was initially developed to deal more with inter-State conflict, but it has been increasingly applied to intra-State conflicts in recent years. Of the thirty-five missions authorized from 1988 through 1998, only five were sent to deal with exclusively interstate conflict”[17].

 

Recent Failures

Over the last decade, the United Nations peacekeeping operations have experienced three devastating failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. The profiles of each mission are as follows:

 

Bosnia: The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed from February 1992 to March 1995. Initially it was established in Croatia to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. In September 1992, UNPROFOR’s mandate was enlarged to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR included approximately 38,600 military personnel, including 684 United Nations military observers; and the Force also included 803 civilian police, 2,017 other international civilian staff and 2,615 local staff. Fatalities in this mission were high relative to other missions, and it marked 211.[18] During the course of the peacekeeping mission in 1995, more than 300 UNPROFOR troops were seized by the Serbs and declared prisoners of war.[19] This situation, in addition to the fact that this mission took a considerable number of casualties, forced the Security Council to consider withdrawing the troops before more personnels were killed.[20]

 

Somalia: The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II was established in March 1993 to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia. UNOSOMII included approximately 28,000 military personnel and some 2,800 civilian staff.[21] Supporting UNOSOM II in the field, but not part of it, were approximately 18,000 troops of the United States Joint Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia.[22] After compliance was gained from the warring parties, the United Nations expanded UNOSOM II mission primarily to disarm the different militias. Resenting the UNOSOM measures, Somali leaders killed twenty-three members of the UN force.[23] Also, a small contingent of Americans from the UNITAF force was killed.[24] Fatalities totaled 147.[25]

 

Rwanda: The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed from October 1993 to March 1996. Fatalities in the UN mission totaled 27.[26] From April to July 1994, between 500,000 and 800,000 Rwandese, mainly of the Tutsi ethnic group, were massacred in Rwanda.[27] Despite the Secretary-General’s request for troops, Member States hesitated to contribute personnel to the area that was experiencing a catastrophe. Thus, massacres in Rwanda “went on unabated and UNAMIR was paralyzed by a lack of capacity to respond.”[28] UNAMIR’s strength at withdrawal marked 1,252 troops and military support personnel 146 military observers; there were also approximately 160 international and 160 local civilian staff and 56 UN volunteers.[29]

 

Addressing Issues

The United Nations has been well aware of the ineffectiveness of its peacekeeping operations. Over the last decade, two remarkable documents, called “An Agenda for Peace” and “The Brahimi Report” respectively, were introduced in an effort to assess and improve the peacekeeping operations.

 

In 1992, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced “An Agenda for Peace”, which provided analysis and recommendations on ways to strengthen and improve the United Nation’s capacity to maintain world peace. In addition to the three conventional measures in maintaining world peace -- preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping -- Boutros-Ghali raised the importance of the fourth phase, post-conflict peace-building.[30] In his words, preventive diplomacy “seeks to resolve disputes before violence break out”, and peacemaking and peace-keeping are “required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained.”[31] He defined post-conflict peace-building as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”[32] He envisioned that post-conflict peace-building “may take the form of concrete cooperative projects…that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace.”[33] He also foresaw those peace-building efforts to include projects that bring States together, such as collaboratively developing agriculture, improving transportation, promoting cultural exchanges and educational projects.[34]

 

Nearly ten years after “An Agenda for Peace”, at the wake of series of peacekeeping failures, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to research on the UN missions and make necessary recommendations. The result of the study, so-called the Brahimi Report, was released in August 2000. The report’s recommendations included clearer and stronger mandates, proper planning for operations to include peace-building strategies, greater professionalism and sufficient funding and staffing for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It also recognized the importance of peace-building in “[assisting] communities and nations in making the transition from war to peace.”[35] It recommended that the United Nations “[strengthen] the permanent capacity…to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.”[36]In addition, it suggested that the Headquarters support for peacekeeping “should be funded through the regular budget of the Organization” as opposed to the traditional practice of funding it through the Support Account.[37] General Assembly’s implementing the Brahimi Panel’s recommendations placed peacekeeping in a privileged position, whereas equally important areas, including development, had not received similar increases in terms of financial resources and were being called upon to do more with less.[38]

 

III.    Analysis

 

As discussed in the previous section, the UN peacekeeping operations are facing challenges. In order to address them, the Organization is currently making effort to implement the recommendations presented in the Brahimi Report, which indicated how the United Nations can improve its peacekeeping operations. The United Nations, however, must ask itself a fundamental question before the full implementation of the Brahimi Panel’s recommendations: whether peacekeeping operations alone can truly help the Organization achieve its ultimate purpose – maintenance of peace and security. The current exercise to implement the Brahimi Panel’s recommendations is placing peacekeeping in a privileged position relative to other equally important areas, including development. The United Nations should question whether they are doing the right thing by focusing its resources on peacekeeping operations. The following section examines the underlying issues that hinder the peacekeeping operations and how to address those issues. By examining the issues and resolution, this paper intends to suggest how the United Nations can become more effective in achieving its mission.

 

Underlying Issues

Although the Brahimi Report presented some constructive recommendations for improving peacekeeping operations, its discussion focused primarily on how the United Nations can effectively operate peacekeeping missions rather than how the United Nations can effectively achieve its mission – maintenance of world peace and security. There are underlying issues that must be addressed so that the United Nations can be more effective in pursuing its mission. These issues include: (1) the fact that peacekeeping is reactive; (2) a lack of political will; and (3) the fact that peacekeeping is a short-term solution, and (4) depressed budget. Detailed discussions on these issues follow:

 

Peacekeeping is reactive and limiting: UN peacekeeping missions are reactive and limiting in a sense that they are deployed to address existing, potential or emerging conflicts. Although peace-building is relatively proactive, it also has limitation because it cannot be effective unless conflicts are minimized.[39] Also, in an area where war and hatred already exist, post-conflict peace-building can sometimes be impossible. For example, the United Nations’ attempt to create a government for Somalia in 1993, after “gaining compliance from the warring parties,” faced strong opposition from Somali leaders who resented the United Nations and killed twenty-three members of the UN force.[40] Ultimately, the UN mission withdrew from Somalia without being able to successfully build peace.[41]

 

Lack of political will: A lack of political will has prevented the United Nations from effectively operating peacekeeping missions. When Member States are faced with the risk of a catastrophe, the decision to deploy a peacekeeping mission is often delayed, which can cause tremendous destruction in conflicting areas. For example, the United Nations’ attempt to control the conflict in Rwanda in 1994 was “judged a failure” because “Member States showed little willingness to provide the necessary troops” despite the Secretary-General’s request.[42]  As a result, the UN mission was “paralyzed by a lack of capacity to respond”, and “massacres in Rwanda went on unabated.”[43] In addition, when serious fighting broke out in Bosnia, the Security Council was “reluctant to authorize [a] large, expensive peacekeeping force.”[44] It was not until the countries supplying troops (primarily Britain, France, Italy and Canada) agreed to pay the additional costs that the UN mission in the area was expanded to accommodate the need.

 

Peacekeeping is a short-term solution: Peacekeeping is only a short-term solution for a problem though a long-term solution is needed in order for peaceful condition to sustain. For example, the security situation in Sierra Leone did not improve in spite of continuous peacekeeping efforts made by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) along with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Although the parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 1996 and it appeared as if an agreement was reached between rival factions, high-ranking army officers led a coup d’etat against the government in 1997.  Efforts to restore law and order and stabilize the situation in Sierra Leone are still being made as of November 2002.[45]

 

Depressed budget: As discussed earlier, peacekeeping operations are expensive, and the financial status remains a significant challenge with Member States owing $2.1 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues as of October 2000.[46] Since the Brahimi Report proposed that the Headquarters support for peacekeeping be funded through the regular budget, instead of the Support Account[47], funding for other meaningful functions of the Organization, such as the social and economic development is experiencing a negative impact. American Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke said: “The United States will support an expansion of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Some of this will cost money and we are going to look for savings elsewhere in the [UN] system.”[48] In fact, the United Nations issued a press release on October 31, 2001 titled, “Allocation of Significant Resources Testifies to Importance o UN Peacekeeping.” It states, “Equally important areas, including development, had not received similar increases [in terms of financial resources] and were being called upon to do more with less.[49]

 

Resolutions

The four underlying issues discussed in the previous section prevent the United Nations from effectively pursuing its mission of maintaining peace and security. However, the United Nations is not addressing them fully upon making efforts for improvement. Their current practices for improvement are primarily to implement the recommendations made in the Brahimi Report; however, the report only presents technical or operational solutions to the existing problem. The issues such as the lack of political will among Member States are not effectively addressed in the Brahimi Report. Rather, the report pleas to Member States: “[The] changes that the Panel recommends will have no lasting impact unless Member States summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace.”[50] Thus the lack of political will not only remains as a hindrance to the effectiveness of the United Nations but also can prevent the Organization from successfully implementing the measures presented by the Brahimi Report. The United Nations must seek other means to resolve these underlying issues. Two suggested resolutions are presented as follows:

 

Place more emphasis on social and economic development: The United Nations should place more emphasis on its economic and social development programs because they can serve as more long-term and proactive solutions and they can foster “conditions of stability and well-being, [51] which are critical for peace to sustain. Efforts to maintain world peace and security should be made regardless of existing conflicts; thus the United Nations should take advantage of its economic and social development programs as peace-building endeavors. The post-conflict peace-building efforts have proven to be challenging because, in warring areas, there are seldom “conditions of stability and well-being. The ideas introduced in “An Agenda for Peace” such as fostering cooperation, mutual understanding, a healthier environment, and promoting peaceful means to resolve conflicts should be pursued as part of the economic and social development on an ongoing basis, rather than peacekeeping missions. It must be noted, however, that the ongoing peace-building missions should also be continued because such measures can also hold promise, despite a limit to building peace in already conflicting areas. It is said that Japan’s post-World War II boom was due in large part to the policies implemented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to establish a democratic self-government, to develop a legal system which will protect individual and civil rights, to reform the educational system, and provide financial support for economic and industrial reforms. Japan’s prosperity was made possible because these policies helped secure the “conditions of stability and well-being”, and today, the country is regarded as one of the safest in the world. Although the current matters in the world cannot be simply compared to what happened in Japan about half a century ago, this example can be an indication that economic and social developments, such as good governance, reliable justice system, and technical and financial assistance are necessary foundations in order for a state to foster and sustain peaceful conditions.

 

Cooperate with Other Organizations: Due to the depressed budget and a lack of political will, which hinder the United Nations to effectively response to international conflicts, there is an increasing need for the UN to cooperate with other organizations, such as NATO, as well as other regional and local organizations. One of the primary reasons for the lack of political will is because some peacekeeping operations are “not of strategic interest” to some Member States. It is said that the failure in the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was due in large part to Member States’ “lack of political will”. When they did not see the “strategic interest” in the activity and “faced with the risk of a catastrophe”, they became ineffective in responding to the situation.[52] Regional or local organizations, which have vested interest in securing peaceful conditions in their areas would have responded to the situation differently. In some cases, the lack of political will makes it inevitable for other organizations to be involved. For example, when China cast a veto in the Security Council for the extension of peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, NATO had to take over the peacekeeping operations and attempt to pacify the area. Unless the United Nations can secure the will of its Member States, it will have to seek assistance from outside organizations in case a similar incident, as the one in Macedonia, happens in the future. In addition, cooperation with other organization will help the United Nations save the costs of peacekeeping operations. Another benefit of cooperation is the fact that the regional and local organizations can play an integral role in UN’s building the “conditions of stability and well-being” because sustainable developments and outcomes can only be achieved if the United Nations involves local and regional actors. The mission in East Timor has been considered successful because it involved local players in building the capacity for local governance, effectively utilizing their knowledge and experience.

 

IV.     Conclusion

 

It is unquestionable that the global peace and security is important, and the UN peacekeeping efforts are essential. However, the current trend within the United Nations to place a greater emphasis on peacekeeping, in terms of personnel, operations and financial resources, should be reviewed and reconsidered because there is a question whether the peacekeeping operations alone are really effective in maintaining world peace and security. The United Nations is currently making efforts to improve its effectiveness and trying to implement the recommendations made by the Brahimi Panel. However, the Organization should pay more attention to underlying issues, such as the fact that peacekeeping is reactive, that it mainly provides only the short-term solutions, the lack of political will and depressed budget. Upon addressing these underlying issues, it should become clear that the United Nations should not rely solely on peacekeeping operations to become effective as an organization. Instead, it should also place emphasis on economic and social development which helps to foster and sustain peaceful conditions in the world.

 

 



[1] Ziring, Lawrence, et.al. “The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics.” pp1. 3rd ed. Thomson Learning, Inc. 2002.

[2] The Charter of the United Nations. Preamble.

[3] Ziring. pp1.

[4] The Charter of the United Nations. Preamble.

[5] The Charter of the United Nations. Article 1. Collective measures are taken by peaceful means, except for conditions stated in Articles 42 and 51 of the Chapter VII, which approve of the use of force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

[6] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). “Peacekeeping Operations Since 1948.” <www.un.org/dpko>.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ziring. pp 200.

[13]DPKO.

[14] The United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. “United Nations Peacekeeping.” <www.una-uk.org>. November 2002.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ziring. pp195.

[18] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type: As of 31 October 2002. www.un.org/dpko.

[19] Ziring. pp191.

[20] Ibid.

[21] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “The United Nations Operation in Somalia II.” <www.un.org/dpko.>

[22] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UNOSOM II profile. <www.un.org/dpko.>

[23] Ziring. pp 194.

[24] Ibid.

[25] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UNOSOM II profile. <www.un.org/dpko.>

[26] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. UNAMIR profile. <www.un.org/dpko.>

[27] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. “Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). <www.un.org/dpko.>

[28] Ziring. pp196.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Boutros Boutros-Ghali. “An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992.” June 2002. <www.un.org/Docs/agpeace.html>. November 13, 2002.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] “Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.” August 2000. <www.un.org/peace.reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm>. November 1, 2002

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] The United Nations. “Allocation of Significant Resources Testifies to Importance o UN Peacekeeping.” October 31, 2001. <www.un.org/dpko.>

[39] International Peace Academy. “Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations.” March 2001. <www.ipacademy.org>.

[40] Ziring. pp 194.

[41] Ziring. pp 195.

[42] Ziring. pp196.

[43] Ziring. pp196.

[44] Ziring. pp191.

[45] DPKO.UNAMSIL Background.

[46] DPKO.

[47] “Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.” August 2000. <www.un.org/peace.reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm>. November 1, 2002

[48] The Defense Associations National Network. “National Network News.” Winter 2000. <www.sfu.ca/~dann/Backissues/nn7-3_6.htm>.

[49] The United Nations. “Allocation of Significant Resources Testifies to Importance o UN Peacekeeping.” October 31, 2001. <www.un.org/dpko.>

[50] The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. “The Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.” <www.un.org>,

[51] The Charter of the United Nations. Article 55.

[52] Ziring. pp196.

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